Military

Prowler:  Best For The Future?

 

AUTHOR Major Kenneth C. Watson, USMC

 

CSC 1990

 

SUBJECT AREA Aviation

 

-TEXT-

 

                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

TITLE: PROWLER: BEST FOR THE FUTURE?

 

    PURPOSE. Although the goal of an all-STOVL ACE by 2010 is worthwhile in terms of

maneuverability and flexibility, none of the possible candidate STOVL platforms are capable of

executing airborne mission-support electronic warfare as we know it today. If the Marine

Corps is to retain the capability to win on future battlefields, it must continue to command

the electromagnetic spectrum.

 

    PROBLEM. The new MAGTF Master Plan states that the Marine Corps will possess

an all-STOVL force by 2010. The EA-6B is incompatible with that goal, because it is a

single-mission airplane with unique support requirements, and so Marine EA-6Bs will be

returned to the Navy when other aircraft pods/pallets are fielded to conduct the EW mission.

If the Marine Corps returns its EA-6Bs to the Navy, it will give up more than just an

airframe--the airborne support EW mission will be severely degraded.

 

    DATA. The electronic threat environment is growing more and more lethal, especially in

the Third World, and the battlefield is growing more electronically dependent. The EA-6B and

TERPES are both evolving to cope with this more dangerous threat. The combination of

EA-6Bs and TERPES gives the MAGTF commander the advantage in situational awareness,

while denying that awareness to the enemy. Helicopters, the KC-130, the F/A-18D, Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and the Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) all offer advantages to the

MAGTF, but they all fall short in some aspect of EW capability. Weight-bearing capacity,

electrical power generation, airspeeds, and altitudes all contribute to the ability to conduct

airborne EW.

 

    CONCLUSIONS. When the factors of threat, mission needs, and current and projected

platform capabilities are weighed, the ability to have men in the loop to make tactical

decisions is of paramount importance. Subsumed in that ability is a platform designed to keep

those men involved in decisionmaking. The more EW systems are miniaturized and automated,

the less they are capable of responding to an increasingly sophisticated threat environment.

The Marine Corps cannot afford to replace the EA-6B before 2010, and it may not be

prepared to do so then.

 

    RECOMMENDATIONS. Before giving up the EA-6B in favor of an all-STOVL force,

Marine Corps planners must determine the full ramifications of that loss on MAGTF

survivability. Long-garnered EW expertise and mission flexibility cannot be rebuilt quickly.

Planners should be very careful before irrevocably committing the Marine Corps to a

marginally survivable force, even if that force is extremely mobile and deployable.

 

 

 

 

                        PROWLER: BEST FOR THE FUTURE?

 

                                   OUTLINE

 

THESIS: Before Marines discard or degrade the ability to conduct airborne, manned

 

electronic warfare (EW), they must carefully consider the real, long-term value of airborne

 

support EW to the MAGTF.

 

 

I.  MAGTF Master Plan EW Goals

 

    A. All-STOVL Force

 

    B. EW Divided: MLR, F/A-18, UAV

 

    C. EA-6B Incompatible with Goal

 

II. Current Strengths

 

    A. TERPES/TEAMS

 

    B. Cadre of Experts

 

       1. Conduct of War

 

       2. Preparation for War

 

III. What's Ahead?

 

    A. Threat Changes

 

    B. EA-6B/TERPES Evolution

 

IV. Alternate Platforms

 

    A. Helicopters

 

    B. KC-130

 

    C. F/A-18D

 

    D. UAVs/RPVs

 

    E. MV-22/MLR

 

V.  Whats Really Important?

 

    A. Support EW Mission Primary

 

    B. Platform Secondary

 

    C. Continued Effectiveness in the Face of Change

 

 

 

 

                        PROWLER: BEST FOR THE FUTURE?

 

 

     This is an exciting time to be a Marine, especially a Marine aviator. With peace breaking

 

out all over the world, the Department of Defense (DOD) budget is shrinking dramatically.

 

National budget deficits and social problems, especially the illegal drug crisis, demand that an

 

even greater share of budgetary attention be paid to domestic issues. Yet, with the inexorable

 

drawdown of forces, we have the rare opportunity to take a hard look at the possible future

 

missions of the Marine Corps and shape our fighting force accordingly. Now is the time to

 

sharpen our much-touted Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept through

 

precisely tailored air and ground acquisition, training, and doctrine. Indeed, when has there

 

ever been a better time than now to complete the transition of air power from a mere

 

supporting arm to a fully integrated combined arm in the MAGTF?

 

     Marines train to exploit fleeting opportunities. In our zeal to trim the Marine Corps

 

budget, we may be all too eager to prematurely throw away certain programs or capabilities

 

because of their apparently high cost-benefit ratio. Much has been written recently about the

 

economic need to reduce the types of aircraft in the MAGTF, for some very good reasons.

 

One of those reasons is that for required flexibility in the future, each weapons system will

 

have to rapidly shift among multiple missions. Single-mission aircraft are not perceived to be

 

flexible enough to respond to the fluid battlefield most analysts have predicted. Another good

 

reason to reduce aircraft types in the MAGTF is to simplify aviation logistics requirements.

 

Operating fewer types of aircraft translates to streamlined aviation maintenance and supply,

 

and it gives the MAGTF commander greater flexibility in task organizing his air. The Marine

 

 

Corps Aviation Neckdown Plan is shown in Figure 1.1

 

 

 

MAGTF MASTER PLAN EW GOALS

 

     The Marine Corps plans to achieve an all-STOVL (Short Takeoff Vertical Landing) force

 

by 2010. Before Marines discard or degrade the ability to conduct airborne, manned electronic

 

warfare (EW), though, they must carefully consider the real, long-term value of airborne

 

support EW to the MAGTF.

 

     An all-STOVL force will give the MAGTF commander the flexibility and maneuverability

 

he will require in 2010. The quicker the Marine Corps achieves this flexibility, the more

 

effective it will be as the exemplar of maneuver warfare...or will it? Toward this end, Marine

 

planners are already replacing the A-6E with the  F/A-18D--shouldn't they follow suit with the

 

EA-6B Prowler? Isn't the Prowler an expensive anachronism in today's "Maneuver Corps"? To

 

answer these questions, we must first examine the benefit to the MAGTF of airborne support

 

EW as it is practiced today. Then we should look at the evolutionary changes to the threat

 

and to the EA-6B. Finally, we must consider the requirement for an orderly transition to the

 

all-STOVL force in light of distant future mission requirements.

 

 

 

     EA-6B Limitations

 

     There are some good arguments that support the position that the Marine Corps should

 

remove the EA-6B from the inventory. It's a single-mission (EW) aircraft. It is relatively

 

large and heavy, as far as jet aircraft go. It can't even hope to attain a STOVL capability.

 

     The Prowler could become a millstone around the MAGTF's neck because of its unique

 

supply and maintenance requirements, although there is a great deal of commonality between

 

 

 

     1 U.S. Marine Corps.  MAGTF Warfighting Center.  MAGTF Master Plan, July 7, 1989,

pp. P-1, ES-3.

 

 

 

 

Click here to view image

 

     2 Ibid., p. 8-13

 

 

 

 

the current EA-6B and the AV-8B and F/A-18 in avionics.

 

     One of the main arguments for phasing the Prowler out of the inventory is its expense.

 

The EA-6B ICAP-II (Improved Capability-2nd Version) flies with state-of-the-art technology,

 

and that technology is costly. A current estimate of the fly-away cost of an ICAP-II aircraft is

 

$26 million.3  The Navy and Marine Corps are planning to remanufacture ICAP-II aircraft into

 

the Advanced Capability (ADVCAP) upgrade, beginning in FY92, for $25 million each.4  The

 

cost estimate for new ADVCAP aircraft is $38 million each.4,5

 

     The EA-6B was designed to work against portions of an enemy's Integrated Air Defense

 

System (IADS), and its weapons system has evolved to match the increasingly sophisticated

 

IADS of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Now that the nation's attention is being

 

redirected to the Third World, many planners do not see a need to continue maintaining and

 

modernizing an expensive weapon system designed against a threat we are unlikely to face.

 

They believe that the third-world low-intensity air defense threat would hardly challenge our

 

sophisticated tactical fighters and attack aircraft, let alone a platform as capable as the EA-6B.

 

If the Marine Corps is paring down its forces to be able to efficiently fight in low-intensity

 

and special operations arenas, these planners believe that the Prowler and other high-tech

 

support systems will have to be cut from the inventory.

 

 

 

CURRENT STRENGTHS

 

     The EA-6B offers the Marine Corps several combat advantages. The resident EW

 

expertise in VMAQ-2 (active duty, flying EA-6Bs) and VMAQ-4 (reserve, flying EA-6As) is

 

invaluable to MAGTF and other Marine Corps planners. Those experts are able to integrate

 

 

 

     3 Recurring cost, without jamming pods, at 12 aircraft per year, in FY89 dollars.

 

     4 Recurring cost, without jamming pods, at 12 aircraft per year, in FY9O dollars.

 

     5 Schmidt, Nolan, LtCol, USMC, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO/OP-501E).  Personal

interview concerning EA-6B cost data, The Pentagon, March 24, 1990.

 

 

 

 

an electronic picture of the battlefield, to advise commanders concerning the most advantage-

 

ous use of radar and communications jamming, and to assist other aircrews in selecting the

 

most survivable ingress and egress routes. VMAQ-2 and VMAQ-4 personnel are experienced

 

in evaluating the electronic battlefield, developing strike routes that exploit enemy vulnerabili-

 

ties, and creating gaps where only surfaces appear.

 

 

 

     TERPES/TEAMS

 

     The most direct benefit that a Marine EA-6A/B detachment brings to the MAGTF is its

 

ability to help the commander see the battlefield. Through the Tactical Electronic Reconnais-

 

sance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES) and the Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning

 

System (TEAMS), EA-6A/B Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) missions update the

 

commander's Electronic Order of Battle (EOB). These updates give the Air Combat Element

 

(ACE) commander the timely information he needs to plan deep and close air support,

 

integrated with the suppression of enemy air defenses. Within half an hour after an EA-6A/B

 

ESM mission has landed, a TERPES report highlights critical threats to the MAGTF,

 

especially those that have moved or changed their electronic parameters. Within two hours of

 

landing, another TERPES report details all the threats in the MAGTF's area of interest.

 

TERPES also updates national EOBs through the Navy operational reporting system.

 

     TERPES is unique to the Marine Corps. When the Marines first became involved in

 

EW, they realized that they would need a substantial ESM capability. The Navy did not have

 

as great a need as the Marine Corps--they had other ESM platforms like the EA-3 and the

 

EP-3 aircraft. The Navy's primary purpose for acquiring the Prowler was as a jamming

 

platform in power projection and war-at-sea roles. The Marine Corps, on the other hand,

 

placed equal weight on ESM and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) (jamming), and

 

independently developed TERPES. The EA-6B operates with a digital tape recorder, which can

 

 

record everything the electronic "eyes" of the airplane see and everything the crew does with

 

the jammers. This digitally recorded information is essential to determine threat emitter

 

locations from triangulation, and to template the battlefield. The TEAMS workstation reads

 

the tapes, and then TERPES combines these mission tapes with historical EOBs and

 

near-real-time information from other sources to paint an up-to-the-minute picture of the

 

electronic battlefield.

 

     TERPES has proven itself often in combat and in exercises. TERPES analysts were first

 

to report Soviet-built SA-3 missile sites in two Thirld-World communist countries, and they

 

contributed significantly to mission planning for the Operation Eldorado Canyon strikes on

 

Libya while aboard USS America. TERPES reports helped the Joint Electronic Warfare

 

Center conduct its evaluation of jamming during that operation.

 

     When Marines are tasked to provide EA-6B detachments to aircraft carriers for a cruise,

 

they take TERPES along. Initially, disgruntled commanders of carrier air groups (CAGs)

 

usually complain about the space required to set up TERPES equipment inside the Carrier

 

Intelligence Center, but by the end of the cruise the CAGs can't praise TERPES enough.

 

They invariably request TERPES if the need for Marine Prowlers arises again.

 

     The EA-6B cannot operate without the TEAMS workstation. They were designed as an

 

integrated weapon system. TEAMS can also assist other ACE and Navy aircrews with

 

intelligence support for route selection. TEAMS plots threat radar acquisition ranges and

 

surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery lethal ranges, and can draw optimum

 

friendly flight paths through the threats. EA-6B aircrews can then select radars along the

 

flight paths as targets for jamming or High-Speed Antiradiation Missiles (HARMs) and all

 

aircrews can begin detailed flight planning.

 

 

 

 

     Cadre of Experts

 

 

 

     Conduct of War. After considering the advantages of TERPES, let's look at the value

 

of having a manned airborne support EW platform. Designed to work mainly against early

 

warning/ground-controlled intercept and acquisition radars, the EA-6B can also be effective

 

against target trackers, missile beacons, and fire control radars. The real value of the platform,

 

though, is in having men in the loop to make tactical decisions. The Prowler is manned by a

 

pilot (left front seat) and three Electronic Countermeasures Officers (ECMOs). The ECMO

 

in the front right seat handles most of the navigation and communication, and communica-

 

tions jamming when the aircraft is so equipped. The two ECMOs in the rear cockpit

 

continually track and analyze the radar threat, prioritize jammer assignments to suppress

 

enemy air defenses, and keep friendly forces informed concerning critical battlefield develop-

 

ments. The EA-6B crew's goal is to take the "I" out of "IADS".

 

     By having men in a close interface with the EA-6B system, critical, unexpected threat

 

changes can be quickly assessed, reported, and countered. Typically, deep air strikes are

 

designed as combined-arms coordinated attacks with integrated EA-6B jamming support. The

 

entire strike package is usually airborne at the same time, and routes are planned based on

 

preflight intelligence. An enemy mobile SAM battery could move to protect a key air avenue

 

of approach and simultaneously change its operating frequencies after the strike package is

 

airborne, presenting a formidable obstacle to the strike's mission accomplishment. Without an

 

EA-6B, the strikers might not detect the changes until it was too late. However, the back-seat

 

ECMOs could notice the changes, advise the strike aircrews, and redesign their own jammer

 

assignments to cover them.

 

     The analysis of enemy IADS surfaces and gaps and the creation of fog and friction for

 

the enemy are the ECMO's stocks in trade. From their first EW school and throughout their

 

 

careers, ECMOs not only learn about enemy weapon systems' operating characteristics,

 

detection ranges, and lethal ranges, they study engagement sequences and critical weaknesses.

 

They practice exploiting these critical command and control vulnerabilities in order to buy time

 

and space for friendly forces to make sound decisions, maintain sufficient maneuver room, and

 

accomplish their missions. This EW expertise is critical to the ACE, and by extension to the

 

MAGTF, in order to effectively execute maneuver warfare.

 

 

 

     Planning for War.  Marine ECMOs not only serve as EW specialists in the conduct of

 

war in the tactical squadrons, they fill critical advisory planning billets in each Marine

 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) and throughout DOD.  They do not merely look out for Marine

 

interests; they provide the expertise to ensure the success of sister-Service and joint forces.

 

The Marine Prowler community supplies an electronic warfare officer (EWO) to each MEF

 

and Marine Aircraft Wing.  Key EW requirements and acquisition billets, with cognizance over

 

all Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, are filled by Marines.  In fact, both of the Program

 

Managers for all Navy helicopter EW systems and all Army helicopter EW systems are

 

Marines.  Marine EWOs serve in key positions in the Joint Staff, the Naval Space Command,

 

the US Space Command, and the Joint Electronic Warfare Center. Sister-Service and joint

 

commanders recognize the value of the aggressive winning spirit Marine EWOs bring with

 

them, and they know that this spirit, combined with the creative application of EW, will be

 

essential to winning on future battlefields.

 

     EW is one of the six functions of Marine Aviation.  As success in war becomes more

 

and more dependent on command of the electromagnetic spectrum, the criticality of EW

 

becomes paramount.  The more effectively we conduct EW in the future, the more success

 

we will enjoy.  The EW function is not conducted only by mission-support platforms like the

 

EA-6B; self-protection EW systems are already part of every aircraft we fly.  Whether the

 

 

Prowler remains in the inventory is immaterial compared to the importance of the support

 

EW mission.  Like it or not, Marine aviators will practice EW more in the future than today,

 

because the nature of future war is electronic. The resource of EW experts we have

 

amassed over the years must be tapped if we plan to win on future battlefields.

 

 

 

WHAT'S AHEAD?

 

 

 

     Threat Changes

 

     Most intelligence analysts agree that the sophistication and lethality of today's battlefield

 

will be surpassed in the near future, and the threat sector that will experience the most

 

pronounced modernization will be the Third World.

 

         The Soviet Union has recently transferred advanced MiG-29 fighter aircraft

     and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to North Korea. Libya trains terrorists on

     its soil while providing support to subversive, opposition, and terrorist groups

     worldwide. The diffusion of power and advanced weaponry...is posing new dangers,

     and this trend will likely continue in the future. Countries hostile to the United

     States will almost certainly acquire more lethal weapon systems. This...may support

     limited, ambiguous provocations that we must be prepared to counter. The damage

     wrought by low-intensity conflict could become extremely great.6

 

 

     Of course, this increased threat sophistication also applies to mid-intensity and high-

 

intensity conflict. "A key consideration in modern general war is the levelling effect widespread

 

proliferation of technology will continue to have among the world's forces. Operations by even

 

the most effective air forces will face great risk from widely available air defense weapons, for

 

example."7  The Israeli Air Force discovered the cost of underestimating Third-World air

 

defenses in the October 1973 war.

 

 

 

     6 Carlucci, Frank C., Secretary of Defense.  Annual Report to the Congress, January 17,

1989, pp. 11-13.

 

     7 Ibid., pp. 5-7.

 

 

 

 

     EA-6B/TERPES  Evolution

 

     In the face of increasingly lethal IADS, especially in the Third World, the requirement

 

for a dedicated, airborne EW platform will not diminish. It will increase. The EA-6B's latest

 

upgrade, the ADVCAP (Advanced Capability), is designed to enable it to meet the near-term

 

threat. With an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) during 1994, it will have a totally redesigned,

 

extremely fast and capable receiver system, a greatly expanded frequency range, and an

 

integrated communications/low-frequency radar jammer. It will be able to carry two additional

 

HARM missiles or jamming pods and to exploit alternate threat cues in order to provide

 

commanders a quicker and more accurate assessment of the battlefield.

 

     TERPES is also evolving to meet the threat. It will soon have a datalink to Marine

 

EA-6Bs and will be interoperable with the new DOD Intelligence Information System and

 

other national, Navy, and Marine intelligence data bases. These and other upgrades will enable

 

it to provide MAGTF and ACE commanders real-time and near-real-time updated electronic

 

battlefield "maps".8

 

     Without these improvements, the Prowler/TERPES team would fall behind the needs of

 

the MAGTF. With them, the MAGTF can maintain the initiative on the battlefield, maximiz-

 

ing friendly situational awareness and minimizing that of the enemy.

 

 

 

ALTERNATE PLATFORMS

 

     Several platforms have been considered to take up some portion of the support EW

 

mission. Unless the roles and expectations of airborne EW are changed, these platforms will

 

not be able to execute support EW as we know it today. Let's briefly examine several of

 

these platforms' advantages and limitations in the support EW mission area.

 

 

    

     5 Flowers, Anthony, CWO-2.  Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition

Command (MCRDAC)/SIGINT-EW, personal interview concerning TERPES, Quantico, March

19, 1990.

 

 

 

 

     HELICOPTERS

 

     The Army has been very successful with its communications-jamming helicopter,

 

QUICKFIX, but it has not yet fielded an airborne radar jammer. However, it is investigating

 

the application of the EA-6B's AN/ALQ-99 system to the UH-1H platform in its Airborne

 

Radar Jammer (ARJ) program. The advantages of an ARJ would be improved responsive-

 

ness to ground and other helicopter forces and good protection of helicopters against

 

radar-guided SAMs. Because of altitude and speed differences, a heliborne radar jammer

 

would not offer adequate protection to fixed-wing jets because of jamming geometry

 

considerations. To give the best protection, a jammer needs to align itself with protected

 

aircraft and victim radar(s). (See Figure 2.) A helicopter obviously could not achieve and

 

maintain enough geometric alignment to adequately protect jets.

 

     The EA-6B ADVCAP will be an outstanding electronic reconnaissance platform, on the

 

order of an EP-3 in quality.9  At 35,000 feet, for example, its line-of-sight range will permit it

 

to see deep into the enemy's back yard, providing the MAGTF commander a very thorough

 

EOB update. A helicopter's line-of-sight range is much more constrained because of its lower

 

operating altitudes. Also, at the slower airspeeds of a helicopter, it would take much longer to

 

accumulate distinct lines of bearing to an enemy emitter sufficient to triangulate and locate it

 

     Additionally, most helicopters do not have the weight-bearing or power generation

 

capability to operate current radar jammers. The EA-6B's internal on-board system, the

 

AN/ALQ-99, weighs approximately 1500 pounds, and the ADVCAP upgrade will increase that

 

weight by at least 1500 pounds more.  EA-6B jamming pods weigh around 1000 pounds

 

apiece, and they each require 30 kilowatts (KVA) of electrical power.  To keep from having

 

to draw from main aircraft power, the pods use small Ram Air Turbines (RATs) to generate

 

their own electricity.  The current EA-6B can carry up to 5 pods, each of which carries two

 

 

 

     9 Schmidt, op cit, March 24, 1990.

 

 

 

 

Click here to view image

 

jamming transmitters. In order to turn the RATs fast enough to generate 30 KVA, 192 Kts

 

airspeed is required for one transmitter; 220 Kts for both.10  If helicopters were to protect a

 

fixed-wing attack force, they would need to carry multiple pods, or many helicopters would be

 

required. Also, a helicopter would probably have to carry an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to

 

generate enough electricity for the system. The combination of low airspeed, limited

 

weight-bearing capacity, and electrical power considerations detracts from most helicopters'

 

effectiveness as support jamming platforms. Of course, larger helicopters such as the CH-46,

 

CH-53, and UH-60 would have much less of a problem with weight. They should be able to

 

 

 

     10 U.S. Navy. EA-6B NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR 01-85ADC-1, w/Change 3, June

1, 1987, p. 1-15

 

 

 

 

carry the internal system, several jamming transmitters, and an APU, but they would still have

 

geometry and altitude problems associated with protecting jets.

 

 

 

     KC-130

 

     Another platform under consideration for an airborne support EW mission is the

 

venerable KC-130. This possibility has several advantages, such as more than adequate weight

 

and power capability and sufficient operating altitude and endurance to support tactical jets.

 

Also, the KC-130 makes an outstanding intercept platform, and it can self-deploy. However, its

 

relatively slow speed would make maintaining adequate geometric alignment to protect jets

 

difficult. An EW version of the KC-130 could readily protect helicopter and AV-8 assets in

 

relatively small Amphibious Operating Areas and areas where enemy air defenses were limited.

 

 

 

 

     F/A-18D

 

     One of the missions being considered for the multi-mission F/A-18D program is support

 

EW. Advantages of this platform are that it is a jet and the Marine platform would be

 

common with the Navy. In addition, the F/A-18D is nearly 100% common with other F/A-18s,

 

simplifying the MAGTF's supply and maintenance burden. However, the F/A-18 is already

 

severely weight and space limited, and over-automation could severely limit the responsiveness

 

and effectiveness of the F/A-18D's EW support on a battlefield where the unexpected is

 

commonplace.

 

     For technical reasons such as receiver sensitivity and dynamic range, the internal

 

ADVCAP avionics system will weigh in excess of 3000 pounds, without any jammers. The

 

state of the art has not yet advanced to be able to install that kind of capability in a platform

 

as small as the F/A-18. Without that kind of capability, the F/A-18D EW suite will be little

 

 

more than a self-protection radar warning receiver.

 

     The reason that automation will degrade the F/A's EW capability is the same reason that

 

it degraded the EF-111's capability. The Air Force realized the need for an airborne support

 

EW platform soon after the Navy and Marine Corps did, but Air Force requirements were

 

slightly different than those of the Navy. The Air Force felt that they needed a jammer with

 

long enough legs and sufficient airspeed to escort supersonic bombers in and out of a target

 

area. Of the available technology, the EA-6B's AN/ALQ-99 system most closely met Air Force

 

requirements, but some functions had to be automated to fit the system into the F-111

 

platform. This automation was required for two reasons: the ALQ-99E (Air Force version)

 

system would be operated by only one crewman; and at the higher airspeeds projected for Air

 

Force missions, events would transpire too quickly for a manual system to cope. In addition,

 

the Air Force deleted the highest frequencies from the ALQ-99E's jammers, which further

 

lightened the load on the lone system operator. The result of all these changes is that many

 

critical decisions and actions are preprogrammed in the EF-111, rendering it less responsive to

 

unexpected threat changes than the EA-6B. The F/A-18 will not only be forced to accept a

 

greater degree of automation than the EA-6B, the EW module will only be one of several

 

mission modules to be flown by the aircraft. With this platform, Marine Corps expectations

 

for responsive airborne EW support will have to be lowered.

 

 

 

     UAVs/RPVs

 

     Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) are the most

 

promising platforms on the horizon to conduct support EW missions, but our concept of EW

 

will have to make a significant change in order to most effectively use them. Col Karch's

 

article (MCG, February 1990) includes an excellent illustration of a concept of operations for

 

EW for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) by UAVs. ECM expendables, decoys,

 

 

communications jammers, and lethal anti-radiation weapons are all well suited to UAV

 

missions. An enemy IADS could literally be saturated with mini-jammers and loitering

 

antiradiation missiles, which would linger over his radars and communications sites for hours,

 

and then attack when those sites attempted to radiate.11

 

     However, the miniaturization needed for a flexible, responsive UAV EW system is

 

presently beyond today's state of the art, and some automation would be required. With

 

automation would come some of the same limitations as listed for other small platforms. Col

 

Karch stated some of the disadvantages of attempting to add EW payloads to UAVs.

 

           First, it adds complexity; therefore, the more capable and complex the

     electronics package, the higher the procurement cost. Second, multiple false target

     generation requires greater electrical power, and UAVs do not have large excess

     power capabilities. Multiple threat radars compound the first two problems...There is

     also the problem of locating enemy air defense units precisely for timely suppression.

     Stand-off EW jamming and air-launched ARMs are certainly needed...[but] EW

     aircraft...may not be available due to limited Marine Corps inventories and a stated

     desire to convert to an all STOVL force.12

 

 

 

     MV-22/MLR

 

     The MV-22 would be a viable platform for a Marine Corps modular support EW system,

 

but it has been canceled by the Secretary of Defense. In the MAGTF Master Plan, the

 

MAGTF Warfighting Center has changed all reference to "MV-22" to "MLR," or Medium

 

Lift Replacement. The need for a replacement for the CH-46 hasn't gone away, and tilt-rotor

 

technology may still be available for the Marine Corps. Therefore, the MLR should be

 

included when considering possible support EW platforms.

 

     If the MLR is indeed a tilt-rotor aircraft, then it would have the advantages of sufficient

 

 

 

     11 Karch, Lawrence G., Col, USMC. "CAS, SEAD, and UAVs," Marine Corps Gazette,

Volume 74, Number 2, February 1990, p. 44ff.

 

     12 Ibid., pp 49, 52.

 

 

 

 

     speed, weight capacity, and power generation to adequately support jets. A jamming

 

aircraft would not have to attain the same speeds as protected jets (ñ420-56O Kts) in order

 

to generate effective jamming signals-nor would jamming transmitters draw from internal

 

aircraft electric power. Having a slower speed than jets would make this job more difficult

 

than for an EA-6B because of the requirement for geometric alignment, but it could be done.

 

     As a support EW platform, the MLR's disadvantages are the time required for

 

developing a new airframe and an EW module for it, the cost involved in a new development,

 

and the degradation to the EW mission caused by being part of a multi-mission platform.

 

      New aircraft take a long time to develop and acquire.  Typically, the time from concept

 

development to IOC is about 10 years. If we were to start today, we would probably not field

 

a new aircraft before the turn of the century. It is also an expensive proposition. It is not

 

likely that the American people would stand for another (post B-2 and F-117) new aircraft

 

start in the middle of the current budget crisis. In any case, reduced spending levels would

 

probably drag out the purchase and fielding of the plane until 2005 or 2010.

 

     The main reason we need an MLR is stated in its middle name, lift, not EW. Again, the

 

EW mission module will necessarily be an adjunct. Because it won't be a dedicated support

 

EW platform, its EW capabilities will be more limited than the current EA-6B.

 

     EW platform capabilities are compared in Appendix A.

 

 

 

WHAT'S REALLY IMPORTANT?

 

     The Marine Corps has only recently officially realized that certainty cannot be achieved in

 

war, but EW system requirements have been written to provide ever-more certainty. "The very

 

nature of war makes absolute certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on

 

 

incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information."13 The drive for certainty has led to

 

more and more automation in both EW and intelligence collection systems. In an attempt to

 

cope with the fast-changing threat environment, developers have built more automated

 

functions and decisions into intelligence and EW systems. This automation has resulted in the

 

opposite of its intent--the more automated systems are less capable of coping with rapid threat

 

changes than the more manual ones. The EA-6B is designed with an optimum combination of

 

automation and manual functions; the on-board system rapidly sorts through and displays the

 

myriad bits of electronic information from the battlefield, but the more critical decisions and

 

evaluations are left to the men. Both elements, men and machine, are essential to the most

 

intelligent application of airborne EW as a combined arm in the MAGTF.

 

     If the Marine Corps abandons the EA-6B platform in favor of smaller, less capable,

 

more automated systems, it will abandon the mission, too. No proposed replacement platform

 

can perform ESM and EOB updates as effectively as the current ECMO/EA-6B/TERPES

 

combination, nor can any proposed replacement provide as effective jamming protection as the

 

Prowler. Before changing the mission, Marines must weigh the benefits of current airborne

 

support EW against the desire for an all-STOVL force.

 

     The requirement for a responsive, flexible support EW system will only increase in the

 

near term, and it will grow astronomically in the distant future. The Marine Corps can not

 

afford to replace the Prowler before 2010, and it may not be prepared to do so then. The

 

MAGTF Master Plan states that by 2010, the EA-6B will be returned to the Navy "when

 

other aircraft (pallet/pods) can assume the mission," but with the intensifying threat, the Navy

 

will have an even greater need for the Prowler for protection of the fleet Marine EW

 

support will have to be provided primarily by Marines.

 

 

 

     13 U.S. Marine Corps.  MAGTF Warfighting Center.  Warfighting, FMFM-1, Quantico,

March 6, 1989, p. 6.

 

 

 

 

     The world is changing. The threat is changing; roles are changing; national interests and

 

goals are changing--the Marine Corps must evolve to continue to protect those interests.

 

Some of the changes are needed: the adoption of maneuver warfare; the fielding of an

 

available, combat-ready expeditionary force; the renewed interest in professional military

 

education. However, not everything Marines have done in the past has been bad. One of the

 

things Marines have traditionally been especially good at is airborne electronic warfare.

 

Marines are taught to be careful not to try to "fix what ain't broke." Now is the time to

 

teach them how to use what we have, not to throw away one of our greatest strengths.

 

 

 

 

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                             BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

     Carlucci, Frank C., U.S. Secretary of Defense.  Annual Report to the Congress,

January 17, 1989

 

     U.S. Navy.  EA-6B NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR 01-85adc-1, with Change 3,

June 1, 1987

 

     Karch, Lawrence G., Col, USMC, "CAS, SEAD, and UAVs," Marine Corps Gazette,

Volume 74, Number 2, February 1990

 

     U.S. Marine Corps.  MAGTF Warfighting Center.  MAGTF Master Plan, Quantico,

July 7, 1989

 

     U.S. Marine Corps.  MAGTF Warfighting Center.  Warfighting, FMFM-1, Quantico,

March 6, 1989