The Last Frog Pilot
AUTHOR Major Robert D. Swisher, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues
-TEXT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE LAST FROG PILOT
THESIS: A thorough understanding of the assault support
Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and its impact on the
future, highlights the need to avoid short term pitfall
solutions and to remain focused on the capabilities required
to meet the threat in the 21st Century.
ISSUE: The United States Marine Corps has historically lead
the way in the development of innovative concepts and
systems to better meet the needs of the nation. The early
struggle to develop helicopter capabilities to fulfill
assault support concepts paid large dividends in Korea and
Vietnam. The experience gained from programing the
introduction of the CH-46 and other innovative aircraft
provided a solid base for developing timely and capable
replacements. Not since the development of the amphibious
doctrine and the introduction of the helicopter has the
Marine Corps had the opportunity to make such an impact on
the future. The development of the MV-22 can truly
revolutionize the modern battlefield. However, the current
budget constraints shelved this otherwise excellent plan to
phase out the aging CH-46E medium lift helicopter. The
postponement of the MV-22 program creates a foreseeable gap
in our medium lift capability beginning in the mid 1990s.
Currently there is an urgent need for the selection of a
suitable MLR for the CH-46. The basic operational
requirements for the helicopter MLR and the MV-22 are the
same. Congress directed that a Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis be done to determine if a pure
helicopter can efficiently meet the need. The clock is
running and the gap is growing. Many types of helicopters
have been proposed as alternatives to the MV-22, but none
have realistically competitive capabilities. The
requirements set forth for the MLR can only be efficiently
met by the MV-22.
CONCLUSION: It is very important that the focus be
maintained on the current and future threat when balancing
capabilities against dollars. A better understanding of the
true versatility and capabilities of the MV-22 by all
concerned may have avoided the development of the MLR issue.
And finally, at this juncture, it appears that the last Frog
pilot is aboard.
THE LAST FROG PILOT
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. A thorough understanding of the assault
support Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and its impact on
the future, highlights the need to avoid short term pitfall
solutions and to remain focused on the capabilities required
to meet the threat in the 21st Century.
I. The historical development of the medium lift assault
support concept
A. Development of Aviation Assault Support
1. The First Assault Support Mission
2. Introduction of the Helicopter
B. Development of Medium Lift Concept
1. The First Medium Lift Helicopter
2. Introduction of the CH-46A
II. Current Status of the CH-46E
A. Navy/Marine Corps Assets on hand
B. CH-46E Capabilities
C. Developing Problems
1. Block Obsolescence
2. Attrition
III. Replacement Plan for the CH-46E
A. MV-22 Program
B. Cyclic Budget Constraints
C. CH-46E Medium Lift Gap
IV. Development of the MLR Issue
A. Criteria Established for the MLR
B. Shortfalls of MLR Contenders
THE LAST FROG PILOT
For those of you, who may not be familiar with the
Marine Corps amphibious assault support jargon, a "frog" is
a CH-46 (Sea Knight) helicopter. My first experience with
the Ch-46 was in late 1977. I was a newly designated Naval
Aviator fresh out of Pensacola, Florida. While in training
at Pensacola I began to notice a trend in the aircraft I was
flying; they were all old. My class was the last to train
at NAS Saufley Field and fly the aging T-34B primary fixed
wing prop trainer. Both the field and the aircraft were
retired from the active training. The next aircraft I
climbed into was the reciprocating piston driven T-28
(Trojan). It served as the intermediate fixed wing prop
trainer. That was the closest I ever came to realizing a
dream of flying a WWII F4U Corsair. The T-28 workhorse was
finally retired in the early 1980s. Basic helicopter
flight training quickly followed in the Bell 206A (Jet
Ranger). The final training was done in the single engine
UH-1E, better known as a "Huey". Some of the Hueys were
sporting battle damage patches from Vietnam. Since I left
Pensacola, both helicopters have been retired from service.
Needless to say, I was getting tired of flying antiques and
was very anxious to get to the state of the art technology
at the cutting edge of the Fleet Marine Force.
After the initial shock of all the relatively complex
systems and nomenclature subsided, I began to see the
reality of the post Vietnam defense budget reductions. The
CH-46, although a very capable aircraft in 1977, was still a
product of 1950s' technology. The cockpit was full of steam
driven style gauges that required an ever vigilant eye. The
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) system usually worked as long
as the little fan lasted that cooled the large black box
full of vacuum tubes. The coffee grinder style handle on
the Automatic Direction Finding (ADF) radio was a constant
source of many sea stories rendered by senior pilots. Other
systems, such as the rotor blade, windscreen, and engine air
inlet anti-icing systems became to maintenance intensive and
costly to maintain. An aircraft with a working, dependable
cabin heater was in high demand when cold weather arrived.
Even then the lack of proper heater duct parts would
allow the pilots feet to go numb. It appeared obvious to me
at the time that the CH-46 was destined to become just
another one of those antiques that I had the opportunity to
fly. Yet, whenever that opinion was voiced, the veteran
frog pilots would soundly declare, "The last frog pilot
hasn't been born yet!" Realizing that the CH-46 would be
around for some time to come, I never felt that this
prophecy had much chance of coming true. Some rough
calculations in 1977 required the CH-46 to be in service
through the year 2004 for any newborn in 1977 to possibly
become a frog pilot.
As unbelievable as it seemed back in 1977, here we are
today with the medium lift CH-46 still in service and nearly
half way to meeting that prophecy. Many changes have
occurred in the last decade to enable the CH-46 to fulfill
the medium lift assault support requirement of the Marine
Corps. Although the CH-46 is a very versatile and
dependable aircraft, the cumulative effect of world wide
high-tech threat, the onset of aircraft block obsolescence,
and the staggering defense budget constraints created a
critical gap in the Marine Corps medium assault support lift
capability for the mid 1990s. A thorough understanding of
the assault support Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and
its impact on the future, highlights the need to avoid short
term pitfall solutions and to remain focused on the
capabilities required to meet the threat in the 21st
Century.
Like many things in the Marine Corps, our aviation
assault support concepts and capabilities were borne out of
necessity and innovation in response to the threat. The
initial concept of assault support is attributed to the
heroic actions of Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt in 1928,
during the "Banana Wars" in Nicaragua. (22:2) He piloted his
Vought O2U-1 Corsair against enemy fire to support a
surrounded Marine force by repeatedly landing in the street
of Quilali village to deliver supplies and evacuate the
seriously wounded. In two days he delivered 1,400 pounds of
supplies and evacuated 18 personnel. (3:22) The concept was
firmly established and the innovations were soon to follow.
The need for assault support to small tactical landing sites
was quickly realized but technology was the restrictive
factor. The advent of helicopter technology in the 1930s
opened the door for assault support as we know it today.
One curious concept tried to combine the speed of a fixed
winged aircraft and the vertical take off/landing capability
of a helicopter. The Marine Corps field tested the Pitcairn
OP-1 autogyro but found the technology not up to the
concept. (19:1) In 1936, Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Geiger
summed it up well in a memorandum to his brigade commander,
when he wrote:
To date no type of autogyro has been demonstrated
which will carry a reasonable fuel supply and military
load and at the same time retain its peculiar
characteristics of taking off and landing in a
restricted area and hovering over a given spot. Until
such time as this type aircraft can carry a
satisfactory military load and retain its flying
characteristics use [by] the Marine Corps is not
recommended. (19:1)
Following the success of Igor I. Sikorsky to produce
the first practical helicopter in the United States, the
industry saw the emergence of the three primary helicopter
developers in the 1940s: Bell; Piasecki*; Sikorsky. With
the military procurement of developmental helicopters during
the war time defense budget spending, the industry and
military helicopters were firmly established.
The Atomic Age caused a great concern for the Marine
Corps and it's amphibious doctrine. Dispersal was the key
and the need for speed and mobility was apparent. Once
more, in 1946, the Navy looked at a tilt-rotor concept.
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation developed the XHJD-1 which
cruised at over 100 miles per hour and carried a useful load
of more than 3,000 pounds. Again, technology could not
solve a stability problem and the concept was
shelved. (19:7-8) A pure helicopter assault support lift
concept became the focus as the industry struggled to
develop the capability. Clearly the helicopter load
capacity was unsatisfactory, but the future prospects
warranted military development.
In 1947, the Marine Corps formed its first helicopter
squadron, HMX-1 (Marine Helicopter Squadron 1) and got the
backing of the National Security Act which firmly
* Piasecki-Venzi. In `46 the company's name changed to
Piasecki Helicopter Corp., to Vertol Aircraft Corp. in `56,
to Vertol Div. of Boeing Company in `60, and in `72 to
Boeing Vertol Company, a division of Boeing Company
manufacturer of the CH-46.
established the composition and mission of the Corps. One
of the tasks assigned is the is the development, in
coordination with the other services, of tactics,
techniques, and equipment used by landing forces in the
execution of amphibious operations. (25:2-3) The Marine
Corps immediately conducted a study and formulated
requirements for the development of an assault support
helicopter. It is commonly known as the Hogaboom Report
submitted to the Commandant on 10 March 1947. It required
the seating for 15 to 20 combat troops, a 5,000 pound
payload capacity, a range of 200 to 300 nautical miles and
500 with auxiliary fuel tanks, a cruise speed of 100 knots,
a hover ceiling of 4,000 feet, an external hook and hoist,
and self-sealing fuel cells. (19:15-16)
For the next few years, with the return of budget
constraints and the lack of technological advancements,
helicopter programs were in danger. Many alternatives were
studied to include the use of seaplanes as a "flying LST" in
coordination with surface craft and lesser capable
helicopter assets. But the Marine Corps doggedly stood by
its view of the future of helicopter assault support for
amphibious operations. Still time was running out and the
need for vertical assault support to support the doctrine
was critical. An interim helicopter, within current
technology, had to be acquired to fill the gap until the
desired capabilities could be developed.
The Korean War ultimately drove the decision to buy the
Sikorsky HRS-1 based on optimal capability and earliest
delivery date. This was the forerunner of the UH-34 and
the medium lift category of helicopters. If there was ever
any doubt of the utility of the helicopter the Korean War
proved otherwise; their future was guaranteed.
By the late 1950s the cyclic problem of budget
constraints and aircraft obsolescence was back. This time
technology was ready to provide the next generation of
turbine-powered helicopters with the long awaited
capabilities. The requirements issued for the UH-34
replacement were still within the 1947 Hogaboom Report
capabilities list with one additional constraint. The
capabilities had to be met by modifying a currently
developed aircraft in order to meet an early delivery date.
The Vertol Corporation won easily with their commercially
developed 107M that was modified to meet the specifications.
This became the CH-46A Sea Knight that evolved into the
mainstay of the Marine helicopter force.
Unlike the previous buy, this was a well planned, long
term procurement designed to phase out the aging UH-34
without degrading current lift assets or capabilities.
Admittedly the Vietnam defense budget spending aided this
process. The first CH-46 was delivered in 1964 and the
first CH-46 squadron entered Vietnam in 1966. (16:224) By
1969 the phasing out of the UH-34 was technically
completed.
Some initial problems were encountered with the CH-46
that were covered well due in part to the good phase-out
plan. Being a modification of a commercial aircraft it had
some system shortfalls that had to be corrected. Engine
inlet screens and filters had to be added to protect the
engines but this reduced the power output. The needed
addition of protective armor and .50 caliber machine gun
stations further reduced the load capability. Valuable
lessons were learned here on the advantages of developing a
military aircraft as opposed to modifying a commercial
aircraft. The major problem occurred in 1967 when all of
the CH-46s had to be grounded to fix a serious structural
problem. Set backs are common with the introduction of any
new system. At that time there were still enough UH-34s
available to fill the temporary gap. (16:231) From that time
until the late 1980s the CH-46 has been an extremely
reliable and versatile asset. It's longevity is due to four
major modifications to include the CH-46D/F/E modifications
and the Safety, Reliability and Maintainability (SR&M)
program. The last program was a major effort to maintain
the high availability rate of the aircraft into the mid
1990s in order to meet the phase-in program of the follow-on
aircraft.
Currently our CH-46 assets are marginally adequate to
meet the medium lift requirement today. Since the first
delivery in 1964 a total of 624 aircraft have been purchased
by the Navy/Marine team. Today, only 341 aircraft are
remaining in service. The Navy is using 81 of them for
their vertical replenishment (ship-to-ship/ship-to-shore)
mission. The Marine Corps is using the remaining 260
aircraft to meet the Search Air Rescue (SAR), pilot training,
and medium assault support missions. Rough estimates show
the Marine Corps as much as 10 aircraft below optimal force
requirements. The Navy has a similar relative
shortfall. (10)
The CH-46 is a highly versatile aircraft that is able
to carry out all assault support missions except inflight
refueling. It is capable of a cruise speed of 145 knots, a
range of 150 nautical miles (ferry range with 3 internal
tanks of 578 nautical miles), and an average payload of
4,500 pounds. The last planned block upgrade was recently
funded. It incorporates three separate initiatives; an
expanded stubwing extended range fuel system, an improved
navigational system, and an emergency aircraft flotation
system. The new fuel system allows an increased range but
at the cost of reduced payload. The new navigation system
provides for possible further upgrades to doppler hovering
or Global Positioning Satelite (GPS) navigation
capabilities. (20:49)
The best way to explain the current situation facing
our medium assault support lift capability is to address the
CH-46 aircraft block obsolescence. The CH-46 is virtually
a product of 1950s' technology in a 1960s' airframe. A
general rule of thumb for the service life of a helicopter
is 30 years or 10,000 flight hours. The 30 year mark begins
in 1993. However, four aircraft have already reached the
10,000 hour mark and more are likely to do so before 1993.
At the time of this writing a decision on the status of
those aircraft had not been made. To complicate the problem
the old technology parts are getting more expensive and
harder to acquire. The aircraft has been out of production
since 1971. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., is the only
manufacturer still making their commercial version of the
CH-46. (1:18) Additionally, some dynamic components of
undocumented flight time usage or predicted service life are
showing increasing failure rates. This is a cause of great
concern and drives an increase maintenance man-hours for
increased inspection cycles. One further factor is the
approximate attrition rate of four aircraft per year over
the last ten years. The problem is critical enough for the
iterally 'phoenix' four aircraft and put them back into
Navy to literally 'phonix' four aircraft and put them back
into service. Two were reclaimed maintenance trainers from
Millington, Tennessee. One was constructed from several
major sections of other out of service aircraft. The last
aircraft was the original test article that was impressed
into service. There are no more spares. (10)
General McCutcheon put it very clearly when he said:
Aviation is a dynamic profession. The rate of
obsolescence of equipment is high and new aircraft have
to be placed in the inventory periodically in order to
stay abreast of the requirements of modern war. (17:134)
Taking full stock in what the General said, the Marine
Corps developed a plan to phase out the CH-46 in a timely
manner with the best threat oriented replacement available.
The tilt-rotor concept and technology finally came together
to provide the long awaited capabilities desired. The MV-22
is designed from the ground up to be a survivor in the
assault support role against the threat in the 21st Century.
The first aircraft were to be delivered as early as 1991
with the gradual phasing-out of the CH-46 to be completed by
1999. (20:50) Many of the CH-46s were to be turned over to
the Navy to cover their vertical replenishment mission until
they could eventually be replaced. The last Frog was
expected to be retired from the Navy inventory by 2004.
Taking all the hard lessons learned from the acquisition
programs of the AV-8, CH-53E, and F-18, the MV-22 is a total
package concept from flight simulators, maintenance trainers
and facilities to new pilot helmets. Outside of normal
minor slips in initial delivery dates, the program was
progressing well. Then the ever cyclic budget crunch
intervened.
During April of 1989, the Defense Resource Board
recommended the cancellation of the MV-22 program. This was
done purely on the basis of perceived cost effectiveness in
favor of the purchase of a mix of CH-60s and CH-53Es to
replace the CH-46. The apparently misinformed Secretary of
Defense quickly moved to cancel the program. His
perspective of the MV-22 was clearly put forth in
congressional testimony when he stated:
I think it's probably a good aircraft, but I could not
justify spending the amount of money that was proposed
to be spent when we were just getting ready to move
into procurement on the V--22 to perform a very narrow
mission that I think can be performed in another
fashion, specifically by using helicopters instead of
the V-22. (2:8)
After the smoke cleared, the Congress directed the
performance of a Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) to evaluate reasonable alternatives for the
replacement of the CH-46E. The COEA will include, but is
not be limited to the CH-53E, CH-60, CH-46, BV-360, EH-101,
or any mix of aircraft. The Institute for Defense Analysis
is conducting the COEA that is further required to be
submitted with the FY91 budget request. The latest report
has the COEA running behind schedule. (10) For the moment
the MV-22 has been put on hold with Congress only making
continued research and development funding available. The
obvious result is the development of a gap in the medium
assault support capability for the mid to late 1990s.
The Marine Corps was quick to begin adjusting to the
sudden change in plans. In March, in his Annual Report to
the Congress, the Commandant summed it up best by saying:
No Marine Corps requirement is more pressing than the
need to identify a solution for the replacement for our
medium lift capability. The Aging CH-46 helicopter is
entering its 26th year of service life. While it has
served us well, we can no longer expect it to carry
Marines in harm's way on the modern battlefield.
Precision guided munitions and hand-held
surface-to-air-missiles place these thirty year old
helicopters and the Marines they carry at risk. (6:65)
The development of the medium lift operational
requirements to provide the criteria for the COEA that
Congress directed was quickly accomplished. The
requirements were not carelessly established but rather was
based on many years of study and analysis as the Joint
Service Operational Requirement for the MV-22 remains
current. However, the selection of an MLR vise the MV-22
requires some additional actions. The additional actions
are based on the projected MLR fleet introduction date of no
earlie than 1997. Unfortunately this will still allow a gap
in lift capability to occur. Therefore, an interim buy of
CH-46s and service life extension programs for the on hand
CH-46s and CH-53Ds will be necessary to fill the gap. In
consideration of any alternative to the MV-22 the added cost
of these actions must also be considered. (12) It is all
very clear that the only system readily able to efficiently
meet the criteria of the MLR and possibly prevent an interim
gap in capability is the MV-22.
A review of the MLR candidates will further distinguish
the MV-22 from the alternatives. The Anglo-Italian EH-101
has the obvious problem of being a sole source foreign
purchase. This alone is usually criteria enough to fail
selection. The BV-360 was produced for commercial use and
as such would require extensive cost prohibitive
modifications. It too is considered a non-starter. A
totally new CH-46(X) is still on the drafting table.
However, current technology and tandem rotor aerodynamics as
we understand it today would limit capabilities to less than
the MV-22. The CH-53E was primarily designed for heavy lift
and to stay in the rear with the gear. Therefore, not only
is it slower but it is twenty-one times more susceptible to
small arms fire than the MV-22. The CH-60 can not carry
heavier loads in the medium lift spectrum. It also can not
carry the required number of Marines. Therefore more
aircraft would have to be purchased. With an already
crowded flight deck, this is a show stopper. Any mix of
aircraft would defeat the goal of commonalty and requires an
aggregate increase in specialized support personnel. All of
the contenders, due to speed and range capabilities require
strategic air lift to deploy globally by other than surface
means. At this time a true contender for the MLR as an
alternative to the MV-22 does not exist while the need for a
MLR is critically real.
General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
again in his Annual Report to the Congress, focused the
issue when he said, "We cannot allow ourselves to regress to
an era of budget driven strategy." (6:62) The Marine Corps
must be capable of meeting the current as well as future
threat anywhere in the world. Limited strategic lift and
potential lose of strategic foreign basing rights places a
premium on the capabilities of speed, range, mobility, and
sustainability. The prospects of having CH-46s in service
through the first decade of the next century are not very
promising or desirable. It is very likely that the last
Frog pilot has been on board for quite some time.
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