Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How To Neck Down Without Choking
AUTHOR Major Benny L. Adams, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Artillery
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. Title: Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How to
Neck Down Without Choking.
II. Thesis: Even though there is no precedent to help us
deal with necking down of aviation assets, we must consider
alternatives to traditional squadron organization or face
problems with availability and maintenance of equipment,
availability and training of maintenance personnel, and
training and proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission
units.
III. Discussion: Marine Corps plans call for a "necking
down," or reduction in the number of different types of
aircraft we operate into the year 2000 and beyond. The first
community to deal with this new phenomenon will be the
F/A-18D squadrons. The F/A-18D is replacing the A-6E and
will eventually provide all-weather attack, reconnaissance,
Supporting Arms coordinator Airborne (SAC(A)), and fighter
capabilities. If we organize these multimission squadrons as
currently envisioned, with six identical squadrons, three on
each coast, problems will arise in equipment maintenance and
availability, maintenance personnel training and
availability, and aircrew training and proficiency. Problems
with equipment will stem mainly from parcelling out limited
reconnaissance sensor suites to six separate organizations
where they will be handled extensively and replacements will
be limited or not available. Maintenance personnel problems
originate with the attempt to man day and night crews in all
specialty areas in six squadrons. Training all aircrew to
proficiency in all of the varied missions is virtually
impossible. Alternatives include designation of rotating
duty squadrons for particular missions, specialization within
the squadron, and squadron specialization.
IV. Summary: Designating one F/A-18D squadron on each coast
to specialize in the reconnaissance/SAC(A) mission while the
others perform the attack/fighter role appears to best
resolve the potential problems of this multimission
community.
V. Conclusion: The Marine corps should organize its F/A-18D
community based on a squadron specialization model vice
traditional methods in order to overcome equipment,
maintenance, and aircrew problems inherent to the
multimission role.
Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How to
Neck Down Without Choking
OUTLINE
Thesis: Even though there is no precedent to help us deal
with necking down of aviation assets, we must
consider alternatives to traditional squadron
organization or face problems with availability and
maintenance of equipment, availability and training
of maintenance personnel, and training and
proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission units.
I. Necking down
A. Inevitable
B. Unprecedented
II. The multimission F/A-18D
A. Missions assigned
1. Attack
2. Reconnaissance
3. Supporting Arms Coordinator Airborne (SAC(A))
4. Fighter
B. Planned squadron organization
III. Problems with planned organization
A. Equipment
B. Maintenance personnel
C. Aircrew
1. Training
2. Proficiency
IV. Alternatives to planned organization
A. Rotating duty squadrons
B. Squadron internal specialization
C. Squadron specialization
V. The future
A. Status duo
B. Innovation
Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How to
Neck Down Without Choking
During a presentation at the Command and Staff college
on March 15th, 1991, LtGen D. A. Wills, Marine Corps Deputy
Chief of Staff for Aviation indicated that the future for
Marine Aviation into the year 2000 and beyond would include
considerable "necking down". That is, a steady decline in
the variety of aircraft which the Marines will own and
operate. Replacing these many varied types of aircraft will
be a handful of types, each with the capability to perform
several different missions. An important consideration here
is that there will be no decrease in the number or type of
missions assigned to Marine Air. Regardless of the number of
different types of aircraft the wing of the future possesses,
it will still be called upon to perform reconnaissance,
anti-air warfare, assault support, offensive air support,
electronic warfare and control of aircraft and missiles (the
six functions of Marine Air. (8:5-8)
Necking down is inevitable. When considering that over
50 percent of the FY 90 Marine Corps budget went towards
aviation, to operate, maintain, and support more than a dozen
different models of aircraft, it becomes readily apparent
that in these times of budget and personnel cuts, we can no
longer afford to operate so diverse an air force. It seems
intuitively obvious that eliminating an aircraft type will
reduce costs. The danger here is that a bigger dose of a
good medicine is not always better and is sometimes fatal.
There is a point of diminishing returns, or culminating
point, if you will, where the unique costs associated with
necking down equal or outweigh the savings. Although we'll
discuss some of these costs later, as they apply to the
F/A-18D program, clearly Marine Aviation has a long way to go
before it reaches this culminating point. The discussion,
therefore, should center not on whether or not we should
reduce the number of different types of aircraft we operate,
but rather how to deal with some of the changes we know are
coming.
When first considering this problem, as an aviator, I
naturally began to search for "the gouge". The gouge is a
common term in the wing, as in "you live and die by the
gouge" or "check with the OpsO, he's got the gouge". In
simple terms, the gouge is the bottom line. Dont give me a
lot of extraneous information, Just tell me how the last guy
(who was successful) did it. Unfortunately, when it comes to
necking down of aviation assets, there is no gouge. We've
never done it. Consider the post war periods of our history.
During 1920, when our armed forces were suffering through
emasculation following the "war to end all wars", seven new
models of aircraft entered service with the Marine Corps.
(6:6) In 1921, four new models entered service and in 1922,
five more were added. (6:6-7) When armed forces manpower
plummeted again following World War II, the Marines received
18 new models of aircraft in 1945, 19 new models in 1946, and
11 new models in 1947. (6:29-33) After the "forgotten war"
of Korea, the Marines added ten new models in 1954, seven
more in 1955 and 11 more in 1956. (6:41-44) As a matter of
fact, a review of aircraft flown by Marines from 1913 to the
present indicates a consistent diversity of aircraft being
maintained in an ever modernizing force. (1:3-41)
It may very well be, then, that the F/A-18D community
will be the first in the history of Marine Aviation to deal
with the problems inherent in necking down. This two seat
version of the F/A-18 Hornet is scheduled to replace Marine
A-6 squadrons by 1993. (7:56) In addition to the
night/all-weather mission of the A-6, the F/A-18D will assume
the tactical reconnaissance mission of the RF-4, the Tactical
Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC(A)) mission of the OV-10D, and
the Forward Air Controller Airborne (FAC(A)) mission of the
OA-4M. (Actually, both the OA-4 and OV-10 can perform as a TAC(A) or
FAC(A). In addition the OV-10 can act as a Supporting Arms
Coordinator Airborne (SAC(A)) by calling and adjusting
artillery and naval gunfire.)
We have, therefore, replaced four aircraft with
one multimission aircraft while maintaining all of our
previously held capabilities.
Two points are in order here before we continue with a
discussion of the missions assigned to the F/A-18D. First,
not all the capabilities planned for the F/A-18D are present
in the current model. For example, the radar must be
upgraded before it is all-weather capable and a sensor suite
must be procured to add the reconnaissance capability.
(4:23-24) I am assuming that these plans will be carried out
in time. Although the current lack of these capabilities is
a serious issue in itself, it is not considered here.
Second, although general capabilities may carry over, just
considering speed differentials between an OV-10 and an RF-4
will make it obvious that no single aircraft can exhibit all
the characteristics of both. For example, the F/A-18D can
perform the general TAC(A)/FAC(A) mission of the OV-10 -- but
the OV-10, due to its speed, also makes a good helicopter
escort. The F/A-18D probably would not.
Of all the missions assigned to the F/A-18D, it is
probably most suited to that of attack. The two-man crew
allows for management of the heavy workload required to
navigate, locate targets, avoid the ground and anti-aircraft
fire, and operate weapons systems while flying fast at night.
There are several skills involved in this mission which must
be learned, practiced, and performed regularly in order to
maintain proficiency. Bombs can be delivered during daylight
or at night, from high altitude or low, by visual means or by
radar, manually or by computer, and with or without laser
guidance. Each delivery method requires peculiar knowledge
and proficiency. Getting to and from a target may require
instrument navigation, night formation flight, low level
navigation, use of night vision goggles, night terrain
clearance flight, aerial refueling, and an instrument
recovery. Each of these skills again requires particular
knowledge and practice to remain proficient. If the F/A-18D
crew is to be nuclear weapons delivery qualified, as the A-8
crews were, this will require a complete syllabus of ground
instruction and flight evaluation of ingress and delivery
methods. Annual certification by graded check flight would
also have to be conducted for all nuclear certified crews.
This list of skills required to perform the attack
mission is certainly not a comprehensive one. It should make
it clear, however, that attempting to maintain proficiency in
the attack mission is a challenge to any squadron. East
Coast squadrons face the additional problem of not having a
live fire range available. In order to drop live ordnance,
these squadrons must deploy to the West Coast or overseas.
Another mission to be assumed by the F/A-18D is that of
reconnaissance. This will place more requirements on the
squadron for training and proficiency. Many basic skills
required for the attack mission, such as instrument flight
and aerial refueling, will obviously carry over to the
reconnaissance role. There are, however, many unique skills
that will have to be learned and practiced. Very high speed
low level flight and navigation as well as sensor operation
will be most important for the aircrew. Equipment handling
and repair will top the list for maintenance personnel.
In the F/A-18D community the combined FAC(A) and TAC(A)
missions are referred to as the Supporting Arms Coordinator
Airborne (SAC(A)) mission. Operating as a SAC(A) will not
require any new hardware, however, to be proficient at it
will require a pilot and Weapons Systems Operator (WSO) with
extensive knowledge of the Marine Aviation Command and
Control System (MACCS) as well as a well rehearsed game plan
for crew coordination.
The final mission assigned to F/A-18D squadrons is the
fighter mission. Crews will have to be proficient in
operating air-to-air radar, running intercepts, employing
air-to-air weapons, and employing aerial combat tactics as a
single fighter or as a member of a larger formation. Also
inherent in this mission is the necessity of thoroughly
understanding the escort role and escort tactics. In order
to be proficient crews must also study aircraft and tactics
of threat nations.
I hope by now it has become evident that we really need
to put some thought into how we plan to organize, equip, and
train a truly multimission aviation community. So far, the
plans call for business as usual. Six F/A-18D squadrons,
three on each coast, with identical organizations, equipment,
and training requirements. Even though there is no precedent
to help us deal with necking down of aviation assets, we must
consider alternatives to traditional squadron organization or
face problems with availability and maintenance of equipment.
availability and training of maintenance personnel, and
training and proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission
units
By equipment I mean principally the high value sensor
suite that will give the F/A-18D its reconnaissance
capability. Equally dividing these assets among the six
squadrons will create a maintenance nightmare and could
result in a lack of availability. Squadrons will not be able
to dedicate particular airframes to exclusively perform the
reconnaissance mission. That means that these sensitive
systems will have to be uploaded, downloaded, and transported
extensively. Every movement is a potential break, and with
only a few assets, the squadron may be unable to replace
them. Even with the tenderest of care, experience has shown
that uploading and downloading of equipment will result in
some failures. Most aviators have experienced the anxiety
that comes with waiting to see if the newly uploaded fuel pod
will really transfer its fuel. Most have also experienced
several that did not, due to damaged or improper connections
or some other malfunction that is just part of the game when
dealing with equipment that is not permanently installed. By
dividing our assets we increase the maintenance workload and
increase the probability that at some point we will not have
the operable equipment required to complete the mission.
Closely related to the equipment problem is the problem
of maintenance personnel. One of the big benefits of necking
down should be savings in personnel. By having six identical
squadrons, each required to perform every mission, our
potential personnel savings are drastically reduced.
Squadron maintenance departments operate 24 hours a day. At
a minimum, the department must have a day and night crew each
composed of enough competent maintainers to fix whatever
problem arises in a multitude of specialty areas. So for
each mission we add that requires a special maintenance
skill, we not only have to man that shop once, but twice.
Manning must also take into account normal and emergency
leave, detachments, and absences due to training. The
maintenance department required by a "do everything" F/A-18D
squadron will be huge, and we haven't even considered
detailed maintenance manning concerns such as Quality
Assurance Representatives (QARs) and Collateral Duty
inspectors (CDIs) required by maintenance instructions.
Aircrew training and proficiency have to rate high on
the list of concerns involved with multimission squadrons.
Aircrew training for each type of aircraft is governed by a
Training and Readiness (T&R) manual. This manual sets out a
building block approach to aircrew training and establishes a
minimum refly interval for currency. The actions necessary
to complete each syllabus flight are set out in the manual
and a number in the 100 to 600 series is assigned. Higher
numbered flights are more advanced and require that certain
specified lower numbered flights be current before a crew can
fly the advanced flight and receive the "tickie." It must be
noted that currency and proficiency are completely different
concepts. Currency simply refers to the refly interval,
anywhere from three months to six months, required by the T&R
manual. Proficiency concerns the crews competency level for
performing a particular mission. A crew who has not flown a
low level flight in five months might be current, but they
are certainly not proficient.
The T&R manual also assigns a Combat Readiness
Percentage (CRP) to each flight, usually .5 to 1.0 percent.
By adding the percentages of each flight for which the pilot
or WSO is current, you can determine that individuals CRP.
The squadron operations department is responsible for
managing aircrew training and uses CRP as an indicator of how
well their training program is working. An average CRP of
90% for any individual A-6, RF-4, OV-10 or OA-4M squadron
would be high. Consider the challenge then in training every
aircrewman in an F/A-18D squadron to be current in every one
of those missions -- and then remember that even if it were
possible to make them current, it would say nothing of
proficiency. There simply is no way to do it without
lowering standards and risking lives.
We know that necking down is inevitable and
unprecedented. We know that it will affect the F/A-18D
program in the near future and that the transition, if it
goes according to current plans, will be fraught with
potential problems. Lets now consider some alternatives
which might alleviate or at least reduce these problems.
One option is a system of rotating duty squadrons.
Although there is no precedent for necking down, we have had
the opportunity to experiment with multimission platforms.
Helicopters, and the CH-46's in particular, are a case in
point. (5:B-3,4) This community has had to deal with
missions ranging from low level night vision goggle (NVG)
flights to over ocean search and rescue (SAR). The way at
least one group handled this was to designate a particular
squadron as the primary NVG flyers for the quarter. Another
squadron might be designated as the primary SAR flyers for
the quarter. Assignments would rotate quarterly with each
period preceded by extensive aircrew training in the upcoming
duty mission.
Duty squadron assignments in an F/A-18D group might take
the form of one squadron designated for the reconnaissance
mission, one for night attack, and one for SAC(A)/fighter.
This might help eliminate the equipment problems if the
reconnaissance sensors were transferred in bulk to the new
duty reconnaissance squadron each quarter (or at the interval
selected by the group commander). Accountability might
become a problem, though, and there would be a spool-up time
required for the receiving squadron to upload the systems,
troubleshoot them, and get them working properly. Another
problem is that other aircraft systems which aren't exercised
tend to break. We might end up spending the majority of each
period trying to get the bombers and shooters up to speed
too.
This concept would not lessen the maintenance personnel
problem. You could not transfer the maintenance expertise
from squadron to squadron along with the sensors and
therefore the expertise would have to be resident in each
squadron. There would be no savings in manpower, in fact
there might be a loss as ordnancemen sit idle in the
reconnaissance squadron, fire controllers sit idle in the
SAG(A) squadron, etc.
Aircrew training and proficiency would certainly be high
in one particular area, but the flexibility of each squadron
would be limited. A new system of recording and tracking
CRP, to coincide with the rotating schedule, would have to be
devised. Although probably manageable from the aircrew
training aspect, the rotating duty squadron concept might
cause more problems than it solves in the equipment and
maintenance areas.
Another idea is specialization by aircrew within each
squadron. This obviously would not address the equipment and
maintenance concerns, but it might at least provide relief on
the aircrew side and could be accomplished independently by
each squadron. It would work similar to the previous
alternative except that groups of aviators within the
squadron, vice squadrons as a whole, would be designated to
perform duty missions. Currency and proficiency could again
be expected to remain at a high level in designated mission
areas and the same requirement to alter CRP measurement would
have to be addressed. This has the potential to become a
scheduling nightmare. Very little flexibility would be
afforded the operations department or the squadron commanding
officer. With the limited redressal of problems, and even
the limited benefit being questionable, the internal squadron
specialization is not a good idea.
My final proposal would be a permanent squadron
specialization. One squadron on each coast would be
designated the reconnaissance/SAC(A) squadron. The remaining
two squadrons on each coast would be all-weather
attack/fighter squadrons. I believe this option would most
adequately address the problem areas.
Equipment benefits are obvious. This plan would
concentrate high value reconnaissance assets at just two
points. Once a sensor suite was installed and working on an
aircraft it could remain there indefinitely. There would be
less handling of the reconnaissance systems and less chance
of malfunction. If a malfunction did occur, sufficient
assets would be on hand to continue with the mission. The
fighter/attack squadrons would exercise all aircraft systems
routinely and thus ensure improved reliability.
Maintenance personnel benefits are also obvious. Now
instead of needing 12 reconnaissance specialist maintenance
crews (day and night crew for each of six squadrons) you
would only need four. Likewise, for the fire control and
ordnance crews, the requirement would go from 12 to eight.
Total maintenance personnel needed would thus be decreased
and the utilization of those present in each squadron would
increase.
Aircrew training and proficiency would likewise benefit.
The range of missions that each pilot and WSO would have to
train for would be reduced to a manageable number. No
deviation would be required from standard CRP measurement
practices. With a decrease in missions and resultant
increase in proficiency would also come increased safety. The
aircrew would no longer have to be so overwhelmed that they
would be proficient in nothing and dangerous in everything.
Besides the benefits accrued in equipment availability,
maintenance personnel, and aircrew training and proficiency,
this plan has the added bonus of reestablishing a separate
aviation reconnaissance community. This community
disappeared from the Marine Corps when the last RF-4 was
retired. Having a separate community for reconnaissance does
several good things. It ensures that there is a well trained
and proficient reconnaissance capability within the Marine
Corps, it provides a vehicle for proposing needed changes and
upgrades of equipment, and it ensures the best possible
upkeep and usage of equipment on hand.
Marine Corps aviation is changing. Necking down will
bring many benefits as well as many challenges to be
overcome. If the challenges are not met with innovative
solutions, necking down may end up choking the usefulness out
of our aviation assets. Even though there is no clear
precedent that sheds light on how we should organize, equip,
and train future multimission capable units, to simply stick
with the status quo of several identically organized
squadrons will certainly result in problems with equipment
availability, maintenance personnel, and aircrew training and
proficiency. The F/A-18D transition program provides us an
opportune time to think about and try some alternatives. For
this particular community, specialization by squadron as
described earlier seems to afford the greatest benefit.
Let's reestablish the reconnaissance community, enhance the
availability and reliability of our equipment, realize the
full effect of expected personnel savings, and produce well
trained, proficient, and safe aircrew. We can do it now with
the F/A-18D program.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Condon, John P., MGen, USMC(Ret). Diamond Anniversary 75th Year of
Naval Aviation. V: UPS Marine Corps Aviation. Ed John M. Elliott.
Washington: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare).
2. Donahue, Paul F., Maj, USMC. "The F/A-18D for the A-6E: A Good Deal
That Warrants a Closer Looks" Marine Corps Gazette, 73 (July 1989), 26-27.
3. Gevock, James R., LtCol, USMC. "Capability for the Future or Longing
for the Past?" Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (May 1990), 68-69.
4. Krupp, Dennis T., LtCol, USMC, and Rash, David J., Maj, USMC. "F/A-18D
Hornet: Strike Fighter for the Future." Marine Corps Gazette, 73
July 1989), 22-25.
5. Lively, Charles M., LtCol, USMC. Feasibility of Permanently Organizing
Marine Helicopter Squadrons as Composite Squadrons. Quantico: Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, 1974.
6. Marine Cords Aircraft 1913-1965 Washington: Historical Branch,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1967.
7. Pitman, C. H., LtGen, USMC. "Aviation Posture Statements" Marine Corps
Gazette,74 (May 1990), 53-57.
8. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine
Aviation. FMFM 5-1 Quantico, 1979.
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