Who Will Rescue Amphibious Search And Rescue?
AUTHOR Major Raymond S. Shelton, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: WHO WILL RESCUE AMPHIBIOUS SEARCH AND RESCUE?
THESIS: The Navy does not now possess, nor does it plan
to develop in the near future, a compatible SAR or
dedicated active duty CSAR capability for the amphibious
fleet.
ISSUE: The lack of attention paid to the capabilities of
the aircraft and crews of the amphibious SAR mission is
readily apparent when reviewing recent U. S. military
history. Area commanders are forced to rely on other than
Naval assets under their cognizance to preform Search and
Rescue (SAR) and combat Search and Rescue. The reason for
this is the incompatibility of the aircraft and crew with
the mission. This entails an even greater paradox for CATF
and CLF as their SAR asset is the least effective of all
within the Navy. The Navy has attempted to rectify the
situation by creating the Helicopter Combat Special Mission
(HCS) community, but it is doubtful that HCS will be
employed in support of the ATF. The UH-1N aircraft is
assigned the mission of ATF SAR. It is incapable of making
a night or multiperson rescues in numbers greater than
eight; and it cannot survive in the modern battlefield
arena. The low priority given ATF SAR within Naval
aviation is reflected by the policy that pilots assigned to
fly the mission are done so on a collateral duty basis.
Proper training for the mission is not provided due to lack
of funding. A solution to the problem must be found that
will lend itself to the over the horizon tactics of the
future. With this in mind, a non-biased reevaluation of
the MV-22 should be conducted. The value of the MV-22
Osprey in the SAR/CSAR role over present alternatives is
astronomical. A new aircraft, mission orientation, and
training standards are needed for the 21st century. If
reassessment by the Navy is not a viable solution, perhaps
reassignment of the ATF SAR/CSAR mission to the Marine
Corps is the answer.
WHO WILL RESCUE AMPHIBIOUS SAR?
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. The Navy does not now possess, nor does
it plan to develop in the near future, a compatible SAR or
dedicated active duty CSAR capability for the amphibious
fleet.
I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT POLICY
A. RECENT HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
1. COLUMBIA
2. LEBANON
B. USE OF BEST AVAILABLE ASSETS BY AREA COMMANDERS
1. PERSIAN GULF
2. BEKAA VALLEY, SYRIA
C. MARINE CORPS POLICY - TACTICAL RECOVERY OF
AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT, AND PERSONNEL. (TRAP)
D. CATF AND CLF SAR PARADOX
II. A MULTIPLICITY OF PROBLEMS
A. NAVY DOCTRINAL SAR AND CSAR VIEWPOINT.
1. CSAR DEVELOPMENT
2. CURRENT CSAR
B. CATF / CLF USAGE OF NAVAL CSAR.
1. CAN HCS ANSWER THE CALL
2. DOES THE CVBG HAVE PRIORITY OVER THE ATF ?
3. REAL WORLD REALITY OF ATF CSAR IS UH-1N
C. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE UH-1N AIRCRAFT
1. LACK OF CAPACITY
2. INABILITY TO EFFECT A NIGHT RESCUE
3. "HANDS-OFF" HOVER CAPABILITY
4. CONTRAST WITH CVBG ORGANIC SAR ASSETS
D. COMMISSIONING OF NEW LHD CLASS SHIPS
1. NEW SHIPS
2. SAME SAR CAPABILITY
E. LACK OF PILOT PROFICIENCY DUE TO TRAINING
1. BUDGET MEASURES
2. COLLATERAL DUTIES / SHIPBOARD BILLETS
F. COMBAT INADEQUACY OF THE MISSION
1. CREW - DUE TO TRAINING
2. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY
G. DWINDLING NUMBER OF AIRFRAMES
1. MARINE CORPS ASSETS
2. MARINES FORCED TO DO THE MISSION
H. PLANNED CH-46 (SLEP) PROGRAM ON HOLD
III. A SAR AIRCRAFT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
A. OVER THE HORIZON OPERATIONS FOR ATF
1. CONTROL OF SAR MISSION
2. NEEDS OF THE FUTURE MISSION
B. BENEFITS OF THE MV-22 OSPREY
C. CURRENT ALTERNATIVES DO NOT MEET MISSION NEEDS
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. NAVY IS INEFFECTIVE IN SAR/CSAR FOR THE ATF
B. MORAL OBLIGATION
C. NAVY RETENTION OF THE MISSION
D. MARINE CORPS ASSIGNMENT OF THE MISSION
WHO WILL RESCUE AMPHIBIOUS SEARCH AND RESCUE?
BACKGROUND AND CURRENT POLICY
To fully comprehend the problems with Amphibious Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) and peacetime Search and Rescue
(SAR) requires viewing the situation from various
perspectives. The Marines Corps relies upon the Navy to
fulfill the missions of both CSAR and SAR however, the Navy
cannot effectively accomplish its assigned mission. The
Navy does not now possess, nor does it plan to develop in
the near future, a compatible SAR or dedicated active duty
CSAR capability for the amphibious fleet.1 Validation of
this statement is graphically evidenced in our recent
military endeavors where amphibious forces have been
employed.
As recently as February 1990, the problem of
ineffective amphibious SAR was made evident when President
Bush traveled to Colombia, South America to meet with other
national leaders concerning the rampant drug problems of
our hemisphere. HMX-1 was to provide the President with
the requisite helicopter support for the summit.
However, HMX-1 Presidential aircraft are not considered SAR
capable. The Navy was given the mission to provide this
service. The USS NASSAU (LHA-4) provided the logistical
and health support base required by the agencies supporting
the Presidential visit. The Navy was forced to replace the
USS NASSAU's normal amphibious SAR UH-1N with three SH-2
aircraft due to the limited capacity and night
incompatibility of the UH-1N.2
In Grenada, Operation "Urgent Fury" found the Navy's
amphibious SAR aircraft sitting on the deck of the ship
unused. Due to operational intensity, Navy pilots assigned
SAR mission responsibility were required to perform their
primary duty aboard ship and thus were not available to
fly. During the assault phase, the 22nd Marine Amphibious
Unit was forced to conduct the mission of CSAR. A crucial
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) asset, a HMM-261(C)
CH-46E, was required to perform this critical mission. The
Marine crew assigned the mission was characteristically not
trained in overwater SAR procedures. Anticipating the
worst, an overwater rescue, the crew did embark the ship's
SAR swimmer. Fortunately, for the crew and the Amphibious
Task Force (ATF), an overwater pickup was not required.3
During the entire assault evolution the ATF's dedicated
UH-1N SAR aircraft launched from the deck of the USS GUAM
(LPH-9) to accomplish a single mission. It was piloted by
the Marine pilot assigned to ship's company. The reason
for this was that the Marine pilot was the only one of
ship's company pilots trained in combat tactics.
In December of 1983, while off the coast of Lebanon in
support of multinational forces in Beruit, the pilots of
HMM-261(C) were again called upon to perform a CSAR
mission.4 Although the Marine aircraft was not
committed, it was prepared to effect a Tactical Recovery of
Aircraft, Equipment, and Personnel (TRAP) mission.
However, the establishment and prosecution of the mission
was not in accordance with the current doctrine espoused
for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
(MEU[SOC]) operations.5 It was an unplanned, haphazard
mission given to the most reliable asset available. The
primary SAR asset of the ATF, the UH-1N, was again bypassed
because of its ineffectiveness in mission accomplishment.
An important factor which cannot be overlooked by any
viable SAR platform is the responsibility of the area
commander to use all forces at his disposal to effect a
rescue. This is stated in JCS Pub 0-2 as:
In urgent situations, the area commander may
assign SAR and CSAR tasks and missions to
forces not assigned but based or operating in
the area and may assume temporary operational
control of them when such forces are not
actively engaged in missions assigned by
their own higher command. Control will
normally be exercised through the subordinate
commander of such forces who will keep the
area commander advised of the availability of
SAR and CSAR capable forces.
This was documented during Operation "Praying Mantis" in
the Persian Gulf. Use of interservice assets by the area
commander was demonstrated when Task Force 160th SOAR (ABN)
was used as the primary CSAR element by the combined forces
of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Why was the Army used for
this traditional Navy mission? The answer is that the
Navy, as in Grenada, could not fulfill its assigned
mission. The ATF SAR aircraft was incompatible with the
mission. TF 160th had the proper equipment and their
people were properly trained to conduct a comprehensive
CSAR mission to include an overwater rescue. Despite the
capability to conduct CSAR, TF 160th will be the first to
decline the mission because they are organized and mission
oriented toward special operations.7 Amphibious SAR is
the Navy's mission. However, TF 160th was unequivocally
the best asset the area commander could employ to give a
substantial guarantee in the event CSAR was required.
The authority of this doctrine and validation of the
inefficiency of the ATF SAR aircraft as a CSAR platform,
were both manifested during the air strike in the Bekaa
valley of Syria. Marines of HMM-261(C) were charged with
the missions of overwater SAR - preformed by a CH-46 - and
CSAR - preformed by a CH-53 8. Again, the area commander
chose the best available assets to fulfill the mission.
The designated ATF SAR asset was not considered a viable
platform for either. Operational commanders realize the
Navy cannot do its CSAR mission and are trying to work
around this flaw with any efficacious entity at their
disposal.
It is a sad note that peacetime budgetary
considerations have all but obliterated the Navy's ability
to conduct CSAR in an opposed environment. Testifying
before Congress in 1983, Rear Admiral Paul T. Gillcrist
(OP-50) stated:
"The National, Department of Defense, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Navy directives on Search
and Rescue policy are all very clear on the
subject of service responsibilities. They
state: First, that each military component of
the Department of Defense is responsible for
providing rescue capabilities in support of
its own operations; and Secondly, and more
specifically, that rescue operations in
support of a naval task force are the
responsibility of the task force commander.
Also, and equally applicable to the Navy, is
the JCS policy that rescue operations in a
battle area are the specific responsibility
of the tactical commander."9
In the past three years specific moves have been
accomplished within the Department of the Navy (DON) to
rectify the adverse SAR/CSAR situation. These improvements
have been made in the Naval Reserve community and the
benefits are not readily accessible to the Marine Corps.
So what is the Marine Corps to do until the Navy sees fit
to find the resources and manpower to accomplish the CSAR
and SAR mission? What are, and how shall the Marine Corps
deal with, the specifics of the problem until the proper
solution is found?
Marine Corps policy, according to the former Deputy
Chief of Staff for Aviation, LtGen K. A. Smith, is that the
Marines will not do CSAR. CSAR for the Marine Corps is a
specific mission to be accomplished by the Navy. Marine
Corps assets cannot be dedicated for that purpose. JCS Pub
0-2,is specific in its stipulation that:
Each Service is responsible for providing
forces capable of performing CSAR in support
of its own operations, in accordance with its
assigned functions.10
Yet, the Marine Corps has continually evaded its
obligation for the search phase of SAR/CSAR by developing
the mission of TRAP. This was done under the auspices of
LtGen K. A. Smith who also coined the phrase.11
The Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and
the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF), face a great
paradox when attempting to employ their SAR/CSAR assets, as
doctrinally prescribed. The paradox stems from the fact
that the type aircraft provided for the mission, and the
crews assigned to carry out that mission, are neither
qualified nor capable of accomplishing the task. Today,
the MAGTF amphibious assault, in peacetime or war, will be
conducted employing substantial aviation assets. The prime
"Marine mover" in the ship-to-shore movement now, and in
the foreseeable future, will be the CH-46, Sea Knight
helicopter. Doctrinal employment of the CH-46 calls for
the aircraft to carry a maximum troop load of eighteen and
a crew of four. If a crash occurs at sea with only half of
the occupants surviving, six of the survivors will not be
rescued on the initial rescue recovery attempt due to the
insufficient capacity of the primary ATF SAR aircraft. The
amphibious SAR/CSAR community, assessed by any measure,
fails to meet the minimum requirements needed for a
contemporary, effective fighting force. Concerned with
these serious shortfalls the statement of Rear Admiral
Gillcrist, weighs heavily on the mind of each CATF and CLF
when time for action draws near:
"No American combat commander is going to
leave his wounded on the field (or in the
water) or his people trapped behind enemy
lines without doing everything possible to
get them back. He is going to keep trying
with whatever resources that he can muster
until he is forced to stop by the enemy. Our
basic makeup provides the impetus for our
actions and the American people would demand
no less."12
If credence is to be paid to this statement then the
amphibious SAR/CSAR mission must be reevaluated and the
shortfalls rectified without service parochialism.
A MULTIPLICITY OF PROBLEMS
The Navy currently views peacetime SAR and CSAR as two
distinct entities, which doctrinally do not interface in
the operational environment. The Navy has provided each
LHA/LPH/LHD with a single UH-1N to be used as the peacetime
SAR platform for the ATF and the MAGTF. To breach the gap
between peacetime SAR and CSAR, existing doctrine
stipulates that in the event of "formal hostilities" the
CSAR mission requirement will be provided for by the newly
established Helicopter Combat Special Missions (HCS)
community. Light Helicopter Attack Squadron Four and Five
(HAL-4 and HAL-5), the east and west coast Naval Reserve
Specialized Operational Forces (SOF) squadrons, absorbed
Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Nine (HC-9), the strike
rescue squadron, to form the HCS community. The community
currently consists of two reserve squadrons, HCS-4 and
HCS-5. Although flying outmoded aircraft the predecessors
of the HCS squadrons contributed substantially to the
tactics of the CSAR mission. The majority of these modern
battlefield tactics were derived from experience or taken
directly from Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron
One (MAWTS-1) in Yuma, Arizona.
HCS-5 and its sister squadron HCS-4, were commissioned
October 1988 and 1989 respectively with the charter of
strike rescue - also known as CSAR - and specialized
operational forces (SOF). Squadrons receiving a primary
mission coalescence of CSAR and SOF is the current trend
among all branches of the U. S. military.13 The
definitive mission of downed aircrew extraction in support
of a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or other Naval Task Force
strike operations, as well as the insertion of clandestine
units, such as SEAL teams in a special operations scenario,
was the basis for the creation of the HCS squadron. The
HCS community flies the HH-60H (Seahawk) aircraft which has
the basics required of modern battlefield helicopters.
These include survival items such as self-defense weaponry,
radar warning equipment (RAW gear), infrared
countermeasures equipment, self-sealing fuel cells, global
positioning navigation equipment, and an airframe built
with ballistic tolerance and combat survivability in mind.
Pilots and crews are well-versed in modern helicopter
tactics including evasive maneuvers (EVM) and terrain
flight (TERF). Training is conducted primarily at night
stressing the maximum use of night vision goggles (NVGs).
Employing the newest combat tactics and using modern, state
of the art aircraft and equipment, the HCS squadron is more
than prepared to accomplish its mission. Mission
assignment dictates that within 72 hours of notification
the HCS squadron shall deploy a combat capable two aircraft
detachment worldwide.14
This in all essence sounds like the perfect solution
for CATF and CLF in their quest to fill the void in the
CSAR. However, there are definite flaws in relying on the
HCS squadrons to accomplish the amphibious CSAR mission. A
serious uncertainty exists in using strictly reserve
units. In accordance with the constitution, reserve units
are by law not required to respond to contingency
operations unless mobilized by Presidential order. Do they
truly possess the ability to mount out in 72 hours? If so,
can they support the multiple phased operations of a
deployed ATF? If able to reach the ATF in sufficient time
to be employed will they be able to integrate into the
mission of the MAGTF owing to the fact that the focus of
their training is to support CVBG strike operations and
SOF? If the situation is crucial enough to warrant the
employment of a MAGTF will it not also warrant the
employment of a CVBG to cover the MAGTF operation?
Doctrine stipulates that the CVBG does not have to be
in close proximity to the ATF/MAGTF, but must be able to
provide protection for its employment. The CVBG commander,
with just cause, will most likely require that the two
aircraft HCS detachment be used in their primary mission of
strike rescue. This leaves CATF and CLF in their original
position of having to rely on their peacetime SAR asset
(the UH-1N) to fulfill the role of CSAR. Thus, the only
realistic conclusion that can be drawn is that the missions
of SAR and CSAR, although in theory assigned to and best
handled by the HCS squadrons, will by default become a
mission of the amphibious SAR element. An element recently
demonstrated as totally unprepared to perform the mission
of CSAR and only marginally prepared for the mission of
SAR.
Realistically then, when we speak of SAR in the
amphibious community we must consider the term to be
synonymous with CSAR! Each aspect of the amphibious SAR
community must be viewed in that light. Currently, the
Navy UH-1N is the primary amphibious SAR platform. The
selection and continued use of this airframe reflects the
low priority the mission receives within Naval aviation.
With a crew of four, full mission equipment, a half-fuel
load, hovering out-of-ground effect, and in the best of
meteorological conditions the UH-1N has a maximum rescue
capacity of eight people. Since its initial delivery in
1971, the UH-1N has always been "less than capable" in
performing the SAR mission for the amphibious community.
Presently, the only readily accessible and reliable
night rescue vehicle available to the amphibious fleet is
the ship designated to follow in trace of the primary
launch and recovery platform (LPH/LHA/LHD). This vessel is
commonly referred to as the "plane guard ship" and is
1940's technology in the 1990's. The UH-1N cannot be used
at night as a rescue platform. It can only be used as a
search platform because it lacks the "hands-off hover"
capability - common throughout Naval aviation - that would
permit its engagement in night rescues. The LPH/LHA/LHD
Naval Aviation Training Operational Procedures and
Standardization (NATOPS) manual is very specific in its
capability requirements for the type SAR vehicle to be used
in the myriad of potential rescue evolutions.15 The
inability of the UN-1N to effect a night rescue dictates
the night landing and launch criteria aboard amphibious
ships. This lack of night rescue capability dictates
"administrative" passengers will not be landed 30 minutes
prior to sunset or debarked until 30 minutes before
sunrise. To effect multi-plane evolutions or troop
assaults during the hours of darkness - most initial
assaults occur in the hours just before dawn - the
amphibious fleet is forced to request a "Doppler Radar"
equipped aircraft, usually an SH-3, to augment the ATF SAR
mission. The ATF's lack of an organic night rescue
capability, and subsequent reliance on external assets for
SAR support, results in the waste of thousands of dollars
and innumerable man-hours.
It should be noted that each UH-1N assigned to the
amphibious SAR mission had been scheduled to receive a
Doppler Radar permitting "hands-off hover" capability,
during scheduled routine rework cycles. Research and
development to install this technology in a two bladed
aircraft, such as the UH-1N, has proven futile. The
projected cost to retrofit all 22 UH-1N SAR aircraft would
be over 26.5 million in today's dollars. Not wanting
torisk money in unproven technology the Navy has
completely cancelled the project. It will not be
reinstated into the budget.16 Had the UH-1N SAR aircraft
received this added capability the shortfall of capacity
remains implicit. The fact is that even a modified UH-1N
is still inadequate as an amphibious SAR platform.
In contrast, the CVBGs deploy with a number of
helicopters that have more than the required rescue
capacity to perform SAR. Although the CVBG commander has
at his disposal the airframes to conduct SAR/CSAR missions
these assets must be drawn from other missions, which in
essence degrades the overall capability of the battle
group. Pilots and aircrews performing the SAR/CSAR mission
on a daily basis for the CVBG do so only as a secondary
mission parameter. Recently, pilots of the HS and HSL
communities began training with the Navy's "Strike
University" in an effort to offset the deficient nature of
SAR/CSAR in the aviation community. These forces will not
be dispatched from the CVBG in time of crisis or war to
help the amphibious platforms, because of the vital role
they play in securing the safety of the CVBG. Again, the
amphibious community will be forced to fend for itself.
The next decade will see the continued commissioning of
the LHD class of amphibious ships. The commissioning of
each new LHD will call for the retirement of one LPH. Yet,
no new SAR assets will arrive to complement the enhanced
capabilities of this new class of ship. Instead the UH-1N,
which in some cases is older than the platform it supports,
will move from the deck of the retired LPH to the deck of
the newly commissioned LHD. Alternatives are being sought,
but according to Captain James L. Hughes, Aviation Plans
and Requirements for Amphibious Operations (OP-504) "As it
stands now there is no real answer."17
To compound the problems placed upon the mission by the
inadequacy of the UH-1N airframe, others are imposed by the
personnel assigned to execute the mission. Conducting a
night search mission at 200 feet above the water, with no
visible horizon, in a severely unstable instrument
platform, takes an immense amount of concentration, skill
and training. The quality of the pilot assigned to fly the
amphibious SAR mission is equal to that of his peers
throughout the fleet. This mission suffers because the
trainina for these quality pilots is not available to the
degree needed. Training is the key. In the "Holloway
Report" on the hostage rescue raid in Iran, it was clearly
stated that it is easier to train a pilot to fly a
different aircraft than to fly a new mission. It follows
then that combat rescue is a contingency mission requiring
extensive and continuous training to master and maintain
adequate proficiency levels.18
Current cost saving budget measures have hurt the U. S.
Navy in general, and in particular the amphibious
community. The Pacific amphibious SAR community flight
hour allocation for fiscal year 1988 was an average of 600
hours per airframe. This allocation equates to
approximately 150 hours for each assigned pilot per year.
This is slightly more than the time needed to be proficient
in familiarization training alone. Deduct from this the
time dedicated to VIP flights, ship support, maintaining
qualifications and currency for temporarily assigned
pilots, and the initial training of new pilots; it becomes
readily apparent that mission oriented training suffers
greatly.
Coupled with the training deficit is the fact that
pilots are assigned to the SAR mission on a collateral duty
basis. Each amphibious SAR pilot's primary duty is his
assigned shipboard billet. Our military advancement system
stresses an individual's primary billet which translates
into designated SAR pilots orienting their flight training
schedule around their shipboard assignments and not vice
versa. This situation works well aboard ship until a SAR
crisis arises beyond the capabilities of the pilot. Most
likely, this is not due to the pilot's flying ability.
Rather, it is due to a lack of training which results in
proficiency degradation. It is not inconceivable that this
degradation of proficiency may result in the loss of life.
Take the mission a step further into the combat arena.
It becomes evident that the vulnerability of the aircraft
and the inadequacy in the training of the crew is
critical. The UH-1N possesses none of the minimum
requirements necessary for the survival of a helicopter on
the modern battlefield. Critics state that the UH-1N will
not have the mission of inland CSAR. Therefore, the
aircraft does not require items such as a low infrared
signature, global positioning navigation system, self
defensive weaponry, a ballistically tolerant airframe, self
sealing fuel tanks, redundance of critical flight control
systems, extended fuel range, or a night blackout flight
capability. They further state that pilots need not devote
more than a minimum amount of time necessary to perfect the
search and rescue techniques required for an unopposed
rescue attempt. However, critics must remember that the
Marines and Navy are preparing to conduct amphibious
conflict in the 21st century from over the horizon (OTH).
The aircraft performing the SAR/CSAR mission must be
compatible with the mission and capable of rescue anywhere
from the assault launch platform to and including the
beach.
Due to tactical dictates ATF operations, one of the
most complex military ventures, will most likely be
conducted under the cover of darkness, and in a restrictive
electromagnetic - radiation - controlled environment. This
will necessitate the use of night vision goggles (NVGs) to
which SAR crews presently do not have access. A substantial
number of Navy helicopter pilots have never seen, let alone
used, NVGs. Yet, it is a proven fact that NVGs greatly
enhance the ability of search crews to locate survivors
both at sea and on the land, in periods of reduced
visibility .19
What happens in the early morning darkness to the fully
loaded CH-46, or its future replacement, shot down a
half-mile from the enemy beach? Navy pilots are not short
on courage and so the SAR bird will attempt a rescue of
their comrades in arms. If today's situation prevails, the
UH-1N, lit up like a Christmas tree (due to lack of NVGs),
close to a hostile shore, with no defensive weapons, and
the capacity to rescue less than a quarter of the potential
survivors, will fall short of its mission and most likely
become a casualty itself. There exists the possibility
that other aircraft could be assigned to assist the SAR
bird. However, what prudent MAGTF commander would
authorize and what Aviation Combat Element (ACE) commander
would divert critical tactical assets needed in the rapid
building of combat power ashore? After all, is not the
success of the mission paramount? If the tactical
situation should allow such a diversion, it may prove more
a hinderance than a help. Marine aircraft do not posses
the proper equipment and their crews are not trained to
effect overwater rescues.
Remove the combat element and place the ATF and MAGTF
in the all too familiar situation of our modern world which
requires the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). In
order to ensure a successful evolution, combat tactics may
well be employed. No matter how noble the effort, how
devastated would the nation be, and how ridiculed would our
Navy and Marine Corps be, when a CH-53 carrying 35
civilians evacuees and a crew of four crashes into the sea
and the UH-1N rescue vehicle can initially rescue a maximum
of 8 survivors.20 The recent past has seen the U. S.
Navy increase its routine deployments into the northern
regions of the Pacific and NATO. Compound the above rescue
scenes with a cold water environment where, due to
hypothermia, time is the critical factor and the scene
becomes littered with unnecessary death and mayhem.
In addition to the above problems the amphibious SAR
community faces the fact that the number of UH-1Ns assigned
the mission of SAR is dwindling and no suitable replacement
is being sought. Currently twenty-five percent of the
UH-1N airframes now assigned the mission on the west coast
are drawn from Marine Corps assets. As the number of UH-1N
airframes used by the Navy for the SAR mission declines by
attrition will the Marines be forced to replace these
assets with Marine UH-1Ns? If this is the case, the lack
of these vital assets within the Marine Corps will severely
impact on the mission and combat posture of the HMLA
squadrons, and their employment in support of the MAGTF.
Routinely Marine squadrons employed aboard air capable
amphibious ships, though unqualified, are forced to augment
the Navy UH-1N in the SAR mission. Due to the singular
employment of the UH-1N airframe aboard LPH/LHA/LHD ships,
routine maintenance, supply, lack of parts, mission
associated commitments and pilot availability, the embarked
Marine squadron will be forced to share the burden of SAR
if flight training and mission preparedness is to continue.
The Navy is concerned about the inadequate airframe
problem. The Defense Department budget proposal for Fiscal
Year 1990 had planned to replace the UH-1N with the Service
Life Extension Program (SLEP) version of the CH-46E "Sea
Knight" augmented with the upgraded "217" Doppler hover
coupler.21 The CH-46E SLEP aircraft were to come from
former Marine Corps assets as the Marines began the
purchase of the MV-22 Osprey 1993. Currently the MV-22
program has been cancelled and will require Congressional
sponsorship to be placed back in the defense budget.
Should this occur the projected procurement will be delayed
well beyond the initial 1993 date. The CH-46E (SLEP) may
have proven a good interim fix, but had the Marines
acquired the MV-22 the old "Sea Knight" would have faced
the same problems, with the exception of capacity, as does
the UH-1N. In fact, the CH-46E is much more critical in
fuel considerations than the UH-1N and could not possibly
be effective as a SAR platform in over-the-horizon (OTH)
missions.
A SAR AIRCRAFT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Undoubtedly future ATF and MAGTF operations will occur
over-the-horizon. Discarding all other factors previously
mentioned, the lack of range of the UH-1N makes it an
unworthy choice for SAR in OTH operations. The OTH SAR
aircraft will need to employ new tactics compatible with
the airframes with which it will serve. As new tactics are
developed, it must be determined who will control the
employment of the SAR aircraft. Will it be the ACE
commander or will the CATF retain control? Normally the
SAR aircraft operates independently of any unit in the ATF
except when conducting a rescue mission. The ability to
interface with the ATF combat information center (CIC) and
be able to prosecute a search over the wide distances
utilized in OTH operations will be preeminent. With the
distances involved datalink may provide the only contact
with the ATF. Will the control ship be able to develop the
battle picture to the degree necessary to correctly and
effectively employ the SAR aircraft? By virtue of the
distances involved the SAR aircraft must possess the
ability to loiter in the most advantageous position
available to benefit both the ATF and the MAGTF assault.
This will necessitate an upgrade in communications for
interaction between the various elements within the ATF.
To solve these questions and help eliminate the problems
previously addressed in the text, with respect to SAR
mission aircraft suitability, a serious readdressal of
MV-22 Osprey acquisition must be undertaken.
The benefits of the MV-22 in the SAR mission over what
the Navy has now, or plans to acquire, are astronomical.
Due to construction design of the rotor/prop assembly there
is virtually no "downwash" directly below the aircraft
while in the hover mode. In an overwater rescue this
factor decreases the severity of trauma on the victim(s).
The MV-22 has a 300-knot dash speed and 500-mile combat
radius which fits perfectly into the OTH and quick
extraction missions. In night overwater SAR missions, the
MV-22 has the added capability of not being bound to a
windline rescue pattern to effect the survivor rescue
attempt. The windline rescue method, required of
conventional Doppler equipped helicopters, is considerably
more time consuming than the manual - daylight - mode, but
is necessary due to the lack of visual references for the
pilot and the high susceptibility to vertigo in this flight
regime. Due to its counter-rotating prop-rotors the MV-22
is free of the limitation of having to hover into the wind
when approaching the survivor. The result, in a night
rescue scenario, is that the MV-22 eliminates the need to
execute a windline rescue pattern, thereby reducing pilot
workload and delivering a substantial reduction in
survivor(s) rescue time.22
During the interim period of acquisition, detachments
could be formed to support the amphibious community since
the MV-22 has the inherent capability of flying over 2100
nautical miles without refueling.23 This provides a
mission compatible CSAR platform available to the CVBG and
the ATF that has a responsive, real-time, worldwide
self-deployment capability. Factor into the equation that
the MV-22 is constructed for combat survivability and
mission accomplishment in the modern battle theatre and the
aircraft becomes a requisite for future potential
survivors.
The benefits of this technology far outweigh any costs
when the spectrum of conflict is equated with the future
battlefield needs. This is fully reconcilable when
adjudicated by the fact that the last 23 international
situations where U. S. armed forces have been employed have
used vertical lift capable aircraft. Some have been
successful (Son Tay, Grenada, Libya, Panama) and some have
not (Iran, Mayaguez). Perhaps the use of this advanced
technology in the future might significantly decrease the
number of military failures. Conversely, it would most
assuredly increase our capability to conduct SAR and CSAR
throughout all the services.
Should the DOD "status quo" of aircraft maintenance and
acquisition be maintained, then we must look at acquiring
the HH-60H (Seahawk) used by HCS-4 and HCS-5. This
aircraft does not completely meet the requirements of the
ATF, but it is a prodigious improvement over the UH-1N.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Navy does not now possess the capability to provide
a viable Combat Search and Rescue or peacetime Search and
Rescue platform in support of the amphibious fleet and
embarked MAGTF. Planners previously identified a partial
solution to this problem through the conversion of Marine
CH-46 assets to the CH-46E SLEP, which was designed to
offset the lack of airframes. The CH-46 airframes were
scheduled for release to the Navy during the Marine Corps
acquisition of the MV-22. This solution did not alleviate
the problem of amphibious SAR pilot training nor collateral
duty assignment. From all indications, the Navy plans to
continue the same as it has for the past 20 years with
respect to the combat quality of ATF SAR pilots and SAR
aircraft.
The moral obligation to Marines and sailors in the
water or awaiting rescue on land must be the primary focus
of the individuals charged with their rescue. The essence
of the CSAR mission is found in the fiber of the American
ethic. Each and every individual soldier, sailor, and
Marine knows he has the right to expect that no reasonable
effort will be spared to ensure his rescue. Graphic
evidence of this fact is shown in the grim statistic that
for the 27 Navy CSAR rescues made in North Vietnam the Navy
lost 19 aircraft and 15 SAR personnel.24 Consider the
effect of sending Marines, both aircrews and heliborne
infantry, into combat or across the open sea with the
knowledge that should they become victims of a crash no
rescue would be attempted! Who would tell the SAR pilot
that his mission is non-vital and that he will not attempt
the rescue of his comrades? If the Navy is to uphold this
moral obligation to the ATF and MAGTF then it must start by
realizing that the existing SAR/CSAR assets of the
amphibious fleet reflect the attitude that Marines and
sailors are considered expendable.
If the Navy retains the mission of amphibious SAR,
which in today's environment means CSAR as well, drastic
changes are needed in doctrine, equipment, training, and
employment of aircraft and crews. Amphibious SAR/CSAR must
become an immediate concern for CNO guidance and a solution
enacted. SAR/CSAR is a contingency mission that requires
extensive and continuous training to master and maintain
the proficiency that equates to the standards explicit
throughout the rest of Naval aviation. SAR/CSAR must be
approached as a field with definitive requirements that
cannot be overlapped with other commitments to the extent
it degrades the desired results of mission accomplishment.
Amphibious SAR/CSAR can no longer be of the quick-draw,
shoot from the hip variety. Pilots and crews must train
diligently and with a specific purpose. Pilots can still
fill collateral duty billets, but the SAR mission must be
their primary focus. An essential part of the SAR crew,
the rescue swimmers and enlisted crew members must train to
multi-person rescues on a routine basis instead of the
single or dual seat aircraft rescues that are stressed in
their initial school training and subsequent evaluations.
Pilots must be required to attend the Coast Guard's formal
SAR school to enhance their knowledge and readiness. This
would ensure their ability to completely fulfill the
requirements of the SAR mission commander (SMC) or the on
scene commander (OSC).
If pilots and crews are forced by default to accomplish
the CSAR mission and bring their survivors home, they must
receive formal combat survival training. Quality training
mirrored on the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics
Squadron One (MAWTS-1) or HCS guidelines is paramount. We
don't send ill-trained Marine pilots off the deck of the
ship to accomplish their mission; so why should the Navy
pilots operating in the same environment receive any less
combat training? As a minimum, training should include the
basics needed for map interpretation and terrain flight
(TERF), NVG usage and application, evasive flight maneuvers
(EVM), and integrated mission planning with the ACE.25
Initial combat training can be obtained in a variety of
ways. Perhaps the best way is to have the SAR crews
trained by the Navy's "Strike University" in Fallon,
Nevada, as are the HS community pilots.
The possibility exists to integrate the individual
crews into training with the Marine squadron with which
they will deploy. If achieved, the Navy SAR pilots must be
integrated into the amphibious assault role of the MAGTF
with a fully developed understanding of MAGTF tactics, and
how the SAR asset fits into the scheme of the operation.
They should become vested members of the ACE with a true
appreciation for its employment and the necessary intimacy
required for both to effectively accomplish their combat
and peacetime missions. Without deviation they must truly
be SAR pilots whose sole mission focus is the rescue of
their comrades and not the needs of a collateral duty. The
MAGTF ACE must acknowledge the role of the SAR element and
fully incorporate the SAR mission into the ACE's role in
the mission of the ATF. Additionally, the Navy must
recognize their importance in overall mission
accomplishment and demand to be integrated in the proper
fashion.
Once quality combat pilots are obtained they must be
provided with an airframe that is adequate in both capacity
and combat survivability. Currently there are no viable
options. The CH-46 is the most likely choice, but the Navy
does not own enough of these airframes to fill current
missions dictates. Acquisition of new CH-46 aircraft is
not anticipated in the near future, (Boeing has sold the
plans to investors in Japan). Thus, the HH-60H and
subsequent to that the SH-3, both with ample capacity to
rescue 10 victims - once they are stripped bare of all
other mission equipment - are the fall back alternatives.
To further complicate the matter neither the HH-60H nor the
SH-3 are compatible with the aircraft intermediate
maintenance department (AIMD) aboard the major amphibious
launch platforms.
A possible solution, but most likely highly unpopular,
and yet, the safest and most forthright means of executing
the mission, would be to task the Marine Corps with
providing SAR/CSAR for the ATF. Although this mission is
contrary to established Marine doctrine it is in keeping
with the Marine Corps' mission as "the force in readiness"
and our espoused ethic of "taking care of our own." As
illustrated in the text, many Marines are called upon to
accomplish the mission of overwater SAR without the benefit
of formal training. This formal training could easily be
accomplished using a small cadre of pilots and crewmembers
from each Medium Helicopter Squadron as designated SAR
crews. These individuals already have the necessary
training to perform inland CSAR due to their training for
the TRAP mission. Supplement TRAP with overwater rescue
training and the CSAR mission profile would be complete.
Forced by combat necessity and day-to-day requirements,
SAR/CSAR has been accomplished by every ATF in the past 20
years. Most Marine planners will initially balk at this
proposal; however, if we are to keep faith with our young
Marines, we must take this situation under serious
consideration. If the Navy is unwilling to provide the
kind of SAR/CSAR capability needed by the Fleet Marine
Force, and we are to continue to pursue our mission as
dictated by Congress and the Commandant, then we must be
prepared to provide for ourselves. This solution would be
the fastest, least costly, most effective answer to the SAR
dilemma if we are to abandon the idea of a superior
alternative airframe.
There are disadvantages to this proposal, but none is
insurmountable. Doctrinal changes would have to be
accepted by CNO and CMC providing the Marine Corps with
jurisdiction over amphibious SAR/CSAR. The doctrinal
guidance would need to be incorporated into NWP-19-1, Navy
Search and Rescue Manual, with a chapter dedicated to
Marine amphibious SAR/CSAR. An amendment would have to be
made to the respective NATOPS manual of the aircraft
selected for the mission, most likely the CH-46. A
doctrinal change to the Assault Support Helicopter Manual
(ASH) reflecting the total encompassing nature of the
SAR/CSAR/TRAP missions would be required, as well as an
update to MEU(SOC) procedures. A CMC sponsored study would
have to determine the requirements for the assignment of a
secondary MOS to both pilots and crews as SAR/CSAR
specialists. This would necessitate an interface with the
national SAR school run by the Coast Guard. Proficiency
would have to be maintained. Thus, funding would be
affected. To alleviate this problem funds earmarked for
the amphibious SAR assets could be transferred to the
Marine Corps Aviation. TRAP mission scenarios could easily
be expanded to incorporate overwater rescues. The
establishment of suitable training sites would not pose a
problem because all major Marine Corps Helicopter Air
Stations are located near open ocean training areas.
The major disadvantage for the amphibious fleet would
be the loss of the utility aircraft for the LPH/LHA/LHD
class ships. This loss would deny the eight to ten
aviators assigned as ship's company, and augment aviators,
the ability to achieve flight minimums. This in essence
would make assignment to an amphibious ship a DIFDEN (duty
involving flight denied) tour for aviators. These billets
are a "hard to sell" item for detailers now and the
deletion of the opportunity to fly would make it even more
so. This does not necessarily have to follow but most
likely would as a casualty of funding. Can the amphibious
ships function without their utility helicopter? The
carriers seem to encounter no problems when the wing assets
depart the ship. The MAGTF command element would be forced
to accept the fact that once embarked it would be
responsible for all the administrative aviation support
required by the ATF (Navy and Marine).
A realistic capability must be developed to meet the
needs of the amphibious SAR/CSAR mission. The Navy has
traditionally spared no expense for individual safety and
survival equipment. What good is accomplished if an
individual survives a crash, manages not to drown, or
survives in a hostile environment, if he has no chance of
rescue? Failure to rectify the present situation is in
essence a failure to place the proper value on the lives of
those who serve. The future of amphibious SAR/CSAR is not
bright. The problems mentioned will not cease to plague
the Navy and Marine Corps until effective programs are
developed to give amphibious SAR the status it deserves in
the naval aviation community. It is imperative the Navy
and Marine Corps come to an agreement on a comprehensive
solution which will afford the Marine Corps the ability to
save its downed aircrews and Marines be it overwater or
overland. The ability of the amphibious SAR community to
accomplish its mission and be a viable asset to both CATF
and CLF will not come about until the shortfalls of
airframe inadequacy and aircrew proficiency are rectified.
Hopefully, it will not take a loss of life or another
combat situation before the problem receives its proper
resolution. Resolving the amphibious search and rescue
paradox will require time, attention, and a diligent effort
by the highest levels of the Navy and Marine Corps.
FOOTNOTES
1 Lieutenant Commander Bryan P. Murphy, USN. "Combat
Search and Rescue Policy for the United States
Navy," (Unpublished Student Thesis), Air Command
and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL., June 1988,
page vi.
2 Major Spencer Smith, USMC. Operations Officer,
HMX-1Quantico, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA.
Interview 20 March 1990.
3 Captain Roy Roe, USMC. Squadron Pilot, HMM-261(C)
Camp Lejeune, NC. Interview 15 February 1990.
4 Ibid.
5 U. S. Marine Corps. Landing Force Training Command,
Pacific MEU(SOC) Planning Guidelines, (Working
Copy), Tactical Recoverv of Aircraft, Equipment
and Personnel (TRAP), September 1988, Tab W.
6 Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Unified Action Armed Forces JCS PUB 0-2.
Washington. D.C., December 1986, page 4-12.
7 SFC D. J. Jones, USA. Operations NCOIC, Task Force
160th SOAR (ABN)., Fort Campbell, KN. Interview
7 March 1990.
8 Major Bert Tussing, USMC. Assistant Operations
Officer, HMM-261(C) Camp Lejeune, NC. Interview 20
March 1990.
9 Rear Admiral Paul T. Gillcrist, USN. "Statement,"
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness, Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape (SERE) and Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR), Hearing (Washington: U. S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1983).
10 Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Unified Action Armed Forces JCS Pub 0-2.
Washington. D. C., December 1986, page 4-14.
11 Major Keith Tibbetts, USMC. Assault Support
Division Weapons and Tactics Instructor, MAWTS-1,
MCAS, Yuma, AZ. Interview, 7 March 1990.
12 Rear Admiral Paul T. Gillcrist, USN.
13 Ed H. Tripp, "SOF Helicopters: Operating on the
Dark Side." Rotor and WinG International, December
1987, pages 42-44.
14 Lieutenant Commander Ray Bellant, USN. Strike
Rescue Coordinator, Strike University, NAS,
Fallon, NV. Telephone Interview, 8 March 1990.
15 Commander, Naval Air Systmes Command, LPH/LHA/LHD
NAPOPS Manual, NAVAIR 00-80T-106, September 1987,
page 7-2.
16 Lt. Col (Sel.) James E. McCormick, USMC.
Requirements Officer for UH-1N/AH-1/OV-10.
Amphibious Operations Aviation Plans and
Requirements (OP-504), Department of the Navy,
Washington, D.C. Interview, 15 March 1990.
17 Captain James L. Hughes, USN. CNO Branch Head for
Amphibious Operations Aviation Plans and
Requirements (OP-504), Department of the Navy,
Washington, D. C. Interview, 7 March 1990.
18 Commander Daniel G. Hartley, USN. "Keeping Faith
With Our People," U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, February 1983, page 60.
19 Colonel John C. Swonson, JR. USAF., Operational
Test and Evaluation Final Report PVS-5 Night
Vision Goggles, Director of Operational
Requirements and Tests DCS/Plans, HQ MAC/XPQT, May
1982, pages 20-21.
20 Commander Michael R. Suldo, USN., "Employment of
the MV22 Osprey in Navy Combat Search and Rescue,"
(Unpublished Student Research Paper), Naval War
College, Newport, R.I., May 1987 page 11.
21 Captain James L. Hughes, USN.
22 Lieutenant Robert L. Wilde, USN., "A Comparative
Analysis of a CV Helicopter and a JVX Tilt-Rotor
Aircraft in an Aircraft Carrier Based ASW Role,"
(Unpublished Student Thesis), Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA., March 1985 pages 42-45.
23 Commander Michael R. Suldo, USN.
24 Martin G. Every. Navy Combat Search and Rescue,
ADA-074593, Falls Church, VA., Biotechnology, 1979
pages 40-41.
25 Commander Daniel G. Hartley, USN.
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