Combat Engineers: Are They A Viable Asset In Today's Environment
AUTHOR Major Frank A. Panter Jr, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: COMBAT ENGINEERS: ARE THEY A VIABLE ASSET IN TODAY'S
ENVIRONMENT?
I. Purpose: To examine the role of the combat engineer as a
key contributor for enhancing mobility, countermobility and
survivability in Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
operations.
II. Problem: Today's environment of quickly changing
threats, force reductions and decreased military budgets makes
combat effectiveness even more difficult to achieve for the
MAGTF. The challenge for the Marine Corps today is to meet
threats across the entire spectrum of conflict with current or
decreased assets. Maximizing the combat effectiveness of our
Combined-Arms Teams in today's changing environment in areas
related to mobility, countermobility and survivability must be
re-examined. The role of the combat engineer as a key
contributor for enhancing these capabilities must be
revisited. To be a viable MAGTF asset, the GCE commander must
know what combat engineer capabililties should be considered
in his planning process.
III. Data: Historically, the combat engineer role on the
battlefield--to improve ground force mobility and to impede
enemy movement--has not changed. The combat engineer, or
"sapper," must still enhance friendly force capability to put
armor and infantry on the objective and deny enemy forces from
it. The organic engineer support resident in the Marine
Division, the Combat Engineer Battalion, should be a major
concern to the GCE commander for enhancement of mobility,
countermobility and survivability on the battlefield. In the
discussion of offensive, defensive and special environmental
operations, tasks are identified that the combat engineers
should perform which will increase the GCE's effectiveness.
There is ample historical evidence of combat engineers being
key contributors to combined-arms teams. The value of having
combat engineers was recently endorsed by the Commandant when
he expressed his desire to bring back the fourth combat
engineer company out of cadre status.
IV. Conclusions: The fundamental combat engineer role has
not changed. What has changed is the magnitude and speed with
which engineering missions must be accomplished in order to
keep pace with the tactical employment of modern weapons
systems. Equipment such as the armored excavator is needed to
allow the combat engineer to contribute his full potential to
the MAGTF mission. May it be low, medium or high intensity
warfare, the employment of combat engineers can enhance
mobility, countermobility and survivability on the
battlefield.
COMBAT ENGINEERS: ARE THEY A VIABLE
ASSET IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT?
OUTLINE
Thesis: The role of the combat engineer as a key contributor
for enhancing mobility, countermobility and
survivability in MAGTF operations must be revisited,
for properly employing the combat engineer as a
combat multiplier enables the commander to master
time and terrain.
I. Combat Engineers
A. Present-day Role
B. Historical Role
II. Offensive Operations
A. Engineer Reconnaissance
B. Placement in Battle Formations
C. Soviet WWII Examples
D. Maintaining MSRs
E. Offensive Countermobility Operations
F. Engineers Used as Deception
III. Defensive Operations
A. Iwo Jima Fortifications
B. Obstacle Planning Considerations
C. Rommel's Use of Obstacles
D. Natural Obstacles
IV. Special Environment Operations
A. Deserts
B. Mountain Warfare
1. Korean War
C. Jungles
D. Cold Weather
E. Urban Warfare
V. Future of Combat Engineers
A. Spectrum of War
B. Viable Asset
COMBAT ENGINEERS: ARE THEY
A VIABLE ASSET IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT?
Warfighting is not only shooting. It is a multitude of
actions, like delivering a message through an area infested by
enemy forces, bringing ammunition forward along a road under
enemy artillery fire, manning a roadblock, serving hot chow,
taking care of the wounded or breaching a minefield.1 When
such functions are performed properly, combat effectivness is
enhanced and the combat commander is better able to impose his
will on the enemy.
The Marine Corps' ability to rapidly project a self-
sustaining, task organized force capable of conducting a wide
range of warfighting functions has long made it the nation's
force in readiness. But today's environment of quickly
changing threats, force reductions and decreased military
budgets makes combat effectiveness even more difficult to
achieve for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The
challenge for the Marine Corps today is to meet threats across
the entire spectrum of conflict with current or decreased
assets. Maximizing the combat effectiveness of our
Combined-Arms Teams in today's changing environment in areas
related to mobility, countermobility and survivability must be
re-examined. The role of the combat engineer as a key
contributor for enhancing these capabilities must be
revisited, for properly employing the combat engineer as a
combat multiplier enables the commander to master time and
terrain.
As the Marine Corps grew during World War II in size and
complexibility, the engineer's job expanded more and more into
a combat role, primarily in the area of assault breaching.
The combat engineer added those tasks associated with direct
participation in the assault, even though his equipment and
organization still retained a strong service support
orientation. Established in 1942, the "engineer service"
expanded over 6000 percent during World War II, more than any
other field in the Marine Corps.2 As the century
progressed, the Marine Corps adapted its organization,
tactics, weapons and concept of employment to include engineer
capabilities for the purpose of meeting current and future
threats. The engineer role evolved to four major areas of
concern: mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and
general engineer support.
While the focus of this discussion will examine the
potential of the Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) located in
the Marine Division, other MAGTF engineers contribute
significant capability to the MAGTF. The Engineer Support
Battalion (ESB) of the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) and
the Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) of the Marine Aircraft
Wing bring the bulk of general engineering support and
engineer reinforcing capability to the MAGTF arena. However,
the organic engineer support resident in the Marine Division,
or Combat Engineer Battalion, should be a major concern to the
Ground Combat Element (GCE) for enhancement of mobility,
countermobility and survivability.
During the 17th century, seize engineers dug extended,
narrow trenches, or saps, to approach an enemy's defensive
position. The digging of these saps coined the word "sappers"
which is known throughout the world's armies today as meaning
combat engineers. The knowledge and skills of the sapper are
nothing new. Sappers have a long tradition dating back to our
own Revolutionary War. General George Washington recognized
the value of sappers for enhancing mobility in the assault as
indicated in his General Orders of 3 August 1779:
"On a march, in the vicinity of an enemy, a
detachment of sappers and miners shall be at the
head of the column, directly after the Van Guard
for the purpose of opening and mending the roads
and removing obstruction."3
The fundamental role of the combat engineer on the
battlefield--to improve the Ground Combat Element's (GCE)
mobility and to restrict the enemy's movement--has not changed.
The "sapper" must still enhance friendly force capability to put
tanks and infantry on the objective and deny enemy forces from
it. But how can the GCE commander put the combat engineers to
optimum use during battle and what engineer capabilities should
he consider in his planning process?
Offense
In offensive operations, it is vital for the commander to
know the terrain over which he will fight. It is the engineer's
responsibility to provide him with an analysis of the terrain
which not only focuses on trafficability, but also identifies
likely enemy obstacle locations. A thorough engineer
battlefield assessment is essential in identifying where the
enemy force is most vulnerable. Accurately predicting the
enemy's obstacle emplacements facilitates attacks through gaps
and against flanks, thus avoiding his strength. To gain this
information requires reconnaissance from all elements on the
battlefield, managed by the intelligence officer. Engineers
should identify specific reconnaissance requirements and
should be allowed to augment dismounted patrols and scouts to
identify obstacle characteristics.
The commander should concentrate his engineer force at
the front of the movement to contact. Engineers with the
covering force allow it to move through undefended obstacles
and restrictions, while engineers with the advance guard allow
it to fight through defended obstacles without reinforce-
ments. Sufficient combat engineers must be available to the
leading maneuver units to clear the way by spanning gaps and
breaching or bypassing obstacles and fortified positions.
When the attack has started, the maneuver element must
maintain speed, surprise, vigilence and momentum to drive
through the enemy defenses. Combat engineers, fighting as
part of a combined arms team, should be positioned well
forward in the attacking task force to enhance the maneuver's
elements mobility.4
An example of this concept of employing combat engineers
in the attack can be seen in mid-April 1945. Three Soviet
"fronts" (army groups) began a strategic offensive operation
to encircle and destroy defending German forces and seize
Berlin. These Soviets were the veterans of nearly four years
of war conducted on a scale and intensity that was unprece-
dented. Among the hard lessons learned by the Soviets was the
critical role played by engineer troops in large, combined
arms operations.
When the Berlin operation began on April 16, "front"
engineers and supporting elements created 340 passages and
removed over 70,000 mines. These assault groups, which
typically included infantry, armor, and flame thrower units,
supported the advance of "frontal" forces deep into enemy
defenses and into the German capital.
The Berlin Operation reflected the massive use of
engineer troops that characterized Soviet combined arms
operations by the end of the war. Some 84 engineer companies
of the "front" constituted assault detachments and groups
tasked to establish paths through minefields and obstacles for
advancing infantry, armor and artillery units. As Soviet
sources report, a concentration of 17 to 22 engineer companies
per km of break-through frontage was typical by the war's
end. After the war, there was an extensive Soviet study of
engineer lessons learned from major World War II operations
and the importance of large-scale engineer support in future
nuclear or conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact conflicts was
confirmed.5
Throughout an offensive operation, logistic support must
be sustained. Combat engineers must open and maintain the
trails and roadways needed to keep this support in pace with
the movements of the maneuver force. When the 1st Cavalry
Division was ordered to relieve the 26th Marines at Khe
Sanh in the early part of 1968, the 11th Engineer Battalion
proved to be a valuable asset. The opening of Highway 9 into
the Khe Sanh Combat Base was completed on April 9 after the
Marine engineers worked day and night to complete their task.
In eleven days, they had reconstructed more than fourteen
kilometers of road, repaired and replaced nine bridges and
built seventeen bypasses to allow for the movement's much
needed logistical support.6
While mobility of the force in offensive operations has
first priority, countermobility operations are vital to help
isolate the battlefield and protect the attacking force from
enemy counterattacks. Obstacles provide flank protection and
deny the enemy from counterattack routes. Engineer
countermobility plans in the offense, however, must stress
rapid emplacement and flexibility. Engineer support must keep
pace and be prepared to emplace obstacles alongside the
advancing forces. Time and resources do not permit engineers
to develop the terrain's full defensive potential.
When maneuver units halt during offensive operations,
engineers must rapidly construct as many fighting positions as
possible. They should improve existing terrain by cutting
reverse slope firing shelves or slots when possible. Armored
excavators would be ideal to use to construct these posi-
tions. The speed to accomplish obstacle reduction missions
and the construction of fighting positions can be increased
while providing the engineer a degree of protection when
employing an armored excavator. It remains to be seen if the
much needed armored excavator the Marine Corps has in the FY
92 budget survives pending cuts.
Although deception is a unit and not an engineer
responsibility, the engineers can be used to construct phony
fighting positions, minefields and bridges. Engineers are a
scarce resource on the battlefield, and observations of both
obvious engineer equipment and working parties transmit a
message to the enemy that a potential offensive is forth-
coming. As exhibited in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli War, the
Egyptians used engineers to install nine fake bridges in
support of their Suez Canal crossing. It could be speculated
that if General Burnside had attempted such a deception on
crossing the Rappahannock during the Battle of Fredericksburg,
he could have avoided some of his casualties and gained a
degree of surprise.
Defense
When transitioning from the offense to the defense,
priority of engineer support shifts from mobility and
countermobility to survivability and countermobility.
Survivability is another role of combat engineers that
demonstrates their force multiplier capabilities--in building
protective shelters, in improving comouflage and in construct-
ing fighting positions. The lethality and destructivensss
that will be found on the modern battlefield gives emphasis to
the need for survivability measures.
When bunkers, pillboxes and other protective shelters are
built, our infantry, command and control centers, and our
weapons and targeting systems are less vulnerable. The
availability of hardened defensive positions has been calcu-
lated to increase survivability of the defender by 54 to 77
percent in personnal casualties and 34 to 118 percent in tank
losses. The effectiveness of direct-fire weapons may rise by
five to ten times when barriers and fortifications are
used.7
The Marines that landed on Iwo Jima in 1945 had a full
appreciation of the protection that hardened defensive
positions offered. During the first eleven days of January,
Army bombers hammered Iwo Jima in daylight with 15,000 tons of
explosives. The battleship Indiana fired 1,300 sixteen-inch
shells into the island in day long salvos. The same day, four
cruisers slammed another 1,300 eight-inch rounds on the
target, sweeping the beaches and Chidori Airfield from end to
end. Air photos showed nearly five thousand craters on one
square mile of rubbled terrain, and other attacks came daily
from the sea or air until Marines hit the beaches on H-Hour on
Feburary 19.8
But what was the ultimate result against the Japanese
defensive positions? General Smith said the air strikes and
Navy shelling were virtually meaningless and minced no words
in his critique:
"All this added up to a terrific total of
destructive effort which the uninitiated
might expect to blast any island off the
military map, level every defense, no
matter how strong, and wipe out the garrison,
but nothing of this kind happended. Like
the worm which becomes stronger the more you
cut it up, Iwo Jima thrived on our bombardment.
The airfields were kept inactive by our
attacks and some installations were destroyed,
but the main body of defenses not only
remained physically intact but they
strengthened markedly.
Still another historical example of how hardened
defensive positions can increase survivability was shown
during World War I at the Battle of the Somme. Allied guns
fired 1,508,657 shells in a pre-attack barrage that lasted
five days and nights. The purpose of the barrage was to cut
the German's barbed wire, smash their trenches and penetrate
their dugouts.
In fact, though, very little of the enemy's wire had been
cut. As for vast German casualties, the majority of the
defenders were unharmed, huddling safely 40 feet below ground
in deep, bomb-proof bunkers to wait out the shellfire.
Underground there were comfortable barracks, even dining rooms
with panelled walls, plus electric lights, hospital wards,
rails for ammunition trucks, and artillery observation
posts.10
To construct these many complex Japanese and German
defensive positions took a great deal of time, material and
manpower. For proper preparations of defensive positions,
engineers should be located with the maneuver force to begin
the work as soon as possible and develop plans for the
follow-on engineers. Engineer digging equipment should be
quickly brought forward to assist the effort. The defense
requires extensive amounts of Class IV, construction material,
and Class V, demolition material, which must be ready to move
forward in the logistical train. The GCE commander should
expect his engineer to provide construction estimates for his
defensive positions to include time, equipment, material and
manpower required.
In the defense, the primary intent of countermobility
operations is to attack the enemy's ability to execute his
plan. This is done by disrupting his combat formations,
interfering with his command and control, and confusing his
commanders to create a vulnerability that friendly forces can
exploit. The secondary intent is to destroy or disable his
vehicles. These missions are accomplished with an integrated
system of tactical obstacles and fires.
It is the engineer's task to assist the commander in
identifying and determining the effectiveness of existing
natural and cultural obstacles and where necessary, reinforce
those areas that lack sufficient barriers in defensive
preparations. When conducting obstacle planning during
current and future planning, consideration must be given to
the effects barrier emplacement will have on the commander's
scheme of maneuver. The engineer can assist the commander in
obstacle planning by providing advice and recommendations that
support the scheme of maneuver in many ways. Some of the
items that should be considered are as follows:
(a) Consideration must be given as to the ease of
breaching or bypassing an obstacle in the event of a
counterattack by friendly forces. How quickly a bypass route
can be improved or how quickly emplaced obstacles can be
breached can be identified by the engineer.
(b) Obstacles should not impede friendly supply
lines in the battle area. Provisions must be made to allow
lanes and/or gaps in obstacle plans to provide resupply. The
engineer can provide advice on placement of lanes and
alternative gaps and/or route improvement for supply lines.
(c) Enemy breaching capabilities are of prime
interest to the engineer. Attention must be given to force
the enemy to commit his limited breaching resources so that
they can be exposed to friendly fires. If the engineer is
involved early in obstacle planning, he can make
recommendations as to the extent of effort that should be
expended to expose this enemy vulnerability.
(d) Cross-country movement is a major concern of the
commander even in the defense. Consideration must be given to
soil trafficability, rock outcrops, permanent snow fields,
river fording sites, landing zone sites, and many other
potential maneuver restrictions. The engineer can make
recommendations on the ability to improve or reinforce the
terrain for friendly force movement.
(e) The engineer can also give the commander advice
on the required materials time needed and amount of equipment
necessary to complete an effective obstacle plan.11
An example of how obstacles can be used to shape the
battlefield was exhibited by Rommel during the Battle of El
Alamein in World War II. The Germans were attempting to
prevent the British from breaking through a 38-mile front
between the sea and the Qattara Depression. The Panzerarmee
Afrika had to create a fortress position that would prevent
passage. But how was Rommel going to create a fortress
position on a flat stretch of desert without the high ground
that many military defenses require? Rommel's answer was the
extensive use of minefields that were deeper, more intense and
more ingeniously deceptive than have been used before in the
war. Interesting enough, it was the strength of the British
minefields that vitally hindered Rommel's own recent offensive
at Alam el Halfa previously.12 Thousands upon thousands of
mines were laid in the North African campaign by engineers on
both sides. Cynics say that the presence of uncleared mines
over the years altered certain social observances among the
desert Arabs. Before the war, the husband rode or walked
ahead of his wife, she following like a servant in his
footsteps. The great expanses of mined areas and the
possiblity of being blown up altered the family formation.
Now the wife walks in front, serving as a human mine
detector.13
Mines, of course, are not the only defensive obstacle the
GCE commander can employ. The combat engineer can assist the
commander in planning, constructing and emplacing at key
locations log, steel, wire and concrete obstacles as well as
anti-tank ditches. Also, natural obstacles reinforced with
explosives and booby-traps can give the GCE commander valuable
time against an advancing enemy. During the invasion of
Normandy, the Germans used the hedgerows in the Caen region as
very effective reinforced natural obstacles.
Special Environment Operations
Unfamiliar environmental conditions may require unique
engineer support. Although combat engineer units should be
capable of operating in a variety of conditions, environmental
extremes usually require specialized techniques, procedures
and equipment. Engineers must fully understand and use the
advantages and disadvantges of five special environments:
deserts, mountains, jungles, winter and urban areas.
The vastness of the desert makes mobility a prime
concern. Roads are usually scarce and primitive. If the GCE
commander expands his engineer reconnaissance, he can better
identify routes, existing obstacles and minefield
locations.
Engineers can also assist maneuver by improving the existing
routes and bridging dry gaps. Of special concern is mud during
rainy seasons. Simple gulley crossings and cross country
movement may require bridging and route improvement efforts.
Due to the speed with which mounted operations progress in
desert terrain, the use of minefields is the primary means for
creating obstacles. Other countermobility methods are generally
not effective. Road craters, for example, usually are easy to
bypass. Opportunities for bridge destruction are rare. Local
materials for expedient obstacles are also scarce.
The desert provides little cover and concealment from
ground-based observers and even less from aircraft. Hull and
turret defilade positions for tactical vehicles are essential.
Earth moving equipment would be used extensively for preparation
of position defenses.
Mountain operations require a large number of combat
engineers since considerable emphasis centers on routes of
communication. Roads and trails in the mountains require an
extensive amount of effort in construction, improvement and
maintenance. Employment of demolitions and use of mines are
particularly effective against the enemy's ability to move.
Bridging operations, destruction and construction, become
extremely important. In general, placement of engineers within
movement columns is critical because they will be able to breach
obstacles.
During the mountain fighting in the Korea War, combat
engineers provided invaluable mobility support as indicated by a
1st Marine Division veteran,
". . . he hadn't gone far when he heard from
behind, `Stop! Stop! The road may be mined!'
He held up an arm and led the column off the road
and waited for the engineers to move up. They
were there in a couple of minutes, found no mines,
and the Marines again headed west. There was
always a platoon of engineers near the front of
the column, near the action. Often they did as
much fighting as a rifle platoon. The only
difference between the two was that the engineers
figured they were learning a trade."14
In the jungle, good roads are rare and are usually
narrow, winding and incapable of supporting sustained military
traffic. Road construction and maintenance are the greatest
concerns of engineers in jungle warfare. Road building can
have significant tactical, operational and political aspects
in the jungle. In a LIC environment, the establishment of a
secure, reliable road network promotes communication and
maneuver.
Engineers are expected to construct landing zones and
airstrips in remote areas of the jungle in support of tactical
operations. Much of the same equipment and techniques in
constructing and draining roadways are applicable in
constructing jungle landing zones and airstrips.
Antipersonnel mines and booby traps are used extensively
because of the heavy use of dismounted infantry. The combat
engineer can train the infantry in countermine techniques as
well as assist in breaching and emplacing them.
In cold weather operations, the engineer is faced with a
new set of problems. During heavy snowfalls, engineers' snow
removal capability will be necessry to clear MSRs, landing
zones and airstrips. In remote northern regions, satisfactory
pioneer roads may have to be constructed by grading and
compacting existing snow.
Countermine operations are different in winter
environments. Mines are not as effective because of frozen
fuses; however, mine detectors are also less effective. Hand
emplaced mines are difficult to bury, but they may be
concealed in snow. Mines placed onto hard packed snow or ice
routes poses the greatest threat.
Enemy mobility depends largely on weather conditions. If
a thaw occurs, many areas which were previously solid ground
will be untrafficable and will require maintenance.
Additionally, combat engineers can be used effectively to
close ice routes over waterways by demolitions.
Unlike deserts, mountains and jungles, the urban
environment is an ever-changing mix of natural and man-made
obstacles. Attacks are easily canalized and surprised. The
conditions favor the defender, for as Sun Tzu stated, "The
worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when
there is no alternative."15
As the Soviets learned in World War II, engineer
capabilities are extensively used in the urban environment.
Engineer missions include clearing mines, clearning rubble,
crossing gaps and breaching other types of obstacles. Earth
moving blades and buckets to push debris, winches and booms to
move obstacles, and demoltion teams are invaluable in the
attack of prepared urban areas.
During the urban defense, engineers are employed for
emplacing point minefields and road craters, destroying
bridges and overpasses, and constructing expedient obstacles
using abandoned vehicles and rubble. Engineers can also
provide technical advice on the employment of protective
obstacles in and around structures. As evidenced in Beirut in
1975 after the bombing of the Marine barracks, simple well
placed barriers can provide a substantial degree of
protection.l6
When combat engineer functions are performed properly in
offensive, defensive and special environment operations,
combat effectiveness is enhanced. There is ample historical
evidence of combat engineers being contributors to combined-
arms teams. By all means, I have not discussed all the
capabililties of the combat engineers. The fundamental combat
engineers' role, however, has not changed. What has changed
in the magnitude and speed with which engineering missions
must be accomplished to keep pace with the tactical employment
of modern weapons systems. Equipment such as the armored
excavator is needed to allow the engineer to contribute his
full potential to the MAGTF mission. May it be low, medium or
high intensity warfare, the employment of combat engineers can
enhance mobility, countermobility and survivability. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps recently expressed in the 1990
posture statement his desire to activate, out of cadre status,
the fourth combat engineer company in all the battalions. By
this endorsement, the fundamental role of combat engineers as
a force multiplier is reinforced. Combat engineers can
contribute many places on the battlefield, while concentrating
at the point where success in the central battle is most
important.
ENDNOTES
1 Janice Holt Giles, The Damned Engineers (Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston, MA, 1970), p. xiii.
2 U. S. Marine Corps, MAGTF Engineer Operations, OH-13
Draft, (Quantico, VA, 1989), p. 1-2.
3 U. S. Army, Department of the Army, Engineer Combat
Operations, FM 5-100, (Ft. Belvoir, VA, 1988), p. 11.
4 Claude L. Roberts and Kent D. Steele, "Combat
Engineers in Evolution," The Military Engineer, (Nov-Dec,
1979), p. 393.
5 Graham Turbiville, "Soviet Combat Engineers in
Afghanistan," The Military Engineer, (Sept-Oct, 1988), p. 561.
6 Lt. Gen John J. Tolson, "Pegasus," Army, (Dec, 1971).
7 John C. Tillson, "The Forward Defense of Europe,"
Military Review, (May, 1981), p. 69.
8 Bill D. Ross, Iwo Jima, Legacy of Valor, (Vanguard
Press, New York, 1985), p. 37.
9 Ross, p. 37.
10 Sidney Allinson, "War's Worst Day," Military Review,
(June, 1989), p. 29.
11 Lt. Charles L. Toomey, "Obstacle Planning," Armor,
(March-April, 1979), p. 44.
12 Fred Majdalany, The Battle of El Alamein, (J. B.
Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1965), p. 64.
13 James Lucas, War in the Desert, (Beaufort Books,
Inc., New York, 1982), p. 120.
14 Jim Wilson, Retreat Hell! (William Morrow and Co.,
Inc., New York, 1988), p. 91.
15 Samuel Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Oxford
University Press, New York, 1963), p. 78.
16 Robert J. Moskin, The U. S. Marine Corps Story,
(McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1987), p. 741.
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