War Reserve Stocks And Marine Corps Sustainability
AUTHOR Major Joseph L. Styons, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
-TEXT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: WAR RESERVE STOCKS AND MARINE CORPS SUSTAINABILITY
I. THESIS: While the foundation of Marine Corps War Reserve
Policy is sound, the weaknesses associated with the acquisition,
storage, maintenance, and ability to deliver these assets creates
a long-standing, complex problem.
II. PROBLEM: Although the Marine Corps allocates a tremendous
amount of manpower, time and money to sustainability, a number of
problems prevents the optimum management of this critical part of
MAGTF combat capability.
III. DATA/BACKGROUND: The sustainability available to MAGTFs is
a primary factor in determining its ultimate victory on the
battlefield. Sustainment, logistically speaking, is normally
expressed in Days of Supply (DOS) available to Marine forces
during combat operations. Sustainment levels in the Marine Corps
vary by Class of Supply. In some critical areas, shortages in
POL, ammunition, principal end items and repair parts, are likely
to have a severe, negative impact on the "staying power" of Marine
forces. There are a variety of complex problems which contribute
to these shortages and prevent a rapid recovery from their
effect. First and most significant are the fiscal constraints for
the purchase of War Reserve Stocks. A flawed acquisition process,
storage and maintenance limitations and transportation constraints
also add to the problems associated with maintaining a full 60 DOS
of War Reserve Stocks as required by current Defense Guidance.
IV. CONCLUSION: These problems are under continuous review and
improvement. However, a great deal remains to be done in order to
maximize the use and distribution of current levels of
sustainment.
V. RECOMMENDATION: The numerous internal Marine Corps agencies
should be redirected to a common goal of attaining, storing,
maintaining, and distributing War Reserve assets in an equitable
manner.
WAR RESERVE STOCKS
AND MARINE CORPS SUSTAINABILITY
Thesis Statement. While the foundation of the Marine Corps War
Reserve Policy is sound, the weakensses associated with the
acquisition, storage, maintenance, and ability to deliver these
assets represents a long-standing, complex problem.
I. The Marine Corps War Reserve Program
A. Historical precedence
B. The need for sustainment
II. Storage/Location of War Reserve Stocks
A. MEF held stocks
B. Externally held stocks
C. Pitfalls associated with non MEF held War Reserve
Stocks
D. Withdrawal/Delivery of stocks
III. Acquisition and Issue of War Reserve Stocks
A. Responsibilities
B. Combat Active Replacement Factors
C. Acquisition priorities
D. Drawdown and reconstitution of War Reserve Stocks
IV. Industrial Base Problems
V. Current Levels of Sustainment
A. Funding levels
B. MPF and NALM offsets
Resupply is certainly not a new concept. As long as there
have been wars, the ability to resupply and reconstitute forces
on the battlefield has been an important and often decisive
combat force multiplier. As General E. G. Thibault points out
in The Art and Practice of Military Strategy, "For the Russian
campaign, the Wehrmacth never had sufficient means available and
this was even more true of raw materials, reserve stocks and
means of transportation than it was of combat forces. It has
been estimated that in order to reach Moscow--not to mention the
line, still further away, from Archangelsk to the Volga--by
means of motor transport alone, at least ten times the number of
vehicles actually available would have been needed."1 This,
and countless other historical examples illustrate the need for
a viable method of acquiring, storing, and providing sustainment
to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The tempo and lethality of
future battles and the resultant rapid equipment losses are
likely to magnify the criticality of an effective and
appropriate level of War Reserve Stocks.
The Marine Corps' War Reserve Policy for ground supplies is
based on current Defense Guidance which requires the Marine
Corps to maintain a 60-day level of sustainment. As a result,
the Marine Corps War Reserve Policy is to stock and position a
60-day level of supplies with the active MEFs to the maximum
extent possible. Since it is not always practical to physically
position these supplies at a MEF location, the policy permits
supplies to be positioned elsewhere under the condition that
operational planning schedules can be met. While the foundation
of the Marine Corps Reserve Policy is sound, the weaknesses
associated with the acquisition, storage. maintenance and
ability to deliver these assets represents a long-standing and
complex problem. This is particularly true in light of our
frequent claim that a unique capability of a MAGTF is its
ability to project and sustain power ashore for up to 60 days.
This is a unique characteristic that only Marine forces possess.
Army special forces are unable to match this capability.
Marine Corps War Reserve Stocks are held in a number of
different locations. As previously mentioned, the active MEFs
hold their own War Reserve Stocks to the maximum extent
practical. Due to the normal availability of many items through
commercial sources such as lumber, packaged POL, construction
supplies, etc., MEFs often opt not to hold these items. This is
also true for a large variety of shelf life items. Obvious
examples are food items, batteries, some types of medical
supplies and some types of ammunition.
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) also holds a large
portion of Marine Corps War Reserve Stocks. The ability of the
Marine Corps to hold an adequate level of subsistence items,
either MREs or "B" rations (soon to be replaced by Tray "T"
rations), is directly related to shelf life and stock rotation
policies. As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the
Defence Personnel Support Center has been arranged for "B"
rations. Basically, this MOA earmarks a portion of total DLA
stocks for Marine Corps use. The Marine Corps pays for this
service and agrees to assist in the rotation of these stocks by
using "B" rations in training exercises. The DLA also holds the
entire War Reserve Requirement for medical supplies for the
Marine Corps Reserve component. Batteries, a critical War
Reserve commodity, are held and managed by a separate DoD
Integrated Material Manager (IMM). These items are held based
on a funded, Interservice Support Agreement with an army
material manager.
The largest holders of War Reserve Stocks for the MEFs are
the Marine Corps Logistics Bases at Albany, GA and Barstow, CA.
The MCLBs hold and maintain portions of Class II (Individual
equipment), Class III (POL) Class IV (Fortification and Barrier
Materials), Class VII (PEIs), Class VIII (medical supplies) and
Class IX (repair parts). A key reason that the MCLBs hold such
a large portion of the MEFs' War Reserve Stocks is because of
Marine Corps War Reserve Policy which states:
"MEF commanders may roll back requirements when:
(1) Requirements are for minimally manned/cadred units
(these stocks will be identified in the store's
system as purpose Code C, initial issue T/E
requirements).
(2) Maintenance-significant items are beyond the
force(s) care-in-stores capability.
(3) Items can be provided to the FMF, as specified in
the withdrawal plan, in sufficient time to meet
assault and assault follow-on embarkation
schedules.
(4) Adequate warehousing space is not available.2"
This policy is designed to relieve MEF commanders from the
burdens of unreasonable storage and maintenance
responsibilities, but in fact over reliance on the the MCLBs for
sustainment is dangerous. There are several reasons that MEFs
should exercise caution before relinquishing custody of their
War Reserve assets to the MCLBs. First and most important is
that when an item, regardless of class, becomes a part of the
MCLB's stocks, visibility with regard to MEF ownership is lost.
In other words, a War Reserve asset obtained from II MEF by MCLB
Albany would simply be subsumed into Albany's on-hand stocks.
To facilitate rotation and repair, Albany manages these stocks
by using various purpose and condition codes. In theory, either
the original asset or a like item should be available at a later
date, but for a variety of reasons which will be covered in
subsequent paragraphs, this is not always true. The key point
is that the MCLBs do not "fence" War Reserve Stocks for a
specific MEF; therefore, there is no guarantee that the MCLBs
will be able to provide a fixed number of items to a MEF upon
request. The lesson to be learned by force planners,
particularly Logisticians, is that when a MEF chooses not to
hold the full 60-day level of War Reserve Stocks it should be
based on a careful analysis and determination that maintenance
and storage is truly beyond its capabilities. The temptation to
relegate the rather mundane, time consuming tasks associated
with custody of large amounts of War Reserve Stocks should be
resisted.
Based on a review of current War Reserve Class VII asset
posture, II MEF appears to be particularly guilty of an over
reliance on MCLB, Albany, GA for the storage and maintenance of
its Class VII War Reserve Stocks. Continuously citing
inadequate storage and maintenance capabilities, II MEF has
become dependent on MCLB Albany to a point that Camp Lejeune
based Class VII levels of War Reserve Stocks are almost nil
(this does not consider MPS and/or NACM stocks).
Withdrawal of MCLB held War Reserve Stocks is primarily a
push system. Each MEF is required to preregister all deliberate
planning requirements in support of its OPLANs. This is an
annual requirement and changes whenever the MEF's structure or
equipment is modified. In the event of a contingency (i.e.,
OPLAN execution) MCLB Albany will direct the preparation of
materials to the appropriate Station of Initial Assignment (SIA)
or the Port/Aerial Port of Embarkation (POE/APOE). Materials
not held by the MCLBs will be requisitioned from the appropriate
Intermediate Materiel Manager (IMM) per previously established
MOUs/ISSAs.
The mobilization Branch at MCLB Albany has the
responsibility for administering the War Reserve System which
supports these withdrawal procedures. The above procedures are
currently in place and have been tested on numerous occasions
with regard to the systems ability to electronically submit
requisitions to the appropriate source and/or push MCLB held War
Reserve Stocks to a specific MEF; however, actual physical
withdrawal of assets has never occurred. The transportation
requirements associated with conducting a full withdrawal in
sufficient time to meet most OPLAN execution schedules is simply
not available. This problem is exacerbated when the fact that
mobilization of Marine forces is most likely to occur at a time
when other services will be competing for the same
transportation assets. Since there is not a suitable airport
for military transport aircraft larger than a C130, in or near
Albany or Barstow, it is probable that rail and truck
transportation systems will quickly become overloaded.
The acquisition process for war reserve materials varies
depending on the class of supply. The mixture of funding
responsibilities are as follows:
CLASS OF SUPPLY ENDING RESPONSIBILITY
I (Subsistence) HQMC
II (Individual equipment) MCRDAC for new acquisitions,
MEFs for replenishment
III (POL) MEFs submit requirements to
the applicable fleet CINC for
funding
IV (STAP items, construc- MCRDAC for new acquisition
tion materials, barrier of STAP, MEFS for replenish-
ment of STAP & purchase of
other items
V Ammunition MCRDAC
VII Principal End Items MCRDC
VIII MEDICAL SUPPLIES MEFs
IX Repair Parts MEFs
"Acquisition should be a complementary, two-way process.
Especially for the long term, the process must identify combat
requirements and develop equipment to satisfy these require-
ments. We should base these requirements on an analysis of
critical enemy vulnerabilities."3
Generally the acquisition process follows the preceding
advice and is based on actual FMF requirements. However, a
notable exception to this rule exists in the procedures used for
procurement of some class II and IV equipment and most class VII
equipment. The application of a Combat Active Replacement
Factor (CARF) to these classes of supplies is the mathematical
tool used to calculate anticipated equipment losses when
operating in a combat/hostile environment. The CARF is simply a
percentage applied to the density of individual items of
equipment. The most recent Marine Corps order on CARFs requires
the newly formed Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
assisted by (Marine Corps Research Development and Acquisition
Command (MCRDAC) to establish CARFs for new items entering the
inventory.
"Replacement factors are determined by applying military
judgement to determine a probable loss rate based on the
following:
a. The scenario, to include the expected enemy threat and
the concomitant employment concept.
b. FMF equipment density.
c. Function in combat.
d. Requirements for a peculiar or special application.
e. Type and mission of units which will use item.
f. Vulnerability under combat use.
g. Durability of the item, to include environmental
effects.
h. Experience data (past history of losses, similarity to
like items in use, judgemental adequacy of previously
assigned factors, etc.)
i. Factors assigned by other services to identical or
similar items.
j. Life expectancy in combat.
k. Estimated operating hours per month under each category
of use, mean time between failure, mean time to repair,
total down time, lead time to replacement, test results
and research studies, as well as tactical effects and
experienced judgement."4
Once fully implemented these considerations will require an
extensive effort and will undoubtedly improve the validity of
the CARF assignment process; however, conversation with several
different Acquisition Project Managers (APMs) within MCRDAC
indicates the need for increased interest and focus on this
effort. For example, presently, when a new Principal End Item
is to be purchased, the APM is allocated a finite funding
level. Frequently, this amount is less than the total
requirement. In these cases first priority normally goes to the
active forces T/Es, second to reserve forces, then MPS, NALM,
etc. The remainder goes to War Reserve. This sequence is an
understandable and unfortunate fiscal reality, but instead of a
system which earmarks these deficiencies for out-year funding
and procurement, the CARF is often adjusted down to meet the
funding level. This reverse engineering process not only causes
the lack of a method to identify War Reserve deficiencies, it
establishes an artificially low CARF which is then coded on the
Marine Corps' official Item Data File (IDF). The IDF which
replaced the more familiar Table of Authorized Material (TAM) is
the source document for future reference to both the item and
it's CARF. In other words, this process creates a permanent,
erroneous CARF for a substantial number of Class II, IV and VII
items of equipment. This process may be gradually improving due
to the recent publication of a new CARF order. An interview
with the Head, Material Policy Section, Installations and
Logistics Department, Headquarters Marine Corps seems to support
this optimism. During this interview, it was pointed out that
approximately 50 CARF changes/updates based on the new Marine
Corps order had recently been submitted for inclusion to the IDF
by the MCCDC.5 Copies of these changes were obtained and
reviewed and indicated progress on the proper selection of
CARFs.
Once acquired, a number of factors contribute to a drawdown
of War Reserve Stocks. This is particularly true for those War
Reserve Stocks held at either Albany or Barstow where, as
previously mentioned, items are not "fenced" for a particular
MEF. The Marine Corps policy requires that any War Reserve
Stocks which are issued must be supported by a reconstitution
plan. But what constitutes a plan, and what is considered
prompt? The intentional vagueness of this policy was designed
to permit flexibility with regard to total asset usage.
Flexibility has certainly been achieved, but the drawdown of
critical War Reserve assets has been an undesirable by-product.
Two of the more frequent justifications cited for using War
Reserve Stocks are to fill deficiencies in either MPS or NALM
stocks. Perhaps a more prominent problem has been the recent
reorganizations directed by the Commandant which were not
supported by increases in funding; consequently, the equipment
necessary to support these activations also came from existing
War Reserve Stocks. Yet another factor is a policy that permits
the MCLBs to issue War Reserve Stocks when a MEF fails to
maintain a C-2 level of readiness in the Status of Resources and
Training System (SORTS) measured resource area for equipment or
supplies on hand. This particular problem is exacerbated by the
submission and subsequent approval of the T/E increases from MEF
units. The Marine Corps also supports research projects by
providing a variety of items to civilian contractors as
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) or Government Loaned
Equipment (GFL). In either case the major source for this
equipment is War Reserve Stocks.
All of these factors are valid and require support; however,
the required reconstitution effort normally consists of listing
shortages as unfunded deficiencies for competition in future
budgets, hardly a viable reconstitution plan.
Can the Industrial Base make up for our shortages in War
Reserve Stocks? Based on an interview with Mr. Nick Linkowitz,
the Marine Corps representative on industrial base issues, the
answer is no.6 He cites a number of reasons, the most
prominent is that so many critical items are out of production
that manufacturer's "tool up" would simply take too long. This
problem is more complex than it may seem when subcontracting,
including numerous second and third tier producers, is
considered. For example, first production of Amphibious Assault
Vehicles (NAVs) would take approximately 18 months and M60 tanks
are out of production completely. Many precision guided
munitions contain unique types of batteries manufactured by
Eagle Picture Battery Company, a sole source small business with
a limited surge capability. Additionally, an increasing number
of items, and an even greater number of components, are foreign
made which obviously restricts the U.S. ability to direct a
surge in production. This is especially true for micro-
electronics and computers. These are only a few examples of the
lack of responsive industrial base for wartime material
production.
Even in an ideal situation in which the Marine Corps has its
full 60 days of sustainability there is a dangerous gap between
the point that industrial production begins to provide
replacements. According to Mr. Linkowite, DoD estimates for any
appreciable results for major end items from industry range from
12 to 18 months.
Despite the myriad of problems associated with maintaining
acceptable levels of sustainment, current levels of War Reserve
Stocks are probably higher than ever. During a recent lecture/
question and answer session at the Marine Corps Command and
Staff College Lieutenant General Carson, the Director of the
Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps indicated that, logistically speaking, sustainment
capabilities are higher now than at any other time in our
history.
These relative high levels vary from one Class of Supply to
the next.(In several critical classes such as Ammunition (Class
V), Subsistence (Class I), Petroleum (Class III), and Principal
End Items (Class VII) shortages still remain.) Lieutenant
General Carson attributes these relatively high levels (normally
expressed in Days of Supply (DOS)) to three primary reasons.
First, and most obvious, is the high funding levels enjoyed by
all U.S. forces over the past decade. Until recently the steady
increase in funding for War Reserve deficiencies has enabled a
rise in the DOS in all Classes of Supply. In some cases, the
fall 60 DOS requirement was actually attained or exceeded for
selected items. Another primary reason cited by the General was
the advent of Near Term Prepositioned Forces, subsequently
renamed Maritime Prepositioned Forces (MPF). Third, was the
establishment of the Norway Air Land MEB (NALM).
Between the three MPS squadrons and the NALM the Marine
Corps gained 30 DOS for 4 MEBs, a significant increase in the
total level of sustainment. From an accountant's perspective as
well as the U.S. taxpayer's, both MPF and NALM stocks should be
considered as a part of the Marine Corps' War Reserve Stocks,
but will these stocks actually be available in the event of a
contingency? In reality MPF stocks are national assets which
may be diverted to another service component or even another
nation in the event of a contingency. In any case, the Marine
Corps does not necessarily have exclusive ownership of these
assets and inclusion of MPF into sustainability DOS computations
may paint an inflated and unrealistic level of preparedness.
The NALM stocks are Marine Corps owned; however, their use is
obviously geographically restricted to the defense of NATO's
northern flank. The Marine Corps' well advertised capability to
project and sustain forces ashore is diluted when we count MPF
and NALM assets as part of our available sustainment.
The purpose for maintaining War Reserve Stocks is to ensure
that acceptable levels of materials are available to the forces
during combat operations. The problems which have been
discussed are complex, involve a great number of internal and
external agencies, and are not easily solved. In many instances
additional funding is the only answer, but centralization of War
Reserve management would also greatly improve the overall
effectiveness of the War Reserve Program. Presently, War
Reserve policymakers reside at HQMC, requirements are determined
at Quantico, Virginia, and the War Reserve System is
administered by the Mobilization Branch at Albany, Georgia.
While there is no absolute solution for all problems related to
War Reserve management, a single manager for this essential
program seems basic. Petty rivalry between agencies,
misunderstanding and misguided loyalty must be eliminated
before the myriad of problems associated with this important
element of our combat readiness can be solved.
ENDNOTES
1 George E. Thibault, The Art and Practice of Military
Strategy (National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984)
p. 489.
2 U.S. Marine Corps, War Reserve Policy Manual (Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1989) pp. 4-7.
3 FMFM 1: Warfighting (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C., 1989) p. 52.
4 U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Active Replacement Factors,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1989) Encl. 1,
p. 1.
5 Lieutenant Colonel B. G. Ramey, Head, LPP-2, Installations
and Logistics Department, HQMC, personal interview about Combat
Active Replacement Factors, March 10, 1990.
6 Mr. Nick Linkowitz, Project Officer, LPO Branch,
Installations and Logistics Department, HQMC, personal interview
about U.S. Industrial Base, March 22, 1990.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atwood, Donald J. "Industrial Base: Vital to Defense." Defense
90, (January/February 1990).
Johnson, Thomas E. "Reconstitution A Combat Force Multiplier."
Military Review, LXIX (September 1989).
Linkowitz, Nick, Industrial Base Project Officer, HQMC. Personal
interview about the U.S. Industrial Base, Washington, D.C.,
March 22, 1990.
Ramey, B. G. Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Head, LPP-2 Section, I&L,
HQMC. Personal interview about Combat Active Replacement
Factors, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1990.
Thibault, George E. The Art and Practice of Military Strategy.
National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984.
U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Combat
Active Replacement Factors, MCO 5420.20. Washington, D.C.,
24 August 1989.
U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting,
FMFM 1. Washington, D.C., 6 March 1989.
U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations, OH 7-6. Quantico, VA,
June 987.
U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. War Reserve
Policy Manual, MCO P4400.39F. Washington, D.C., May 17, 1989.
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