The MAGTF's Approach To Logistics In Maneuver Warfare
AUTHOR Major Paul J. Pisano, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE MAGTF'S APPROACH TO LOGISTICS IN MANEUVER WARFARE
THESIS: Unless the MAGTF makes some major adjustments in its
approach to logistics/CSS operations, the logistics wars that have
plagued armies of the past regardless of the style of warfare will
burden the MAGTF of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style
of warfare.
DATA: The ability of an army to sustain itself has always been a
problem since they took to the field to fight their enemies.
Contributing to this problem is the lack of transportation, the
ability to procure the needed amount of supplies to sustain troops,
the affects of Clausewitzian friction on logistics/CSS operations,
the problem of high consumption rates in repairs parts, and their
affect on maintenance production. The fathers of kesselschlacht
and blitzkrieg developed a radical doctrine that was logistics
intensive, but didn't take into account the logistics wars past
armies had endured when developing and prosecuting this doctrine.
Consequently, logistics and all of its intricacies played a major
role in the failure of blitzkrieg. The MAGTF is in the unique
position of learning to cope with the logistics wars for they will
never eliminate them, but they have the chance to minimize their
affect on the MAGTF'S style of maneuver warfare.
CONCLUSION: The MAGTF can minimize the affects of the logistics
wars by divorcing the traditional approach to logistics and
adopting a multi-dimensional approach to logistics operations.
THE MAGTF'S APPROACH TO LOGISTICS IN MANEUVER
THESIS: Unless the MAGTF makes some major adjustments in its
approach to logistics/CSS operations, the logistics wars that have
plagued armies of the past regardless of the style of warfare will
burden the MAGTF of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style
of warfare.
I. Historical problems of logistics
A. Sustainment
B. Transportation
C. Clausewitzian factor of friction
II. Historical case study
A. Kesselschlacht
B. Blitzkrieg
III. MAGTF'S problems
A. Sustainment routine
B. Transportation limitations
C. Maintenance and supply constraints
D. Clausewitzian friction
IV. MAGTF'S approach to the logistics problems
A. Doctrinal approach
B. Multi-dimensional approach
C. Solutions
THE MAGTF'S APPROACH TO LOGISTICS IN MANEUVER WARFARE
Logistics as defined by Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1
"is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces". It encompasses the total scope of activity
needed to form. equip, sustain. move. engage, disengage, and
disestablish military forces. "Logistics comprises the means and
arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics".1
The above definitions suggest that logisticians should have
no difficulties sustaining a maneuver style of warfare. A style
which depends upon operational speed, tactical mobility,
flexibility, an expanded battlefield, the avoidance of surfaces,
and the exploitation of gaps regardless of time and space".2 Yet
our military forces have a hellish time trying to provide 3000
calories per day to Marines and Soldiers in uncomplicated attrition
warfare, let alone a style of warfare whose philosophy is to
"exploit fleeting opportunities".3
The above difficulty is nothing new. Armies have fought this
logistics' war since they took to the battlefield. Yet with
historical accounts of past armies, and the technological advances,
advantages available to present day military forces, our armed
1 George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics, (Washington D. C: National
Defense University Press, 1986), p. XVIII
2 MCCDC, USMC, Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1 (Quantico,
1988), pp. 1-5 - 1-7
3 MCCDC, USMC, Warfighting, FMFM 1 (Quantico, 1989), p. 31
forces still find it difficult, and sometimes impossible to sustain
their forces in combat operations.
The question of military forces being bound by the "umbilical
cord of supply"4, however, is not the one that is of issue. For
past armies, and future armies alike will always be tied to that
umbilical cord. By what degree, however will our military forces
be affected by the proverbial tail of logistics in the conduction
of maneuver warfare is the question that should be asked. For
unless the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) makes some_major
adjustments in its approach to logistics/combat services support
(CSS) operations, the logistics wars that have plagued armies of
the past regardless of the style of warfare will burden the MAGTF
of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style of warfare.
To begin with a distinction must be made between the role of
logistics on the three levels of war, and its impact on the MAGTF.
At the strategic level of war, logistics is concerned with the
national assets available to the military forces. For instance,
the availability of raw materials; the capacity to process those
materials into the means of war via the industrial output
capability of this nation. Strategic level logistics also concerns
itself with those agencies that provide strategic mobility, such
as Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Sealift Command (MSC),
and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to the operating
forces, and their materials to the theater of operations.
4 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, 10th ed. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 57
It also concerns itself with the allocation of resources to
the military services via agencies such as the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA). The MAGTF has little, if any, control of logistics
at the strategic level of war. (Most decisions at the strategic
level are made by senior government officials.) The Marine Corps
like its sister services, submits its requirements to the various
national agencies for its logistics support.5
Logistics at the operational level of war is both an art, and
a science. For it involves planning, the science of logistics, and
timing, the art of logistics -- the timing of logistics is
critical when supporting the tactical level of war.6 It also
includes inter and intra theater logistics concepts such as
coordinating Host Nation Support (HNS), Inter-service support
agreements (ISSAs), and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). Some
of the many logistics responsibilities in which the CINC has
purview include transportation, air and water facilities, civil
engineering support, and procurement planning
The MAGTF'S role with logistics at the operational level of
war is situational dependent. For instance, if the MAGTF
commander's role is that of the CINC, or JTF Commander, the MAGTF
commander will be responsible for the logistics pipeline to the
theater or area of responsibility (AOR). If the he fills the role
5 See chapter 3, "Logistics in the National Defense", for a
detailed explanation.
6 See chapter 9, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General
Staff, 1865-1941", for the affects of poor logistics timing at the
operational and tactical levels of war.
of the Ground Component Commander (GCC), his purview of logistics
will encompass all ground forces in the AOR. However, if the
commander's role is that of service component commander, he will
rely upon established ISSAs, MOUs, and his organic capabilities,
which for the MAGTF is thirty to sixty days.
Logistics at the tactical level of war is also known as CSS.
Logistics at the tactical level is concerned
with sustaining forces in combat. It deals
with the fueling, arming, and maintaining of
troops and machines. Tactical logistics
involves the actual CSS functions with
immediately or imminently available usually
resident in the combat trains.7
At this level, the MAGTF commander's concerns are his units'
organic assets, and his logistics capabilities: supplies,
equipment and services for the Marines, and the tactical timing of
CSS.
Although strategic level logistics provides the means to war.
It is the operational and tactical levels of logistics that will
affect the MAGTF'S ability to prosecute maneuver warfare.
"The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns without
plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much
use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient
petrol to haul them around".8 The above statement depicts the
sustainment problems that have always plagued armies. In fact,
7 MCCDC, USMC, Campaigning, FMFM 1-1 (Quantico, 1990), p. 78
8 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H.
Liddell Hart, tr. Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1953), p. 328
when one examines the means and methods of providing CSS to the
MAGTF, one sees them fighting the same logistics' wars past armies
have fought. These `wars' will affect the MAGTF'S ability to
exploit those fleeting opportunities. To further illustrate these
logistics wars an examination of the historical problems in
logistics is in order.
Whether or not the logistician plans to use horse drawn
wagons, motor driven vehicles, or high capacity, high speed cargo
jets, providing sustainment will always be a constant battle. The
logistics trains or field trains' concept of sustainment, for
instance, dates back to Pre-Napoleonic warfare. And except for the
technological difference in equipment and transportation, it still
practiced today by the MAGTF and other military organizations.
Although there is some merit to the above mentioned system,
there are some inherent difficulties which past armies have
experienced as well as the MAGTF. For example, adequate amounts
of fuel to support maneuver whether it is fodder or petrol. Timely
maintenance production: whether it's replacing a wooden wagon
wheel, or a sophisticated tank track; adequate repair parts to
support the above and other types of maintenance. And adequate
transportation assets: whether it is horse drawn or motor driven -
- there is never enough. That the present logistics' wars stem
from historical approaches to sustainment is no coincidence. There
is no simple method of providing sustainment.
Another historical problem that continues to stymie
logistics/CSS operations is the state of main supply routes (MSRs).
As recent as World War II, unimproved roads used as MSRs were the
standard in rural and isolated areas as well as secondary and
tertiary roads. A problem not in itself; however, as weather
patterns changed with the various seasons, so did the conditions
of the roads. During the rainy season, for instance, roads became
untrafficable quagmires.9 And more often than not, trucks carrying
supplies never reached their destinations:
In the autumn of 1941, armored spare parts
were scarce in the Russian theater. The
supply lines were over-extended at the time
the muddy season set in. Most roads in Russia
became impassable, and truck columns were not
able to move up armored spare parts, and other
supplies.10
The MAGTF seldom experiences the likes of the above in present
day exercises. However, with emphasis placed on low intensity
conflict (LIC) in third world countries, the MAGTF may experience
similar difficulties in overcoming untrafficable roads as did the
Germans in operation Barbarossa.
The last historical logistics' problem for discussion
obstructs logistics', and tactical operations as well: the
Clausewitzian factor of friction. "As long as we have no personal
knowledge of war, we cannot conceive where the difficulties
lie. . . everything is so simple in war, but the simplest thing
9 See chapter 9, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General
Staff, 1865-1941", for detailed explanation.
10 German Tank Maintenance in World War II (Washington D. C:
Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), p. 23
is difficult".11
So as in the Russian campaign, the simplest task of moving
supplies from the source in theater to the front became impossible
because simple factors like the affects of inclement weather on
unimproved roads were not expected, and not fully considered.
As one can see the above logistics support problems have
stymied tactical operations from Wallenstein to the present.
Whether or not these problems can be eliminated with current
technology is rather doubtful because modern technology requires
sophisticated support which only compounds the above problems.
However, this isn't the issue to consider. Instead the
discussion will focus upon logistics in maneuver warfare. And
since maneuver warfare is in its infancy in the Marine Corps, the
opportunity to develop an approach to CSS that is in consonance
with maneuver warfare at the operational and tactical levels of
war is prime. For the MAGTF'S present approach to logistics/CSS
is not compatible with this style of warfare.
To do this, an examination of the manner in which past armies
have managed -- if they were capable of managing -- the above
logistics problems when they executed a maneuver style of warfare.
The application of the above lessons to present operations will not
eliminate the logistics' wars the MAGTF has to endure. However,
the lessons will provide knowledge which in turn will minimize the
impact of the above constraints caused by these wars when MAGTF
11 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, tr. O. J. Matthijs Jolles
(Washington D. C: Combat Force Press, 1953), p. 53
executes its maneuver style of warfare.
There are several historical examples one could glean data
which may identify, and perhaps minimize the aforementioned
logistics problems in the operational and tactical levels of war.
However, German kesselschlacht, and blitzkrieg doctrine will be
examined. For the Marine Corps' style of maneuver warfare is based
on the above ideology. And the German example offers some
excellent illustrations of logistics miscalculations which may
serve as a platform to re-evaluate the MAGTF'S approach to
logistics and CSS operations.
Kesselschlacht -- the art of encircling the enemy -- was
developed by Von Moltke circa 1866-1870, and was the prelude to
blitzkrieg doctrine.12 In his issuance of The Regulations for the
Higher Troops Commanders, Von Moltke stressed deep encirclements.
He did not mention anything about logistics support:
He warned against the futility of frontal
attacks, and urged whenever possible that
Prussian troops should attack the flanks of
the enemy position. The Regulation stressed
movement to get better firing advantage; and
flanking became a key element in Prussian
doctrine.13
Von Moltke was successful in the conduct of both the 1866, and
the 1870 campaigns against the Austrians, and French respectively.
12 See chapter 1, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General
Staff, 1865-1941", for a more detailed account.
13 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German
General Staff, 1865-1941 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1971), p. 6
However, it was during these campaigns that he realized his "army's
logistical limits, and how those limits might govern the success
or failure of the kesselschlacht doctrine for the future".14
For instance, the logistics problem Von Moltke encountered
-- maintaining a line of communication (LOC) __ stemmed from
incompatible transportation: steam driven trains, and horse drawn
wagons. At the operational level, the trains could push supplies
as far as the rail system allowed. However, the rail system did
not go to the front. Instead, the supplies were transferred from
the railhead to horse drawn wagon trains which were supposed to
deliver the supplies to the front. And for the most part they did.
The lack of speed inherent to horse drawn wagon technology,
however, created bottlenecks at the railhead which reduced the
flow of supplies to the front. Such was the case in "1866 when
supplies had been rushed to the railhead in such abundance that
they quite overwhelmed the capacity of the old-fashioned horse-
drawn wagons to move them quickly to where the marching armies
needed them".15
The obvious solution to the above problem was to procure more
transportation assets to support railhead operations. However,
this only compounded the problem because additional horses and
wagons demanded more logistics support: fuel and maintenance.
Additionally, the technology of the time did not provide the speed
14 Addington, p. 9
15 Addington, p. 9
needed to support kesselschlacht doctrine. The quandary that Von
Moltke found himself in caused him to have a better appreciation
for logistics. Accordingly, "the 1866 and 1870 campaigns left Von
Moltke with an enlarged understanding of the relatively short
striking range, the limited endurance, the logistical inflexibility
of the German Army beyond the railhead, and the need to tailor
doctrine and strategy to logistical limitations".16
An interesting parallel to the above is the breakout at
Normandy during Operation Overlord. During the lodgement phase of
the operation, there was a massive build-up of supplies on the
coast. Adequate in quantities, these supplies were to sustain the
operation during the breakout. So the allies went racing across
France in pursuit of their enemy. However, they encountered many
obstacles in their logistics operations. The major one being the
large amount of time trucking units required to complete round
trips between Normandy depots and front-line units. As a result,
logistical support became more frantic in nature, "the needs of
the combat forces being met almost wholly on a hand-to-mouth
basis".17 The above was a contributing factor in the eventual
decision to slow the pace of operations.
In blitzkrieg doctrine the concept of kesselschlacht is
applied to mechanized and motorized forces. A formal definition
16 Addington, p. 10
17 Roland G. Ruppenthal, United States Army in World War II,
Logistical Support of the Armies, (Washington D. C: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1970) pp. 489-490
that grasps the concept of blitzkrieg can be found in the American
Heritage Desk Dictionary: "Blitzkrieg is any swift, concerted
effort". Concerted effort means all elements -- including the
logistics arm -- not just traditional maneuver elements. And this
is where the Germans made their mistake: when they didn't consider
logistics operations as an equal arm to maneuver at both the
operational and tactical levels of war.
Guderian, the father of blitzkrieg, conceived of the Panzer
Division. "It was an armored-mechanized, motorized task force, one
in which mobile infantry, artillery, engineers, and supply units
were combined with a brigade of tanks in order to allow the tanks
to fight with full effect".18 "He was thinking of breakthroughs
and deep strategic penetrations unhindered by logistical limits of
the past".19
By the eve of World War II, the German concept of blitzkrieg
doctrine centered around "fast moving and long range armored and
motorized units which would spearhead the attack, breakthrough the
enemy's front and move to counter the encirclement of escape, and
sever his communications"20-- similar to the philosophy of the new
Marine Corps doctrine.
18 Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the
Eighteenth Century, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984),
p. 164
19 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German
General Staff, 1865-1941, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1971) , p. 34
20 Addington, p. 42
There was little, if any, mention of logistics operations
during the development of this doctrine. Accordingly, the Germans
were to rely upon the sustainment system of the past with current
technology. They believed that motor-driven transportation would
eliminate the bottlenecks at the railroad stations created by
archaic modes of transportation. The Germans didn't take into
account the effects of new technology on their logistics
operations. For instance, the maintenance and fuel requirements
of tracked and wheeled vehicles, the effects of poor roads, and
other Clausewitzian factors that affect all operations.
During the initial stages of the war the Germans did not come
to this realization for their prosecution of blitzkrieg proved to
be successful in several of their campaigns. Most notable were the
Poland and French campaigns. Not to say the Germans didn't run
into logistics problems during these campaigns, for they did.
"However, the Germans were able to overcome their logistical
constraints because of the ideal conditions of weather, roads, rail
and range".21 The Germans travelled relatively short distances
during the initial stages of the war.
In contrast to the above, however, the Germans were not able
to overcome the historical logistics problems they encountered in
Operation Barbarossa. In fact the largest single military
operation of all time, proved to be such a logistical nightmare
21 Addington, p. 173
that it "staggered the imagination".22
For instance, in addition to the historical logistics'
problems which plagued the German army during the above campaign,
performing additional tasks such as converting rail from Russian
to German size track required additional logistics efforts not
fully considered prior to the campaign. The affects weather had
on both the scarce unimproved road network, and transportation
assets: both horse, and motor driven. And the fact the Germans
couldn't get winter clothing to their troops were symptoms of their
poor logistics network.
The fact they "did not possess the industry nor manpower for
a prolonged contest",23 also contributed to the logistics failure
of the operation. It must be noted that limited industrial output
was first experienced in the French campaign where production in
motor transport, and spare parts could not keep pace with blitz
doctrine. The Germans didn't experience the full effects of
limited industrial output until the Russian campaign, however.
There were more significant factors which caused the Germans
to lose in Russia as well as the war. For instance, their lack of
strategic depth, and of course Hitler. However, logistics was a
contributing factor for their failure at the operational, and
tactical levels of war.
22 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, 10th ed. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 175
23 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German
General Staff, 1865-1941, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1971) p. 182
What was the nature of their logistics' problems ? As stated
earlier in the paper, one of the difficulties was they failed to
recognize, and incorporate the logistics' arm into their
development of blitzkrieg. Although it's implied that Guderian was
concerned about logistics, -- supply units were part of his Panzer
Division -- there is no indication that he gave any new thought to
logistics at the operational level -- the pipeline from the source
of supply in theater to front-line units. Instead, the Germans
subordinated logistics to maneuver, and never shifted their focus
of effort to logistics. Accordingly, when the Panzer divisions
depleted their supplies, they were forced to stop their pursuit of
the Russians. Subsequently, the Russians were able to avoid the
encirclement at the critical juncture of the battle, and escape
further into their homeland. The Germans did achieve some tactical
victories; however, these victories did nothing except prolong the
inevitable.
Although the above campaign was both a logistical and
operational failure, the doctrine of kesselschlacht, and blitzkrieg
must not be judged by the logistical implications of Barbarossa.
For as mentioned the Germans did achieve operational and tactical
success during their prosecution of blitz. However the Germans
failed to realize that the art of sustainment requires the same
effort as the art of executing tactics. For if the Germans applied
blitzkrieg philosophy to their sustainment operations at the
operational level of war, they might not have traveled any great
distances, but they would have minimized the logistics' war of
sustainment.
The above describes some of the reasons the Germans were not
capable of sustaining themselves during the prosecution of their
Blitzkrieg doctrine. The thought that comes to mind is the
commonalty of the German's and MAGTF'S difficulties. For instance,
there is a transportation shortage in the MAGTF which will affect
the ability to sustain their employment at the operational, and
tactical levels of war. "A comparative analysis of a Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) lift capabilities and lift requirements
indicates that there is a substantial shortage in medium and heavy
motor transport assets to support maneuver combat units in a
sustained mid-intensity conflict, unless major augmentation is
received from outside sources".24 Figure 1 further illustrates
this.
Click here to view image
It's true the MAGTF has an advantage over the Germans in that
the MAGTF has two available methods of aerial delivery in addition
to ground transportation: (1), fixed wing air delivery, and (2),
24 LtCol Robert L. Bailey and Maj Leslie Stein, "Transporting
the Marine Corps into the Future", Marine Corps Gazette, 73
(October 1989), 60.
25 Bailey and Stein, p. 60
external helicopter resupply.26
Aerial delivery,however, is not a dependable means of
transportation for it is weather dependent. Besides fixed wing air
delivery is dependent upon limited airplanes such as the C-130 and
the C-141 which will be in high demand for logistics at the
operational level during combat operations.
The helicopters could make up the difference depicted in
figure 1, however, one can't rely upon them as a primary means of
transportation for providing logistics support. The reasons for
this is the external factors that dictate the use of them in the
logistic support role such as the superiority in the air, the
weather, and the maintenance requirements.
The functional areas of maintenance and supply offers another
similarity between the German army, and the MAGTF. Unlike the
German army who could not keep up with their maintenance because
of fast paced operations: a la blitzkrieg, or mismanaged spare
parts' production and distribution; the MAGTF imposes on themselves
its own maintenance and supply constraints.
To begin with, one has to accept the fact that the MAGTF will
never win the maintenance war. Equipment is going to break whether
or not it wears out, or becomes a casualty of battle. And broken
equipment will affect tactical speed, a necessity in maneuver
26 The Germans did use the Luftwaffe for aerial resupply, but
unlike our concept of it the Luftwaffe needed a runway to land
their planes to deliver their supplies. See Chapter 8, "The
Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941", for
further discussion
warfare. Therefore, the goal of maintenance production must be to
minimize the affects of broken equipment on combat operations.
However the practices that govern maintenance production are
not in consonance with the flavor of maneuver warfare. For
instance, maintenance production in the MAGTF requires that repairs
be classified into one of three categories: organizational (user
level), direct support (intermediate level), and depot level
repairs. Each category has its own maintenance tasks, yet some
tasks overlap one another. However, all repairs have to fixed by
the appropriate level technician. Therefore, Marines who are
potentially capable of conducting the repairs on their unit's
equipment cannot because of inflexible procedures.
This in turn imposes logistics constraints on the maneuver
element. Marines at the user level, for instance, can't ignore
these practices because the three categories of maintenance require
different manuals and tools not available to all maintenance
personnel. So if equipment breaks, and its beyond the prescribed
level of maintenance, it must be evacuated to the rear for repairs.
Both the inability to repair, and the evacuation process become a
logistical burden in combat operations. It also becomes a time
consuming process not in consonance, as stated, with the idealogy
of maneuver warfare -- broken equipment is pushed rearward.
Couple the above with inadequate amounts of critical repair
parts and you have a logistics' war that will cripple a unit, and
disrupt the operational tempo. "One of the biggest problems facing
Marine Corps' repairmen and technicians today is a lack of a ready
supply of repair parts at the organizational level".27 Whenever a
technician requires repairs parts, he submits requisitions to a
source of supply outside his unit. The using unit is not allowed
to hold any A-stocks of critical repair parts because of
superfluous regulations. Like evacuating equipment to the rear,
units requiring critical repairs parts have to push rearward,
instead of forward for support. This negates the forward push
concept of logistics which is required to support maneuver warfare.
The above mentioned constraints are of a physical nature:
bound by the equipment and materials of war. There is another
constraint that does more to inhibit present day logistics/CSS
operations that the aforementioned physical constraints -- that of
mental constraints, attitude, the psychological umbilical cord to
consumptions rates.
Although logisticians are probably the most realistic planners
in the MAGTF, they are at times slaves to the consumptions rates
and tables. Day of supply (DOS), for instance, is a planning
factor that contains a quantity of supplies including ammunition.
Accordingly, most of their plans focus upon providing DOSs to units
who expend their allotted supplies on a schedule. And if war was
perfect, this system would be an efficient one.
However, war is chaotic and inefficient, and maneuver elements
may need more than the prescribed DOS to execute their mission.
Therefore, rather than stopping the war with the phrase, I can't
27 Capt Peter R. Violette, "Critical Repair Parts for Maneuver
Warfare", Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (February 1990), 26.
support them, logisticians are going to have to change their way
of thinking.
Logisticians, first of all, must look beyond the horizon of
consumption rates and tables by placing these rates in proper
perspective. For instance, the DOS concept is critical at the
operational level of war where the supply pipeline from strategic,
and/or inter-theater sources are required for intra-theater
support. It is inflexible at the tactical level of war because
maneuver elements may require more than the prescribed DOS.
Logisticians must also understand the difference between the
focus of effort and priority of effort at the tactical level when
providing CSS to the MAGTF.
The focus of effort infers that the main effort will be the unit
the MAGTF commander designates. Accordingly, they become the
priority of effort for logistics support operations. The main
effort may change as the battlefield takes shape according to the
will of MAGTF commander. So will the priority of support. If this
means taking supplies from another unit then so be it. The MAGTF
commander makes this decision when he re-designates the main
effort. Therefore, the logistician provides the required support,
and if necessary re-evaluates the re-order point (ROP) for
sustainment at the operational level.
Thus far the discussion has centered around the historical
constraints of logistics, some self imposed constraints, the
problems of sustainment, and their affects on combat operations.
The question that comes to mind in the manner in which the MAGTF
must approach these logistical constraints in the prosection of
maneuver warfare. And rather than eliminating all the
aforementioned constraints -- an impossible task -- the goal of
this explanation is to re-emphasize the measures that will minimize
the logistics' wars in maneuver warfare, and provide some new
twists to ideas that may eliminate those self-imposed constraints.
Of the seven principles of CSS, two of them -- flexibility,
and responsiveness -- are directly pertinent to a maneuver style
of warfare. Although all logistics efforts must focus around the
seven principles, these two will be foremost in all CSS operations.
Although these two principles are ideals used to guide planning,
they do suggest eliminating self imposed constraints by
decentralizing control at the lowest level possible. They also
infer developing the concept of battlefield maintenance, and
mission-oriented replenishment.
FMFM 4, states that "centralized control and decentralized
execution are ideals sought in CSS operations". It also goes on
to say, that "CSS operations are as dynamic as the tactical
operations which they support, and equally susceptible to changing
conditions and situations".28 To maintain this type of
flexibility, control must be decentralized whenever and where ever
possible. Of the six functional areas of CSS, maintenance, and
supply provide this opportunity.
An example of this is the three categories of maintenance
28 MCCDC, USMC, Combat Service Support, FMFM 4 (Quantico 1987)
pp. 7-2 - 7-3
previously discussed. As defined, these categories place a control
on maintenance tasks that some believe should be managed at the
highest level possible. This negates the principle of
responsiveness. For units who need repairs beyond their
capabilities as defined by superfluous procedures have to encounter
a bureaucracy in order to get their equipment repaired.
Battlefield maintenance would eliminate this burden for it implies
repairing equipment as expeditiously as possible at the lowest
level of maintenance production -- organizational level.
Battlefield maintenance is a concept that will eliminate all
the garrison constraints the Marine Corps places on this particular
CSS function. For instance, it would eliminate the need to
evacuate equipment to the rear for repairs, for the organizational
unit will effect its own repairs. the concept of battlefield
maintenance suggests eliminating the function of third echelon
maintenance at direct support. And using those available
technicians in either a supervisory capacity at the organizational
level, or assigning them to fourth echelon maintenance to assist
in the repairs of components. (Because of the intricacies of
repairs, component rebuild would have to take place in the Force
Combat Service Support Area (FCSSA).) It also suggests developing
sound field expedient practices, practices not found in manuals,
but proven practices from common sense and experience. The net
result will be expeditious repairs.
The Marine Corps already allows for decentralized maintenance
on a temporary basis. MCO P4790.2B states that "force commanders
are authorized to approve temporary (6 months or less) increases
in the authorized echelon of maintenance".
To implement the decentralized maintenance at the
organizational level during a crisis may not be prudent, however.
For a tremendous amount of logistics is required to initiate a
program such as this. For example, repairs manuals not yet
authorized by the table of allowance for publications (TAP) are
required; special tools not yet authorized by the table of
equipment (T/E) are needed; and additional training not allowed
because of the limited amount of available time is needed as well.
And if the MAGTF is preparing to deploy for combat, the required
logistic support will not be available. So rather than wait,
let's execute and practice what we need to know before the war
starts.
Recklessness is not being advocated. However, caution like
in other military operations can act like a mental constraint that
ties logisticians to consumption rates and tables -- a formula for
inflexibility.
Battlefield maintenance must also expand to include supply
operations in the area of repair parts. This simply means
expanding the present system beyond its limitations, specifically
pre-expended bins (PEBs).
The criteria for the PEB is low cost, fast moving items for
organizational, and other levels of maintenance. However, repairs
parts such as reflectors, firing pins , nuts, bolts, and screws,
are the items found in a typical PEB. They do not, however,
sustain the maintenance effort. So rather than requisitioning
repair parts to sustain maintenance operations, why not build unit
parts' blocks that would eliminate the time consuming process of
requesting repair parts, and allow the unit to maintain their
production level ? These unit part blocks, or unit packs would
include secondary repairables, and repair parts that
organizational, and direct support maintenance list as high usage
items. Accordingly, organizational units would manage this block,
and submit requirements for its replenishment to the SASSY
Management Unit as required.
The next area in need of adjustment is that of sustainment.
When a combat service support detachment (CSSD) is built, its task
organization, and table of equipment focus on the mission, but
incorporates the six functions of CSS. The idea behind this
premise is to provide flexible support to the maneuver element, and
anticipate all their needs. Accordingly, the logistics
requirements internal to the CSSD in support of this concept
burdens itself with unnecessary equipment and tasks. Besides a
CSSD can't anticipate all the requirements a maneuver element may
develop in the course of combat -- war isn't perfect; besides the
footprint required to support such a notion would be huge.
Rather than trying to provide support to a unit in all the
functional areas of CSS, whether or not that support is required,
the combat service support element (CSSE) must develop the concept
of mission-oriented replenishment -- the art of sustainment.
In developing this concept, the CSSE would task organize
themselves on two basic functional areas: rearming, and refueling.
In addition to the stated tasks, the above mentioned function
simply replenishing other classes of supply that are pertinent for
survival: food, water, some repairs parts etc. It does not
include maintenance because that will be decentralized to the
lowest level possible. The other functions of CSS will not be
included for they are not pertinent to replenishment. Besides they
to create a large footprint.
The mission-oriented replenishment concept would allow the
CSSD to maneuver with the supported unit and create windows of
logistic opportunities of support. Rather than being predictable,
and waiting for the unit to assume a defensive posture before
displacing to a position to provide support. It would also lessen
the transportation requirement for the CSSD would not be hauling
all that engineer equipment.
The other functions of CSS will not be eliminated from
logistics operations. Those functions, instead, will be conducted
in general support of the supported unit, and in direct support of
the supporting CSSD. This will allow the MAGTF commander to shift
the focus of effort to logistics whenever necessary for shaping
the battlefield. This also suggests that the CSSDs in support of
the maneuver elements will be as streamlined as possible, which
will enable them to provide flexible and responsive support.
The above concepts are nothing new. However they will fall
under the guise of a logistics manoeuver. And like maneuver
warfare, logistics manoeuver changes its approach from the
formulated technique of providing CSS, to streamline support. It
suggests that the historical and traditional approaches to CSS be
abandoned for concepts that incorporate the needs of the supported
unit with the principles of flexibility and responsiveness.
"A German general is once said to have remarked that
blitzkrieg is paradise for the tactician but hell for the
quartermaster".29 And perhaps in the days of Guderian it was.
However, if the logistics manoeuver concept -- creating windows of
opportunity for CSS support -- is pushed forward, maneuver elements
will not become casualties of poor logistics like the Germans did
in World War II.
29 Roland G. Ruppenthal, United States Army in World War II,
Logistics Support of the Armies, (Washington D. C: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1970) p.489
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Addington, Larry H. The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General
Staff. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971.
Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth
Century. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
Bailey, Robert L., LtCol, USMC. and Stein, Leslie, Maj, USMC.
"Transporting the Marine Corps Into the Future". Marine Corps
Gazette. 73 (October 1989)
Eccles, Henry E. Logistics in the National Defense. Pennsylvania:
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German Tank Maintenance in World War II. Washington D. C: Center
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Hart. Tr. Paul Findlay. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
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