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Who Will Rescue Amphibious Search And Rescue?
AUTHOR Major Raymond S. Shelton, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THESIS:    The  Navy  does not now possess, nor does it plan
to   develop  in  the  near  future,  a  compatible  SAR  or
dedicated  active  duty  CSAR  capability for the amphibious
ISSUE:    The  lack of attention paid to the capabilities of
the  aircraft  and  crews  of  the amphibious SAR mission is
readily  apparent  when  reviewing  recent  U.  S.  military
history.    Area commanders are forced to rely on other than
Naval  assets  under  their cognizance to preform Search and
Rescue  (SAR) and combat Search and Rescue.   The reason for
this  is  the  incompatibility of the aircraft and crew with
the  mission.  This entails an even greater paradox for CATF
and  CLF  as  their  SAR asset is the least effective of all
within  the  Navy.    The  Navy has attempted to rectify the
situation  by creating the Helicopter Combat Special Mission
(HCS)  community,  but  it  is  doubtful  that  HCS  will be
employed  in  support  of  the  ATF.   The UH-1N aircraft is
assigned  the mission of ATF SAR.  It is incapable of making
a  night  or  multiperson  rescues  in  numbers greater than
eight;  and  it  cannot  survive  in  the modern battlefield
arena.    The  low  priority  given    ATF  SAR within Naval
aviation  is reflected by the policy that pilots assigned to
fly  the  mission  are  done  so on a collateral duty basis.
Proper  training for the mission is not provided due to lack
of  funding.    A solution to the problem must be found that
will  lend  itself  to  the  over the horizon tactics of the
future.    With  this  in mind, a non-biased reevaluation of
the  MV-22  should  be  conducted.    The value of the MV-22
Osprey  in  the  SAR/CSAR  role over present alternatives is
astronomical.    A  new  aircraft,  mission orientation, and
training  standards  are  needed  for  the 21st century.  If
reassessment  by  the Navy is not a viable solution, perhaps
reassignment  of  the  ATF  SAR/CSAR  mission  to the Marine
Corps is the answer.
THESIS  STATEMENT.   The Navy does not now possess, nor does
it  plan  to develop in the near future, a compatible SAR or
dedicated  active  duty  CSAR  capability for the amphibious
           1. COLUMBIA
           2. LEBANON
           1. PERSIAN GULF
           2. BEKAA VALLEY, SYRIA
           1. CSAR DEVELOPMENT
           2. CURRENT CSAR
           1. LACK OF CAPACITY
           1. NEW SHIPS
           1. BUDGET MEASURES
           1. CREW - DUE TO TRAINING
    To  fully comprehend the problems with Amphibious Combat
Search  and  Rescue  (CSAR)  and peacetime Search and Rescue
(SAR)   requires   viewing   the   situation   from  various
perspectives.    The  Marines  Corps relies upon the Navy to
fulfill  the missions of both CSAR and SAR however, the Navy
cannot  effectively  accomplish  its  assigned mission.  The
Navy  does  not  now possess, nor does it plan to develop in
the  near  future, a compatible SAR or dedicated active duty
CSAR  capability  for  the amphibious fleet.1  Validation of
this  statement  is  graphically  evidenced  in  our  recent
military   endeavors   where  amphibious  forces  have  been
    As   recently   as   February   1990,   the  problem  of
ineffective  amphibious  SAR was made evident when President
Bush  traveled to Colombia, South America to meet with other
national  leaders  concerning  the  rampant drug problems of
our  hemisphere.    HMX-1  was to provide the President with
the requisite helicopter support for the summit.
However,  HMX-1 Presidential aircraft are not considered SAR
capable.   The   Navy  was given the mission to provide this
service.   The   USS  NASSAU (LHA-4) provided the logistical
and  health support base required by the agencies supporting
the  Presidential visit.  The Navy was forced to replace the
USS  NASSAU's  normal  amphibious  SAR UH-1N with three SH-2
aircraft   due   to   the   limited   capacity   and   night
incompatibility of the UH-1N.2
    In  Grenada,  Operation  "Urgent  Fury" found the Navy's
amphibious  SAR  aircraft  sitting  on  the deck of the ship
unused.   Due to operational intensity, Navy pilots assigned
SAR  mission  responsibility  were required to perform their
primary  duty  aboard  ship  and  thus were not available to
fly.    During the assault phase, the 22nd Marine Amphibious
Unit  was  forced  to conduct the mission of CSAR. A crucial
Marine  Air-Ground  Task  Force  (MAGTF) asset, a HMM-261(C)
CH-46E,  was  required to perform this critical mission. The
Marine  crew assigned the mission was characteristically not
trained  in  overwater  SAR  procedures.    Anticipating the
worst,  an  overwater rescue, the crew did embark the ship's
SAR  swimmer.   Fortunately, for the crew and the Amphibious
Task  Force  (ATF),  an  overwater pickup was not required.3
During  the  entire  assault  evolution  the ATF's dedicated
UH-1N  SAR  aircraft  launched from the deck of the USS GUAM
(LPH-9)  to  accomplish a single mission.  It was piloted by
the  Marine  pilot  assigned  to ship's company.  The reason
for  this  was  that  the  Marine  pilot was the only one of
ship's company pilots trained in combat tactics.
    In  December  of 1983, while off the coast of Lebanon in
support  of  multinational  forces  in Beruit, the pilots of
HMM-261(C)   were  again  called  upon  to  perform  a  CSAR
mission.4      Although   the   Marine   aircraft   was  not
committed,  it was prepared to effect a Tactical Recovery of
Aircraft,   Equipment,   and   Personnel   (TRAP)   mission.
However,  the  establishment  and prosecution of the mission
was  not  in  accordance  with the current doctrine espoused
for  Marine  Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
(MEU[SOC])  operations.5    It  was  an unplanned, haphazard
mission  given  to  the  most reliable asset available.  The
primary  SAR asset of the ATF, the UH-1N, was again bypassed
because of its ineffectiveness in mission accomplishment.
    An  important  factor  which cannot be overlooked by any
viable  SAR  platform  is  the  responsibility  of  the area
commander  to  use  all  forces  at his disposal to effect a
rescue.  This is stated in JCS Pub 0-2 as:
         In  urgent  situations, the area commander may
         assign  SAR  and  CSAR  tasks  and missions to
         forces  not assigned but based or operating in
         the  area and may assume temporary operational
         control  of  them  when  such  forces  are not
         actively   engaged  in  missions  assigned  by
         their   own  higher  command.    Control  will
         normally  be exercised through the subordinate
         commander  of  such  forces  who will keep the
         area  commander advised of the availability of
         SAR and CSAR capable forces.
    This  was documented during Operation "Praying Mantis" in
the  Persian  Gulf.   Use of interservice assets by the area
commander  was demonstrated when Task Force 160th SOAR (ABN)
was  used as the primary CSAR element by the combined forces
of  Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.  Why was the Army used for
this  traditional  Navy  mission?    The  answer is that the
Navy,   as  in  Grenada,  could  not  fulfill  its  assigned
mission.    The  ATF  SAR aircraft was incompatible with the
mission.    TF  160th  had  the  proper  equipment and their
people  were  properly  trained  to  conduct a comprehensive
CSAR  mission  to  include an overwater rescue.  Despite the
capability  to  conduct  CSAR, TF 160th will be the first to
decline  the  mission because they are organized and mission
oriented  toward  special  operations.7    Amphibious SAR is
the  Navy's  mission.    However, TF 160th was unequivocally
the  best  asset  the  area commander could employ to give a
substantial guarantee in the event CSAR was required.
    The  authority  of  this  doctrine and validation of the
inefficiency  of  the  ATF  SAR aircraft as a CSAR platform,
were  both  manifested  during  the  air strike in the Bekaa
valley  of  Syria.   Marines of HMM-261(C) were charged with
the  missions  of overwater SAR - preformed by a CH-46 - and
CSAR  -  preformed  by  a CH-53 8. Again, the area commander
chose  the  best  available  assets  to fulfill the mission.
The  designated  ATF  SAR  asset was not considered a viable
platform  for  either.    Operational commanders realize the
Navy  cannot  do  its  CSAR  mission  and are trying to work
around  this  flaw  with  any  efficacious  entity  at their
    It    is   a   sad   note   that   peacetime   budgetary
considerations  have  all but obliterated the Navy's ability
to  conduct  CSAR  in  an  opposed  environment.  Testifying
before  Congress  in  1983,  Rear  Admiral Paul T. Gillcrist
(OP-50) stated:
         "The  National,  Department  of Defense, Joint
         Chiefs  of Staff and Navy directives on Search
         and  Rescue  policy  are all very clear on the
         subject  of  service  responsibilities.   They
         state:  First, that each military component of
         the  Department  of Defense is responsible for
         providing  rescue  capabilities  in support of
         its  own  operations;  and  Secondly, and more
         specifically,   that   rescue   operations  in
         support   of   a  naval  task  force  are  the
         responsibility  of  the  task force commander.
         Also,  and  equally applicable to the Navy, is
         the  JCS  policy  that  rescue operations in a
         battle  area  are  the specific responsibility
         of the tactical commander."9
    In  the  past  three  years  specific  moves  have  been
accomplished  within  the  Department  of  the Navy (DON) to
rectify  the adverse SAR/CSAR situation.  These improvements
have  been  made  in  the  Naval  Reserve  community and the
benefits  are  not  readily  accessible to the Marine Corps.
So  what  is  the Marine Corps to do until the Navy sees fit
to  find  the  resources and manpower to accomplish the CSAR
and  SAR  mission?  What are, and how shall the Marine Corps
deal  with,  the  specifics  of the problem until the proper
solution is found?
    Marine  Corps  policy,  according  to  the former Deputy
Chief  of Staff for Aviation, LtGen K. A. Smith, is that the
Marines  will  not  do CSAR.  CSAR for the Marine Corps is a
specific  mission  to  be  accomplished by the Navy.  Marine
Corps  assets cannot be dedicated for that purpose.  JCS Pub
0-2,is specific in its stipulation that:
         Each Service is responsible for providing
         forces  capable  of performing CSAR in support
         of  its own operations, in accordance with its
         assigned functions.10
    Yet,   the  Marine  Corps  has  continually  evaded  its
obligation  for  the  search phase of SAR/CSAR by developing
the  mission  of  TRAP.  This was done under the auspices of
LtGen K. A. Smith who also coined the phrase.11
    The  Commander  of  the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and
the  Commander  of  the  Landing  Force  (CLF), face a great
paradox  when attempting to employ their SAR/CSAR assets, as
doctrinally  prescribed.    The  paradox stems from the fact
that  the  type  aircraft  provided for the mission, and the
crews  assigned  to  carry  out  that  mission,  are neither
qualified  nor  capable  of  accomplishing the task.  Today,
the  MAGTF  amphibious assault, in peacetime or war, will be
conducted  employing substantial aviation assets.  The prime
"Marine  mover"  in  the  ship-to-shore movement now, and in
the  foreseeable  future,  will  be  the  CH-46,  Sea Knight
helicopter.    Doctrinal  employment  of the CH-46 calls for
the  aircraft  to carry a maximum troop load of eighteen and
a  crew of four.  If a crash occurs at sea with only half of
the  occupants  surviving,  six of the survivors will not be
rescued  on  the  initial rescue recovery attempt due to the
insufficient  capacity of the primary ATF SAR aircraft.  The
amphibious  SAR/CSAR  community,  assessed  by  any measure,
fails   to  meet  the  minimum  requirements  needed  for  a
contemporary,  effective  fighting  force.    Concerned with
these  serious  shortfalls  the  statement  of  Rear Admiral
Gillcrist,  weighs  heavily on the mind of each CATF and CLF
when time for action draws near:
         "No  American  combat  commander  is  going to
         leave  his  wounded  on  the  field (or in the
         water)      or his people trapped behind enemy
         lines  without  doing  everything  possible to
         get  them  back.    He is going to keep trying
         with  whatever  resources  that  he can muster
         until  he is forced to stop by the enemy.  Our
         basic  makeup  provides  the  impetus  for our
         actions  and  the American people would demand
         no less."12
    If  credence  is  to  be paid to this statement then the
amphibious  SAR/CSAR mission  must  be  reevaluated and the
shortfalls rectified without service parochialism.
    The  Navy  currently views peacetime SAR and CSAR as two
distinct  entities,  which  doctrinally  do not interface in
the  operational  environment.    The Navy has provided each
LHA/LPH/LHD  with a single UH-1N to be used as the peacetime
SAR  platform  for the ATF and the MAGTF.  To breach the gap
between   peacetime   SAR   and   CSAR,   existing  doctrine
stipulates  that  in  the  event of "formal hostilities" the
CSAR  mission  requirement will be provided for by the newly
established   Helicopter   Combat   Special  Missions  (HCS)
community.    Light Helicopter Attack Squadron Four and Five
(HAL-4  and  HAL-5),  the  east and west coast Naval Reserve
Specialized  Operational  Forces  (SOF)  squadrons, absorbed
Helicopter  Combat  Support Squadron Nine (HC-9), the strike
rescue  squadron,  to form the HCS community.  The community
currently  consists  of  two  reserve  squadrons,  HCS-4 and
HCS-5.    Although flying outmoded aircraft the predecessors
of  the  HCS  squadrons  contributed  substantially  to  the
tactics  of  the CSAR mission.  The majority of these modern
battlefield  tactics  were  derived from experience or taken
directly  from  Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron
One (MAWTS-1) in Yuma, Arizona.
    HCS-5  and  its sister squadron HCS-4, were commissioned
October  1988  and  1989  respectively  with  the charter of
strike  rescue  -  also  known  as  CSAR  -  and specialized
operational  forces  (SOF).  Squadrons  receiving  a primary
mission  coalescence  of  CSAR  and SOF is the current trend
among   all   branches   of  the  U.  S.  military.13    The
definitive  mission  of downed aircrew extraction in support
of  a  Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or other Naval Task Force
strike  operations,  as well as the insertion of clandestine
units,  such as SEAL teams in a special operations scenario,
was  the  basis  for  the creation of the HCS squadron.  The
HCS  community flies the HH-60H (Seahawk) aircraft which has
the  basics  required  of  modern  battlefield  helicopters.
These  include survival items such as self-defense weaponry,
radar     warning    equipment    (RAW    gear),    infrared
countermeasures  equipment,  self-sealing fuel cells, global
positioning  navigation  equipment,  and  an  airframe built
with  ballistic  tolerance and combat survivability in mind.
Pilots  and  crews  are  well-versed  in  modern  helicopter
tactics   including  evasive  maneuvers  (EVM)  and  terrain
flight  (TERF).    Training  is conducted primarily at night
stressing  the  maximum  use of night vision goggles (NVGs).
Employing  the newest combat tactics and using modern, state
of  the art aircraft and equipment, the HCS squadron is more
than   prepared   to   accomplish   its  mission.    Mission
assignment  dictates  that  within  72 hours of notification
the  HCS squadron shall deploy a combat capable two aircraft
detachment worldwide.14
    This  in  all  essence  sounds like the perfect solution
for  CATF  and  CLF  in  their quest to fill the void in the
CSAR.    However, there are definite flaws in relying on the
HCS  squadrons to accomplish the amphibious CSAR mission.  A
serious   uncertainty   exists  in  using  strictly  reserve
units.    In accordance with the constitution, reserve units
are   by   law   not  required  to  respond  to  contingency
operations  unless mobilized by Presidential order.  Do they
truly  possess the ability to mount out in 72 hours?  If so,
can  they  support  the  multiple  phased  operations  of  a
deployed  ATF?   If able to reach the ATF in sufficient time
to  be  employed  will  they  be  able to integrate into the
mission  of  the  MAGTF  owing to the fact that the focus of
their  training  is  to  support  CVBG strike operations and
SOF?    If  the  situation  is crucial enough to warrant the
employment   of  a  MAGTF  will  it  not  also  warrant  the
employment of a CVBG to cover the MAGTF operation?
    Doctrine  stipulates  that  the CVBG does not have to be
in  close  proximity  to  the ATF/MAGTF, but must be able to
provide  protection for its employment.  The CVBG commander,
with  just  cause,  will  most  likely  require that the two
aircraft  HCS detachment be used in their primary mission of
strike  rescue.   This leaves CATF and CLF in their original
position  of  having  to  rely  on their peacetime SAR asset
(the  UH-1N)  to  fulfill  the role of CSAR.  Thus, the only
realistic  conclusion that can be drawn is that the missions
of  SAR  and  CSAR,  although in theory assigned to and best
handled  by  the  HCS  squadrons,  will  by default become a
mission  of the amphibious SAR element.  An element recently
demonstrated  as  totally  unprepared to perform the mission
of  CSAR  and  only  marginally  prepared for the mission of
    Realistically   then,  when  we  speak  of  SAR  in  the
amphibious  community  we  must  consider  the  term  to  be
synonymous  with  CSAR!    Each aspect of the amphibious SAR
community  must  be  viewed  in  that light.  Currently, the
Navy  UH-1N  is  the  primary  amphibious SAR platform.  The
selection  and  continued  use of this airframe reflects the
low  priority  the  mission  receives within Naval aviation.
With  a  crew  of  four, full mission equipment, a half-fuel
load,  hovering  out-of-ground  effect,  and  in the best of
meteorological  conditions  the  UH-1N  has a maximum rescue
capacity  of  eight  people.   Since its initial delivery in
1971,  the  UH-1N  has  always  been  "less than capable" in
performing the SAR mission for the amphibious community.
    Presently,  the  only  readily  accessible  and reliable
night  rescue  vehicle  available to the amphibious fleet is
the  ship  designated  to  follow  in  trace  of the primary
launch  and recovery platform (LPH/LHA/LHD).  This vessel is
commonly  referred  to  as  the  "plane  guard  ship" and is
1940's  technology  in the 1990's.  The UH-1N cannot be used
at  night  as  a  rescue platform.  It can only be used as a
search  platform  because  it  lacks  the  "hands-off hover"
capability  -  common throughout Naval aviation - that would
permit  its  engagement  in  night rescues.  The LPH/LHA/LHD
Naval   Aviation   Training   Operational   Procedures   and
Standardization  (NATOPS)  manual  is  very  specific in its
capability  requirements for the type SAR vehicle to be used
in  the  myriad  of  potential  rescue  evolutions.15    The
inability  of  the  UN-1N  to effect a night rescue dictates
the  night  landing  and  launch  criteria aboard amphibious
ships.    This  lack  of  night  rescue  capability dictates
"administrative"  passengers  will  not be landed 30 minutes
prior   to  sunset  or  debarked  until  30  minutes  before
sunrise.      To  effect  multi-plane  evolutions  or  troop
assaults  during  the  hours  of  darkness  -  most  initial
assaults   occur  in  the  hours  just  before  dawn  -  the
amphibious  fleet  is  forced  to  request a "Doppler Radar"
equipped  aircraft,  usually an SH-3, to augment the ATF SAR
mission.    The  ATF's  lack  of  an  organic  night  rescue
capability,  and  subsequent reliance on external assets for
SAR  support,  results  in the waste of thousands of dollars
and innumerable man-hours.
    It  should  be  noted  that  each  UH-1N assigned to the
amphibious  SAR  mission  had  been  scheduled  to receive a
Doppler   Radar  permitting  "hands-off  hover"  capability,
during  scheduled  routine  rework  cycles.    Research  and
development  to  install  this  technology  in  a two bladed
aircraft,   such  as  the  UH-1N,  has  proven  futile.  The
projected  cost  to retrofit all 22 UH-1N SAR aircraft would
be  over  26.5  million  in  today's  dollars.   Not wanting
torisk   money   in   unproven   technology   the  Navy  has
completely     cancelled  the  project.    It  will  not  be
reinstated  into  the  budget.16  Had the UH-1N SAR aircraft
received  this  added  capability  the shortfall of capacity
remains  implicit.    The fact is that even a modified UH-1N
is still inadequate as an amphibious SAR platform.
    In   contrast,   the  CVBGs  deploy  with  a  number  of
helicopters   that   have  more  than  the  required  rescue
capacity  to  perform  SAR.  Although the CVBG commander has
at  his  disposal the airframes to conduct SAR/CSAR missions
these  assets  must  be  drawn from other missions, which in
essence  degrades  the  overall  capability  of  the  battle
group.   Pilots and aircrews performing the SAR/CSAR mission
on  a  daily  basis  for  the CVBG do so only as a secondary
mission  parameter.    Recently,  pilots  of  the HS and HSL
communities   began   training   with   the  Navy's  "Strike
University"  in  an effort to offset the deficient nature of
SAR/CSAR  in  the aviation community.  These forces will not
be  dispatched  from  the  CVBG  in time of crisis or war to
help  the  amphibious  platforms,  because of the vital role
they  play  in  securing the safety of the CVBG.  Again, the
amphibious community will be forced to fend for itself.
    The  next decade will see the continued commissioning of
the  LHD  class  of  amphibious ships.  The commissioning of
each  new LHD will call for the retirement of one LPH.  Yet,
no  new  SAR  assets  will arrive to complement the enhanced
capabilities  of this new class of ship.  Instead the UH-1N,
which  in some cases is older than the platform it supports,
will  move  from  the deck of the retired LPH to the deck of
the  newly commissioned LHD.  Alternatives are being sought,
but  according  to  Captain  James L. Hughes, Aviation Plans
and  Requirements for Amphibious Operations (OP-504)  "As it
stands now there is no real answer."17
    To  compound the problems placed upon the mission by the
inadequacy  of the UH-1N airframe, others are imposed by the
personnel  assigned  to  execute  the mission.  Conducting a
night  search  mission  at 200 feet above the water, with no
visible   horizon,   in   a   severely  unstable  instrument
platform,  takes  an  immense amount of concentration, skill
and  training.  The quality of the pilot assigned to fly the
amphibious  SAR  mission  is  equal  to  that  of  his peers
throughout  the   fleet.   This  mission suffers because the
trainina  for  these  quality pilots is not available to the
degree  needed.    Training  is  the  key.  In the "Holloway
Report"  on  the hostage rescue raid in Iran, it was clearly
stated  that  it  is  easier  to  train  a  pilot  to  fly a
different  aircraft  than  to fly a new mission.  It follows
then  that  combat rescue is a contingency mission requiring
extensive  and  continuous  training  to master and maintain
adequate proficiency levels.18
    Current  cost saving budget measures have hurt the U. S.
Navy   in   general,   and   in  particular  the  amphibious
community.    The  Pacific  amphibious  SAR community flight
hour  allocation  for fiscal year 1988 was an average of 600
hours    per  airframe.      This   allocation   equates  to
approximately  150  hours  for each assigned pilot per year.
This  is slightly more than the time needed to be proficient
in  familiarization  training  alone.   Deduct from this the
time  dedicated  to  VIP  flights, ship support, maintaining
qualifications   and   currency   for  temporarily  assigned
pilots,  and  the initial training of new pilots; it becomes
readily  apparent  that  mission  oriented  training suffers
    Coupled  with  the  training  deficit  is  the fact that
pilots  are assigned to the SAR mission on a collateral duty
basis.    Each  amphibious  SAR  pilot's primary duty is his
assigned  shipboard billet.  Our military advancement system
stresses  an  individual's  primary  billet which translates
into  designated  SAR pilots orienting their flight training
schedule  around  their  shipboard  assignments and not vice
versa.    This  situation works well aboard ship until a SAR
crisis  arises  beyond  the capabilities of the pilot.  Most
likely,  this  is  not  due  to  the pilot's flying ability.
Rather,  it  is  due  to a lack of training which results in
proficiency  degradation.  It is not inconceivable that this
degradation  of  proficiency may result in the loss of life.
    Take  the  mission a step further into the combat arena.
It  becomes  evident  that the vulnerability of the aircraft
and  the   inadequacy  in  the  training  of   the  crew  is
critical.    The  UH-1N  possesses  none   of   the  minimum
requirements  necessary  for the survival of a helicopter on
the  modern  battlefield.  Critics state that the UH-1N will
not  have  the  mission  of  inland  CSAR.    Therefore, the
aircraft  does  not  require  items  such  as a low infrared
signature,   global   positioning  navigation  system,  self
defensive  weaponry, a ballistically tolerant airframe, self
sealing  fuel  tanks,  redundance of critical flight control
systems,  extended  fuel  range,  or a night blackout flight
capability.   They further state that pilots need not devote
more  than a minimum amount of time necessary to perfect the
search  and  rescue  techniques  required  for  an unopposed
rescue  attempt.    However,  critics must remember that the
Marines   and  Navy  are  preparing  to  conduct  amphibious
conflict  in  the  21st century from over the horizon (OTH).
The   aircraft  performing  the  SAR/CSAR  mission  must  be
compatible  with  the mission and capable of rescue anywhere
from  the  assault  launch  platform  to  and  including the
    Due  to  tactical  dictates  ATF  operations, one of the
most   complex   military  ventures,  will  most  likely  be
conducted  under the cover of darkness, and in a restrictive
electromagnetic  - radiation - controlled environment.  This
will  necessitate  the use of night vision goggles (NVGs) to
which  SAR crews presently do not have access. A substantial
number  of Navy helicopter pilots have never seen, let alone
used,  NVGs.    Yet,  it  is a proven fact that NVGs greatly
enhance  the  ability  of  search  crews to locate survivors
both  at  sea  and  on  the  land,  in  periods  of  reduced
visibility .19
    What  happens in the early morning darkness to the fully
loaded  CH-46,  or  its  future  replacement,  shot  down  a
half-mile  from  the enemy beach?  Navy pilots are not short
on  courage  and  so  the  SAR bird will attempt a rescue of
their  comrades in arms.  If today's situation prevails, the
UH-1N,  lit  up like a Christmas tree (due to lack of NVGs),
close  to  a  hostile  shore, with no defensive weapons, and
the  capacity to rescue less than a quarter of the potential
survivors,  will  fall  short of its mission and most likely
become  a  casualty  itself.    There exists the possibility
that  other  aircraft  could  be  assigned to assist the SAR
bird.      However,   what  prudent  MAGTF  commander  would
authorize  and  what Aviation Combat Element (ACE) commander
would  divert  critical  tactical assets needed in the rapid
building  of  combat  power  ashore?   After all, is not the
success   of   the  mission  paramount?    If  the  tactical
situation  should  allow such a diversion, it may prove more
a  hinderance  than  a  help.  Marine aircraft do not posses
the  proper  equipment  and  their  crews are not trained to
effect overwater rescues.
    Remove  the  combat  element and place the ATF and MAGTF
in  the all too familiar situation of our modern world which
requires  the  Noncombatant  Evacuation Operation (NEO).  In
order  to  ensure a successful evolution, combat tactics may
well  be  employed.    No  matter  how noble the effort, how
devastated  would the nation be, and how ridiculed would our
Navy   and  Marine  Corps  be,  when  a  CH-53  carrying  35
civilians  evacuees  and a crew of four crashes into the sea
and  the UH-1N rescue vehicle can initially rescue a maximum
of  8  survivors.20    The  recent  past  has seen the U. S.
Navy  increase  its  routine  deployments  into the northern
regions  of the Pacific and NATO.  Compound the above rescue
scenes   with   a  cold  water  environment  where,  due  to
hypothermia,  time  is  the  critical  factor  and the scene
becomes littered with unnecessary death and mayhem.
    In  addition  to  the  above problems the amphibious SAR
community  faces the fact that the number of UH-1Ns assigned
the  mission of SAR is dwindling and no suitable replacement
is  being  sought.    Currently  twenty-five  percent of the
UH-1N  airframes  now assigned the mission on the west coast
are  drawn from Marine Corps assets.  As the number of UH-1N
airframes  used  by the Navy for the SAR mission declines by
attrition  will  the  Marines  be  forced  to  replace these
assets  with  Marine  UH-1Ns?  If this is the case, the lack
of  these vital assets within the Marine Corps will severely
impact  on  the  mission  and  combat  posture  of  the HMLA
squadrons, and their employment in support of the MAGTF.
    Routinely  Marine  squadrons employed aboard air capable
amphibious  ships, though unqualified, are forced to augment
the  Navy  UH-1N  in  the  SAR mission.  Due to the singular
employment  of  the UH-1N airframe aboard LPH/LHA/LHD ships,
routine   maintenance,   supply,   lack  of  parts,  mission
associated  commitments and pilot availability, the embarked
Marine  squadron  will  be forced to share the burden of SAR
if flight training and mission preparedness is to continue.
    The  Navy  is  concerned  about  the inadequate airframe
problem.   The Defense Department budget proposal for Fiscal
Year  1990 had planned to replace the UH-1N with the Service
Life  Extension  Program  (SLEP)  version of the CH-46E "Sea
Knight"  augmented  with  the  upgraded  "217" Doppler hover
coupler.21    The  CH-46E  SLEP  aircraft  were to come from
former   Marine  Corps  assets  as  the  Marines  began  the
purchase  of  the  MV-22  Osprey  1993.  Currently the MV-22
program  has  been  cancelled and will require Congressional
sponsorship  to  be  placed  back  in  the  defense  budget.
Should  this occur the projected procurement will be delayed
well  beyond  the  initial 1993 date.  The CH-46E (SLEP) may
have  proven  a  good  interim  fix,  but  had  the  Marines
acquired  the  MV-22  the  old "Sea Knight" would have faced
the  same  problems, with the exception of capacity, as does
the  UH-1N.    In  fact, the CH-46E is much more critical in
fuel  considerations  than  the UH-1N and could not possibly
be  effective  as  a  SAR platform in over-the-horizon (OTH)
    Undoubtedly  future  ATF and MAGTF operations will occur
over-the-horizon.    Discarding all other factors previously
mentioned,  the  lack  of  range  of  the  UH-1N makes it an
unworthy  choice  for  SAR  in  OTH operations.  The OTH SAR
aircraft  will  need  to  employ new tactics compatible with
the  airframes with which it will serve.  As new tactics are
developed,  it  must  be  determined  who  will  control the
employment  of  the  SAR  aircraft.    Will  it  be  the ACE
commander  or  will  the  CATF retain control?  Normally the
SAR  aircraft  operates independently of any unit in the ATF
except  when  conducting  a  rescue mission.  The ability to
interface  with  the ATF combat information center (CIC) and
be  able  to  prosecute  a  search  over  the wide distances
utilized  in  OTH  operations  will be preeminent.  With the
distances  involved  datalink  may  provide the only contact
with  the ATF.  Will the control ship be able to develop the
battle  picture  to  the  degree  necessary to correctly and
effectively  employ  the   SAR  aircraft?   By virtue of the
distances   involved  the  SAR  aircraft  must  possess  the
ability   to   loiter  in  the  most  advantageous  position
available  to  benefit  both  the ATF and the MAGTF assault.
This  will  necessitate  an  upgrade  in  communications for
interaction  between  the  various  elements within the ATF.
To  solve  these  questions  and help eliminate the problems
previously  addressed  in  the  text,  with  respect  to SAR
mission  aircraft  suitability,  a  serious  readdressal  of
MV-22 Osprey acquisition must be undertaken.
    The  benefits  of the MV-22 in the SAR mission over what
the  Navy  has  now,  or plans to acquire, are astronomical.
Due  to construction design of the rotor/prop assembly there
is  virtually  no  "downwash"  directly  below  the aircraft
while  in  the  hover  mode.    In  an overwater rescue this
factor  decreases  the  severity of trauma on the victim(s).
The  MV-22  has  a  300-knot  dash speed and 500-mile combat
radius   which   fits  perfectly  into  the  OTH  and  quick
extraction  missions.   In night overwater SAR missions, the
MV-22  has  the  added  capability  of  not being bound to a
windline  rescue  pattern  to  effect  the  survivor  rescue
attempt.      The   windline   rescue  method,  required  of
conventional  Doppler  equipped helicopters, is considerably
more  time  consuming than the manual - daylight - mode, but
is  necessary  due  to the lack of visual references for the
pilot  and the high susceptibility to vertigo in this flight
regime.    Due to its counter-rotating prop-rotors the MV-22
is  free  of the limitation of having to hover into the wind
when  approaching  the  survivor.    The  result, in a night
rescue  scenario,  is  that the MV-22 eliminates the need to
execute  a  windline  rescue pattern, thereby reducing pilot
workload   and   delivering   a   substantial  reduction  in
survivor(s) rescue time.22
    During  the  interim  period of acquisition, detachments
could  be  formed  to support the amphibious community since
the  MV-22  has  the inherent capability of flying over 2100
nautical   miles  without  refueling.23    This  provides  a
mission  compatible  CSAR platform available to the CVBG and
the   ATF   that  has  a  responsive,  real-time,  worldwide
self-deployment  capability.   Factor into the equation that
the  MV-22  is  constructed  for  combat  survivability  and
mission  accomplishment in the modern battle theatre and the
aircraft   becomes   a   requisite   for   future  potential
    The  benefits  of this technology far outweigh any costs
when  the  spectrum  of  conflict is equated with the future
battlefield   needs.     This  is  fully  reconcilable  when
adjudicated  by  the  fact  that  the  last 23 international
situations  where U. S. armed forces have been employed have
used  vertical  lift  capable  aircraft.    Some  have  been
successful  (Son  Tay, Grenada, Libya, Panama) and some have
not  (Iran,  Mayaguez).    Perhaps  the use of this advanced
technology  in  the  future might significantly decrease the
number  of  military  failures.    Conversely, it would most
assuredly  increase  our  capability to conduct SAR and CSAR
throughout all the services.
    Should  the DOD "status quo" of aircraft maintenance and
acquisition  be  maintained,  then we must look at acquiring
the  HH-60H  (Seahawk)  used  by  HCS-4  and  HCS-5.    This
aircraft  does  not  completely meet the requirements of the
ATF, but it is a prodigious improvement over the UH-1N.
    The  Navy does not now possess the capability to provide
a  viable  Combat  Search and Rescue or peacetime Search and
Rescue  platform  in  support  of  the  amphibious fleet and
embarked  MAGTF.    Planners previously identified a partial
solution  to  this  problem through the conversion of Marine
CH-46  assets  to  the  CH-46E  SLEP,  which was designed to
offset  the  lack  of  airframes.   The CH-46 airframes were
scheduled  for  release  to the Navy during the Marine Corps
acquisition  of  the MV-22.  This solution did not alleviate
the  problem of amphibious SAR pilot training nor collateral
duty  assignment.    From all indications, the Navy plans to
continue  the  same  as  it  has  for the past 20 years with
respect  to  the  combat  quality  of ATF SAR pilots and SAR
    The  moral  obligation  to  Marines  and  sailors in the
water  or  awaiting rescue on land must be the primary focus
of  the  individuals charged with their rescue.  The essence
of  the  CSAR  mission is found in the fiber of the American
ethic.    Each  and  every  individual  soldier, sailor, and
Marine  knows  he has the right to expect that no reasonable
effort  will  be  spared  to  ensure  his  rescue.   Graphic
evidence  of  this  fact is shown in the grim statistic that
for  the 27 Navy CSAR rescues made in North Vietnam the Navy
lost  19  aircraft  and  15  SAR  personnel.24  Consider the
effect  of  sending  Marines,  both  aircrews  and heliborne
infantry,  into  combat  or  across  the  open  sea with the
knowledge  that  should  they  become  victims of a crash no
rescue  would  be  attempted!   Who would tell the SAR pilot
that  his  mission is non-vital and that he will not attempt
the  rescue  of his comrades?  If the Navy is to uphold this
moral  obligation to the ATF and MAGTF then it must start by
realizing   that   the   existing  SAR/CSAR  assets  of  the
amphibious  fleet  reflect  the  attitude  that  Marines and
sailors are considered expendable.
    If  the  Navy  retains  the  mission  of amphibious SAR,
which  in  today's  environment  means CSAR as well, drastic
changes  are  needed  in  doctrine, equipment, training, and
employment  of aircraft and crews.  Amphibious SAR/CSAR must
become  an immediate concern for CNO guidance and a solution
enacted.    SAR/CSAR  is a contingency mission that requires
extensive  and  continuous  training  to master and maintain
the  proficiency  that  equates  to  the  standards explicit
throughout  the  rest  of  Naval aviation.  SAR/CSAR must be
approached  as  a  field  with  definitive requirements that
cannot  be  overlapped  with other commitments to the extent
it  degrades  the desired results of mission accomplishment.
Amphibious  SAR/CSAR  can  no  longer  be of the quick-draw,
shoot  from  the  hip  variety.  Pilots and crews must train
diligently  and  with  a specific purpose.  Pilots can still
fill  collateral  duty  billets, but the SAR mission must be
their  primary  focus.    An essential part of the SAR crew,
the  rescue swimmers and enlisted crew members must train to
multi-person  rescues  on  a  routine  basis  instead of the
single  or  dual  seat aircraft rescues that are stressed in
their  initial  school  training and subsequent evaluations.
Pilots  must  be required to attend the Coast Guard's formal
SAR  school  to enhance their knowledge and readiness.  This
would   ensure  their  ability  to  completely  fulfill  the
requirements  of  the  SAR mission commander (SMC) or the on
scene commander (OSC).
    If  pilots and crews are forced by default to accomplish
the  CSAR  mission and bring their survivors home, they must
receive  formal  combat survival training.  Quality training
mirrored   on   the  Marine  Aviation  Weapons  and  Tactics
Squadron  One  (MAWTS-1) or HCS guidelines is paramount.  We
don't  send  ill-trained  Marine  pilots off the deck of the
ship  to  accomplish  their  mission; so why should the Navy
pilots  operating  in  the same environment receive any less
combat  training?  As a minimum, training should include the
basics  needed  for  map  interpretation  and terrain flight
(TERF),  NVG usage and application, evasive flight maneuvers
(EVM),  and  integrated  mission  planning  with  the ACE.25
Initial  combat  training  can  be  obtained in a variety of
ways.    Perhaps  the  best  way  is  to  have the SAR crews
trained   by  the  Navy's  "Strike  University"  in  Fallon,
Nevada, as are the HS community pilots.
    The  possibility  exists  to  integrate  the  individual
crews  into  training  with  the  Marine squadron with which
they  will  deploy. If achieved, the Navy SAR pilots must be
integrated  into  the  amphibious  assault role of the MAGTF
with  a  fully developed understanding of MAGTF tactics, and
how  the  SAR  asset  fits into the scheme of the operation.
They  should  become  vested  members of the ACE with a true
appreciation  for  its employment and the necessary intimacy
required  for  both  to  effectively accomplish their combat
and  peacetime  missions.  Without deviation they must truly
be  SAR  pilots  whose  sole  mission focus is the rescue of
their  comrades  and not the needs of a collateral duty. The
MAGTF  ACE  must acknowledge the role of the SAR element and
fully  incorporate  the  SAR  mission into the ACE's role in
the  mission  of  the  ATF.    Additionally,  the  Navy must
recognize    their    importance    in    overall    mission
accomplishment  and  demand  to  be integrated in the proper
    Once  quality  combat  pilots  are obtained they must be
provided  with an airframe that is adequate in both capacity
and  combat  survivability.    Currently there are no viable
options.   The CH-46 is the most likely choice, but the Navy
does  not  own  enough  of  these  airframes to fill current
missions  dictates.    Acquisition  of new CH-46 aircraft is
not  anticipated  in  the  near future, (Boeing has sold the
plans  to  investors  in  Japan).    Thus,  the  HH-60H  and
subsequent  to  that  the  SH-3, both with ample capacity to
rescue  10  victims  -  once  they  are stripped bare of all
other  mission  equipment  - are the fall back alternatives.
To  further complicate the matter neither the HH-60H nor the
SH-3   are   compatible   with   the  aircraft  intermediate
maintenance  department  (AIMD)  aboard the major amphibious
launch platforms.
    A  possible  solution, but most likely highly unpopular,
and  yet,  the safest and most forthright means of executing
the  mission,  would  be  to  task  the  Marine  Corps  with
providing  SAR/CSAR  for  the ATF.  Although this mission is
contrary  to  established  Marine  doctrine it is in keeping
with  the  Marine Corps' mission as "the force in readiness"
and  our  espoused  ethic  of  "taking care of our own."  As
illustrated  in  the  text,  many Marines are called upon to
accomplish  the mission of overwater SAR without the benefit
of  formal  training.   This formal training could easily be
accomplished  using  a small cadre of pilots and crewmembers
from  each  Medium  Helicopter  Squadron  as  designated SAR
crews.     These  individuals  already  have  the  necessary
training  to  perform  inland CSAR due to their training for
the  TRAP  mission.    Supplement TRAP with overwater rescue
training  and  the  CSAR  mission profile would be complete.
Forced  by  combat  necessity  and  day-to-day requirements,
SAR/CSAR  has  been accomplished by every ATF in the past 20
years.    Most  Marine  planners will initially balk at this
proposal;  however,  if  we are to keep faith with our young
Marines,   we   must   take  this  situation  under  serious
consideration.    If  the  Navy  is unwilling to provide the
kind  of  SAR/CSAR  capability  needed  by  the Fleet Marine
Force,  and  we  are  to  continue  to pursue our mission as
dictated  by  Congress  and  the Commandant, then we must be
prepared  to  provide for ourselves.  This solution would be
the  fastest, least costly, most effective answer to the SAR
dilemma  if  we  are  to  abandon  the  idea  of  a superior
alternative airframe.
    There  are  disadvantages  to this proposal, but none is
insurmountable.      Doctrinal  changes  would  have  to  be
accepted  by  CNO  and  CMC  providing the Marine Corps with
jurisdiction   over  amphibious  SAR/CSAR.    The  doctrinal
guidance  would  need to be incorporated into NWP-19-1, Navy
Search  and  Rescue  Manual,  with  a  chapter  dedicated to
Marine  amphibious  SAR/CSAR.  An amendment would have to be
made  to  the  respective  NATOPS  manual  of  the  aircraft
selected  for  the  mission,  most  likely  the  CH-46.    A
doctrinal  change  to  the Assault Support Helicopter Manual
(ASH)  reflecting  the  total  encompassing  nature  of  the
SAR/CSAR/TRAP  missions  would  be  required,  as well as an
update  to MEU(SOC) procedures.  A CMC sponsored study would
have  to  determine the requirements for the assignment of a
secondary   MOS   to  both  pilots  and  crews  as  SAR/CSAR
specialists.    This would necessitate an interface with the
national  SAR  school  run  by the Coast Guard.  Proficiency
would  have  to  be  maintained.    Thus,  funding  would be
affected.    To  alleviate  this problem funds earmarked for
the  amphibious  SAR  assets  could  be  transferred  to the
Marine  Corps Aviation.  TRAP mission scenarios could easily
be   expanded   to   incorporate  overwater  rescues.    The
establishment  of  suitable  training sites would not pose a
problem  because  all  major  Marine  Corps  Helicopter  Air
Stations are located near open ocean training areas.
    The  major  disadvantage  for the amphibious fleet would
be  the  loss  of  the  utility aircraft for the LPH/LHA/LHD
class  ships.    This  loss  would  deny  the  eight  to ten
aviators  assigned  as ship's company, and augment aviators,
the  ability  to  achieve  flight minimums.  This in essence
would  make  assignment to an amphibious ship a DIFDEN (duty
involving  flight  denied) tour for aviators.  These billets
are  a  "hard  to  sell"  item  for  detailers  now  and the
deletion  of  the opportunity to fly would make it even more
so.    This  does  not  necessarily  have to follow but most
likely  would  as a casualty of funding.  Can the amphibious
ships  function  without  their  utility  helicopter?    The
carriers  seem to encounter no problems when the wing assets
depart  the ship.  The MAGTF command element would be forced
to   accept   the  fact  that  once  embarked  it  would  be
responsible  for  all  the  administrative  aviation support
required by the ATF (Navy and Marine).
    A  realistic  capability  must  be developed to meet the
needs  of  the  amphibious  SAR/CSAR  mission.  The Navy has
traditionally  spared  no  expense for individual safety and
survival   equipment.   What  good  is  accomplished  if  an
individual  survives  a  crash,  manages  not  to  drown, or
survives  in  a  hostile environment, if he has no chance of
rescue?    Failure  to  rectify  the present situation is in
essence  a failure to place the proper value on the lives of
those  who  serve.  The future of amphibious SAR/CSAR is not
bright.    The  problems  mentioned will not cease to plague
the  Navy  and  Marine  Corps  until  effective programs are
developed  to  give amphibious SAR the status it deserves in
the  naval  aviation  community.   It is imperative the Navy
and  Marine  Corps  come  to an agreement on a comprehensive
solution  which  will afford the Marine Corps the ability to
save  its  downed  aircrews  and  Marines be it overwater or
overland.     The ability of the amphibious SAR community to
accomplish  its  mission  and be a viable asset to both CATF
and  CLF  will  not  come  about  until  the  shortfalls  of
airframe  inadequacy  and aircrew proficiency are rectified.
Hopefully,  it  will  not  take  a  loss  of life or another
combat  situation  before  the  problem  receives its proper
resolution.    Resolving  the  amphibious  search and rescue
paradox  will require time, attention, and a diligent effort
by the highest levels of the Navy and Marine Corps.
1 Lieutenant  Commander  Bryan  P.  Murphy,  USN. "Combat
     Search  and  Rescue  Policy  for  the United States
     Navy,"  (Unpublished  Student  Thesis), Air Command
     and  Staff  College,  Maxwell  AFB, AL., June 1988,
     page vi.
2 Major   Spencer   Smith,   USMC.   Operations  Officer,
     HMX-1Quantico,  Marine  Corps  Base,  Quantico, VA.
     Interview 20 March 1990.
3 Captain  Roy  Roe,  USMC.  Squadron  Pilot,  HMM-261(C)
     Camp Lejeune, NC. Interview 15 February 1990.
4 Ibid.
5 U.  S.  Marine  Corps.  Landing Force Training Command,
     Pacific   MEU(SOC)  Planning  Guidelines,  (Working
     Copy),  Tactical  Recoverv  of  Aircraft, Equipment
     and Personnel (TRAP), September 1988, Tab W.
6 Department    of   Defense.   Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.
     Unified   Action   Armed  Forces    JCS   PUB  0-2.
     Washington. D.C.,  December 1986, page 4-12.
7 SFC  D.  J.  Jones,  USA.  Operations NCOIC, Task Force
     160th SOAR (ABN)., Fort Campbell, KN. Interview
     7 March 1990.
8 Major   Bert   Tussing,   USMC.   Assistant  Operations
     Officer,  HMM-261(C) Camp Lejeune, NC. Interview 20
     March 1990.
9 Rear  Admiral  Paul  T.  Gillcrist,  USN.  "Statement,"
     U.  S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
     Subcommittee   on   Readiness,  Survival,  Evasion,
     Resistance  and Escape (SERE) and Combat Search and
     Rescue  (CSAR),  Hearing (Washington:   U. S. Govt.
     Print. Off., 1983).
10 Department   of  Defense.    Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.
     Unified   Action   Armed  Forces    JCS   Pub  0-2.
     Washington. D. C., December 1986, page 4-14.
11 Major    Keith    Tibbetts,  USMC.    Assault   Support
     Division  Weapons  and Tactics Instructor, MAWTS-1,
     MCAS, Yuma, AZ.  Interview, 7 March 1990.
12 Rear Admiral Paul T. Gillcrist, USN.
13 Ed  H.  Tripp,  "SOF  Helicopters:  Operating  on  the
     Dark  Side." Rotor and WinG International, December
     1987, pages 42-44.
14 Lieutenant   Commander   Ray   Bellant,   USN.  Strike
     Rescue   Coordinator,   Strike   University,   NAS,
     Fallon, NV.  Telephone Interview, 8 March 1990.
15 Commander,  Naval  Air  Systmes  Command,  LPH/LHA/LHD
     NAPOPS  Manual,  NAVAIR 00-80T-106, September 1987,
     page 7-2.
16 Lt.    Col     (Sel.)  James    E.    McCormick,   USMC.
     Requirements     Officer   for     UH-1N/AH-1/OV-10.
     Amphibious     Operations    Aviation      Plans  and
     Requirements   (OP-504),  Department   of  the  Navy,
     Washington, D.C.   Interview, 15 March 1990.
17 Captain  James  L.  Hughes,  USN.  CNO Branch Head for
     Amphibious     Operations    Aviation      Plans  and
     Requirements   (OP-504),  Department   of  the  Navy,
     Washington, D. C.  Interview, 7 March 1990.
18 Commander  Daniel  G.  Hartley,  USN.  "Keeping  Faith
     With   Our   People,"   U.   S.   Naval   Institute
     Proceedings, February 1983, page 60.
19 Colonel    John  C.  Swonson,  JR.  USAF.,  Operational
     Test    and  Evaluation  Final  Report  PVS-5  Night
     Vision    Goggles,    Director    of    Operational
     Requirements  and Tests DCS/Plans, HQ MAC/XPQT, May
     1982, pages 20-21.
20 Commander  Michael  R.  Suldo,  USN.,  "Employment  of
     the  MV22 Osprey in Navy Combat Search and Rescue,"
     (Unpublished  Student  Research  Paper),  Naval War
     College, Newport, R.I., May 1987 page 11.
21 Captain James L. Hughes, USN.
22 Lieutenant  Robert  L.  Wilde,  USN.,  "A  Comparative
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     (Unpublished  Student  Thesis),  Naval Postgraduate
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23 Commander Michael R. Suldo, USN.
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25 Commander Daniel G. Hartley, USN.
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Personal Interview with:
Bellant,   R.,   Lieutenant  Commander  USN,  Strike  Rescue
         Coordinator,  Strike  University,  NAS, Fallon, NV.
         8 March 1990.
Coyle,  R.  H.,  Commander  USN,  Operations Officer, HCS-5,
         Pt. Magu, CA. 3 March 1990.
Hughes,   J.   L.,   Captain   USN,   CNO  Branch  Head  for
         Amphibious    Operations    Aviation    Plans   and
         Requirements  (OP-504),  Department  of  the  Navy,
         Washington, D. C. 7 March 1990.
Jones,  D.  J.,  SFC USA, Operations NCOIC, Task Force 160th
         SOAR (ABN)., Fort Campbell, KN.  7 March 1990.
Kennedy,   G.   E.,  Lieutenant  USN,  Assistant  Operations
         Officer, HCS-4, Norfolk, VA. 3 March 1990.
McCormick,   J.   E.,   Lt.  Col.(Sel.)  USMC,  Requirements
         Officer    for    UH-1N/AH-1/OV-10.      Amphibious
         Operations    Aviation   Plans   and   Requirements
         (OP-504),  Department  of  the  Navy,    Washington
         D. C.  15 March 1990.
Roe,  R.,  Captain  USMC,  Squadron  Pilot, HMM-261(C), Camp
         Lejeune, NC. 15 February 1990.
Ryan,  M.,  Commander  USN,  CNO  SAR  Requirements  Officer
         (OP-504B),  Department  of  the  Navy,  Washington,
         D. C. 9 March 1990.
Smith,  S.,  Major  USMC, Operation Officer, HMX-1 Quantico,
         Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA.  22 March 1990.
Tibbetts,   K.,   Major   USMC,   Assault  Support  Division
         Weapons  and  Tactics  Instructor,  MAWTS-1,  MCAS,
         Yuma, AZ. 7 March 1990.
Tussing,  B.,  Major  USMC,  Assistant  Operations  Officer,
         HMM-261(C), Camp Lejeune, NC.  20 March 1990.

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