Sealift: A Problem Of The 1990's
AUTHOR LCdr Charles F. Thuma Jr, USN
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
-TEXT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SEALIFT: A PROBLEM OF THE 1990'S
The world continues to change at a rapid pace.
Everyday another headline indicates a continued losing of
communism's grip on Eastern Europe and the decline of the
Soviet empire. This causes uncertainty as to the extent of
commitment of U.S. military forces in NATO. The far east
continues to be a concern for the U.S. with the emergence of
Japan and Korea as economic powers and the instability
within the Philippines. Congress questions the levels of
commitment of U.S. forces and supplies around the globe.
The indication is a continued decline of force levels
overseas, and a continued reduction in the defense budget
through the 1990's. Because of global uncertainty and
looming force reductions overseas, the U.S. sealift
capabilities should be enhanced to meet continuing strategic
goals and commitments. Fewer forces and assets overseas
means the U.S. will have to move more troops, equipment,
supplies, and fuel to fulfill treaty and alliance
obligations. Air transport is capable of meeting some
requirements but the bulk of sustainment will have to go by
sealift.
The U.S. merchant marine continues its decline,
dwindling down to its lowest level since World War II.
A strong revitalized merchant marine would provide the
sealift capability that will be required in a time of
conflict.
SEALIFT: A PROBLEM OF THE 1990'S
Although substansial force reductions are inevitable
because of the rapidly changing international scene, our
sealift capability should be enhanced in order to allow the
United States to meet continuing strategic commitments.
I. Changing scene
a. Perestroika
b. Eastern Bloc
c. European economic combination 1992
d. Pacific rim
II. U.S. Strategic concerns overseas
a. Force projection
b. Reinforce
c. Alliance obligations
d. Massive supply and resupply requirements
III. Only sealift can do the job
a. Troops
b. Equipment
c. Supplies
d. POL
IV. Air supplements sea
a. Emergency
b. Critical
c. High priority
V. Status of United States merchant marine
a. Active government maritime fleet
b. National defense reserve force (NDRF)
c. Ready reserve force
VI. Requirements
a. Sealift is critical
b. A minimum of 650 ships
VII. Allies capabilities
a. Have limited sea assets
b. Don't want to lose their shipping
c. Have own interests
d. Can't be depended on
VIII. Reinvigorate merchant marine
a. Subsidize U.S. companies
b. Ship government cargo by U.S. flags
c. Government build merchant ships and lease to
civilians
d. Merchant marine research and development
SEALIFT: A PROBLEM OF THE 1990'S
With the tolling of the bell at midnight 31 December
1989, a new and challenging decade began for the United
States. For those who protect and defend the nation and its
way of life a cause of great concern is the shrinking
defense budget. The announced defense budget for fiscal
year 1991 has a negative 2.6 percent growth. This shrinking
and stretching of military dollars, appears to be the trend
of the next decade, shrinking in number, stretching every
dollar further. The cuts from the defense posture will
occur both by reduced modernization (i.e., B-2), weapons
cuts (ships and planes), and troop cuts. Many Americans
question our commitment of forces outside our borders and
see a reduction in force level in foreign countries as an
answer to the defense budget dilemma. Although substantial
force reductions are inevitable because of the rapidly
changing international scene, our sealift capability should
be enhanced in order to allow the United States to meet
continuing strategic commitments.
The global scene has witnessed an extraordinary change
never dreamed possible. Much of the relaxed atmosphere must
be attributed to the head of the Soviet Union, President
Gorbachev. His sweeping changes in openness in the Soviet
Union, Perestroika, have led to thaw of the "Cold War"
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union has conducted troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe,
demilitarization of equipment (destroying tanks), and
admitted guilt for various actions (the Soviet Union
admitted it was wrong in invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) radar outside Moscow
was a violation of the US/USSR ABM treaty.
Gorbachev's policies have led to massive changes in the
Eastern Bloc nations. Political changes have occurred
recently in the Warsaw Pact which two years ago would have
been put down with force by the Soviet Union. Poland now
has a non-communist government. Former communist leaders in
East Germany are under arrest awaiting prosecution for
wrongs against the people. Czechoslovakia has forced out
the ruling communists and is replacing the cabinet with over
50 percent non-communist members. Lithuania has declared
itself an independent country from the USSR. Most amazing
of all is the tearing down of the Berlin wall and the
opening of free and unrestricted passage between East and
West Berlin. Also, the possibility of re-uniting East and
West Germany has been discussed for the first time in over
45 years.
While political changes are the current news, other
events are in the offing. In 1992 an European economic
combination will take place linking 12 free countries of
Europe together in one economic base which will have an
undetermined affect on the world economic situation. This
uniting of economic power may limit the economic evolution
of the recently freed Warsaw Pact Nations. Whatever the
case, European economic combination must be monitored with a
cautious eye from the United States.
Europe, although the sight of numerous changes, is not
the only concern. The Pacific Rim area is evolving into its
own presence. Japan and Korea have vast economic power.
The Philippines' instability continues to concern the United
States which has several advanced bases in that country.
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Australia continue to
make economic advances and gains by leaps and bounds.
Continuing through the 1990's and into the 21st
century, the United States has strategic concerns which span
the globe. However, with the necessity of decreasing the
budget deficit and the changing situation overseas, both
constituents and politicians want insight on reducing
military forces overseas and cutting the defense/military
budget. Why does the United States keep forty thousand
United States troops in Korea? The European situation
raises bigger questions: what is the reason behind the
thousand troops in West Germany? Defense Secretary Cheney
feels there are possibilities of greater United States troop
cuts in Europe.1 Whatever happens with the defense budget
and force reductions, the United States is still a world
power and must project forces outside its borders. Whether
the forces are forward based or deployed overseas, they will
require sealift to get to an area of operation, and to be
sustained.
Besides power projection, if a conflict occurs overseas
where United States forces are located, reinforcement of
these troops will be critical. Also, the U.S. has
commitments to the various alliances with or on which it is
a signatory. When conflicts or turmoil occur in various
areas of the globe, we may be required to fulfill our treaty
obligations. A conflict would probably start out with the
shipment of equipment and supplies to our allies and may
ultimately lead to the insertion of United States troops.
In order to maintain our Super Power strategic interests
through out the world, whenever a conflict occurs massive
amounts of supplies and resupply will required. It is
not unimaginable that the conflict could be half-way around
the world from the United States.2
Only sealift can effectively move the massive amount of
support required in global commitments. Former Military
Sealift Commander, Vice Admiral Walter T. Piotti, Jr.,
estimated that 95 percent of the dry cargo and 99 percent of
the liquid cargo needed to sustain land combat must go by
sea.3 Even though much of the material to be moved is air
transportable, not enough aircraft exist to do the job.
Because of the size and complexity of the initial surge
requirement of military equipment to the theater of
operations it must go by ship.4 Current commitments to
NATO call for reinforcement to Europe of 10 Army divisions
which demands more sealift than we currently have.5 If
forces are reduced overseas, our commitment for
reinforcement may increase. Sealift can easily handle
moderate numbers of troops while commercial airlines would
have to be commandeered to accomplish large troop lifts.
With sealift, the cubic size and weight of each piece of
equipment, whether it is a tank, bulldozer, or helicopter,
is not critical. Notwithstanding, cubic size and weight are
critical in determining air lift capability and loading
plans for aircraft. Supplies such as rations, jet engines,
parts, and ammunition, are not constrained by restrictions
when transported by ships. In fact, loading of equipment
and supplies may be facilitated by roll-on/roll-off ships
that have found some favor in today's merchant fleets. One
item that cannot be transported by aircraft in the
quantities required are petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(POL). Sealift tankers and cargo ships are more capable of
transporting the POL required to keep American forces
operating. Sealift is the choice for large quantities of
resupply, estimated at 10 million tons of dry cargo and 110
million barrels of liquid in a 120 day period, that will be
required to support Europe and other allies.6
Although sealift will be the choice for large
quantities of supplies, it will need to be supplemented by
airlift. The very first deployment to a conflict area will
be troops and supplies transported by airlift using both
military and Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft.
Airlift has a quick response time to a crisis anywhere in
the world. This quick response makes airlift essential for
emergency situations, such as Panama. Nevertheless, airlift
does not have the bulk capability that sealift does. The
work horse of the military airlift command, the C-141
Starlifter, can carry only 13 standard size 463L pallets or
153 troops. The C-130 Hercules can carry even less: only 6
463L pallets or 91 troops. Neither one of these transports
can carry tanks. Only the C-5A Galaxy has the capacity to
airlift armor. It can carry two M-1 tanks or 36 463L
pallets or 340 troops.7 Current day air transports are
excellent for critical items, such as repair parts, or high
priority items, such as command and control communications
equipment.
Nonetheless, when it comes to sustainment of forces,
airlift just cannot transport the required bulk and tonnage.
A good example of airlifts inability to carry the necessary
loads is that of Stalingrad during World War II. After
German troops holding Stalingrad were surrounded by the
Russians, they were forced to surrender because the amount
of airlifted supplies were insufficient for sustainment.
Slightly closer to present day, the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift
of 11 months initiated after the Russians had isolated West
Berlin from rail and road access was a tenuous solution at
best that might have failed had the blockade not been
terminated.8 If airlift cannot provide the sustainment
required, the United States must utilize the U.S. merchant
marine sealift capabilities to meet the transport
requirements of overseas commitments.
Most Americans do not know much about the U.S.
merchant marine because American owned shipping carries only
4.2 percent of United States waterborne freight.9 What is
the United States Merchant Marine and what is its status?
The Merchant Marine comes under the regulation of the
Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration.
There are approximately 404 privately-owned U.S. flagged
merchant ships carrying cargo throughout the globe. Of
these, only 272 are militarily useful, the rest being large
tankers, bulk cargo ships (grain), and special purpose
Ships.10 Additionally, there are 394 U.S. citizen and
corporation-owned vessels that are flagged in other
countries which is called Flag of Convenience (FOC).11
Using a foreign flag allows reduced safety standards,
maintenance costs, and the hiring of foreign crews at lower
wages which produce reduced operating costs. Most FOC
vessels are registered in Liberia, Panama, the Bahamas, and
Honduras. In event of an emergency, the government has
negotiated agreements, not treaties, with those countries to
allow the United States control of FOC; this arrangement is
called Effective United States Control (EUSC). There are
approximately 243 vessels (167 Liberian, 47 Panamanian, 27
Bahamian, and 2 Hondurian) under the EUSC program.12 Of
these, 138 are militarily useful (91 tankers, 34 dry cargo
and 13 passenger).13 However, whether the U.S. will be able
to exercise EUSC control is questionable because it is based
on the goodwill of the nations involved. Changing
international situations mean the U.S. cannot always depend
on the good will of other nations when difficulties arise.
As an example, during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, EUSC
ships under Liberian registry were prevented, by executive
order of the Liberian government, from being used by the
U.S. to carry military supplies to Israel. The other
problem with EUSC is that there is no guarantee that foreign
officers and crews operating these vessels will be willing
to sail into troubled waters. Imagine the problems of the
following scenario: a Liberian-flagged tanker, owned by an
Exxon Bahamian subsidiary, manned by Indian officers and
crewed by Tiawanese is delivered to the government for oil
transport in a time of crisis.14
Realizing the lack of U.S. merchant marine vessels and
the problems of FOC, the Government owns an active and
inactive fleet of vessels. The active fleet is comprised of
working vessels under the control of the Military Sealift
Command (MSC). The inactive fleet is mothballed vessels
under the administration of the Maritime Administration and
is composed of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF).
MSC is charged with the responsibility of providing
sealift for strategic mobility of the armed forces in
support of national objectives. Strategic sealift includes
not only government-owned ships but also those of the
merchant marine. MSC contracts for the services of
commercial vessels and hires merchant crews. It also
maintains government-owned support vessels that are not
available in the private sector (i.e., crane ships). MSC
has 135 vessels: 23 special mission ships; 41 Naval
auxiliaries; and, 71 strategic sealift vessels. The 71
strategic sealift ships are include 25 tankers and 46 dry
cargo vessels. Only 11 of the dry cargo vessels would be
readily available in a time of crisis.15
A majority of the strategic sealift vessels compose
three maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) squadrons, loaded
and in position around the world. These are civilian
vessels under contract to MSC. Each MPS squadron is
designed to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for 30
days. A four-ship MPS squadron is continuously underway in
the Eastern Atlantic. Another squadron of five MPS ships is
anchored at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. A third MPS
squadron of four vessels is anchored at Tinian (north of
Guam) in the Western Pacific. These MPS vessels would be
steamed to the vicinity of a conflict, unloaded and married
up with Marine forces which are flown in. Additionally, at
Diego Garcia, there are 12 prepositioned vessels of the
Afloat Pre-positioning Force which are loaded with Army and
AirForce unit equipment.16 MSC assets are currently able to
get underway and are operational vessels.
The NDRF, on the other hand, are mothballed vessels
which have been stored in three locations in the United
States: James River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and, Suisun
Bay, California. The NDRF was originally conceived after
World War II by placing 1,400 merchant ships in storage to
preserve them in an operational state to allow for a speedy
reactivation during a national crisis.17 However, the NDRF
has been reduced to approximately 133 ships, most of which
are so old and deteriorated that it is questionable as to
their actual use.18 The NDRF was originally designed to
have the mothballed ships reactivated in 5-10 days. Lack of
money and attention have taken their toll: a 1976 Maritime
administration study concluded a more likely time of 30-40
days for reactivation.19
Because of the 1976 study the RRF was created. The RRF
was formed by increasing the state of maintenance and
readiness of a portion of the NDRF to levels allowing
reactivation within 5, 10, and 20 days. The RRF composed of
more modern vessels with the most military value: roll
on/roll off, light carriers, and break bulk with self-
loading/off-loading capability.20 There are currently 95
vessels in the RRF.21
There are two problems with the NDRF and RRF: shipyards
and crews. First, the number of shipyards available to
refurbish/reactivate ships in storage has decreased
dramatically since World War II. As an example, in 1982
there were 110 shipbuilding companies, employing 112,000
workers. In 1989 there are 69 companies, employing 72,000.
These statistics indicate a 50 percent decrease in seven
years. There is for the first time in 300 years no
shipbuilding company conducting construction on the Delaware
River.22 All ship building in the United States is
currently done for the U.S. Navy. There are more shipyards
needing work than orders for ships to be built. There have
been no orders for commercial ocean going vessels for
several years.23
During World War II United States shipyards were
producing a million tons of shipping a month. This
production easily exceeded the half a million tons of
shipping the Germans were sinking each month.24 The U.S.
does not have the shipyard capacity to refurbish ships in
mothballs, let alone build the number of ships required to
replace those lost in a conflict. Every U.S. merchant
vessel sunk or disabled during a conflict is another drop of
this country's life blood lost.
Even if the shipyard capabilities existed to refit all
the NDRF and RRF ships, there are not enough U.S. merchant
marine sailors available to operate these vessels. This
second problem of crews may be the worse of the two problems
facing the NDRF and RRF. The decline of the U.S. Merchant
Marine has led to a decrease in the number of jobs available
and the pool of available merchant sailors to crew ships in
a time of conflict. There is an estimated shortfall of
1,400 merchant mariners to meet the sealift requirements of
a single theater war with a projected shortfall of 12,000
sailors by the year 2000.25 Part of the reason for this
is modernization which has reduced the number of crew
members required to man merchant vessels from an average of
35 crew members in the 1960's to an average of 22 today.
Also, automated diesel propulsion has supplanted steam
as the economic choice for merchant vessel operations.
Another reason is U.S. merchant sailors have priced
themselves out of work. U.S. merchant sailors are the
highest paid in the world, receiving high salaries for as
little as six months work. Additionally, many of the U.S.
merchant marine sailors are old, the average age of active
licensed officers is 59 and unlicensed personnel is 50.26
In MSC vessels it is not uncommon to have the youngest crew
member able to collect social security. It is questionable
as to how these older men would stand up to the strain of
getting merchant vessels through hostile waters. There have
not been openings in the U.S. merchant marine for younger
blood for a number of years. The unions maintain a tight
control and opportunities for openings are just not present.
The shortfall of personnel available in a crisis to man RRF
and NDRF assets will continue to be a problem for the
foreseeable future.
Putting these problems aside, in the time of immediate
mobilization the U.S. would ideally have 272 U.S. flagged
merchant vessels, 138 EUSC vessels and 36 MSC vessels for a
total of 446 militarily useful vessels available
immediately. Ideally there would be an additional 228 RRF
and NDRF vessel available with in 5 to 120 days.27
It is obvious by now that in any major crisis sealift
will be critical in transporting reinforcement and resupply
to the area affected. An estimated that 650 vessels will be
required to resupply NATO in the event of Russian
aggression.28 Resupply is then a problem as the U.S. is
approximately 200 vessels short of the 650 vessels required.
There are, however, a possible 228 additional ships within
an estimated 4 months. This provides a total of 674 vessels
as an optimistic view. As nice and clean as it seems, this
is not true. For one thing, not all vessels will be in the
United States proper to be able to load cargo for Europe
when a conflict starts. Some will have just been loaded out
with cargo and underway for foreign ports. Others will be
in foreign ports loading or unloading cargo. Also, it
depends on the type of ships that are available. It is not
possible to put oil into cargo ships; just as it would not
work to load dry stores on to tankers.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee as to the number of
EUSC vessels which will honor the agreement. If crews can
be found for the 95 RRF ships they can be depended on to do
their part. There is no certainty in having the NDRF
vessels being available in 120 days due to lack of shipyard
capability and crew availability. A fair guess would be a
guaranteed 350-400 vessels available within five days of the
conflict; leaving the United States approximately 250-300
vessels short. The other item to remember in that many
critical materials to keep a war economy running must come
from overseas. Vessels cannot necessarily be changed to
transport supplies to Europe and stopped from bringing in
raw materials into the country without damaging the war
buildup.
One possible solution that readily comes to mind is to
ask U.S. allies to provide some of their merchant vessels to
assist the U.S. effort. This assistance probably would not
be forthcoming. First, our allies have limited assets
themselves and also use shipping to maintain their
economies. Second, U.S. allies may not want to accept the
risk of possibly losing their limited shipping assets to
submarine and air attacks for a cause that may not be in
that country's interest. Third, U.S. allies have their own
interests and supporting the U.S. in its crisis might be in
conflict with that nation's own interest.29 Finally, the
U.S. cannot always depend on support from nations which we
perceive are friendly to us. Our allies may not want to
charter/loan their ships to the U.S. for any one of the
above reasons.
So what is the solution to the sealift capability
dilemma facing the United States?? The answer is a healthy
United States merchant marine. The problem is the proper
remedies to restore the U.S. Merchant Marine to a better
condition. One definite prescription is government
attention. President Bush has signed a national sealift
policy which addresses problems in the Merchant Marine.30
However, no funding has been allocated to execute this
policy.31 Funding is critical to the respawning of the
policy. Operational Differential Subsidy (ODS) is intended
to make up the difference in the compensation costs borne by
ships crewed by U.S. officers and men and the average crew
costs incurred by foreign flag ships that are in substantial
competition with subsidized U.S. vessels.32 ODS only
applies at this time to certain U.S. vessels and it needs to
apply to all U.S. vessels.
To further assist companies owning U.S.-flagged vessels
the laws and regulations related to required manning levels,
which were enacted at the turn of this century, need to be
reviewed and revised. Specifically: elimination of the
three-man watch system; removal of impediments to cross
utilization of shipboard personnel; and elimination of the
requirement for a dedicated radio officer.33 These changes
would allow manning at the same levels as modern foreign
vessels and reduce operating costs. Additionally, require
all government cargo, Department of Defense and non-
Department of Defense be shipped by U.S. flag merchants.
Currently, up to 50 percent of Non-Department of Defense
government cargoes may be shipped in foreign-flagged
vessels.34
Furthermore, something needs to be done as a financial
incentive for ship owners. Tax breaks that were allowed for
U.S. owners of vessels flagged in foreign countries were
eliminated in 1986.35 Either 1986 tax breaks need to be
restored or the U.S. should allow international registry,
sometimes called second registry, which would allow U.S.
vessels to fly the American flag but man with foreign crews
thereby allowing lower operating costs and competition on
equal footing with foreign shipping companies.36 If
incentives for U.S. ship owners are not possible then the
government should build militarily useful vessels and lease
them to private U.S. flag owners to operate.37 The above
solutions would provide a number of militarily useful
vessels under U.S. control in a time of crisis.
Finally, Research and Development (R&D) must be done in
the merchant marine area. Funding must be allocated from
both government and private sources for maritime R&D.
Several other nations, Japan as an example, provide
government funding for industrial research. The United
States, in order to have a healthy competitive merchant
marine capable of meeting the nation's military sealift
requirements during a crisis, must make technical advances
to regain the cutting edge of the shipping industry. Only a
successful R&D program done hand-in-hand by the government
and private industry can succeed in pushing U.S. shipping to
the forefront of the world.
As the defense spending continues to decline in the
1990's, force levels will be reduced. Indications are the
Army followed by the AirForce will suffer the greatest cuts
and reductions. Our overseas presence in other countries
will continue to decline. Some would claim that the
requirement for strategic sealift will decline. However,
common sense leads one to the conclusion that the less
forces and supplies that are overseas, the larger the
quantity of troops, equipment and supplies that will have to
be transported to the area of crisis. Sealift is the only
method to get massive amounts of material from the U.S. to
the conflict and keep the forces resupplied. Only a healthy
merchant marine will allow the United States to meet the
challenge of the spectrum of low intensity through high
intensity conflicts the U.S. will face in the 1990's through
the next century. Hopefully, the U.S. will be able to move
war sustainment by sealift to the conflict or crisis area
with a stronger, revitalized Merchant Marine, adequate
vessels and judicious advanced planning of the resources and
monies available.
ENDNOTES
1. Patrick E. Tyler, "More Troop Cuts Possible In
Europe, Cheney Says," The Washington Post, November 27,
1989, Section A, p.1 and 8.
2. Major Bradley E. Smith, USA, "Maritime Challenges To
Sustaining The Force," Military Review, September 1989,
p.21
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. "Sealift - A Land Power Essential," Defense Report
83-25, Association of the United States Army.
6. Richard L. Clarke, "Flags Of Convenience," Defense
Transportation Journal, October 1989, p.68.
7. AF Pamphlet 76-2: Airlift Planning Factors
(Washington D.C.:Department of the Airforce, 29 May 1987)
pp. 28-34.
8. D. M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin, "Airbridge to
Berlin, The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its origins and
aftermath," Presidio Press, 1988.
9. Smith, Bradley E., p.22.
10. Robert Elwell, Plans, Program and Policy Office,
Military Sealift Command, Telephone interview on U.S.
Shipping capabilities, Washington, D.C., February 15, 1990.
11. Smith, Bradley E., p.23.
12. Elwell.
13. Ibid.
14. Clarke, p.70.
15. Elwell.
16. Smith, Bradley E., p.25.
17. Ibid.
18. Elwell.
19. Smith, Bradley E., p.25.
20. Ibid.
21. Elwell.
22. Eric Smith, "Shipyards Nearly Extinct Along The
Deleware River," The Virginian-Pilot, October 15, 1989,
Section E, pp.1-2.
23. William Matthews, "Shipbuilding Program Billions
Over Budget," Navy Times, September 11, 1989, p.69.
24. John Aquilino and James Sanders, "Shielding
Strategic Sealift," Amphibious Warfare Review, Spring 1988,
p.41.
25. Commander Earl J. Higgins, USNR, "Who Will Man The
Merchant Ships," Proceedings, February 1989, p.36.
26. Peter J. Finnerty, "U.S. Merchant Marine Still
Sliding As Its High-Seas Competition Stiffens," Maritime,
1989, p.82.
27. Elwell.
28. William Matthews, "Battle Lines Set on Merchant
Marine Funding," Navy Times, October 30, 1989, p.25.
29. Aquilino, John and James Sanders, p.42.
30. National Security Sealift Policy, Defense
Transportation Journal, December 1989, p.33.
31. William Matthews, "Battle Lines Set on Merchant
Marine Funding," Navy Times, October 30, 1989, p.25.
32. L. Edgar Prina, "Postulates of Power, New Bennet
Bill Provides Hope for U.S.-Flag Fleet," Seapower, August
1989, p.37.
33. Andrew E. Gibson, "Task of Rebuilding Merchant
Marine Rests Squarely with President," Maritime, 1989, p.67.
34. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the
Maritime World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p.188.
35. Gibson, p.67.
36. Finnerty, p.80.
37. Asher, p.188.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Aquilino, John, and James Sanders. "Shielding Strategic
Sealift." Amphibious Warfare Review, Spring 1988.
2. AF Pamphlet 76-2: Airlift Planning Factors (Washington
D.C.:Department of the Airforce, 29 May 1987).
3. Asher, James. "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime
World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989.
4. Clarke, L. Richard. "Flags Of Convenience." Defense
Transportation Journal, October 1989.
5. Elwell, Robert. Plans, Program and Policy Office,
Military Sealift Command. Telephone interview on U.S.
Shipping capabilities, Washington, D.C., February 15,
1990.
6. Finnerty, Peter J.. "U.S. Merchant Marine Still Sliding
As Its High-Seas Competition Stiffens." Maritime, 1989.
7. Giangreco, D. B., and Robert E. Griffin. "Airbridge to
Berlin, The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its origins and
aftermath," Presidio Press, 1988.
8. Gibson, Andrew E.. "Task of Rebuilding Merchant Marine
Rests Squarely with President." Maritime, 1989.
9. Higgins, Earl J., Commander, USNR. "Who Will Man The
Merchant Ships." Proceedings, February 1989.
10. Matthews, William. "Shipbuilding Program Billions Over
Budget." Navy Times, September 11, 1989.
11. Matthews, William. "Battle Lines Set on Merchant Marine
Funding." Navy Times, October 30, 1989.
12. National Security Sealift Policy. Defense Transportation
Journal, December 1989.
13. Prina, L. Edgar. "Postulates of Power, New Bennet Bill
Provides Hope for U.S.-Flag Fleet." Seapower, August
1989.
14. "Sealift - A Land Power Essential." Defense Report 83-
25, Association of the United States Army, 1989.
15. Smith, E. Bradley, Major, USA. "Maritime Challenges To
Sustaining The Force." Military Review, September 1989.
16. Smith, Eric. "Shipyards Nearly Extinct Along The
Deleware River." The Virginian-Pilot, October 15, 1989.
17. Tyler, E. Patrick. "More Troop Cuts Possible In Europe,
Cheney Says." The Washington Post, November 27, 1989,
Section A.
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