Military Intervention: A Question Of Risk
AUTHOR Major John R. Turner, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA History
-TEXT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MILITARY INTERVENTION: A QUESTION OF RISK
Thesis: Acceptable risk levels of operational clarity,
certainty, and control were achieved for Operation
Urgent Fury in 1983, and Operation Just Cause in
December 1989, but not before or during the failed
Panama Coup in October 1989.
Sun Tzu said it well, "Those who know when to fight and
when not to fight are victorious." Since the dawn of creation
man has intervened or meddled in his fellow-man's business. A
prayer following Solomon's model for leaders in I Kings 3:9
would serve us well, "So give your servant a discerning heart
to govern your people and to distinguish between right and
wrong. For who is able to govern this great people of yours?"
The United States must assume its role as democratic
example to the world with caution. We must continue to be
reluctant to use force.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, writing for The Washington Post,
October 16, 1989, identified clarity, certainty, and control
as the three key ingredients before military intervention is
used. Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause and the October
1989 Panama Coup failure were selected for investigation
because of the plan to use overt military intervention existed
in each. Two met with almost immediate support back home.
Whereas the failed coup attempt was followed up with hawks and
doves alike calling for action against Noriega. In each case
risk was assessed and analyzed before military forces were
committed. President Reagan acted wisely in 1983, and
President Bush has acted wisely, even though House Majority
Leader Gephardt has accused him of running a government "of
the polls, by the polls, and for the polls." In some manner,
most elected (seeking reelection) leaders keep their ears to
the voters.
President Kennedy warned in 1962, "the great enemy of
truth is very often not the lie--deliberate, contrived, and
dishonest--but the myth--persistent, persuasive, and
unrealistic." Risk assessment must include balance. We must
balance the budget, balance the armed forces against the
threat, balance the response, and balance our perception of
ourselves so as not to fall victim to the "myth" President
Kennedy warned us about.
MILITARY INTERVENTION: A QUESTION OF RISK
OUTLINE
Thesis: Acceptable risk levels of operational clarity,
certainty, and control were achieved for Operation
Urgent Fury in 1983, and Operation Just Cause in
December 1989, but not before or during the failed
Panama Coup in October 1989.
I. Military intervention
A. Historical perspective
B. Risk
II. Grenada: Operation Urgent Fury
III. Failed Panama Coup attempt in October 1989
IV. Panama: Operation Just Cause
V. Next time: The military intervention risk dilemma
MILITARY INTERVENTION: A QUESTION OF RISK
Those who know when to fight and when not to fight
are victorious. Those who discern when to use many
or few troops are victorious. Those whose upper and
lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.
Those who face the unprepared with preparation are
victorious. Those whose generals are able and are
not constrained by their governments are victorious.
(19:85)
--Sun Tzu
Teddy Roosevelt said that we should speak softly but carry
a big stick. The big stick in context would be a strong
military to ensure deterrence was and is listened to.
"President Bush vowed today (January 12, 1990) to stand fast
against those who would `naively cut the muscle out of our
defense posture' . . .," and "recast the threat as one of
uncertainty." (David Hoffman, The Washington Post, January 13,
1990) Doctor George Liska of Johns Hopkins University said,
That all major powers have forcefully intervened at
one time or another in geopolitically delimited
spheres of influence against disturbing developments
or alien influences. All the pious disclaimers to
the contrary notwithstanding, intervention is as much
an inalienable right as a common practice in
international relations. Actual reasons and artful
rationalizations frequently overlap when discussing
this practice. (20:190)
In our system of "by the people and for the people," our
elected and appointed leaders must tread lightly and proceed
most wisely. It would be to our national advantage if more of
our leaders prayed fervently like King Solomon of I Kings 3:9,
"So give your servant a discerning heart to govern your people
and to distinguish between right and wrong. For who is able
to govern this great people of yours?" In recent years,
Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush have referenced and asked
for God's power, strength, and wisdom in decisions concerning
the safety and strategic defense issues facing the United
States, and in particular, when military force is contemplated
or exercised.
The United States must coexist in a world containing
states of greatly varying ideological philosophies. A world
"marked by civil disturbances, terrorist violence, subversive
activities, surrogate wars, insurgencies, and guerilla
warfare." (12:4) The President is faced with great problems
covering internal affairs such as poverty, education, health
care, drug and alcohol abuse, crime, etc. Additionally, the
President must face external demands for the use of our
elements of power, economy, diplomacy (politics), and
military. "When the modern state was born, civil war was born
too." (7:1) Armed intervention, you might say, began when God
had expelled Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, and He
posted an angel with a flaming sword to guard against their
reentry and access to the tree of life. (Genesis 3:24)
Since earliest times, the United States has seen as its
mission and responsibility setting the democratic example,
"freedom and social justice to all mankind; leading men away
from their wicked ways; and establishing an international
order of harmony." (12:5) Then Secretary of State George
Shultz said in 1988,
Americans will always be reluctant to use force. It
is the mark of our decency. A great power cannot
free itself so easily from the burden of choice. It
must bear responsibility for the consequences of its
inaction as well as for the consequences of its
action. (12:5)
Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Robeson IV, writing for the
Marine Corps Gazette in November 1989 said,
The need to resort to military force of some kind may
arise routinely in the affairs between nations, even
when a state of war does not exist. . . . We must be
prepared to execute national policy by imposing our
will on the enemy at any level, from using intense
clashes between large military forces--backed by an
official declaration of war--through conducting or
countering covert hostilities which barely reach the
threshold of violence. (14:27)
Military intervention has always been a matter of risk.
Clausewitz tells us that "war is a mere continuation of policy
by other means." (3:119) The decision for military
intervention should not be answered until "risk" has been
assessed and analyzed. Risk, what will it cost the nation
when and if they exercise their option of military
intervention? This can be weighed in terms of men, money, and
materiel. However, often, the most pressing concern is
twofold--world and public opinion. Who will support the
action externally and internally? In 1965, a national poll
revealed 61% of those polled supported President Johnson's war
in Vietnam. By 1968, however, only 41% supported the war
effort. (1:53) As a result, President Johnson turned his
efforts to ending the war, did not run for reelection, and his
actions made it difficult campaigning for Hubert Humphrey.
Nixon was elected. President Nixon was into his second term
before the war ended "officially" in 1973. Vietnam fell in
1975 and our pullout was under-fire. As a result of this long
and unpopular war, the question of risk has been in the
forefront of every consideration of using U.S. military might.
House Majority Learder Richard Gephardt "in one of the
sharpest Democratic assaults to date on Bush, . . . accused
the president of running a government `of the polls, by the
polls, and for the polls.'" (Tom Kenworthy, The Washington
Post, March 7, 1990)
German general Hans von Seekt in his book, Thoughts of a
Soldier, states,
Action has three stages: The decision born of
thought, the order of preparation for execution, and
the execution itself. All three stages are govened
by the will. The will is rooted in character, and
for the man of action character is of more critical
importance than intellect. Intellect without will is
worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.
(4:26)
The events of the 1970's set the stage for the 1980's.
The 70's began with the Vietnam war and ended with the fall of
the Shah in Iran, Maurice Bishop in charge of Grenada,
Sandinistas running Nicaragua, Noriega inching closer to total
power in Panama, and worst of all--American hostages held in
Iran! President Reagan came into office in January 1981
vowing to restore the United States' global prestige and
rebuild our military might. The American hostages in Iran
were freed on Inauguration Day 1981. Later in 1981, two
Libyan fighters were shot-down over the Gulf of Sidra by Navy
fighters. Sadly, Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981. In
1983, the Marine Corps was faced with the worst loss of life
in one day in many years when the barracks in Beirut was
destroyed by a terrorist truck-bomb attack. Later, Operation
Urgent Fury, successfully rescued many American students, and
freed Grenada from a Marxist-Leninist inspired government
backed by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Two Libyan
patrol boats were sunk in the Gulf of Sidra in March 1986. In
April 1986, Operation El Dorado Canyon was tremendously
successful in showing Gaddafi that he was not nearly as safe
as he suspected, and it sent a signal to the world that the
United States meant business. The Persian Gulf incidents of
1988 have met with mixed reviews, but all in all, the Navy and
Marine Corps performed well and the sea lines of communication
have remained open for free navigation. The 1980's closed
with fantastic events, including, the apparent crumbling of
the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe, Soviet internal strife, the
Sandinistas scheduling free elections for early 1990 (the
Sandinistas lost in February 1990!), and Noriega's fall from
power and capture in Panama following the United States
invasion on December 20, 1989.
In all cases cited above, the United States considered the
important question of "risk." In most cases, bold and
agressive actions have met with allied support, and more
importantly, support from the citizens of the United States.
Public opinion is high, and President Bush is enjoying
unparalleled public support for his actions during his first
year in the White House. To narrow our review, only three
events were chosen for closer consideration. These are
Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada during October 1983, the
failed coup attempt in Panama during October 1989, and
Operation Just Cause in Panama during December 1989. These
three were chosen because American troops on the ground played
a large part in assessing and analyzing the risk associated
with each action. The failed Iranian raid in 1980 was omitted
because it required much more covert action, whereas the three
under question were primarily focused on overt military
actions, and two of the three resulted in overt military
actions. They are also matters of public record. Acceptable
risk levels of operational clarity, certainty, and control
were achieved for Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, and Operation
Just Cause in December 1989, but not before or during the
failed Panama Coup in October 1989.
GRENADA: OPERATION URGENT FURY
"Unless it's your coup, it's hard to know what is really
going on." (9:19) How true. The same can be said for any
military action either covert or overt. If it is your plan
and your action, a much greater level of clarity, certainty,
and control can exist.
Maurice Bishop's rise to power in Grenada during 1979 came
from a successful coup overthrowing Prime Minister Gairy's
government while he was out of the country. In 1983, Prime
Minister Bishop became the object of yet another coup by
Bernard Coard, his co-Ieader and Deputy Prime Minister.
Bishop and several of his followers were murdered and within
just a few days U.S. forces intervene and topple the
Marxist-Leninist government. It is very difficult to talk
about Grenada without adding Cuba, Nicaragua, and to a lesser
degree Panama. Marxist-Leninist ideology flows through Fidel
Castro to all Soviet interest states in the Americas. Now
Castro's faithful allies, Maurice Bishop of Grenada, Manuel
Noriega of Panama, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, have passed
from power. In fact, the world's socialist bloc headed by the
Soviet Union is crumbling. (Jeane Kirkpatrick, The Washington
Post, February 27, 1990) Castro is concerned. It was
reported through UPI news service from Mexico City on March
15, 1990, that more than 2,000,000 Cubans will participate in
a rehearsal of what they predict will happen if the United
States invades Cuba.
For many years the real problem in Central and Latin
Amercia has not been poverty, but the real culprit has been
Soviet influence through Marxist-Leninist ideology. Poverty
is a distant second. (20:40) For more than a decade, Grenada
has been trying to use the Amercian media to present favorable
images of their revolution. In fact, one of the captured
documents was a telephone book listing sympathetic media
points of contact and other useful persons in the United
States. (20:255)
Grenada was rescued in October 1983. Grenadians prefer
"rescue mission" to intervention or invasion. (REUTER news
network, St. George's, Grenada, March 13, 1990) During ABC's
evening news on March 11, 1990, John Quinones reports from St.
George's, Grenada, "six and one-half years ago, American
troops ousted the island's Marxist government. Most
Grenadians still remember it as a day of liberation."
Following Grenada's liberation, the Soviet Union and Cuba
warned Nicaragua about provoking the United States. Every
effort should be made to deprive the United States of an
excuse for military intervention in Nicaragua. (20:127) It
can be noted that neither Cuban nor Soviet bases exist in
Nicaragua. The Grenada action has proven to be a large plus
factor for the United States' credibility and reliability as
an ally to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. (20:127)
Former Ambassador to Grenada and nine other Caribbean
nations and territories, Sally A. Shelton writes,
The United States cannot afford to be uninformed
about political movements in the Caribbean Basin,
especially when they have sharp differences of
opinion with the United States. This is exactly what
happened in Grenada, where information about the New
Jewel Movement (NJM) was dated and sketchy at the
time of the revolution in 1979. This was because the
NJM was not taken seriously, and little effort had
been given toward developing systematic channels of
information about Grenada. We ignore these political
actors of the region--be they on the right or the
left--at our own peril.
It is a travesty not to have a U.S. embassy or
consulate on each of the independent islands of the
Caribbean, perhaps even on the non-independent isles.
One cannot develop good information or a feel for
what is happening unless one is physically present.
(20:237)
FAILED PANAMA COUP IN OCTOBER 1989
The coup attempt had too many ifs and maybes--including
the purported statement by Major Giroldi that he was not going
to turn Noriega over to the United States, but rather press
for internal reform. As hard as we were pressing for
Noriega's capture and trial in the United States, it would
follow that if we considered acting during the coup, when and
if Major Giroldi said that he would not turn over Noriega, we
changed our minds quickly and left him to his own devices.
(Author's opinion) Major Giroldi was not the most credible
coup leader because he had put-down a coup attempt against
Noriega in 1988. Clarity, certainty, and control were
missing. Major Giroldi's wife could not fill the voids in the
coup plan to satisfy U. S. officials. (Author's opinion)
One Republican senator is reported to have said that three
things should be known before the president commits U.S.
troops: (1) The reliability of the individuals involved, (2)
the adequacy of the planning, and (3) the likelihood of
casualties. These three need to be coupled with very clear
political and military objectives. (9:19) The United States
wanted to help Major Moises Giroldi during the coup attempt.
Risk prevented our intervention. Things may have moved too
fastly or slowly, but the conclusion was that there was more
to lose than to gain. Another consideration is that the coup
attempt required a large amount of covert action leading up to
possible overt military action by U.S. forces in Panama.
William Rusher writing for The Washington Times on October 20,
1989, reports,
I simply can't stand the ineffable gall of people who
have spent nearly two decades trying to cripple the
ability of the U.S. government to respond effectively
in a foreign crisis, now suavely complaining the
President George Bush and his aides didn't do enough,
or do it fast enough, during the unsuccessful attempt
to overthrow Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel
Noriega. Talk about Monday morning quarterbacks!
Seldom in the field of human conflict have so many
been so wise after the event.
Syndicated columnist Jeane Kirkpatrick's article entitled
"The Coup Game" appeared in The Washington Post on October 16,
1989. She gives three things as the missing ingredients that
led to the United States not acting during the failed coup
attempt of October 3, 1989. These are clarity, certainty, and
control. With restraints imposed by Congress, concern of
world opinion, and the fear of public opinion, the Bush
Administration acted as have many administrations that have
gone before--they hesitated in using military force. As time
has gone on, the decision not to act seems to have been the
best one for United States concerns. This is supported by the
successful invasion of December 20, 1989, and Noriega in
custody pending trial in the United States.
Several good things seem to have come from the failed
coup. The White House and CIA are continuing to review and
rewrite the rules concerning assassination. According to
Andrew Rosenthal writing for The New York Times on October 13,
1989, the Bush Administration began carefully reconsidering
and reevaluating what is required before action is taken to
assist in future coup attempts. More importantly, the
planners and strategists got busy working out the details for
an invasion of Panama at the earliest opportune time--December
20, 1989.
PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE
In 1984, while Assistant Professor of National Security
Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California, Doctor Michael Clough wrote three things
pertaining to Grenada that seem germane to the aftermath of
the Panama Operation Just Cause: (1) Following perceived
successes come the tendencies to overestimate the long-term
effects of individual events, (2) there are tendencies to
exaggerate the significance of events dramatized by the news
media, and (3) there seems to be subconscious sensitivities to
believe that unless events have broader and larger
significance than as isolated events, they are not worthy of
discussion. (20:164)
A lead story in The Washington Times on March 19, 1990,
gives us an example of exaggeration by stating that "the
American public was deprived of on-the-scene accounts of the
critical first hour of the U.S. intervention in Panama largely
because a senior Pentagon official had locked away plans for a
small group of reporters to accompany the first wave of
troops."
Jeane Kirkpatrick's three C's--clarity, certainty, and
control were evident in the planning and executing of
Operation Just Cause. (9:19) General Thurman took command on
October 1, 1989, and following the failed coup of October 3,
set about to rapidly finish the rewrite of the contingency
plan for Panama. (The Washington Post, January 7, 1990)
CLARITY: By November the plan had been approved by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell.
CERTAINTY: Approval had included authorization for
rehearsals by assigned forces. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
said, "the best form of welfare for the troops is first-class
training, for this saves unnecessary casualties." (4:26)
Minutes before the invasion, U.S. agent Kurt Frederick Muse
was rescued from prison along with many jailed Panamanian
officers who had participated in previous attempts to
overthrow Noriega. (The Washington Post, January 1, 1990) As
early as July 1989, joint contingency readiness exercises were
focusing on what became objectives of Just Cause. Surprise
was achieved because the "slow but steady growth in these
activities `desensitized' the Panamanians. . . . Rehearsals
right under their noses. . . ." (15:28)
CONTROL: The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
by strengthening the roles of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Commnaders-in-Chief cut much of the
bureaucratic redtape in defining the chain of command and
control. Therefore, communications were more easily
established and excecuted without too many "thinking that they
need to be listening" following President Bush's order on
December 17, 1989, to execute the invasion plan. (Defense
News, March 5, 1990)
NEXT TIME: THE MILITARY INTERVENTION RISK DILEMMA
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in a speech during November 1989, said,
No matter how sound your system, how powerful
your politics, how dynamic your economy, how strong
your values, without the armed forces to back them
up, a democratic people can be at risk. . . .
We must not allow ourselves to be confused about
our security. In that respect, the future has not
changed. The world is still dangerous, there are
still threats to our republic, and we still need
ready armed forces to deter war and to win at war if,
God forbid, that becomes necessary. (13:5,7)
Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, presented "five defense blanks" on Thursday, March
22, 1990: (1) "Threats to our national security," (2)
"military strategy," (3) "dollar(s)," (4) "force structure,"
and (5) "the program." (The Washington Post, March 25, 1990)
The article above closes with,
I am constantly being asked for a bottom-line
defense number. I don't know of any logical way to
arrive at such a figure without analyzing the threat;
without determining what changes in our strategy
should be made in light of the changes in the threat;
and then determining what force structure and weapons
programs we need to carry out the revised strategy.
To decide on the size of the defense budget without
first going through this process would be little
better than pulling a number out of the air.
In 1962 while delivering a commencement address at Yale
University, President Kennedy warned us, "the great enemy of
truth is very often not the lie--deliberate, contrived, and
dishonest--but the myth--persistent, persuasive, and
unrealistic." Risk assessment must include balance.
Balance must be the watchword of the 1990's. We must
balance the budget, balance the armed forces against the
threat, balance the response, and balance our perception of
ourselves so as not to fall victim to the "myth" President
Kennedy warned us about nearly thirty years ago.
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