The "Army 2000", Today's Effects, Tomorrow's Technology and Future Strategy
AUTHOR Major David H. Schock, USA
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE "ARMY 2000", TODAY'S EFFECTS, TOMORROW'S
TECHNOLOGY AND FUTURE STRATEGY.
THESIS: These powerful combinations of political, social,
and economic forces will impact greatly on the budget of the
U.S. Army in the next decade. In direct correlation with
this reduction will come structural changes and personnel
reductions. Combined with the rapid advancement of
technology, the "Army 2000" will be a smaller, decidedly
different force in appearance, yet will still follow an
enhanced version of the present day AirLand Battle doctrine.
ISSUES: The unbelievable events that have occurred in the
WARSAW Pact and within the political structure of the Soviet
Union has led a strong Congressional push at home to reduce
the Armed Forces. Additional social problems with drugs,
the homeless, the poor and our education system have further
increased the demand for cutbacks in DOD spending. Economic
factors, primarily the budget deficit, are another plank in
the platform to drastically reduce the services. It appears
that the Army, being the largest service, will be hit by
most of the budgetary cutbacks. The President and Secretary
Cheney of the Defense Department have proposed gradual,
systematic reductions in the Army that will still retain our
warfighting ability without hollowing out the Army. On the
positive side of the coin, the rapid advancement of weapon
technology will allow the Army to cutback on it's personnel
and equipment without losing the ability to win on the next
battlefield. That is if the Congressional leaders do not
total gut the Army. These technological advances will
effect the look of the future structure of the Army.
Needing less and less people to perform the same mission,
the division strengths could be cut by as much as one-third.
Once we have this new structure, will the Army doctrine of
AirLand Battle and it's predecessors give the leadership of
the Army the right doctrine in which to fight and win? The
doctrine is sound and not predicated on numbers of personnel
or structure, but on abilities of the leadership to apply
it's techniques.
CONCLUSIONS: The political, economical and social
ramifications of the present will effect the DOD budget.
That in turn will definitely effect the Army's force
structure and procurement during the next decade. Together
with modern technology and the AirLand Battle doctrine, the
"Army 2000" will be able to meet our commitments to our
allies and to the nation in the 21st century.
THE "ARMY 2000"
THESIS STATEMENT. These powerful combinations of
political, social, and economic forces will impact greatly
on the budget of the U.S. Army in the next decade. In
direct correlation with this reduction, will come structural
changes and personnel reductions. Combined with the rapid
advancement of technology, the "Army 2000" will be a
smaller, decidedly different force in appearance, yet will
still follow an enhanced version of the present day AirLand
Battle doctrine.
I. PRESENT DAY POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. POLITICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.
B. SOCIO/ECONOMIC BATTLES TO FIGHT
C. PRECEDENTS
D. PRESENT POLICY
II. FUTURE TECHNOLOGY
A. ROBOTIC
B. DIRECTED ENERGY, LASERS
C. SMART MUNITIONS
D. STATE-OF-THE-ART MATERIALS
III. THE AIRLAND BATTLE
A. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
B. THE PRESENT CONCEPT
C. AIRLAND BATTLE-FUTURE
IV. POSSIBLE STRUCTURE OF THE "ARMY 2000"
A. INFANTRY DIVISIONS
B. AVIATION, DISCOM, ARTILLERY
V. CONCLUSION
THE "ARMY 2000"
Today's Effects, Tomorrow's Weapons, and Future Strategy
In the event that you have just returned from a year long,
solo excursion around the world in your sailboat, here are
some of the headlines you may have missed. SOVIET UNION ON
THE DECLINE! EAST AND WEST GERMANY TO UNITE! EASTERN
EUROPE FREE AT LAST! THE COLD WAR IS OVER! DRUG CZARS
THREATEN PRESIDENT BUSH! CONGRESS CALLS FOR A CUT IN THE
DEFENSE BUDGET BY $10-20 BILLION! For the last year, the
unraveling of the WARSAW Pact, causing several satellites of
the USSR to spin from orbit, have dominated all facets of
the news. Poland became the first Soviet bloc country to
begin the march away from the Kremlin. Next, in the
seemingly never-ending exodus of WARSAW Pact countries, came
Czechoslovakia, followed by Hungary, East Germany and
Romania. Now even Lithuania has declared it's independence
from Mother Russia.
While the rest of the world has been going through it's
evolution, socio/economic problems at home have caused all
levels of society to call for less military spending. The
dominant reasons are the attempt to reduce the budget
deficit, and the desire to spend more on the social ailments
of the United States, such as drugs, the plight of the
homeless, the poor, and education. These powerful
combinations of political, social, and economic forces will
impact greatly on the budget of the U.S. Army in the next
decade. In direct correlation with this reduction will come
structural changes and personnel reductions. Combined with
the rapid advancement of technology, the "Army 2000" will be
a smaller, decidedly different force in appearance, yet will
still follow an enhanced version of the present day AirLand
Battle doctrine.
Politicians and world leaders, inspired by these heady times
of possible peace, are calling for a drastic reduction in
the military forces in NATO and total troop pullouts in some
WARSAW Pact countries. Never to be accused of being
shrinking violets, U.S. Congressional leaders are joining
the optimists on the peace bandwagon, calling for immediate
withdrawals from Europe and massive reductions in the
military budget. These pronouncements of Soviet dominance
declining throughout the world, are leading our policy-
makers into formulating sympathetic reductions in equipment,
manpower, research and development of our armed forces, most
particularly in the Army. The so called "peace initiative"
that Congress is looking for, is to be carved directly out
of the military budgets of the Armed Forces over the next
few years. The largest portion to be cut will be that of
the Army. The high side estimate is $200 billion over the
next five years, with the low side being $180 billion over
the same period.(8-14)
Apparently the vocal majority of the populace is supporting
this reduction in budget with its corresponding effect on
force structure of the "Army 2000". The call for reductions
in the Pentagon budget is not only coming from the liberals
in Congress, but from some of the military's staunchest
supporters. For example, this statement appeared recently
in a local newspaper,
(Senator Sam)Nunn critized Defense Secretary
Richard B. Cheney for what he said was Cheney's
refusal to formally accept an intelligence
community finding that the Soviet army is now far
less threatening than in the years preceding the
ascendance of Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev.(11-1)
He used this fact to demand reductions in U.S. forces and
corresponding budget cutbacks due to this supposed lack of
threat.
Another part of this equation that is still unanswered is
the attempt to reduce the military spending in order to
bring the budget deficit under control. This problem has
been identified many times before, most recently in the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings congressional bill, with little effect
on the upward spiral of the deficit. Congressional leaders
feel that extensive reductions in military spending can
effectively help in the solution of this problem.
Additionally, many people want the expected monetary savings
to be used to fight the many social ailments in the U.S.
society. Some want to spend money on the tremendous "drug
war" that is ongoing. Some, however foolishly, want to have
the military actually fight the war itself. The drug war is
not the only area that Congress is looking to spend this
"peace initiative". The homeless, the poor, our education
system are a few of several social programs in need of
money. With the prospect of peace in Europe, combined with
major socio/economic problems at home, popular opinion is
calling for action to reduce the spending on the military.
There is a definite precedent set by previous leaders of the
United States, who have had effects on the force structure
of the Army. They too were swayed by popular opinion.
Following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson's policies
returned the United States to it's previous position of
isolationism and reduced the overall strength of the Army
drastically. President Harry Truman, along with his
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, reduced the defense
budget in land forces and thereby created the position the
U.S. found itself in on June 24, 1950. When North Korea
invaded the Republic of Korea, the United States had limited
forces available to counter the attack. President Truman
and the post World War II reduction was not the only
historical example that should be cited. More recent
history gives another example of troop reduction and
cutbacks in equipment and procurement during the Carter
presidency. The lack of planned and controlled reductions
caused problems even into the late 1980's.
Succumbing to the pressures from abroad and from within the
United States Congress, President Bush and Secretary Cheney
have no choice but to make reductions in the force. The
policy from the White House and the Defense Department is to
gradually reduce the Army forces over the next five years,
so as not to make a hollow shell of the Army and be unable
to meet our commitments. At this time, there is a proposal
to deactivate two to three divisions, but Congress is
looking hard at the possibility of deactivating over half of
the eighteen divisions by the year 2000.(5:19)
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense has proposed
reduction in the AH-64 procurement, elimination of the AHIP
(Advance OH-58), cost cutting with the M1 Abrams tank and a
total re-look on the new LHX helicopter.
Another thought process of restructuring the Army that must
be addressed, is the problem of identifying the challenges
the Army will be facing in the next century. Not only must
Department of Defense policymakers and Congressional
committees agree on the appropriate reduction in the Army
budget, the curtailment must be done in concert with a
forward look at the next possible threat environment. Mr.
Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., professor of internal security
studies at Tufts University and President of the Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc. wrote an article in which
he stated,
By the end of the 1990's, we are likely to have
witnessed the reduction of the forward deployed
forces from NATO-Europe and the Asian-Pacific
area. On the other hand, the formulation of
additional power centers in possession of a range
of military capabilities associated with low to
high-intensity conflict will have important
consequences for all states, including the U.S.(9-
22)
The reduction in personnel in the Army by the year 2000 will
not only be a reflection of the previously mentioned
politically generated budget reductions. The rapid advance
of technology that will occur during the next decade will
allow a more potent force with less personnel. There are
innumerable areas that will be explored and enhanced by
technologies of the next decade, providing the Army with
increased projection of force with reduced manpower.
Robotics, lasers, state-of-the-art materials, and smart
munitions are just a few of the advances that the Army will
use in the reduction of the force, while still maintaining
the same or better capabilities of winning on the
battlefield.
One of the most exciting concepts that is just beginning to
emerge is that of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). In the
present day utilization of the AirLand Battle concept,
intelligence acquisition is essential to the force commander
so that he may detect larger forces, maneuver to avoid their
surfaces, find the gaps and position for the first strike.
In the twentyfirst century, the need for real time
intelligence requirements will be critical. The most
desirable will be the ability to point to the enemy location
for a first strike capability.
As a penetrating airborne collection system with
loiter capability, the UAV is uniquely capable of
conducting a detailed search for hard-to-find and
non-emitting targets.(4:45)
Although the Joint Services are in the development stages of
the future UAV for the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, this
concept will be used in concert with the new iteration of
ground sensors. This combination of advanced technology will
greatly enhance the field commanders capability to identify
locations, surfaces and gaps of the future enemy. "The UAV
will be small, require less personnel to operate and
maintain, and cost much less than currently manned aerial
vehicles."(3:26) One of the most exciting of the proposed
UAVs is the Condor from Boeing. This aircraft has a
wingspan of 200 feet, is powered by a 6 cylinder piston
engine, flies at altitudes well above normal aircraft and
its loiter time is days, instead of hours.(3:28)
Additionally, there are several developments in the Unmanned
Ground Vehicle (UGV). These remotely operated platforms
will be capable of a wide range of observation and weapon-
like activities that will increase the intelligence
gathering capabilities and security of the ground force
commander. These future robotics of the "Army 2000" will
help reduce the manpower requirements of the intelligence
gathering units and provide real time intel with zero risk
to ground personnel.
Another concept that is presently in the inventory, but will
become more influential on the future structure of the Army,
is the laser. The directed energy weapons of the next
decade will be utilized to spot and track targets from
distant and safe locations. They will then pinpoint that
location for aerial delivered smart munitions and
land/aerial fired missiles. Additionally, weapons like the
stingray, a low-energy weapons system designed to blind the
optics of threat surveillance and target acquisition
systems, will become prevalent on the battlefield and will
be very difficult to counteract.(1:37) This technology is
the prototype of future weapon systems that will provide the
U.S. Army with "soft kill" capabilities on the future
battlefield. These developments will reduce the number of
forward observers, increase the lethality of the artillery
firepower and protect against enemy threat acquisition.
These gains in technology will reduce the manpower
requirements for the "Army 2000".
Not only will the soldiers of the future will be armed like
a space warrior of television fame, but they will also look
futuristic with a helmet made of high-impact-resistant
Kevlar that covers the ears and provides a short range
radio. They will have visors to protect eyes from lasers
and be equipped to identify toxic chemicals. These soldiers
will wear night vision, infrared lenses to see through the
smoke and dark. Knowing where you are at all times will be
as simple as checking the watch sized indicator on your
uniform connected with the Global Position System that will
pin-point your exact location. This will assist in night
navigation. Hand held weapons will have self-contained
rounds which will fire dart-like objects that will penetrate
better than bullets. Shoulder-fired laser weapons will have
the capability to destroy enemy equipment and the optical
senses of their personnel. Chameleon-like clothing will be
worn over lightweight shielding to protect against hostile
fire/lasers.(5:21)
All in all, the soldier of the future may resemble the
Predator, in the movie of the same name starring Arnold
Scwartzenegger. Just in these areas of robotics, lasers,
and state-of-the art materials alone, the force requirements
of the Army can be adjusted downward. These and future
technological innovations will increase our capabilities to
acquire real time intelligence, locate the enemy, bring
firepower to the target and protect our soldiers while
reducing the force structure.
As you have witnessed, not only do the effects of the
rapidly changing face of the Eastern European countries
effect the budget and structure of the "Army 2000", so will
the technological advancements have a tremendous effect.
If the peace of Western civilization causes reductions in
the Army's budget and that causes drastic changes in the
structure of the next decade, how will this effect the
doctrine of how to fight? Present day strategy is built
around the AirLand Battle concept. How can this doctrinal
concept meet the new strategies of the year 2000?
The Army's doctrinal concept of AirLand Battle, which
originated in the 1970's, is a well thought out and major
building block of National Security Strategy. It is
adaptable to training the force regardless of future
dimensions of the Army; not constricted to a preordained set
of strategic military plans; and the focus is on training
leaders to think independently and utilize all sources
available to operate effectively in the fog of war. AirLand
Battle gives all Army leaders the exact guidance to "conduct
campaigns and major operations and for fighting battles and
engagements".(12:2) In fact, the doctrinal strategy of the
United States Army, the AirLand Battle concept, is
applicable in situations of low, medium or high intensity
conflict. By utilizing historically proven principles of
war such as mass, economy of force and maneuver, the U.S.
Army can train to fight at any level of force structure and
expect to win the next battle. This doctrinal concept is a
way of thinking and acting in war, not rigidly specified
steps that must be taken in order to ensure victory.
History has given us many examples of strategy based upon
rigid and conforming doctrine that has affected the outcome
of many battles and wars. In World War I the Schlieffen
Plan, imposed by the Chief of Staff of the German General
Staff years before, conformed to one central axis. Another
historical example is France's preparation for World War II
and the rigidity of the Maginot Line. A modern day example
is the Soviet's basic principle to attack with a totally
destructive force, using massive firepower, followed by
echelons of tanks and mechanized vehicles to weaken or break
gaps in your positions. In opposition, the AirLand Battle
doctrine allows the forces of the United States to operate
from a small training/logistical base, utilizing the simple
tenets of AirLand Battle. The strength of the AirLand
Battle concept is being adaptable to situations and to the
force structure of the Army.
However, the bonding agent of this entire concept is the
training of the leaders to think independently within the
concepts of the higher command, utilizing all the assets on
hand. These are very critical skills that are discussed in
FM100-5,
In the final analysis and once the force is
engaged, superior combat power derives from the
courage and competence of soldiers, the excellence
of their training, the capability of their
equipment, the soundness of their combined arms
doctrine and above all the quality of their
leadership.(12:14).
Throughout the entire thought process of the AirLand Battle,
the independent thinking of the on site leaders, making
decisions within the broad overall scope of the mission, is
stressed. Of the four dynamics of combat, consisting of
maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership, "The most
essential element of combat power is competent and confident
leadership".(12:13) Independent leadership is emphasized
and essential in the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative,
agility, depth and synchronization.
In addition, the AirLand Battle doctrine strengthens the
utilization of all available assets on the battlefield with
it's close, deep and rear battle concepts. Not only is
combined arms important to U.S. Army doctrine, but the use
of all joint assets and the latest technology is strongly
enforced. In the 21st century the "Army 2000" will be able
to accomplish it's deep and rear battle missions with the
enhancement of future technology.
However well this doctrine has worked in the past and
present, the Army cannot stand still and expect today's
doctrine and strategy to function in the year 2000 without
some fine tuning. In fact, the determination of military
strategy is an ongoing process for the leadership of the
Army. General Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, will be
making a study of a proposed Army war-fighting doctrine this
summer. The title of this re-tooled strategy is called
AirLand Battle-Future (ALBF) and it will state that future
engagements will be fought in much greater areas of
responsibility (AOR's), at a much increased tempo of warfare
and finally as stated earlier, fought with less and less
troops.(1-25) The ALBF will still align itself with the
AirLand Battle tenets and not depend on strength of numbers,
but on initiative in the attack or even in the defense.
The new and improved version of the AirLand Battle-Future
will improve our capabilities by utilizing the latest
technology developed by the year 2000. But with the advent
of technology, changes are sure to follow. A smaller force
of soldiers, using the most modern, technologically
developed weapons, will radically change the structure of
the present day Army. The present day concept of the
Mechanized Division could change to resemble the Marine's
MPF, with the total reliance on equipment found in POMCUS
stock locations in Europe. The need for several of these
divisions will not be realized. The tried and true pure
infantry division will be totally cut from the force due to
the lack of a mission. The highly mobile airborne, air
assault and light divisions, increased in capability by the
Air Force C-17 aircraft, will be the basic structure of the
"Army 2000".
The present structure of the Army division has been used
throughout the last several wars, but could be changed to
something similar to that of the Marine Corps. All support
units may be stripped out of the divisions, leaving only the
infantry. Support requirements will be placed at another
level so that the CORPS level Commander can tailor his
forces more readily.(1-25) The actual strength of the
fighting force of these divisions will be reduced due to
increased lethality of weapons, the use of robotics in the
support channels and the increased capabilities of the
lasers, UAV's and materials of the future.
In the infantry brigades, the total strength could be
reduced by one-third to one-half the present day numbers.
Smaller units with maximized firepower, using long range
intelligence gathering innovations, will be the standard
force. The aviation brigades will be able to reduce both
pilots and support personnel due to the technological
advances of the aircraft and UAV's. No longer will a manned
aircraft have to be sent forward of the FEBA to locate and
call fire on enemy positions. UAV,s with their ability to
avoid detection by radar, infrared, and optics, will replace
many pilots and Forward Observers (FO). The technological
advancement of aircraft, with the increased use of
replacement of black boxes and fly-by-optics, will scale
back the support required personnel. Robotics and
prepackage classes of supply can eliminate large numbers of
support personnel in the DISCOM elements.
Robots and automated supply movement equipment can make the
supply channels much more responsive. Even the artillery
can increase their proficiency by use of robotics and smart
fire and forget munitions. This in turn will reduce the
overall signature of the aviation brigade, the division
support units and the artillery on the battlefield, thus
decreasing vulnerabilities in the rear battle area.
Therefore, the division of the "Army 2000" could be scaled
back to at least one-third of the present day size and still
be effective. The AirLand Battle has served the Army
structure well since it was initiated in the 1970's, so will
the next generation of the AirLand Battle-Future equip our
forces with the appropriate maneuver doctrine for it's
structure.
Over the next decade, the United States Army will be reduced
in structure, equipment and personnel through the time-
honored political process and the need to address internal
social ills. The permanency of peace and the effect on the
fight against the social ailments of this country will make
this a continual process. Where it will stop won't be known
for a long time. Weapons research, development and
procurement will continually be scaled back in line with
reduction in personnel. However, the progress of technology
will assist in maintaining the combat strength of the U.S.
Army during these reductions. "Technologically, it is
possible that a few soldiers could have the same battlefield
effect as a current brigade."(6-6) Even so, the question
will be asked if we will be able to meet the commitments of
the 21st century with the "Army 2000".
The answer is, that in the continual evolution of the
AirLand Battle doctrine, the strategy to fight and win, in
any level of conflict, will be there. This is a military
strategy built of the strength of its leaders and soldiers,
on their ability to process information rapidly, act quickly
and yet correctly. It is not based on inflexible, physical
requirements, such as a large standing Army. The AirLand
Battle of the future will allow the "Army 2000" to fight and
win on the future battlefield.
Bibliography
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Technology." Military Review,10(October 1989), 29-41.
2.Baker, Caleb, "AirLand Battle - Future."Army Times,March
12, 1990,p25.
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Aviation,39,January 31, 1990,28-30.
4.Bornick, Bruce, CPT(P), USA,"Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
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February 12, 1990, 16-21.
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Strategy, An Introduction to National Security
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Army Magazine,40(March 1990)14-26.
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in 90s and Beyond."Army Magazine,40(February 1990)20-
26.
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