Marine Aviation - Present And Future
AUTHOR Major Robert M. Thomas, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
-TEXT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: MARINE AVIATION- PRESENT AND FUTURE
I. THESIS: There are 6 aviation functions that the air
combat element performs in order to complete the mission
of Marine Air. What present assets does the Marine Corps
possess and what are the future assets required to perform
these 6 functions? What are some of the limitations and
capabilities of these assets?
II. DATA: The governments of eastern European countries,
as well as the Soviet Union, have begun their biggest
change in years. American military and civilian leaders
are reviewing the threat posed by these former communist
bloc countries. No matter, until the mission of Marine
aviation changes, the air combat element must prepare
itself to participate as a supporting arm to the Fleet Marine
Force in the prosecution of a naval campaign. The tasks
required to support the mission are organized into 6 functions.
These functions are air reconnaissance, electronic warfare,
antiair warfare, offensive air support, control of aircraft
and missiles, and assault support. Ongoing changes are
occurring with aging aircraft and equipment being retired
and replaced by new assets. Lt. General C. Pitman, Deputy
Chief of Staff for aviation USMC, delineated milestones
from the MAGTF master plan,in the summer 1989 issue of
Armed Forces Journal International: fewer types of aircraft
in the Marine Corps for commonality of parts and maintenance,
better navigation equipment for helicopters, night vision
capability for all aircraft,,and an all VSTOL force by 2010.
The F/A-18D is currently replacing the A6-E, OA-4M, and RF-4B.
The F/A-18D provides commonality with the F/A-18A already
in the fleet. With the retirement of the A6-E, departs an
all-weather close air support capability, all-weather deep air
support capability, and a aerial refueling asset; all missions
which the F/A-18D is unable to perform. The only air recon-
naissance capability the F/A-18D has is visual until 1994.
1994 is when the photo reconnaissance pod that the F/A-18D
would use is in the fleet. The MACCS is undergoing constant
updates in all its systems with the introduction of ATACC,
IDASC, TAOM, and MATCALS in the near future. The ADVCAP
newest version of the EA-6B, will be arriving in the next 5
years. This coincides with the restructuring of VMAQ-2 into
3 smaller squadrons. The most pressing problem facing the
Marine Corps is the shortfall in medium lift capability with
the service life of the CH-46 rapidly approaching. The pri-
mary solution to this problem is the MV-22. Due to fiscal
problems, the MV-22 is in question. Will the medium lift force
of the future Marine Corps be MV-22s, CH-60 Blackhawk, or some
other option.
III. CONCLUSION: The future is going to be a definite challenge
for Marine air. It will be a challenge to "wring out" the new
assets and apply their limitations and capabilities in order
to effectively fight with them in the next battle; against
an unforeseeable opponent.
MARINE AVIATION - PRESENT AND FUTURE
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. This paper will address the present
and future Marine Corps aviation assets required to perform
the respective aviation functions. It will also point out
the capabilities and limitations of selected aviation
assets.
I. Mission of Marine Aviation
A. The 6 Functions
B. Marine Air Assets
1. Table I
II. Offensive Air Support
A. Mission
B. Assets
1. A6-E
2. F/A-18D
3. AV-8B
III. Assault Support
A. Mission
B. Assets
C. Troop Lift
1. CH-46
2. MV-22
D. AH-1W
E. Aerial Refueling
IV. Antiair Warfare
A. Mission
1. Air Superiority
B. Assets
C. Amphibious Operations
D. Hawk
E. Stinger
V. Electronic Warfare
A. Mission
B. Assets
1. EA-6B
2. Weapons
C. EA-6B Future
VI. Control of Aircraft and Missiles
A. Mission
B. Assets
1. MACCS
C. Limitations
VII. Air Reconnaissance
A. Mission
B. Assets
C. Limitations
MARINE AVIATION- PRESENT AND FUTURE
The F/A-18D mission commander has just finished the
brief of an offensive air support mission. It is 1998 in
the bunker complex at Bobo, Norway. In 4 hours, the of-
fensive air mission will support an amphibious landing by
4th MEB in northern Norway. Their mission is to delay an
advance by Soviet troops from the east. After 8 years of
seemingly stable relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union mounted a surprise
offensive through northern, central and southern Europe.
It is the spring of 1990. The threat of the future
is unclear. 1989 marked the beginning of change in the
Soviet Union and eastern Europe. According to political
and military leaders, the Soviet Union is an unlikely
threat for the near future. However, until the mission
of Marine aviation changes, Marine pilots and operators
must have the most capable aircraft and equipment, respect-
ively, with which to perform the 6 functions of Marine
aviation. This paper will delineate the 6 functions of
Marine aviation. The paper will address the present and
future Marine Corps aviation assets required to perform
the respective aviation function. It will also point out
the capabilities and limitations of selected assets.
The primary mission of Marine aviation is to part-
icipate as the supporting air component of the Fleet Marine
Force (FMF) in seizure and defense of advanced naval bases
and for the conduct of such land operations as may be
essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (9:5)
A collateral mission of the Marine Corps aviation component
is to participate as an integral component of naval aviation
in the execution of such other Navy functions as the fleet
commanders may direct. (9:5) An amphibious operation
requires successful tactical air operations. The require-
ments of a landing force call for a flexible, responsive
air combat element (ACE). Air component tasks include
planning and employing air power to assist in seeking out
and destroying enemy forces and supporting installations,
gaining and maintaining air superiority, preventing move-
ment of enemy forces along routes of communications into
and within the objective area, and providing direct air
support to the ground combat element in order to assist in
the attainment of assigned objectives. The tasks required
to support the Marine aviation mission have been categor-
ized into separate functional areas. These functions are
air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support,
offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of
aircraft and missiles. TABLE I delineates the assets in
the Marine Aircraft Wing and the respective function which
the asset is tasked to perform.
TABLE I
TYPES OF MARINE AVIATION UNITS
SQUADRON TYPE AIRCRAFT PRIMARY AVIATION FUNCTION
VMA (AW) A-6E OFFENSICE AIR SUPPORT
VMFA F/A-18A ANTIAIR WARFARE
VMFA (AW) F/A-18D OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT
VMA AV-8B OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT
VMAQ EA-6B ELECTRONIC WARFARE
VMFP RF-4B AIR RECONNAISSANCE
VMGR KC-130F/R ASSAULT SUPPORT
VMO OV-10A/D ASSAULT SUPPORT
MALS OA-4M CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES
HMH CH-53D/E ASSAULT SUPPORT
HMM CH-46 ASSAULT SUPPORT
HMLA UH-1N/AH-1W ASSAULT SUPPORT
LAAM HAWK ANTIAIR WARFARE
LAAD STINGER ANTIAIR WARFARE
MACS TAOC CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES
MASS DASC/ASRT CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES
H&HS TACC CONTROL OF AIRACRAFT AND
MISSILES
OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT
Offensive air support is defined as those air operations
that actually deliver firepower against enemy ground forces
for the destruction or neutralization of installations,
equipment and personnel. (9:7) Offensive air support
missions are classified as either close air support or deep
air support. Table I illustrates the aircraft assets whose
primary mission is offensive air support.
Presently, the A6-E is primarily tasked for deep air
support due to its search radar and terrain clearance
capability. The A6-Es capabilities demand its employment
at night and/or in bad weather conditions. With the
search radar and computer in the A6-E and the PPN-19
radio beacon in the battalion, the capability exists for
all-weather close air support. The A6-E is currently
being replaced by the F/A-18D which will bring to Marine
Corps aviation tremendous capabilities. One of the main
reasons the F/A-18D was chosen to replace the A6-E was
commonality of force. The F/A-18D shares common support
with the single seat F/A-18A, already in the fleet. The
two seat F/A-18D will also perform such missions as air
reconnaissance, tactical air control airborne, and forward
air control airborne. USMC Deputy Chief of Staff for
aviation, Lt. Gen. C. Pitman, is quoted as saying, "Our
new proposal is to assign the missions of our 21 RF-4Bs,
37 OA-4s/TA-4s, and 50 A6-Es to a force of 84 F/A-18Ds."
The only capabilities the F/A-18D will not possess are
the all-weather terrain clearance and all-weather close
air support. A conscious decision was made to do without
these capabilities until the F/A-18D could be modified.
The F/A-18D will be a tremendous asset to the ACE, limited
only by the imagination of aviation planners and the
weather.
The AV-8B is the bread and butter of offensive air
support, specifically close air support. "The all-VSTOL
capability is one of the stated goals of the MAGTF master
plan. The master plan has evolved around this goal,"
stated LT. Gen. C. Pitman in a recent article in the Armed
Forces Journal International. The Marine Corps wants expe-
ditionary capability so as not to rely on large conventional
airfields that have been targeted by the enemy. The AV-8B's
best capability is its sustained sortie rate. (4) Lt. Gen.
C. Pitman stated in the August 1989 issue of the Armed Forces
Journal International that:
We need a quick turnaround, the ability to go out, strike,
do the mission, come back, refuel, rearm, and go out
again. That is why the AV-8B's sustained sortie rate
is higher than any other aircraft. It is not because it
is so much better an aircraft, but it can get out there
in ten minutes and get back in ten minutes and deliver
its load,whatever time that takes. Or stay on station
for an hour or two. It's sortie generation we're look-
ing for. (4)
To enhance the AV-8B's capability, the Marine Corps
has bought the night attack version of the aircraft. The
night attack AV-8B will give the Marines a clear weather,
night attack capability. The AV-8B will truly continue
to be an asset to Marines in future battles.
ASSAULT SUPPORT
Assault support uses aircraft to provide tactical
mobility and logistical support for ground combat elements,
the movement of high priority cargo and personnel within
the immediate area of operations, inflight refueling for
fixed-wing aircraft, and the evacuation of personnel and
cargo. (7:3) The tasks of assault support fall within
4 categories: (1) vertical assault airlift, (2) air
delivery, (3) inflight refueling, (4) air evacuation. (9:7)
The assets used to perform these tasks are found in
several type squadrons. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
(HMM) is the primary troop transport squadron, containing
the CH-46 helicopter. Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron,
equipped with the CH-53D/E helicopter, is the logistic,
transport helicopter squadron. The Marine Light Attack
Squadron (HMLA) is composed of UH-1N/AH-1W helicopters.
The UH-1N is primarily used for utility support and the AH-1W
is tasked primarily for close-in fire support missions.
Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) contains the OV-10A/D
aircraft. The OV-10A/D is tasked for air reconnaissance,
observation, and air control operations, to list
a few. Some specific assault missions performed by the
OV-10 are air drop, air delivery, illumination, and evacu-
ation. The Marine aerial refueler/tranport squadron has the
KC-130 aircraft. Its primary mission is to provide aerial
refueling service to Fleet Marine Force units.
The primary troop lift aircraft is the CH-46 heli-
copter. One CH-46 squadron of 12 aircraft has the capa-
bility of moving approximately one reinforced infantry
company in a single lift. (7:10) The CH-46 will reach
the end of its service life in 1995. The Marine Corps is
70 aircraft short in the medium lift requirement. This is
due in part to several factors: service life, CH-46 attri-
tion, spare parts, and budget problems with the acquisition
of the primary replacement aircraft, the MV-22 tiltrotor.
The original buy of 522 MV-22s was to replace about 250
CH-46s and 130 earlier model CH-53s. (4) The MV-22 is
a very capable aircraft. Its capabilities include capacity
for 24 personnel, speeds to 300 knots, unrefueled range of 2000+
nautical miles, over-the-horizon capability, and a decrease
in maintenance-man-hours per flight hour. The alternative
fleet of CH-53Es and CH-60 Blackhawk helicopters would
impose range and speed limitations on over-the-horizon
operations. (4) The CH-60 is a proven combat performer
for the Army in the recent Panama operation. The CH-60
has limitations for over-the-horizon operations but it is
an effective interim solution to the medium lift problem.
The MV-22 should not be bought just because it fits into
the over-the-horizon concept but because it is a techno-
logical breakthrough that has so many capabilities which
will not be realized until it is put in the hands of
Marine pilots. Replacing the CH-46 is an urgent need;
the solution should be the MV-22 Osprey.
The AH-1W is the most recent version of the AH-1 to
be fielded. It is virtually a new helicopter with the
capability for the Hellfire, Sidearm, Sidewinder, and TOW
missiles. A few problems will have to be solved before
this attack helicopter can achieve its full capability.
The Hellfire has a laser receiver installed for terminal
guidance, which means the missile must "see" laser energy
for it to terminally guide. The AH-1W does not have
any laser "designate" capability, thus the successful
employment of the Hellfire depends on an independent source
of laser designation, e.g. MULE ground designator or OV-10D
A6-E airborne designator. A night targeting system which
will have a laser designator is under development for the
AH-1W in conjunction with the Israelies. (4) Another
problem is one which affects the TOW missile capability.
Defective TOW missile motors have been discovered in the
fleet's weapon's inventory: approximately 80% of all TOW
motors are defective. The solution which was implemented
involved replacing 50% of the defective motors to suffi-
ciently stockpile the TOW inventory until TOW II is intro-
duced in 1992. The MAGTF master plan envisions replacing
the AH-1, UH-1, and OV-10 with a common vertical takeoff
or land (VTOL)/ short takeoff or land (STOL) aircraft
during the first decade of the next century. (4)
The KC-130 aircraft's primary mission is aerial
refueling. Its other tasks include air tranport of troops
and cargo, air delivery, and medevac. The KC-130 is vital
to all of these tasks, especially aerial refueling. The
Marine Corps will experience a shortage of aerial refueling
assets in the next 10 years. With the A6-E being retired
from the Marine aviation inventory, an aerial refueling
asset is lost. The A6-E has the capability of carrying
an aerial refueling store which gives the A6-E the capa-
bility of refueling other airborne aircraft. The F/A-18D
aircraft, which is replacing the A6-E, does not have the
capability of carrying the aerial refueling store that
would give the F/A-18D the aerial refueler capability.
Considering these facts, the mission planners will have
more requirements for airborne fuel and less assets with
which to accomplish this mission.
A few years ago, the Marine Corps decided to request
all strategic aerial refueling missions from the Air Force,
e.g. Transpacs and Translants. Previous to that, the
KC-130 performed that mission, supporting FMF units. With
the decision by the Marine Corps to request these missions
done by the Air Force, the requirement to train Marine
KC-130 pilots for this mission became obsolete. At the
present, Marine KC-130 pilots are no longer qualified to
perform this mission. The Air Force can easily become
over-committed in strategic aerial refueling and the
possibility exists that the Air Force will not have the
assets available for the Marine Corps' requests. The
mission planners must prepare for this possibility and
qualify Marine Corps pilots and aircrewmen to perform the
strategic aerial refueling mission.
ANTIAIR WARFARE
Antiair warfare (AAW) is the action that is required
to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air
and missile threat. (5:1) The primary purpose of AAW is
to gain and maintain air superiority. AAW operations are
further characterized as air defense and offensive AAW.
Air defense is all defensive measures designed to destroy
attacking enemy aircraft or missiles or to nullify and
reduce the effectiveness of such attack. (9:6) Offensive
AAW constitutes operations conducted against the enemy air
or air defense system. Offensive AAW consists mainly of
air attacks to destroy or neutralize hostile aircraft,
airfields, radars, air defense systems and supporting areas.
Three principles of AAW are destruction-in depth,
mutual support, and centralized coordination and decen-
tralized control. Destruction-in depth is threat detec-
tion and destruction beginning as far as possible from
the vital area and continuing as long as the threat
exists. Mutual support deals with the integrated and
overlapping pattern of several AAW elements so the loss
of any one element does not reduce the effectiveness of
the AAW system. Centralized coordination is the respon-
sibility Commander of the Landing Force (CLF), delegated
to the Tactical Air Commander (TAC). (6:1-2) Decentral-
ized control is the delegation to subordinate elements
within the AAW system of the authority to react immediately
to a threat.
The specific organizations of the Marine Aircraft
Wing (MAW) for AAW are the fighter/attack (VMFA) squadrons,
headquarters and headquarters (H&HS) squadron, marine air
control (MACS) squadron, light antiaircraft missile (LAAM)
battalion, and the low altitude air defense (LAAD) bat-
talion. The MAW contains approximately 75 aircraft in
the VMFA squadrons. The H&HS operates the TACC and the
early warning radars of the tactical air operations
center (TAOC) come from the MACS. The Hawk surface to air
missile is in the LAAM and the Stinger shoulder-fired
missile is in the LAAD.
AAW in support of an amphibious operation is complex.
Elements of a joint task force (JTF) or advance groups
of the amphibious task force (ATF) would conduct offensive
AAW operations before the ATF arrives. (6:3-9) During
movement of the landing force (LF) to the amphibious objec-
tive area (AOA), the responsibility for AAW rests with the
commander amphibious task force (CATF). (6:3-9) During the
assault phase, air superiority must be maintained in the
AOA. LAAD teams, along with the carrier battle group
(CVBG) aircraft and/or ATF air in theatre, will provide air
defense during the assault and buildup phases. TAOC
radars and Hawk missile units will gradually be phased
ashore and establish defense-in depth.
Once control is passed ashore, the CLF has the
responsibility for AAW, which he delegates to the TAC.
A MEF has approximately 250 aircraft, 3 Hawk batteries,
and 90 Stinger teams to conduct AAW. The TAOC's radars
will search out to 300 miles for enemy aircraft. How is
the AAW system going to be set up to best defend the LF?
The CLF determines the vital areas that are to be defended.
Once this has been determined, the air defense systems are
then deployed. Hawk missile batteries may also be deployed
with the GCE along with Stinger teams. Fighter aircraft
are positioned at combat air patrol stations to round out
the defensive AAW system.
One problem which may occur involves the employment
of the Hawk missile system. To provide greater mobility
and increase the defensive capability of the Hawk, the
battery can be divided into two major configurations-
the Hawk Battery (minus), and the assault fire unit (AFU)
(5:26) The problem is that the AFU is only capable against
low altitude targets (below 9000'). Thus, while the battery
is divided, the surveillance and engagement capability of
the battery is degraded,
The Stinger shoulder-fired missile is continuously
being upgraded. There are limitations to its employment.
Lessons learned from the use of the British Blowpipe
shoulder-fired missile in the Falklands supports this
opinion. The Blowpipe and Stinger have small warheads,
1-2 kilograms. This was a limitation. The Blowpipe had
to impact the target aircraft to have any chance of causing
damage to that aircraft, and even then, in a large percen-
tage of cases the targeted aircraft made it back to base.
(3:30,31) Out of 100 engagements by the Blowpipe, only
9 aircraft were destroyed. (3:31) Those 9 were helicopter
and slow flying propeller aircraft. (3:31) Another
limitations of its employment is against low flying, high
speed (500 plus knots) aircraft. It took 20 seconds to
locate, acquire, and engage the target. (3:30) In 20
seconds, a jet at 500 knots has traveled 3 miles, which
could be out of range.
The Stinger is continuously being improved. Even with
that in mind, a low flying, high speed aircraft presents a
threat to those areas of the LF protected by the Stinger,
e.g. the ground combat element (GCE). Mutual support over
the GCE amounts to the Stinger missile and small arms.
This principle of mutual support could be strengthened
with a mobile antiaircraft (AAA) gun, e.g. the Vulcan.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
The function of electronic warfare in military action
involves the use of electromagnetic energy to determine
exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromag-
netic spectrum and actions which retains friendly use
of the electromagnetic spectrum. (9:8) There are three
categories of electronic warfare: electronic warfare
support measure (ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM),
and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).
The EA-6B is the only electronic warfare aircraft
in the Marine Corps. They comprise one squadron, VMAQ-2,
which is subdivided into 3 detachments, a total of 18
aircraft. Lt. Gen. Pitman recently approved a plan to
form three separate squadrons with 5 EA-6Bs in each
squadron. The future also calls for the Marine Corps
to upgrade to the newest version of the EA-6B, the ADVCAP
(advanced capability). However, some circles do not view
the future of the EA-6B being so bright. In a time of
budget cuts, the rumor is the Marine Corps will lose 12
EA-6Bs; 6 EA-6Bs remaining in one squadron.
Other electronic warfare assets are found in the
landing force's weapons inventory. The bomb dump con-
tains antiradiation missiles, such as the Harm, Shrike,
and Sidearm which aircraft launch against enemy radars.
Also available are Samson decoys, which are used in an
electronic deception role.
The use of the electromagnetic spectrum has been an
integral component in recent successful battles. From the
Israelies' use of it in the Bekaa Valley to the U.S. strike
in Libya, the exploitation of electronic warfare was instru-
mental in each battle. Further support for the EA-6B's
existence was documented during a joint test in 1981
called EW/CAS (electronic warfare during close air support).
The EA-6B is an invaluable and irreplacable asset. The
Marine Corps must avoid any plan to decrease the number
of EA-6Bs in its force.
CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES
Control of aircraft and missiles is achieved by inte-
gration of all aviation functions into a single coordinated
system. (8:1-1) The Marine air command and control system
(MACCS) provides the ACE with the facilities, capabilities
and communications to exercise command and control of avia-
tion assets. The Marine Air Control Group (MACG) has the
mission of operating the MACCS. The units of the MACG
involved in operating the MACCS are Tactical Air Command
Center (TACC), Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC),
Direct Air Support Center (DASC), and Marine Air Traffic
Control Squadron (MATCS).
The equipment of these units is old and outdated.
The TAOC is 1966 vintage that is being replaced by a more
capab1e and modern Tactical air operations module (TAOM).
(2) These modules will monitor the early warning radars
with new computers as well as receive data link informa-
tion from the Navy E2C. The DASC is being updated with
the improved DASC (IDASC). (2) The IDASC is nothing more
than a manual plotting board and communications equipment
housed inside a shelter which is truck transportable. The
TACC is being upgraded with the advanced TACC (ATACC),
which is scheduled to be delivered to the Marine Corps by
April 1991. (2) The new Marine air traffic control and
landing system (MATCALS) is being prpduced for the MATCS
arriving in the FMF at any time.
With its sophisticated sensors (radar), communications
(data link), and firepower (aircraft and missiles), the
MACCS appears to be an effective formidable tool. What
lies behind this illusion is a system based upon a flawed
concept of employment. (1) A system that depends on radar
and radios (particularly ground-based) will be at the top
of an adversaries' "first day" priority target list. (1)
To survive, the system must be mobile, which it is not.
The surface lift requirement of the MACCS is the highest
in the Marine Corps for similiarly sized units. Improve-
ments have been made with the IDASC making it more trans-
portable by truck, but other agencies are virtual cities
of equipment. (1) Once in place, the TACC, TAOC, Hawk
and MATCS detachments are slow and difficult to move.
Another limitation besides mobility is the vulnerability
of the MACCS to antiradiation missiles (ARM) and electronic
countermeasures (ECM). (1) Black-box (ECCM) solutions to
ARM and ECM are the planners' solution, but any radar or
circuit can and will be found by a well-trained enemy. (1)
The MACCS also suffers from disjointed training.
The MACCS is so large that it is rarely deployed as an
entire system and when it is in Team Spirit or Gallant
Eagle, there are so many constraints that operating the
MACCS according to doctrine becomes impossible. (1)
Individual agency training occurs and aircrews and ground
commanders see only part of the system (1)
The MACCS is a complex, time-consuming and sometimes
hard to understand system. It is immobile, vulnerable
and not battle-tested. But it is what the Marine Corps
has and will use in the next war. It must be tested and
trained with in its entirety so Marines can identify flaws,
correct them or learn how to work with them.
AIR RECONNAISSANCE
Air reconnaissance is the acquisition of intelligence
information employing visual observation and/or sensors
in air vehicles. (9:6) Marine aviation reconnaissance
capabilities include the employment of photographic,
electronic and visual reconnaissance/surveillance to
fulfill the specific and immediate requirements of the
landing force.
Marine assets normally tasked for air reconnaissance
are the RF-4B, OV-10D, and EA-6B. The RF-4B's capabilities
include side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), photographic,
and visual. The OV-10D is normally tasked to provide
reconnaissance at night using its forward-looking infrared
(FLIR). The EA-6B is used to collect electronic information
to better build an electronic order of battle.
The RF-4B is being retired from the Marine Corps in
the summer of 1990. The F/A-18D is replacing the RF-4B
this summer. Although, the F/A/18D will not be capable of
performing the photo mission until 1994. The F/A-18D will
have to carry a photo pod to perform the mission. The photo
pod will not be ready for the FMF until 1994. Other than
35mm photo missions, the Marine Corps will have to request
other service assets for photo or SLAR air reconnaissance
missions.
The times are transitional in Marine aviation. The
F/A-18D is replacing the A6-E, giving the Marine Corps a
very potent asset. At the same time, the Marines are
losing a capability in the A6-E of all-weather close air
support. The medium lift shortfall is one of the biggest
problems as the CH-46 nears its service life while its
proposed replacement, the MV-22, is still being scurtin-
ized. The future of Marine aviation is fewer types of
aircraft for commonality of parts and maintenance. The
MACCS is being upgraded resulting in newer and more
reliable equipment. It is also pointed out that the MACCS
is equipment and personnel intensive and training with
the system in its entirety with few constraints, is a
necessity. Marine aviation is in an exciting and trans-
itional stage. It will be a challenge for aviation plan-
ners to deal with the limitations of these aircraft and
equipment, and effectively employ them in the future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bozelli, Robert R., "Rethinking MACCS," Marine Corps
Gazette, (October 1988).
2. Goodman, Glenn W., Jr., "Marines Modernize Air Command
and Control with Off-the Shelf Equipment," Armed
Forces Journal International, (August 1989).
3. Hillson, Franklin J. Maj., USAF, "Barrage Balloons For
Low Level Defense," Airpower Journal, (Summer 1989),
p. 27-39.
4. Ropelewski, Robert R., "Marines Shun Runways in Future
Fighter Plans," Armed Forces Journal International,
(August 1989).
5. U.S. Marine Corps. Antiair Warfare, FMFM 5-5, Quantico,
1980.
6. U.S. Marine Corps. Antiair Warfare, OH 5-5, Quantico,
1987.
7. U.S. Marine Corps. Assault Support, FMFM 5-3, Quantico,
1979.
8. U.S. Marine Corps. Control of Aircraft and Missiles,
OH 5-8, Quantico, 1988.
9. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1, Quantico,
1979.
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