Training Infantry To Win In The Deadly Battlefield Of The Future
AUTHOR Major Paul D. Refling, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: TRAINING INFANTRY TO WIN IN THE DEADLY BATTLEFIELD OF
THE FUTURE
THESIS: All through the infantry training process, the Marine
Corps must refocus and refine its practices if victory in battle
is to be ensured and exploitation of its training weaknesses is
to be avoided.
THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY TRAINING:
Individual training of infantry is conducted in fairly strict
accordance with the Individual Training Skills Manual ("ITSM").
Such training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, School of Infan-
tray and at the infantry units is generally excellent. The
few areas in which improvement is required are better weapons
cleaning practices, adequate ammunition allowances and mainte-
nance of individual ITSM skills following SOI graduation.
THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR SMALL UNIT INFANTRY TRAINING:
Small infantry units, those below the Battalion level, are to
be trained in accordance with the Marine Corps Combat Readiness
System ("MCCRES"). In practice, however, several factors dilute
the effectiveness of the standards represented by MCCRES. Per-
sonnel turbulence, varying experience levels of junior leaders,
small unit training preemption by larger unit exercises and
the current Division training system's orders all combine to
defeat the goals set forth by MCCRES and the orders therefrom.
The solution to the problems presented is to return to a step-
by step building block approach to training in stricter conformance
with MCCRES' well-stated goals.
THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR LARGE UNIT INFANTRY TRAINING:
Larger units, Battalions and beyond, rely on large exercises to
train. But, because the exercises neither require the making
of difficult decisions nor the realistic expenditure of ammuni-
tion, these exercises fall far short of their training potential.
One must train to learn, not train to avoid learning until con-
fronted with a real battle situation.
THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR INFANTRY STAFF TRAINING:
Like the larger units, Division staffs rely on large exercises
for training. Similarly, these exercises fail to live up to
their full learning potential. Staffs must avoid the temptation
to take advantage of the "exercise-only" atmosphere and must,
instead, move to the field and train in the field.
TRAINING INFANTRY TO WIN
IN THE DEADLY BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: All through the infantry training process, the
Marine Corps must refocus and refine its practices if victory on
the battlefield is to be ensured and exploitation of its training
weaknesses is to be avoided.
I. The Problems and Solutions for Individual Infantry
Training
A. At the Marine Corps Recruit Depot
B. At the School of Infantry
C. At the Infantry Units
II. The Problems and Solutions for Small Unit Infantry Training
A. The Problems
1. The Problem of Personnel Turbulence
2. The Problem of Varying Experience Levels Among
Junior Leaders
3. The Problem of Small Unit Training Preemption
4. The Problem of the Division Training System's Orders
B. The Solution
III. The Problems and Solutions for the Large Unit Infantry
Training
A. Failing to Make Hard Decisions and "Training to Learn"
B. Practicing Unrealistic Ammunition Expenditures and
"Training to Learn"
IV. The Problems and Solutions for Staff Training: Training
as We Will Fight
TRAINING THE INFANTRY TO WIN
IN THE DEADLY BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
INTRODUCTION
The Marine Corps' sole reason for existence is to win bat-
tles. From the perspective of a Marine whose occupational specialty
is infantry, the chief vehicle through which the Corps attains
this goal is training.
Training in the Marine Corps can be broken down into four
areas: (1) Individual training; (2) small unit training (Company
and below); (3) large unit training (Battalion and above); and
(4) staff training.
The Corps espouses a logical building block approach to
training. This approach is represented by two materials. First,
individuals are trained to the standards set forth in the Indivi-
dual Training Skills Manual ("ITSM"). Second, these individuals
are integrated into small units which are trained to the standards
of the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System ("MCCRES").
The building block approach to training continues as these
small units are integrated into larger units which conduct large
field exercises. The exercises are conducted, not only to learn
how to maneuver and fight, but to solve the additional problems
of logistics, engineering and administration. Staff training seeks
to meld these units into a synergistic whole for winning in battle.
All through the training process, however, the Marine Corps
commits errors through lack of focus on its goal--winnning in bat-
tle. These errors, however small and insignificant, create gaps
which, if exploited, could lead to our defeat.
This paper will focus on finding some of the problems and
on proposing workable solutions.
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
Marines receive individual training at the Marine Corps Re-
cruit Depots, at the School of Infantry and at the first infantry
units to which the Marines are then assigned.
1. Training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depots
The individual training received at the Marine Corps Recruit
Depots is very good. While a Company Commander, and later, a
Chief Instructor at the Infantry Training School, Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, I observed that the Marines given into our care are
almost universally motivated and eager to learn. The Marines are
disciplined, hard-working and squared-away. They have an almost
perfect base on which to build the knowledge necessary to be
Infantry Marines.
Despite this near perfect resource to train, I did observe
one continued problem. Invariably, I would find part of the Com-
pany trying to use unauthorized weapons cleaning methods and materi-
als, from carburetor cleaner to Tide, from bleach to Easy-Off Oven
Cleaner. When asked why, students would state that it was how
their Drill Instructors had prepared them for final inspection.
An overemphasis on spotlessly clean, overly dry weapons for
final inspection has caused Drill Instructors to find an expedi-
ent method of achieving the requested results. This practice, if
not stopped, will not only harm the weapons themselves. It will
place the lives of those using the weapons at risk in battle.
The solution is to allow only authorized cleaning materials
and methods to be used. The weapons should be inspected with an
understanding of just how clean and oil-free they can be using only
the materials and methods allowed.
2. Training at the School of Infantry
As we follow the individual Marine to the School of Infantry,
we will again find the training to be of good quality. The School
of Infantry, or "SOI," graduates a Marine Infantryman who can ef-
fectively employ his MOS weapon and who has been physically hard-
ened by the strenuous outdoor training. The keys to SOI's success
are:
1. ITSM which provides a level of skill for Marines to at-
tain and an ammunition allowance with which to train;
2. The building block training approach, followed by both
written and practical examinations, which assures that the stan-
dards addressed by ITSM are met or exceeded; and
3. A long lead-time training schedule which allows the
logistics, ranges and instructors to all come together in con-
cert at the required time and place to cover the required objec-
tives.
These keys to success are followed by all the infantry, entry
level schools. The individual technical skills of the Privates,
PFCs, Lance Corporals and Second Lieutenants are uniformly very
good. My experiences as a Platoon Commander and as a Company
Commander bear out this conclusion.
3. Training at the Infantry Unit
When a Marine joins his first infantry unit, is the know-
ledge he receives in individual training built upon in a uniform,
consistent and progressive manner? Unfortunately, I believe the
answer is no for the following three reasons.
The first problem is that an infantry unit's training allowance
for ammunition does not support either the training or the testing
of individual Marines to the ITSM standards. In the area of anti-
tank weapons, for example, an individual must engage a series of
moving and stationary targets with a sub-caliber LAAW or its up-
dated successor. Obtaining six of eight hits with the sub-caliber
device and one hit with a live LAAW qualifies the individual by
ITSM standards. Even though all Marines are required to be trained
to this standard, my Company's allowance for sub-caliber LAAWS
was set by the Division at 128, enough only to test my thirteen-
man assault section. The Division ammunition allocation thus
eviscerates that Marine Corps order.
If we believe the ITSM requirements are valid, then we must
give the units the ammunition to both train and test to the
standards demanded by ITSM. If the cost of ammunition is too
great to test every year, then we must set up an alternative,
systematic approach to test the individual Marine. One alterna-
tive is to test at longer intervals. Another is to develop
training devices that will train and test the Marine without
the large ammunition expenditure.
The second problem with training at the first infantry unit
is that the current Marine Corps promotion system has no direct
relation to the individual skills required by ITSM. For example,
a Marine Infantryman assigned to duty outside his MOS is given no
direct incentive to work on his MOS skills while in the unrelated
billet. Thus, when he arrives back at an infantry unit, his indi-
vidual skills have usually not kept pace with his current rank.
One solution to this problem is to institute a system of
practical exams, MOS specific, prior to each promotion. This
not only gives Marines an incentive for continued MOS study, but
provides better Marines back into the infantry units.
The third problem is related to the second. The unit to which
the individual Marine is assigned has no current requirement to
test if all Marines can pass ITSM standards on a continuing basis.
Therefore, in a battle for scarce time and resources, the individual
training usually falls victim to unit training goals. The obvious
error is that no unit is better than the sum of its individual
Marines.
A solution is to require units to requalify Marines up to
ITSM standards on a recurring basis. This solution not only
builds up the skills level of all individual Marines, but increases
the total unit's skill level.
The individual training received by Marines at the Depot, SOI
and at the infantry units is well calculated to achieve the goal
to win battles. We should, however, correct the weapons cleaning
practices, provide ammunition allowances consistent with ITSM
standards and assure that Infantrymen maintain ITSM skills acquired
at the Depot and SOI.
SMALL UNIT TRAINING
Small units, for the purposes of this paper, are those units
below the Battalion level. The current standards for training
small units are contained in the MCCRES orders. If we take those
standards as being fundamentally sound, are our current small
units effectively trained for battle? I would say yes, but only
marginally so. Personnel turbulence, the varying infantry experi-
ence levels of junior leaders, small unit training preemption and
division training errors all lead to this marginal level of training.
1. Personnel Turbulence
The personnel turbulence at the squad and fire team level is
critical. In order to be an effective unit, the squad or fire
team must train as a unit and be treated as a unit.
Personnel turbulence is best defined by the following
illustration. Imagine a Battalion, the strength of which varies
from week to week from three Companies to two Companies to even
only one Company. The Battalion's effectiveness is severely ham-
pered and the Regimental Commander who permits this would pro-
bably be relieved. Yet, at the most inexperienced level of
leadership, this attrition and flux in strength is almost always
in effect.
To illustrate the problem at the squad and fire team level,
consider an average Rifle Company on a non-SOC unit deployment
training schedule. By table of organization, the unit has 176
enlisted Marines. If the manning level by HQMC is 90%, the
unit's actual strength is 158 Marines. These losses effectively
reduce the thirteen-man squads to eleven-man squads. Those losses
are further compounded by the Fleet Assistance Program ("FAP").
Since no Battalion Commander is going to send his unit diary
clerk or motor transport mechanic to FAP, the Rifle Companies
bear that burden. The average, resulting squad strength is now
ten Marines. In addition, there are school quotas, leave and
sickness which further deplete the original thirteen-man squad
to a field strength of seven to nine Marines.
This flux may be acceptable at the Company and Platoon
levels. It is a serious impediment at the squad, and especially,
at the fire team levels.
2. Junior Leaders' Varied Infantry Experience Levels
Another training inhibitor is the experience levels of the junior
leaders. At first blush, this is a questionable problem until you
realize that anywhere from one-third to one-half of a typical
SOI graduating class is assigned to non-FMF duty. Approximately
half of a given Rifle Company's NCOs, while squared-away and
intelligent, have never practiced their trade at the entry
level. It is especially hard on the mortar and machine gun MOS's.
These skills require large firing ranges and the actual weapons
on which to practice. The ranges and weapons are unavailable
except in FMF units. Thus, junior leaders--Corporals and Ser-
geants--are often called upon to train and lead Marines whose
MOS skill levels are greater than their own. This skill level
deficiency causes not only training problems but undermines our
entire leadership rationale.
3. Small Unit Training Preemption
Another serious training problem at the small unit level is,
for lack of a better term, small unit training preemption; that is,
Division, Regiment and Battalion level exercises conducted without
regard to the effect of such exercises on small unit training.
To illustrate the problems presented by small unit training
preemption, let us consider, in turn, both the Combined Arms
Operations ("CAO") and the Combined Arms Exercises ("CAX").
These exericses were the largest and most visible ones during my
tenure as a Company Commander while at the Second Marine Division.
These exericses are undoubtedly important at the large unit level;
they do, however, have serious consequences at the small unit
level.
The typical CAO exercise lasts a week or more. The time is
divided into several 36 to 48 hour mini-exercises. The time alloted
to the small units inbetween the mini-exercises is devoted to
force list changes, changes in transportation modes and large
geographical movements.
The first mini-exercise is usually a good learning experience
at all levels. This is because adequate time has been allocated
to issue orders, carry out defensive/offensive engineering and
carry out reconnaissance.
Small unit training preemption begins with the second and
subsequent exercises. These exercises usually follow the preceding
exercise by twelve hour breaks. During this time at the higher
levels, the Regiment and Battalion staffs are brought together,
debriefed and a new operation order is issued. This procedure
calls for the Regiment and the Battalions to think of solutions,
write frag orders and then issue orders to the units below.
At the Company level, small unit training preemption evolves
rapidly. The first two hours are spent getting the Company assem-
bled and moved to a new assembly area. The third hour is usually
spent distributing or redistributing ammunition, chow and water.
The next six to seven hours are spent cleaning weapons, eating and
sleeping. The sleep is particularly important because the operations
plans have kept the Company moving all during the first 48 hour
mini-exercise.
The Battalion frag order is usually issued no sooner than one
to two hours prior to Start-Ex. If you have a smart Company Com-
mander, he can formulate a plan, do a map reconnaissance and write
a frag order while driving back to the assembly area. This acti-
vity leaves an hour, usually less, for the Company Commander to
issue his order to his Platoon Commanders. The Platoon Comman-
ders, Squad Leaders and Fire Team Leaders usually have hardly
enough time to get their Marines ready to move out much less to
issue orders.
This exercise has, obviously, less than optimal training value
for the small units. The value is less than optimal because the
junior leaders are unable to follow the basic troop learning
steps. Marines are thrown into the back of darkened AAVs, not
knowing the enemy situation, their own mission or their own
concept of operations.
A typical CAX is set up as a fire support planning and
fire support execution exercise at the Battalion level. Prior to
the exercise itself, small unit live fire training is available.
This training is excellent, especially the 400 series of
ranges.
But, does the Battalion exercise itself build on and add to
the small unit's tactical abilities? The question is best an-
swered through the eyes of a Corporal.
First, the Corporal sees his Company go into the attack
up a valley with no flank security and with no attempt to secure
the obvious dominating high ground on either flank. The Corporal's
next impression is of unlimited fire support to cover his advance
and to clear his assigned objectives. The Corporal then digs in
a linear defense on the valley floor against a mechanized enemy
counterattack. He later fires his final protective fires to
defeat the enemy.
The Corporal has a vivid impression as he looks down on an
enemy strong point that is clearly dominated by the high ground
of which he is in possession. Yet, he eagerly assaults it with
his clear firepower superiority. The third morning, the Corporal
is again in a mostly linear defense and he again fires a final
protective fire to defeat the enemy mechanized attack.
Clearly, these are not the lessons the Marine Corps wants to
teach small units. Yet, the discussion of both CAO and CAX
illustrates that neither helps small unit training. To the con-
trary, the experiences hurt it by providing bad examples to fol-
low in the future.
4. Division Training System
The final small unit training problem consists of the division
training system itself. First, the typical division training order
is not results-oriented. It does not give ammunition, live fire
ranges and instructional packages and then demand results in ac-
cordance with ITSM or MCCRES orders.
Instead, the typical division training order commonly con-
tains statements such as, "50% of your training must be at night,"
or "each Marine is to receive two hours of dining facility appre-
ciation per quarter."
Second, the division training system provides ineffectual
inspections. The training inspection team ordinarily consists of
a Master Sergeant and his clerk. They inspect the Company's
training records. They do not inspect the training; they do
not inspect the results of the training. They do not have any
standards with which to compare the training which they should
observe.
Third, the division training system fails to require that
each fire team, squad, platoon and company to pass a separate
MCCRES test on its readiness. This clearly should be required
in order to insure victory in battle.
The above discussion of problems with small unit infantry
training demonstrates amply my opinion that the training is
replete with errors. These errors in training and logistics might
easily be exploited and result in our defeat.
The problems associated with personnel turbulence, experi-
ence levels, small unit training preemption and the division
training system can be addressed by returning to a step-by-step,
building block approach to training. I propose just such an
approach in the following four steps, the end result of which is
a new, division-wide, deployment training cycle.
The first step is to take the current Marine Corps Combat
Readiness Evaluation System, from fire team through Battalion,
and determine how long a particular event should take. Assume
that the time required to train and to test a fire team to
MCCRES standards is one month. When this planning sequence is
repeated for each larger unit up to the Battalion level, it
results in a Battalion training cycle. The numbers in the
graph below are less important than is my proposal that the
training of each larger unit will not start until the smaller
units have completed their training. This will result in solving
small unit training preemption.
Click here to view image
The second step to more effective small unit training is to
cut down on personnel turbulence. Marines should only be trans-
ferred in or out of a unit prior to the unit's starting its train-
ing schedule. Assume this step adds three months to the original
Battalion training schedule and the cycle now looks like this:
Click here to view image
Furthermore, individual schools should take place only during the
receive and detach personnel portion of the cycle. Assume a peri-
od of time sufficient to allow individual ITSM refresher train-
ing, rifle range and individual NBC refresher training. The train-
ing cycle now is:
Click here to view image
If you add a six-month deployment to the cycle, it becomes
a training deployment cycle. A modified version of this system
is, in fact, currently being used for the MEU-SOC Battalions.
If this system were applied Division-wide, the results will be
better training, reduced personnel turbulence and better range/
logistics utilizations.
The third step to better small unit training is to make
large unit exercises conform more to reality. If, in the CAX
scenario mentioned earlier, you would not defend against a
mechanized attack on the valley floor in a linear defense, then
do not practice doing it in training.
A fourth step to improved small unit training is to have
the division training order reinforce the current ITSM and MCCRES
orders by providing ammunition, firing ranges and training evalu-
tions to meet the ITSM and MCCRES orders. Set your training
standards for the most difficult mission and then train to meet
them. If you want improved training then make the additions,
not to the individual unit training, but to the Marine Corps as
a whole by changes to the basic orders of ITSM and MCCRES. In
this way, improvements will be felt throughout the Marine
Corps.
LARGE UNIT EXERCISES
Are large unit exercises, as currently practiced, effective
for training to win in battle? My answer is no! The problem is
not that the Battalions cannot maneuver; the problem is not that
the Regiments cannot issue proper orders and have them carried
out. The problem is that we do not practice the "too-hard-to-do"
things.
1. Failing to Make Hard Decisions
At the large unit level, exercises which entail difficult
decisions are avoided. To illustrate, imagine an exercise which
focuses on a mass chemical attack. Such an exercise would force
the Commander to decided whether to (a) reembark his force,
decontaminating it onboard ship or (b) continue the attack, set-
ting up decontamination sites for Regimental-sized units. A
mass chemical attack presents an opportunity to practice the art
of making hard decisions, an opportunity we should never pass
up.
I propose to solve this training deficiency by "training to
learn." What I propose is not just to maneuver units on the
battlefield but to also solve tactical problems identified prior
to the exercise.
"Training to learn" can be demonstrated by returning to
our mass chemical attack illustration. First, a large scale
chemical attack can be made as a subproblem for a Division
landing exercise. The engineers will build mock-ups of the
Frog missile on the Dragon Wagon. The four Transporter Erector
Launcher ("TEL") mock-ups are then given to the Op For Commander.
He may position them wherever he decides. But, if he fires them,
they obviously must be within their estimated range of 70 kilome-
ters.
This real-life tactical problem gives everyone problems to
solve prior to the exercise. The Battalions and Regiments would
be armed with knowledge of the enemy's capabilities. They
would be required, under such circumstances, to not only practice
the usual individual NBC protective measures, but to also study
and solve the problem of how to implement large scale decontamina-
tion procedures in a time sensitve environment. Failing to do
so would be accompanied by large scale losses.
This exercise provides the Division Commander with difficul-
ties only someone at his level can solve. He would decide
whether the landing be made as scheduled or whether to wait
until the Air/Navy/Recon has the TELs targeted and destroyed.
The scenario also drives the Navy to ponder and perhaps test
a plan to do either a mass evaucation/decontamination exercise
or to assist the Division with decontamination on the beach.
The proposed exercise also challenges the reconnaissance
assets--Air, Navy, Recon and national assets--to do a more
thorough and realistic job. If Generals and Admirals are holding
up the landing exercise because of an inability to find the high
value target and destroy it, then the training exercise has
come close to providing a realistic environment and to providing
ample practice at making hard decisions.
2. Practicing Unrealistic Ammunition Expenditures
The typical exercise, both in the field and in war games,
does not restrict the amount of ammunition we expend. We prac-
tice by firing on every target we see, think we see or have an
inclination of seeing. With unlimited assets, it would be
foolish to act otherwise.
What Commanders really need to practice is not how to call
fire missions but how to apply scarce and valuable firepower
assets to critical battle areas in order to achieve victory.
I again propose a "training to learn" solution to this
problem. The solution is easy and realistic. At the beginning
of each exercise, start with a basic allowance of ammunition.
If a Commander chooses to fire his whole allowance prior to
H-hour, that is his call. He will, however, receive no more
until the next day. The losses he suffers are his problem.
After a few such days, Commanders would become expert at fire-
support allocation.
STAFF TRAINING
Is current staff training effective and will it enable the
Marine Corps to win on the battlefield of the future? The cur-
rent system is effective in issuing operations orders which are
correctly formatted. It is effective in delivering food, water
and medical care in field exercises.
But, are current staffs trained to work and plan in the
mobile, flexible and deadly battlefields of the future? My
answer is no and the reason for my answer is simple: We will
fight like we train.
To illustrate how we do train, walk through a typical exer-
cise. The staff planning begins months in advance of the exer-
cise. The operations orders are typed, prepared and distributed.
Good staff planning starts to fall apart. Either the exercise
headquarters are prestaged in the field or, even worse, are not
sent to the field.
If the headquarters does go to the field, it is common for
it not to move while in the field. Furthermore, the staff does
not try to issue new orders or make major changes to orders al-
ready written once they are in the field.
While in the field, neither active nor passive defense mea-
sures for the headquarters itself are practiced. When was the
last time you saw a Division headquarters in the field where
everyone had either a fighting hole or bunker in which to work
or just survive in the event of enemy fire?
In sum, either these examples or--better yet--your own experi-
ences lead to the conclusion that we do not train as we will
fight. If our observations are correct and staff training is
ineffective, then how can we change it?
The solution is to train. It does require large amounts of
hard work and a new set of priorities. If we want to train our
staffs to be mobile, flexible and survivable, we must train
them to be that way. I propose we take a division staff to the
field for one month. During that time, require the staff to
displace every two days. After each displacement, inspect the
new headquarters area to ensure each Marine has a protected
position, bunker or fighting hole from which to carry out his
tasks. During this month, require the staff to plan, type, pre-
pare and distribute operations orders and overlays.
At the end of this training period, the staff will be mobile,
flexible and survivable. It would have found solutions to the
problems of typing, preparing and distributing operations orders
and overlays while in the field environment. Finally, the staff
will have much less hesitancy in asking Regiments and Battalions
to follow its example to train for solving the hard problems.
CONCLUSION
Winning in battle is the Marine Corps' only reason for exis-
tence. Each and every Marine must rededicate himself to that
goal and make it his first priority. Training, both realistic
and difficult, is the vehicle by which victory will come. To
be true to our heritage, we must train each day as if the battle
will be tomorrow, for who can foresee when the next Pearl Harbor
or Inchon will occur?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnim, R. von, Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal,
Hudson Kimberly Publishing Co., Kansas City, Mo., 1897.
Collins, Arthur S., Jr., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.),
Common Sense Training, Presidio Press, Novato, Ca., 1981.
English, John A., On Infantry, Praeger, New York, 1984.
Faucitt, William, Regulations for the Prussian Infantry, Green-
wood, _______________ , 1968.
Liddell Hart, Basil H., A Science of Infantry Tactics, Simpli-
fied, William Clowes, London, 1926.
Morrison, John Frank, Training Infantry, U.S. Cavalry Ass.,
Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1914.
Rommel, Erwin, Field Marshal, Attacks, Athena Press, Inc.,
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