A Marine Component Commander For Unified Commands
AUTHOR Major Raymond H. Young, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Operations
-TEXT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: A MARINE COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR UNIFIED COMMANDS
THESIS STATEMENT: Joint doctrine needs to be revised to explicitly
establish a Marine component commander in each of the geographic unified
commands, because misinterpretation of the present doctrine has created a
system which fails to recognize the Marine Corps as a separate service with
unique characteristics and does not serve the needs of the commander.
ISSUE: Currently there is no Marine component commander in the
geographic unified commands. This paper addresses the reasons for this,
contends that it is wrong, and recommends corrective action. Beginning
with a historical overview of the USMC as a separate service, the paper then
discusses the present unified command and control system. The duties and
responsibilities of Service component commanders are discussed along with
possible reasons why the absence of a Marine representative at the unified
command level has been perpetuated. The fact that the CINCs do have the
power to organize any way they may choose is covered in detail. Finally,
several major problems with the current system are identified.
CONCLUSION: The present organization of the geographic unified commands
must be changed to reflect the reality of the USMC as a separate service.
The reasoning for this has nothing to do with Service parochialism. The key
factor is that the unified CINCs are not receiving the kind of input necessary
to make informed decisions regarding the employment of Marine forces.
RECOMMENDATION: The JCS needs to revise current doctrine and remove
the possibility of misinterpretation by the CINCs. They should direct the
establishment of Marine component commanders within all unified
commands. This would ensure that each CINC's organization and the joint
command and control system as a whole are more efficient and effective.
A MARINE COMPONENT COMMANDER IN UNIFIED COMMANDS
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. Joint doctrine needs to be revised to explicitly
establish a Marine component commander in each of the geographic unified
commands, because misinterpretation of the present doctrine has created a
system which fails to recognize the Marine Corps as a separate service with
unique characteristics and does not serve the needs of the commander.
I. Historical Background
A. USMC as a separate service
B. CMC's relationship to the JCS
II. Present Status of USMC in Unified Commands
A. Marine Corps Manual's directive to commanders, staff
officers, and working groups
B. Purpose of Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
C. Quotes from JCS PUB 2 (UNAAF) and introduction of Service
component commanders (SCC)
D. Definition and duties of SCC
E. Who is fulfilling SCC duties for USMC
F. General Crist and CentCom example
III. Problems With Present System
A. Navy officers don't adequately understand USMC
B. Bad example for subordinate commands
C. Failure to recognize USMC utility divorced from amphibious
operations
D. Intervening command level hinders responsiveness to CINC
E. Marine staff officers aren't the answer
IV. Solution
A. Do what JCS has done
B. General Crist's answer: ... it makes good sense
C. Literal interpretation of existing guidance
A MARINE COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR UNIFIED COMMANDS
What is the role of the United States Marine Corps in the current
unified command structure? What should it be? The answers to these
questions are often obscured in historical precedent and traditional ties
which no longer meet the needs of those charged with executing national
policy by the application of military power. The current system for
exercising command and control of the nation's armed forces Is designed to
provide unity of effort in the application of diverse military resources.
This can only be achieved if responsible commanders receive sound advice
and counsel on how to properly employ the unique capabilities of all forces
assigned to their command. To do this, these commanders must have direct
access to subordinate commanders from each of the armed services. This
access opens a channel of communications that allows the frank and candid
exchange of views on how best to accomplish assigned tasks. When this
communication is inhibited, the resultant loss of such wise consul can
seriously degrade the commander's ability to accomplish his mission. Over
the years, the formal relationship between commanders of unified
commands and their Marine subordinate commanders has not allowed this
necessary direct liaison to take place. The reasons for this are numerous but
the solution is singular. This paper will attempt to explain the problem and
recommend a solution.
On July 11,1798 the Marine Corps was established as a separate
Service by act of Congress.1 Throughout its history, protagonists have
raised questions about the Marine Corps' role in the defense establishment.
On March 27, 1820, Marine Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Archibald
Henderson wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that, "Our isolated Corps with
the Army on one side and the Navy on the other (neither friendly) has been
struggling ever since its establishment for its very existence."2 The Corps
was autonomous at that time and its mission was rather nebulous. Then, in
1834, Congress specifically provided that "the Marine Corps... shall at all
times be subject to the laws and regulations established for the government
of the Navy, except when detached for service with the Army by order of the
President."3 This settled the matter and the arrangement worked well for
over 113 years. This period included the Mexican American War and World
War I when, "by order of the President," the Corps was detached for service
with the Army.4
Following World War II Congress again acted to clarify and modify its
position as to exactly what the Marine Corps should be and what it should
do. In the National Security Act of 1947 Congress spelled out, in greater
detail than for any other Service, the roles and missions for the Corps. This
was as a direct result of congressional fears that the Corps might be
abolished completely or reduced to a ceremonial role. The wording of the
act left no doubt that the Marine Corps was a separate service within the
Department of the Navy. Still, the fact that the Corps was organizationally
located in the Department of the Navy did not prevent it from serving under
Army command in both the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts.5
The National Security Act also laid the foundation for our current
system of providing strategic direction to the armed forces and for the
operation, under unified control, of integrated land, naval, and air forces.
The act required the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to "establish unified
commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the
interest of national security." Currently there are eight unified commands,
five of which -- U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European
Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Central Command -- are assigned
forces to conduct necessary military operations in specific geographic
areas of responsibility.6 It is in these commands, often referred to as the
warfighting commands, that the organizational problem of determining the
appropriate role of the Marine component commander exists.
The JCS, too, had trouble determining the appropriate role of the
Marine commander. From 1947 to 1978 the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(CMC) functioned as a Service Chief in all ways but one: he was only a part-
time member of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS), being allowed to
participate in meetings only when matters pertaining specifically to the
Marine Corps were being discussed. This was apparently based on the
assumption that the Chief of Naval Operations spoke for the Department of
the Navy, inexorably wedding the Marine Corps to the Navy. General Louis H.
Wilson, then the 26th CMC, voiced his opinion on this in an April 1977
article published in Sea Power magazine:
The Navy and Marine Corps thus support and complement each
other, and the fundamental concept of a Marine Corps is
inseparable from that idea of mutual support and common
purpose. The Marine Corps could not perform its mission
successfully in the absence of a powerful Navy...7
General Wilson's statement appeared to support the generally
accepted notion, that there was only one Naval Service. What CMC did not
say was that the Army could not successfully perform its mission in the
absence of an Air Force or a Navy; or that the Navy would be hard pressed to
fulfill its mission without an Army and an Air Force. All the Services are
dependent to a certain extent on the capabilities of the others. The key is to
recognize that there are separate and distinct capabilities resident in each
and that they are all complementary. The possibility that the Marine Corps
could find itself fighting along side Army or Air Force units must always be
considered. Later in the the same article General Wilson touched on another
pertinent point:
The Marine Corps provides a significant portion of our general
purpose forces, and while we place primary emphasis on our
amphibious role we are also aware that a wide range of
contingencies demand that we be prepared to perform other
tasks when directed.8
A year later (1978), in recognition of the fact that all matters
discussed by the JCS in some way pertained to the Marine Corps, Congress
included in the Defense Appropriations Act of 1979 a provision making CMC
a full-time member of the JCS.
The most recent edition of the Marine Corps Manual, a Navy Department
publication, incorporates the organizational relationship of the Corps within
the Department of Defense (DoD) by enjoining all Marine commanders and
representatives on joint staffs and working groups to:
... ensure that the status of the Marine Corps as a separate
service with all rights, privileges, duties, and
responsibilities as such is recognized and maintained in all
directives, plans, and agreements involving the Marine Corps.9
This reminder of independent status seems to have been lost on everyone
except Marines. Its applicability in unified commands is solely at the
discretion of the individual commander and that discretion rarely favors
equality for the Corps.
The recent Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is
the latest attempt to streamline the military command and control system
to make it more efficient and effective. This Act specifically emphasized
jointness, making several major changes to the organization of the JCS and
the role of its chairman. Unfortunately, for the most part, it did not address
organizations below the DoD and JCS level, such as the unified commands,
thereby leaving these commands with an organizational flaw that
potentially degrades the efficiency and effectiveness of their command and
control systems.
Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS PUB 2 provides a straight
forward, common sense approach to command organization. It states that:
... each commander will organize assigned forces so as best
to perform the mission. The organizational form of forces
will depend on the mission assigned, the manner in which
the mission is to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength
of assigned component elements of the forces assigned...
the command organization should integrate the components
of two or more Services into an efficient team while, at the
same time, preserving to each Service its single Service
responsibilities. ... organizational integrity of the Service
components should be maintained in so far as practicable.10
Eighteen additional pages of guidance provide details on how each Unified
Commander in Chief (CINC) may choose to exercise his authority. Of the
seven different ways to exercise operational command, by far the most
popular among CINC's is through Service component commanders.
The Service component commander is defined as, "the senior officer of
each service assigned to a unified command and qualified for command by
the regulations of the parent service... "11 All five geographic unified
commands have organized their forces in this manner.12 To the uninitiated,
it would follow that there would be four component commanders in each
unified command, one for each Service. However, there are only three: one
for each military department. What the unified commands call Service
components are, in fact, departmental components. There is one for the
Army department, one for the Air Force department, and one for the Navy
department. Although the CINC's have been given the latitude to organize in
any manner that will best accomplish the mission, none have appointed a
Marine component commander. Not in one unified command does the Marine
Corps have its own place at the decision-making table.
JC5 PU6 2 dictates that, among other things, the component
commander makes recommendations to the CINC on proper employment of
the forces of his Service; selects and nominates specific units for
assignment to subordinate forces; provides supporting operational and
exercise plans to support the CINC's mission as requested; is responsible for
internal administration, discipline, training, intelligence, and logistics of
his forces; and, perhaps most importantly, the Service component
commander is responsible for mission accomplishment.13
Who is fulfilling these responsibilities for the Marine Corps if there is
no Marine component commander? The "Naval" component commander. But
the Naval component commander is a Navy officer. Even the brightest, most
experienced officer would be challenged in fulfilling the responsibilities
enumerated above for an entire Service; to be able to adequately address
such diverse concerns for two separate Services would require unparalleled
knowledge and expertise.
It is interesting to note that General George B. Crist, USMC (Ret), the
only Marine ever to serve as CINC of a unified command, saw fit to
reorganize Central Command (CentCom) to reflect four vice three Service
components for certain contingencies.14 This organization was in effect
for the JCS approved Middle-East campaign plan from 1986 to 1988. Though
some might suspect that Service favoritism influenced this decision,
General Crist insists it did not. In fact, he suggests that it is only Service
parochialism that prevents this organization from being adopted elsewhere.
General Crist contends that the key points to consider are:
...is he [the Service component commander] going to be an
operational commander, what missions are you going to be
assigning him, and where does he have to do it?15
The current organizational chart in the Joint Staff Officers Guide 1988
depicts only three "Service" components, not four, for CentCom.16 General
Crist's enlightened view on how the CINC's should organize their respective
commands does not appear to be shared.
A personal experience of the author demonstrates why other CINC's
might hesitate to follow General Crist's example. It occurred at a major
wargame where the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command
(CINCLANT) would not allow an independent Marine component command to
be organized at unified headquarters level. CINCLANT's reasoning was that
it "violated joint doctrine." As already pointed out, this simply is not true.
But if one man interpreted doctrine in this manner, what should we expect
from other CINC's?
Joint doctrine needs to be revised to explicitly establish a Marine
component commander in each of the geographic unified commands, because
misinterpretation of the present doctrine has created a system which fails
to recognize the Marine Corps as a separate service with unique
characteristics and does not serve the needs of the commander. The advice
the CINC gets on how best to employ the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) assigned to him may be lost, filtered, or muffled if routed through
an intervening level of command. Placing the Marine component under the
naval component commander makes the Marine advice subservient to the
Navy advice, especially detrimental if the two are conflicting or
contradictory.
It is no slight to the Navy officer functioning as the Naval component
commander to question his ability to advise the CINC on the Marine Corps. It
is unrealistic to expect him to fully appreciate or understand Marine Corps
tactical philosophy or its position on doctrinal matters (i.e., command and
control of Marine air, where the Marine Corps accepts joint doctrine but not
Air Force interpretation of that doctrine).17 The Navy commander is
already busy trying to coordinate the views of his various "composite
warfare" communities. It is unreasonable to expect him to master the
nuances of another specialty that does not fall within his Service's
expertise or to call on him to advise the CINC on forces which are not even
part of his parent Service.
Another problem with the practice of continually placing the Marine
component under the Navy component is that it is mimicked by subordinate
commands. Marines assigned to Joint Task Forces (JTF) are habitually
placed under the Naval force commander even though there may not be an
amphibious operation to justify this relationship. In the January 1987 issue
of the Marine Corps Gazette, Major John F. Otis, Jr., noted that:
This operational control relationship of ComMarFor
[Commander, Marine Forces] to ComNavFor [Commander, Navy
Forces] during amphibious operations severs the direct
relationship between ComMarFor and the commander, joint
task force (CJTF) and, in effect, terminates his role as a
service component commander... commander, landing force
(CLF) [Marine] is responsible to the commander amphibious
task force (CATF) [Navy] for landing force operations; [but] in
a JTF each Service component commander is responsible to
a JTF for operations... the doctrinal CATF/CLF relationship
during amphibious operations has been allowed to spill over
into the JTF command relationship structure...18
Major Otis could have pointed out that the CLF might be an Army
officer, as in the many examples of WW II where the Army actually
conducted more amphibious operations that the Marine Corps.19 A further
study of applicable doctrine would also show that even in amphibious
operations the CLF is co-equal to CATF for planning, and only reverts to a
subordinate status upon embarkation remaining so only until the termination
of the amphibious operation.20 It is difficult to imagine an Army
component commander remaining subordinate to the Navy component in the
day to day operations of a unified command, yet unified commanders insist
on maintaining this type of relationship between Marine and Navy forces.
The system addressed above is most at fault for not recognizing the
utility of the MAGTF divorced from amphibious operations. This narrow
view of tying the Marine Corps to the Navy fails to consider such continuing
commitments as the Air Contingent Force, Norwegian Air Landed Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, or the very real possibility that Marines may once
again be committed to sustained operations ashore. In all of these examples
the Marine forces will be separate from the Navy. Are we to assume that in
these situations the CINC would want to be advised on the proper
employment of the MAGTF by the Army (or Air Force) component
commander?
The intervening step of going through the Naval (read Navy) component
commander, at both the unified command and JTF level, to communicate
with the Marine component can only complicate matters and slow the
responsiveness of the command as a whole. For instance, the important but
mundane task of developing Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)
for a MAGTF has to be submitted to the CINC through the Naval component
commander even if the deployment is to take place by Military Airlift
Command aircraft.21 This chop of the TPFDD by another service component
can only hinder the development of troop lists and deployment data which
might be required in response to an emerging crisis. This is but one specific
example where common sense and simplicity should require that the CINC be
able to communicate directly with all his Service component commanders
and vice versa.
The Marine Corps is a separate, independent service with a high utility
value for the CINC's. There are currently over twenty JCS approved unified
command Operation Plans (OpPlan)22, all of which call for participation of
Marine forces. A large portion of this utility is based on the proper
employment of the MAGTF as an integrated combined arms team. When
Marines are to be used, they must have direct access to the CINC to discuss
their employment. Though there are many Marine joint staff officers in each
unified command, a staff officer -- regardless of rank- - seldom expresses
his views to the commander with the same vigor (or the same concerns) as
a subordinate commander.
What binds the Marine Corps to the Navy is our history and traditions.
The CINC's need to acknowledge, though, that history was modified by the
National Security Act of 1947. By establishing a direct relationship with
their subordinate Marine commanders they can correct the deficiencies
caused by this past oversight. There are many examples of Marine Corps
participation in "sustained operations ashore," such as WW I, Korea, and
Vietnam. Now is the time to modify the traditional Navy/Marine
relationship to reflect current laws and the potential reality that we may
not always fight only as a naval Service.
The unified commands need to do what the JCS have done -- make the
Marine component commander a full member of their organization with all
rights, privileges, and responsibilities as such. To ensure that individual
CINC's see the wisdom of this reorganization, directive guidance from JCS
should be forthcoming.
Of all the reasons to adopt a Marine component commander in the
unified commands, perhaps General Crist's is the most succinct, "Because it
makes good sense."23 If the Marine Corps is truly a separate service, then
it deserves an independent voice. This is not a jealous call for equality but
an emphasis on the fact that there are significant differences in the
composition and capabilities of Marine forces when compared to other
services. It is unrealistic and unreasonable to expect another Service
component commander to be as familiar with Marine forces as he is with his
own. The resultant lack of expertise is an embarrassment to him and a
disservice to the CINC. The overriding concern should always be to identify
the person and organization that best allows the CINC to accomplish his
mission. A literal interpretation of the published guidance provides the
answer. Organize by military service, remembering they are four in number.
With Congressional directives to think, train, and act jointly, the Marine
Corps is destined to be a full partner in the joint arena. However, this
status will only be realized when Marines represent Marines at all the
councils of war.
Footnotes
1 Robert D. Heinl,Jr., Soldiers of the Sea. (Annapolis: United States
Naval Institute, 1965), p. 10
2 Organization for National Security, ECP 1-6. Marine Corps Educational
Center. (Quantico: Marine Corps Schools, 1970), p. 10.
3 Ibid., p. 11
4 J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1977), pp. 176 and 411.
5 Ibid., pp. 674 and 895
6 The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1988, AFSC Pub 1. Department of
Defense. (Norfolk: Armed Forces Staff College, 1988), pp. 42-47. Hereafter
cited as AFSC Pub 1.
7 Louis H. Wilson, General, USMC. "The Marine Corps: Sound
Fundamentals and Dedicated Professionalism." Sea Power (April 1977), pp.
49-50.
8 Ibid., p. 52.
9 Marine Corps Manual. Department of the Navy (Washington, D.C.:
Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1980), p. 1-4.
10 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). JCS Pub 2 with Change 1.
Department of Defense. (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), p.
3-8. Hereafter cited as JCS Pub 2.
11 Ibid., p.3-25.
12 AFSC Pub 1., pp 50-59.
13 JCS Pub 2., p. 3-25.
14 George B. Crist, General USMC (Ret); Commander in Chief U.S. Central
Command 1985-1988. Personal interview about command relationships in
unified commands. Quantico, Virginia, December 7, 1989. Hereafter cited
as Crist Interview.
15 Ibid.
16 AFSC Pub 1., p. 52.
17 CG MCCDC ltr 3000/WF 12E, dtd 9 March 89, Subj: The Joint Force
Air Component Commander and Command and Control of Marine Air-Ground
Task Force Aviation, (Quantico ,Virginia)
18 John F. Otis, Jr., Maj, USMC. "Joint Task Force Operations." Marine
Corps Gazette (January 1987), pp. 24-25.
19 J. D. Ladd, Assault From The Sea. (New York: Hippocrene Books Inc.,
1976), pp. 235-238
20 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. JCS Pub 3-02 with Change
5. Department of Defense. (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986),
Chapter 2.
2 Crist Interview.
22 Robert J. Segars, Col, USAF. Member of Armed Forces Staff College
Instruction Department. Response to questions following class on
"Organization for Command" at Command and Staff College Quantico,
Virginia, November 13, 1989.
23 Crist Interview.
Bibliography
Crist, George B., General USMC (Ret); Commander in Chief U.S. Central
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Heinl, Robert D. Jr., Soldiers of the Sea. Annapolis: United States Naval
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Ladd, J. D. , Assault From The Sea. New York: Hippocrene Books Inc., 1976.
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