Terrorism: Challenges For The Marine Corps
AUTHOR Major William M. Meade, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: TERRORISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE CORPS
THESIS: The Marine Corps has made progress combatting
terrorism, but the challenges of terrorism have caused
problems which still require a solution.
ISSUE: The advent of terrorism in the modern age has had a
profound and far-reaching impact on the Marine Corps. Our
national policy regarding terrorism is clear in its mandate
to take both proactive and reactive measures to ensure the
safety of Americans everywhere. The Marine Corps has
translated this mandate into changes in force structure,
organization, equipment, training, and doctrine. As a
result of the scope and pace of these changes, some
significant problems have arisen to complicate mission
accomplishment. Most significant of these problems is the
lack of standardized training for the special skills
required in counterterrorism operations. The nature of
these skills is such that their diversity, coupled with
their sustainment requirements, often results in the
degradation of the Marine's ability to perform his original
tasks. Cooperation between the services is hindered by the
duality and overlapping of missions. Finally, the issue of
where the Marine Corps should place its emphasis in
combatting terrorism remains in contention.
CONCLUSION: Terrorism is a plague which has no foreseeable
cure. Recent events strongly indicate that terrorism will
be present throughout the spectrum of conflict. Even though
the Marine Corps' capabilities to combat terrorism have
increased dramatically, the challenges for the future will
not diminish.
TERRORISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE CORPS
Outline
Thesis Statement: The Marine Corps has made progress in
combatting terrorism, but the challenges of terrorism have
caused problems which still require a solution.
I. Impact
A. Beirut Bombing
B. Other Acts Against Marines
II. Policy
A. National
B. Marine Corps
III. Progress
A. Structure
B. Equipment
C. Training
D. Directives
IV. Problems
A. Standardization
B. Skill Diversity
C. Service Rivalry
D. Focus
TERRORISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE CORPS
The sight of the smoking, collapsed building which had
housed the headquarters of the Marine Battalion in Beirut,
Lebanon was an unforgettable one. The TV screen in our
house was filled with the horrified and dazed faces of
wounded, young Marines. As I sat in stunned silence, I
could sense my own body beginning to go into a state of
shock.
This was my reaction, along with thousands of other
Marines, to the news of the terrorist bombing on that 23rd
day of October 1983. For me, it was a very personal and
compelling event. I was stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC, and
my Battalion was due to assume the mission of Airlift Alert
Battalion in the near future. As the days unfolded, the
details of the bombing became clearer, but they could shed
no light on the one question which haunted all of us who
were so close to the tragedy: Why did over 240 Marines and
sailors die while performing a mission described as
peacekeeping and non-combatant?
The answer is both simple and complex at the same time.
Terrorism defies the normal application of logic and reason.
It transcends the bounds of human decency and makes a
mockery of any semblance of morality. It respects no laws,
beliefs, or norms. It is ruthless, mindless violence
designed to shock and horrify both its victims and its
audience. It is effective. It is here to stay.
The Beirut bombing was a galvanizing event for all
Marines. The report from the Long Commission illustrated
the magnitude of the bombing by reminding the Corps that the
last time it suffered that many dead in one day was on D-Day
on Iwo Jima in World War II. (9:183). Beirut, however, is
only one in a growing list of Terrorist attacks involving
Marines. A list of terrorist attacks against Marines during
this past decade includes:
(1) A Marine embassy guard killed at his post in
Kabul, Afghanistan
(2) Marine embassy guards kidnapped and held
with other employees in Teheran, Iran
(3) Two Marines killed while on liberty in Tel
Aviv, Israel
(4) Several beatings and an assassination of a
Marine Corporal in the Philippines
(5) The killing of three Marines at an outdoor
cafe in El Salvador
(6) The kidnapping and video-taped hanging of
LtCol Higgins in Lebanon.
The above is not a list compiled from painstaking
research done in a forgotten corner of a library. All are
incidents which were described in varying degrees of detail
by newspapers and television and have become part of a
collective consciousness for individual Marines and the
Corps as an institution. Just what all of this means is to
be the thrust of this paper. The Marine Corps has made
progress in combatting terrorism, but the challenges of
terrorism have caused problems which still require a
solution.
Before we delve into Marine Corps policy regarding
terrorism, we will briefly discuss the subject of terrorism
from a national perspective. I hardly think it necessary to
build a case in this paper that terrorism is an issue of
national attention and concern.
The creation of scores of new agencies and departments
designed to combat terrorism is evidence of its impact. It
has affected all three branches of government, as well as
the military and civilian law enforcement agencies. The
media has also played prominently in this phenomenon. In
fact, the media is a key player in both promoting and
combatting terrorism. (11:233) To a large degree, terrorism
is so effective, because it is such a perfect paradox. The
more a country reacts to a terrorist event on a national or
international level, the more effective the terrorist act
becomes. However, in order to strike back at the terrorist
(outside the U.S. anyway), we must use national assets in
the international arena. This was summarized by Noel Koch,
Assistant Secretary of Defense, who was responsible for
counterterrorism under Caspar Weinberger. Koch said that
from a national perspective, much of the damage done by
terrorism is self-inflicted. Terrorism depends for its
power, on our reaction to it. (10:365)
To better understand our specific national policy
regarding terrorism, the following three principles are
listed. (5:B-3)
(1) All terrorist actions are criminal and
intolerable whatever their motivation, and
should be condemned.
(2) All lawful measures to prevent such acts
and to bring to justice those who commit them
will be taken.
(3) No concessions to terrorist blackmail will be
made, because to do so will merely invite
further demands.
At the national level, the Department of State is the lead
agency for response to terrorist incidents that take place
outside the United States. The Department of Justice is the
lead agency for domestic terrorism. (5:B-3) It is outside
the scope of this paper to discuss the issues of posse
comitatus and the specifics of jurisdiction. With that
caveat, all discussions of the use of military force in this
paper will assume that competent civilian/military authority
has authorized such action.
Having painted a very broad brush stroke at U.S. policy
regarding terrorism, we can turn to the discussion of Marine
Corps policy and the meat of this paper. Marine Corps Order
3302.1A specifically addresses the official policy. It
states that combatting terrorism encompasses those actions
taken to prevent or neutralize terrorist activity.
Antiterrorism measures are proactive and designed to reduce
vulnerability to terrorism. Counterterrorism actions are
those reactive measures taken in response to terrorist
threats of acts. Commanders must develop an operational
capability that provides a defense in depth against this
threat. (3:1)
It is clear that our current Commandant's intent is to
place the responsibility for combatting terrorism on his
commanders. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps, as an
institution, has made some significant strides over the past
decade in this endeavor. Some of these capabilities take
the form of enhanced equipment, specialized training,
organization changes, and doctrine development. We will
examine in greater detail, the more far-reaching and
permanent of these developments.
The change with the greatest impact on the Corps has
unquestionably been the development and designation of the
MAU (now MEU) SOC (Special Operations Capable) units. This
concept was formulated and implemented during the
Commandancy of General P.X. Kelley. In a 1985 Marine Corps
Gazette article, General Kelley described the MEU (SOC) as:
... not our intention to duplicate the
capabilities of any existing Special Operations
Force organizations, but, rather, to provide a
complementary capability based on the introduction
of forces from the sea--our specialty. (7:23)
In general, the MEU (SOC) has enhanced capabilities and
equipment for intelligence gathering and direct action
missions. The fourteenth and final direct action mission
listed is hostage rescue. (7:23) Unquestionably, it is this
mission which has caused the most controversy within and
outside the Marine Corps. We will address this specific
controversy later in the paper.
A second structural change resulting specifically from
a perceived need to counter the terrorist threat is the
formation of a Marine Corps Security Force Battalion on each
coast. These Battalions are tasked with providing the
specialized training required for Marines destined to Marine
Detachments aboard ships, as well as those Marines assigned
to guard vital Naval bases and installations in CONUS and
abroad. Additionally, these battalions are tasked with the
training and operational control of the Fleet Anti-terrorism
Support Team (FAST) Company. This is a 300 man unit which
is trained and equipped to rapidly deploy to any Naval Base,
ship, or installation at the direction of the fleet
commander. Their equipment and weapons are of the latest
design, and their training is both highly specialized and
rigorous. Included in their missions are hostage rescue and
recapture of our country's most sensitive materials and
facilities.
Another enhancement in our Corps' capabilities results
from upgraded equipment and better training. Although a
laundry list of special weapons and equipment could be
included as a table, the following more powerfully makes the
point. While commanding the Marine Security Force Company,
Diego Garcia, I was scheduled to have a command visit from
my Battalion Commander and his Operations Officer in August
1988. I received a call from the Operations Officer
cancelling the visit at the last minute. He explained that
he had just received authorization to spend an additional
$575,000.00 for the purchase of special weapons, equipment,
and sophisticated communications gear for FAST Company. He
also explained that authorization was granted to purchase
everything from the manufacturer directly, without going
through the normal supply procurement cycle.
Training has always been the benchmark of any
consistently superior military organization. Since
terrorism counteraction is a relatively new field, it is
understandable that there are not a lot of qualified
instructors or training programs available. SSgt. R.P.
Newman, survival-evasion-resistance-escape (SERE) instructor
at the U.S. Navy SERE school, puts it this way "A training
program is only as effective as its instructors." (12:21)
In this regard, the Marine Corps recognizes the need to send
Marines to established, accredited joint-service schools to
receive the best training possible. Additionally, a newly
released Marine Corps Order has specifically identified
particular billets with mandated schooling. (4:3,3) To
further support the training and education process, the
Marine Corps has begun utilizing the following schools
within the last 5 years:
(1) Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification, JFK
Special Warfare Center, FT. Bragg, NC
(2) Terrorism Counteraction on Military
Installations, U.S. Army Military Police
School, FT. McClellan, AL
(3) Defensive Driving, Summit Point, WV
(4) Terrorism in Low Intensity Conflict, JFK
Special Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, NC
(5) Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, JFK
Special Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, NC
(6) Terrorism Counteraction Instructor Training,
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft.
Leavenworth, KY
(7) Dynamics of International Terrorism, USAF,
Hurlburt Field, FL (3:2,1)
The last area that we will address in our discussion of
Marine Corps capabilities to combat terrorism is directives
and publications. In addition to the two recent Marine
Corps Orders which have already been identified, a draft
copy of a new order on the Code of Conduct has been
approved. Marine Corps Order 3460.1A addresses training and
education to support the Code of Conduct. What makes it
unique is its guidance for instruction to assist U.S.
military personnel in captivity or hostile detention during
peacetime. (6:2,2) In an interview with the Marine Corps
Combat Development Command officer responsible for terrorism
counteraction programs, I was told that both the Army and
the Air Force intend to use our order as a model for their
own.
In terms of publications, OH 7-14, Terrorism
Counteraction, is the Corps' most comprehensive publication
dedicated to countering the terrorist threat. It is a tool
designed for both the individual and the commander. FMFRP
7-14A, The Individual's Guide for Understanding and
Surviving Terrorism is a brand new reference publication
aimed at decreasing an individual's chance to become a
target, and increasing his chance for survival, if captured.
The last publication is the Marine Corps Institute (MCI)
self-paced course 02.10, Terrorism Counteraction for
Marines. This course is also designed to teach the
individual Marine how to avoid becoming a target.
Successful completion of an MCI course earns a Marine points
toward promotion.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the Marine Corps has
moved out smartly in the war against terrorism. It has
reorganized its structure, purchased upgraded equipment,
specialized its training, and disseminated a new policy.
Although these measures are on target and commendable,
significant problems still remain. As it is not the intent
of this paper to criticize or identify minor problems, the
following areas are considered to be the most critical.
The lack of standardized training, techniques, and
procedures among the various units which have specialized
missions is the one overarching problem. I found this to be
a recurring theme in both the literature and during
conversations I conducted with action officers at HQMC,
MCCDC, and Security Force Battalions. Because so much of
this is evolving in terms of both tactics and technology, it
is difficult to come up with quantifiable standards which
are recognized and accredited by the other services and
Departments of State and Justice.
This problem is greatly exacerbated by two factors.
First, because the requirements were developed by several
different type units (MEU (SOC) , Security Force Bns, SOTGs)
tactics began to take on peculiarities associated with the
different units. This is understandable, because only some
of the missions overlapped in these units and their T/Os and
T/Es were not similar. Secondly, the familiar East Coast
versus West Coast mentality surfaced between the MEUs and
the Security Force Battalions. HQMC had a difficult time
addressing this due to the political pressure to develop
units and capabilities to meet this insidious new threat of
terrorism. Consequently, what we have now is both like and
unlike units using different equipment and different
procedures to accomplish missions which require the highest
degrees of specialization and repetitive skills.
Where this problem is beginning to have the most
effect, is the loss of credibility among the other service
SOC forces and agencies like the FBI. For instance, Delta
Force and Seal Team 6 both have routinely conducted joint
exercises in the Mediterranean, but Seal Team 6 cancelled a
recent exercise due to training incompatibilities.
Another training related problem is the diversity of
specialized skills which Marines are required to know. An
example of this is the degradation of primary skills when
Marines must spend all their training time to meet the
required amount of sustainment training to stay certified in
a SOC skill. Force Reconnaissance Marines are particularly
susceptible to this. The Army studied this problem in 1986
during operation Brave Eagle. During this exercise, Special
Forces teams conducted 24 hour surveillance operations of
remote airfields in search of drug traffickers. State and
Federal law officials praised this action and requested it
be continued. The Army, however, found the overall training
benefits minimal, and the Special Forces unit's wartime
mission tasks declined. (8:56)
Inter-service rivalry is a fact, and it is not
surprising that it should be involved in an area with as
much funding and as much notoriety as Counterterrorism. The
problem, as explained to me by an action officer, relates to
designation of skills, funding, and control of forces. The
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is allocated the
majority of training slots and funding for SOC skills. If
Marines want to use those training slots and funds for SOC
skills, then the Marines will fall under the operational
control of JSOC vice the Commandant. However, for Marines
to participate in the joint SOC exercises, they must have
the requisite training. This is a particularly thorny
problem and it ties in with the standardization of skills
dilemma discussed earlier.
I see another problem becoming worse as the Marine
Corps focuses more on the counterterrorism aspect of SOC
forces. This very simply means that the antiterrorism
aspect of deterrence will receive a reduced emphasis.
Maneuver Warfare philosophy tells us that we should not
focus on two areas simultaneously. There is a finite amount
of assets that require one area to be our main effort, while
the other is an economy of force affair. A recent Marine
Corps Gazette article speaks eloquently on the subject.
Antiterrorism training has characteristics of defensiveness
and caution that make it unattractive. It involves tedious
attention to detail and nobody believes it could happen to
them. But in today's world, terrorism remains a constant
threat and training to overcome it is crucial to readiness.
(12:20)
As I reflected on the words of that article, I was once
again reminded of the Beirut bombing and my tour in Camp
Lejeune. This time, however, I thought about the phrase
that says nobody believes it could happen to them. Three
weeks after the bombing, we deployed to Central America for
an exercise. Prior to leaving Camp Lejeune, we all received
a two hour extensive briefing on the terrorist threat.
During our voyage down, we received an additional two
briefings on the terrorist threat, both general and specific
to our unit. As we prepared to go ashore, all the officers
and SNCOs were issued live ammunition for their sidearms in
case of a terrorist attack in Honduras, our destination.
There was no terrorist attack.
Eighteen months later, my Battalion deployed to Korea
for Team Spirit. The Stars and Stripes newspaper reported
growing student unrest over the exercise and North Korean
threats to retaliate against the U.S. "aggression". We
received no terrorist threat briefings prior to deploying or
during our eight week stay. One week before departing, our
Battalion hosted an officer's call in one of the local
Korean bars we had rented for the evening. We had
advertised the affair in the local camp paper. It was a
wonderful time and we eventually stuffed over fifty officers
into the tiny bar. There was no terrorist attack.
Personal anecdotes are not necessarily the best method to
use in a research paper, but I believe that this one
accurately illustrates the problems associated with
maintaining an effective antiterrorism program. When both
the individual Marine and the Corps itself believe that it
can't happen again--it will!
The final problem is one of philosophy, of attitude, of
perspective. We began this discussion of problems
combatting terrorism with the concrete, succinct example of
training. How have we managed to end with the ethereal
world of philosophy? We have because it is critical to an
understanding of the problem of terrorism as a whole. FMFRP
7-14A gives us a clue to the problem in a chapter
appropriately titled, Perspectives. It says that the phrase
"one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is
overused because it is true. (2:1-3) Contrast that to what
Senator Henry Jackson says on the subject:
The idea that one person's terrorist is another's
"freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned..."freedom
fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter
schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do...It is a
disgrace that democracies would allow the
treasured word of freedom to be associated with
acts of terrorists. (11:18-19)
This is not a question of semantics, but a question of
perspective. Along these same lines, here is another
description which aptly fits the terrorist. The law treats
terrorists as criminals and helps strip the veneer of
martyrdom and heroism from their crimes. (10:367)
The more we as Marines speak of waging war on the
terrorist with all means at our disposal, the more we risk
legitimizing his cause and politicizing his fight. We also
need to closely examine what our payoff may be in terms of
our risk. It could prove most beneficial to heed the words
of Marine Capt. T. F. Western "I am excited about our new
SOC capability...I have doubts because of a dangerous gap
between perceived and actual capabilities." (13:40) The
trend to seek out the terrorist and attack him has become
the current vogue in many of the more recent articles
written for the Gazette and other publications. The
following idea is taken from an article written by then
LtCol (now BGEN Select) Ray Zinni. Zinni talks about the
key to defeating terrorism is a sound command security
program coupled with well-trained, alert Marines. (14:65)
That we will be faced with dealing with terrorism
across the entire spectrum of conflict has already been
foreshadowed by recent events in Central America. The rebel
attack in San Salvador, El Salvador last year is renowned
for the unrelenting TV coverage afforded several Green
Berets who were barricaded in their hotel room and
surrounded by rebel forces. But even this media event was
dwarfed by television's frenetic coverage during the Panama
invasion. Who could forget the hand-wringing of several of
TVs' Morning show hosts who railed at the Army for not
stopping the operation to rescue hostage journalists? The
specter of terrorism becoming commonplace in military
operations across the spectrum of conflict is a reality.
The probability of terrorism does not go down, as some would
contend, as the level of conflict goes up. (1:85)
In this paper, we have described the effect of
terrorism on both individual Marines and on the Corps as a
whole. Although a relatively recent threat to our Corps,
the changes it has caused are enormous, when one considers
the magnitude of all missions the Marine Corps must stand
ready to perform. There have been changes in the
organization, training, equipment, and doctrine, solely to
better prepare the Corps for this unique challenge.
As a result of the pace required to implement these
changes, there are some significant problems which still
demand solutions. Some of the problems are easily
identified, but are complex in their resolution. These
problems tend to be made of issues of equipment, funds and
other material things. Other problems are of a more
nebulous form. They are generally a result of human nature,
and consist of those human attributes which are not so
easily quantifiable.
Regardless of the nature of these problems, they exist
today and pose a very real challenge for our Corps. The
reward for their solution will be a safer, richer quality of
life for individual Marines and their families, while the
Marine Corps will be a better prepared combat force. The
prospects for terrorism to scourge itself from our world are
bleak. The challenge of defeating terrorism is one that we
must heartily embrace as Marines.
Bibliography
1. Berrong, Larry B., Lieutenant Colonel and Gerard, Jr.,
Paul T. Lieutenant Colonel, "Combatting
the Terrorist Threat." Study Project, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1985.
2. HQMC, USMC, FMFRP 7-14A, 31 Oct 1989, (HQMC,
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Washington, DC).
4. HQMC, USMC, MC0 1500.49, POS, 5 Oct 1989, (HQMC,
Washington, DC).
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VA).
6. HQMC, USMC, Draft MCO 3460.1A TE 341, undtd, (HQMC,
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Marine Corps and Special Operations," Marine
Corps Gazette, (Oct 1985)
8. Kolton, Randy J., Major, U.S. Army, "Combatting
the Columbian Drug Cartel," Military Review, (Mar
1990)
9. Long Report, Department of Defense Commission on Beirut
Airport Terrorist Act, Oct 1983, (Washington, DC)
10. Martin, David C. and Walcot, John, Best Laid Plans,
Harper & Row, New York, 1988.
11. Netanyahu, Benjamin, Terrorism - How The West Can Win,
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1986.
12. Newman, Robert P., SSgt, U.S. Marine Corps, "Making
Marines Terror Resistant, Marine Corps Gazette,
(Jan 1990).
13. Western, T.F., Capt, U.S. Marine Corps,
"Countering Terrorism With the MAU," Marine Corps
Gazette, (Mar 1986).
14. Zinni, A.C., Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, "The Key
to Defeating Terrorism," Marine Corps Gazette,
(Apr 1985)
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