The Future Of TACAIR In Joint/Combined Operations
Major Steven P. Schavrien, USAF
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE FUTURE OF TACAIR IN JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS
THESIS: One of the most difficult tasks that the
Joint\Combined Task Force commander will have to deal with in
the future is the efficient and effective employment of
tactical aircraft (TACAIR), regardless of the nationality
markings of the aircraft or to which branch of service the
aircraft is assigned to - air or naval forces.
BACKGROUND: The United States Air Force and Marine Corps have
had many differences of opinion on how TACAIR should be em-
ployed and controlled. Many historical cases point to each
service as having a bona fide case for argument. Tradition
has become outdated dogma in some cases. These traditions are
likely to be a major stumbling block when US forces are
employed in combat in the future.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The military services need to get their acts
together or we will face severe fragmentation in the next con-
flict, global or regional. The Congress of the United States
has realized this and is forcing the services to conform. It
is time for the services to take the initiative and become a
truly joint military force. We, the soldiers, not the
Congress, should be striving to keep the military a viable and
strong instrument of national policy. If we do not, then the
soldiers of the future will bear our buffoonery.
CONCLUSION: The time has come to put aside our differences
between services. If the senior military leaders cannot agree
on simple items, such as definitions, then it is up to the
rest of us to make an all out attempt to make the "Joint"
system work.
The Future of TACAIR in Joint/Combined Operations
OUTLINE
One of the most difficult tasks that the Joint\Combined
Task Force commander will have to deal with in the future is
the efficient and effective employment of tactical aircraft
(TACAIR), regardless of the nationality markings of the
aircraft or to which branch of service the aircraft is
assigned to - air or naval forces.
I. Evolution of the Air Component Commander
A. United States Army Air Corps
B. United States Air Force
C. Other Examples
D. Omnibus Agreement
II. Evolution of the Air Combat Element
A. United States Marine Corps Doctrine
B. The ACE in the Korean War
III. Definitional differences
A. View of the battlefield
B. Airpower missions requiring study
1. Interdiction
2. Close Air Support
3. SEAD
C. Airspace Management
IV. Future of Joint/Combined Operations
A. The Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986
B. Diminishing Resources
THE FUTURE OF TACAIR IN JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS
One of the most difficult tasks that the Joint/Combined
Task Force commander will have to deal with in the future is
the efficient and effective employment of tactical aircraft
(TACAIR) , regardless of the nationality markings of the
aircraft or to which branch of service the aircraft is
assigned to - air or naval forces.
In this age of shrinking budgets, many articles and
papers have been written by experts inquiring why the United
States needs four separate services. Especially when all four
have some form of TACAIR capability to include the Army with
its attack helicopters. If we, the military, do not get our
act together it is distinctly possible that in the near future
the United States military forces will loose their individual
identities and become the United States Armed Forces, vice the
United States Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps.
Turbulent Joint/Combined operations is not just a late
20th century problem, in World War II, the problems associated
with combined operations were evident. General Eisenhower
walked a fine line between his American and British generals
and politicians during the planning for the invasion of the
African and European continents. Inter-service parochialism
within the Department of Defense (DOD) in the future could be
the deciding factor in restricting the prudent employment of
aircraft to include tactical fighters and bombers.1
The way to end inefficient use of TACAIR is to centralize
the control of all tactical aircraft under one commander while
decentralizing the execution down to the lowest level
practical. This concept has been the position of the United
States Air Force (USAF) since the inception of joint
operations and the name of Joint Force Air Component Commander
(JFACC) has been given to that individual wielding this
awesome destructive power.2 According to the Joint Chief of
Staff's Publication 26, the JFACC "derives his authority from
the Joint Force Commander who has the authority to exercise
operational control, assign missions, direct coordination
among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his
forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his
overall mission." His responsibilities are the "planning,
coordination, allocation and tasking of sorties" to support
the Joint Force Commander's mission statement and concept of
operations.3
The concept of the JFACC however, has not been totally
embraced with open arms by all of the branches of the United
States military, especially by the United States Marine Corps
(USMC). The biggest concern of the Marine Corps is that their
aviation assets will be taken away and placed under the
operational control of the JFACC and that this individual will
always be an USAF "blue suiter". The Marine Corps philosophy
is that no Marine aviation will be under the operational
control or command of anyone but an United States Marine and
that Marine aviation, also called the Air Combat Element
(ACE), can not be separated from its associated Ground Combat
Element (GCE) of its parent Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF).4
A great military theologian, Carl Von Clausewitz,
discussed at great lengths the concept of the concentration of
military forces in preparation for battle. He saw no reason
to divide forces up peacemeal unless, it was for an urgent and
necessary reason. He also stated that the division of forces
should not be done just for the sake of an individuals whim of
how the forces should be utilized as had happened many times
in the past. An analogy can be derived from this axiom - do
not let your doctrine become outdated dogma just because it
has been stated so in the past in an attempt to perpetuate
your existence.
In this example, the concentration of airpower under one
individual allows for the coordination and assignment of
TACAIR missions by analyzing the available assets, i.e. the
number of airframes available, and the required missions for
that particular time period, i.e. the type of sorties that are
required to accomplish the higher commander's intent with
respect to airpower. This enables the coordinator to respond
to the request of all the ground units and efficiently
allocate out these assets. Clausewitz continues by saying
that this grave error would not be repeated if one looks at
the division of forces as the exception rather as the rule.5
There is no doubt that in some situations it would be
beneficial for Marine aviation to remain operationally
controlled by the MAGTF commander. However, the unwavering
stance that the JCS have agreed that the ACE is never to be
detached from its MAGTF does not hold water. An example is in
the case of the NATO south flank. Allied Forces South-Air
Forces South (AFSOUTH-AIRSOUTH), under CINCSOUTH Admiral
Busey, requested that for sustained operations ashore, all
aviation would be consolidated under COMAIRSOUTH, an USAF
general. The Marine Corps, as might be expected, vigorously
opposed this idea and attempted to invoke a JCS message
published in March of 1986 called the "Omnibus Agreement".
This agreement agreed to by all of the service chiefs
states that "the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
commander will retain operational control of his organic air
assets." If only this statement is taken from the Omnibus
Agreement then it is obvious that in the event of introduction
of US forces into a conflict and a MAGTF is involved, the
commander of that MAGTF will retain operational control of his
air assets.6
However, there is another statement in the Omnibus
Agreement which says:
"Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority
of the Theater or Joint Force Commander, in the exercise
of operational control, to assign mission, redirect
efforts (E.G., the reapportionment and/or re-allocation
of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined
by the joint force commander that they are required for
higher priority missions), and direct coordination among
his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in
accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain
integrity of the force, ..."
This statement obviously gives the Theater or Joint Force Com-
mander the authority to organize his forces in any manner he
or she sees fit. It is time to stop arguing over the issue of
operational command and go about our business of maintaining a
credible deterrent posture under the direction of the
Joint/Combined Force Commander.7
But even in World War II, before Joint/Combined
Operations was a buzz word, problems arose with the attempt to
consolidate the Allied Air Forces to ensure unity of effort.
The Eighth Air Force headed by General Ira Eaker, USAF, did
not want to become a team player along with the British Bomber
Command headed by Air Marshall Harris.8
The heavy bomber leaders felt that they could bomb
Germany into submission (the old "bomb them into the stone-
age" saying) without the aid of ground forces. For a short
period of time, the Allied High Command allowed the bombers to
attempt to force Germany into capitulation. The hourly
bombings were having an effect on the German people but the
Wehrmacht was still fighting. The decision was made to invade
the continent and support was requested from the bombers, who
promptly balked at the idea of becoming just a supporting role
in the war effort. It was necessary for the General
Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe, to step
in and force the Bomber Command into line. The Joint/Combined
Force Commander will have the same problem in the future and
will probably solve it the same way - with a direct order!9
We apparently did not learn our lessons well in WW II as
the airwar in Korea and Vietnam was not all rosey either. The
United States divided up each of the countries geographically
in an attempt to keep the different service's TACAIR
separated. This dividing up of the countries did accomplish
that but it prevented the concentration of forces required to
hand the enemy a decisive defeat in the offensive air arena.
Even though the United States and its allies enjoyed near
total air superiority in both conflicts, the allies failed to
coordinate the efficient use of TACAIR. There are however,
two good examples of when Joint/ Combined Operations in the
TACAIR community worked.10
The first example was during the retreat to the Pusan
perimeter. The United States Air Force and Army had been
utilizing jeeps with Forward Observers (FO) and they jointly
decided that controlling air strikes could best be
accomplished from the air.11 The USAF supplied the forward
air controllers in "Mosquito" observer aircraft to direct the
Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft, which were mainly United
States Navy (USN) carrier based airplanes. However, problems
did exist in the types of aeronautical charts and geographical
reference system being used (which is still a problem today)
during these CAS missions.12 The second example was during
late 1967 in the Vietnam conflict, where General Westmoreland,
Commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
and General William Momyer, the Commander, Seventh Air Force,
decided that a single air commander and a supporting staff
could better manage all the air assets of the MACV and
published a MACV directive so stating.13 The "Joint" system
was put into effect in March of 1968 with the publication of a
fragmentary order or "frag" that covered all in theater based
air missions of MACV.
The frag is a listing of all missions for a certain
period of time and contains force size, targets, additional
assets, and airspace assignments/restrictions. This frag was
able to ensure efficient use of a very scarce resource,
aircraft. The USAF and USMC commanders made the system work,
sometimes because gentlemen agreements between the two were
the only solution.14 But the official policy from Head-
quarters Marine Corps was that Marine Air would not come under
the control of a single air component commander which did
cause the air war effort to lack synergism.15
The Marine Corps position is for retaining the
operational control of the MAGTF's air assets to allow for the
integration of aircraft into a combined arms package to engage
the enemy on the battlefield. The doctrine of the Marine
Corps is an expeditionary one and must provide for the
protection of the MAGTF once the decision to employ the
Marines is made. This concept of operational control of
airpower is a valid one when the Marines are the only United
States military presence in the theater of operations.16 For
sustained joint/combined operations ashore it will be
necessary to consolidate the air effort to ensure that a
portion of the air arm is not idle or overtasked, i.e. a
principle of the military historian Clausewitz, termed the
economy of force.17
However, the Marine Corps system is not without it's
merit. By the outbreak of the Korean War, the Navy-Marine
team had already learned the value of CAS aircraft and the
responsiveness of these aircraft to the ground commander from
its experiences in the South Pacific Campaign of World War II.
In Korea, a certain number of the carrier's attack aircraft
were dedicated to each ground unit. While this enabled the
ground commander to have aircraft overhead or on short call,
the aircraft did not always have targets to drop their
ordnance on which resulted in a waste of aircraft sorties.
This could also limit the number of aircraft available for the
next round of fighting. Without targets aircrews dumped their
ordnance into empty fields. Carrier based aircraft are
hesitant to bring unexpended ordnance back to the boat to
minimize the damage to the aircraft and landing deck if a
crash occurs.18
The first beginnings of the MAGTF occurred in the 1950's
when Lieutenant General Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific, informed General MacArthur and General
Stratemeyer that the Marine contingent in Korea (a brigade)
was an inseparable team and under no circumstances could they
be broken up. He explained to General MacArthur that the
Marine Wing and ground unit had trained for war together and
complemented each other, General MacArthur agreed and the
Marine Brigade remained intact. This set a dangerous pre-
cedent for future Joint operations.19
Some of the biggest stumbling blocks to effective and
efficient Combined/Joint operations concerning the USAF and
USMC has been the following: the "view" of the battlefield,
differences concerning the definition of tactical missions,
and the functions of airspace management throughout the entire
battlefield. The view of the battle is the most mis-quoted by
the USMC as to the position of the USAF. The Marine Corps has
stated that the Air Force states that the deep battle, i.e.
interdiction, take precedence over the ongoing close-in battle
or CAS missions.20 This statement is nothing further from the
truth. The USAF and United States Army have agreed on the
Airland Battle Future to be the two services doctrine to take
them into the 21st century. This is the basic doctrine that
will be used for the prosecution of the next conflict by these
two forces. The concept does not put priority of missions
into doctrine but does lay out the foundation for the
employment of the Tactical Air Forces and Army Team.21
The premise in the Airland Battle doctrine is that deep
operations, or interdiction, when properly executed will shape
the close-in battlefield that will occur at a later time. It
is difficult to imagine that at the outset of hostilities, a
commander of ground force would not want to attrite the enemy
beyond his immediate battlefield. If no time is available to
interdict those enemy forces in the deep area then it is time
to relieve pressure off the friendly ground forces by using
synchronized effort of ground elements and air, to include
battlefield air interdiction, rear area, and close or CAS
missions. But if constant pressure is not applied to the
enemies' logistical train and depots, then these second
echelon forces will be in the close-in battlefield shortly,
compounding friendly forces effort to the shape the battle-
field as they desire.22
The Marine term for the interdiction mission is the
function of Marine Aviation called Offensive Antiair Warfare.
The definition of Offensive Antiair Warfare is "air attacks to
destroy or neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields, radars, air
defense systems, and supporting areas." No mention is made of
attacking and destroying enemy ground combat service support
areas that do not directly supply the enemy aviation effort.
This should be a distressing function of Marine Aviation to
the GCE as most infantrymen would rather fight an opposing
force that did not have it's full complement of ammunition and
war supplies.23
Another mis-conception is that the United States Air
Force is not committed to or capable of carrying out the CAS
mission in support of the troops on the ground. The USAF,
active and reserve, possesses approximately 2500 tactical
aircraft that can and do train in the mission of CAS on a
regular basis. Of these 2500 aircraft, 590 of them can
perform only the CAS mission. These aircraft have only one
designated operational capability (DOC), they are incapable of
performing any other mission. The United States Army has 25
divisions as of 15 Dec 88, the ratio of USAF CAS capable
aircraft to Army division is approximately 100 aircraft to
each division.24 The ratio in the USMC is approximately 109
to 1, both services are almost equal in their dedication to
the CAS mission.25
The differences in missions is a definitional one and no
amount of Joint exercises or pontificating by service chiefs
will cure this. The USMC is determined to use the term
function of aviation and the USAF considers the term mission
to refer to that type of sortie that the aircraft performs. A
more well written and refined JCS Pub 26 would be a good start
and both services would be able to align its doctrinal
definitions along with this publication. However, the chances
of acquiring an agreement on the wording of this publication
is not very high. Difficulty has been experienced with any
concerted effort to publish a definitive JCS publication that
would please all the services.26
The one area of disagreement that could have the most
devastating effect on airframes and infantry soldiers on the
ground is in airspace management. The USAF has trained not
only for the expected global conflict, triggered by NATO, but
also for the "low-intensity" conflict such as in Panama. To
totally integrate airpower into the battlefield, control
measures must be instituted to ensure safety of aircraft and
ground troops. The USAF and USA have agreed under the Airland
Battle doctrine that the deep battle or interdiction missions
will be the total responsibility of the Air Force.
All other missions to include the close and rear
operations will be a joint responsibility of both services
requiring extensive coordination to prevent fratricide. The
United States Air Force and Army have extensively worked
together in the areas of Joint Air Attack Tactics (JAAT) where
Army helicopters work with Air Force fast movers during CAS
missions. These JAAT missions require enormous amounts of
coordination to ensure a truly combined arms attack. Great
progress has also been made in the Joint Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses (J-SEAD). J-SEAD is the use of all tactical
resources, Army and Air Force, in an effort to neutralize,
destroy or deceive the enemy's air defense system by
electronic or physical means.27
The dividing line between deep and close missions will be
the Fire Support Coordination Line or the FSCL. This FSCL
will be mutually agreed upon by both services. The FSCL
allows TACAIR to conduct an interdiction campaign without
being concerned with "short rounds", basically bombing
friendly forces by friendly TACAIR.28 The USMC uses the FSCL
as a phase measure and not one of control, a violation of
their own doctrine.
Marines typically send reconnaissance ground teams past
the FSCL. To protect these teams, restricted fire zones are
established and will be moved by a time schedule or on order.
But the fallacy is that these teams, who are very mobile,
could easily outrun or be overrun by these moving restricted
fire zones, moved by time, and then be engaged by friendly
TACAIR. The movement of the zones on order will require
communication between the Tactical Air Control System and the
aircraft. To date, USMC aircraft do not possess state of the
art jam-resistant radios such as the ARC-164 "Have Quick" UHF
radio to allow for communications on today's electronic
warfare intensive battlefield.29 By doctrine though, Fleet
Marine Force Manual 7-1 states that no coordination by
aircraft is required past the FSCL to strike any target. This
allows for the greatest flexibility of airpower by not tying
the aircrews to visual recognition of targets while flying at
speeds of over 800 feet per second.30
So what does the future hold for the employment of
TACAIR? As stated earlier, the services of the United States
are having difficult times working out the "Joint" problem.
Congress, realizing the problem of getting the services to
work together was not going to improve, passed in 1986 the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. This bill requires the services to
exchange more officers in operational and academic units to
further the "Joint" effort. The bill also requires that all
Generals be Joint Service Officers (JSO). An officer is a JSO
when he/she has completed Joint Professional Military
Education and a 3 year tour in a designated Joint billet.31
Basically because of the services unwillingness to press
forward in the "joint" arena, the politicians stepped in and
are now force feeding the services to make them cooperate with
each other. This has not been all bad, as exchange officers
in sister service jobs and educational institutions are able
to learn of the other services operations and at the same time
offer their own services views and capabilities.
One answer to our problems in this time of diminishing
budgets, might be a concerted effort by all services, starting
at the service chief level, to operate in a truly
Joint/Combined environment with out regard to individual
service desires. Another might be definitive JCS Pubs which
address directly the Joint issues. What's the bottom line?
Let's "stop quibbling about airpower, the idea is to win the
war"ù32
The intent has not been to point fingers at any one
service, but more as to point out our weak areas. If we
define our problems and come up with appropriate solutions to
these problems, then we will be able to do our job more
efficiently. If not, the next war may be a repeat of Vietnam
and we would have to listen to the United States Congress
harangue us unmercifully for another twenty years about the US
military's ability to work together.
ENDNOTES
1 D. Clayton James, A Time For Giants, (Franklin Watts, New
York, 1987), p. 31.
2 Major John E. Valliere, USAF, "Stop Quibbling About Air
Power; The Idea Is To Win The War", (USMC CSC, Quantico
VA, Jan 90), p. 4.
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 26," Fundamental Principles
For Counter-Air", (JCS, Washington, D.C., 1 April 1986),
p. B-5.
4 Major General M. P. Sullivan, USMC, "The Joint Force Air
Component Commander And Command And Control Of Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Aviation", (MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 9
Mar 89), p. 2,4.
5 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), p. 204.
6 Lieutenant Colonel John Roe, USAF, "Point Paper On Omnibus
Agreement For Command And Control of USMC TACAIR", (HQ
USAF/XOXWD, Washington, D.C., 17 Oct 89), p. 2.
7 Roe, p. 5.
8 James, p. 100-01.
9 James, p. 102.
10 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History, (The Viking Press, New
York, 1983), p. 415.
11 Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War In Korea, (Nautical
and Aviation Publication Company of America, Baltimore,
Maryland, 1986), p. 44.
12 Commanders Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, USN,
"The Sea War In Korea", (United States Naval
Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1957), p. 55.
13 "The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973", (History and Museums
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington,
D.C., 1985), p. 274.
14 "The Marines In Vietnam 1954-1973, p. 275.
15 Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985), p. 243.
16 Sullivan, p. 2.
17 Clausewitz, p. 213.
18 Cagle and Manson, p. 51-53.
19 Cagle and Manson, p. 61-62.
20 Sullivan, p. 2.
21 US Army Field Manual 100-5, "Operations", (Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 5 May 1986),
p. 14.
22 USA FM 100-5, p. 19.
23 US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1," Marine
Aviation", (MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 24 Aug 1979), p. 7.
24 "An Air Force Almanac", Air Force Magazine, (Air Force
Association, Washington, D.C., May 1989), p. 52-53.
25 US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 1-
11, "Fleet Marine Force Organization 1990", (MCCDC,
Quantico, VA, 14 February 1990), p. 5-26,5-48-50.
26 JCS Pub 26, p. App B.
27 USA FM 100-5, p. 48.
28 USA FM 100-5, p. 48-49.
29 US Marine Corps Publication "Horizons", (MCRDAC, Quantico,
VA, November 1989), p. 17.
30 US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-1," Fire Support
Coordination", (MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 23 April 1981),
p. 2-11.
31 Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Stenner, USMC, "Title IV And The
Marine Corps", Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1988),
p. 24,26.
32 Valliere, p. 1.
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