Assume The Best: The North Korean Campaign Of 1950
AUTHOR Major Richard P. Mills, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Leadership
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE : ASSUME THE BEST : THE NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF 1950
THESIS : The American High Command made several critical
assumptions prior to the fall/winter campaign of 1950 and
those assumptions were wrong : It was those faulty
assumptions that assured defeat.
BACKGROUND : On 25 June , 1950 North Korea invaded South
Korea. The North Koreans rapidly defeated the South's
forces. The United Nations approved military intervention
General Douglas MacArthur led a United States force to
Korea to restore the country . MacArthur conducted the
Inchon operation and turned the tide of the war . By
September 1950 , the UN/US war aims were complete . The US
then decided to invade North Korea to reunite the
peninsula.
DISCUSSION : In planning the campaign into North Korea ,
MacArthur made 4 critical assumptions . Those were : (1) The
Chinese would not enter the war, (2) The North's army was
destroyed, (3) American troop performance was improved , and
(4) Total victory was possible . Historical study proves
that none of those assumptions were correct . The planners
of the campaign should have based their assumptions on the
intelligence and operational information they had available.
The incorrect assumptions led to military disaster.
CONCLUSION : The assumptions covered factors that were
crucial to the campaign . By failing to recognize the true
risks of the invasion , the planners invited military
disaster . The campaign failed because commanders and staffs
failed to live up to their responsibilities.
ASSUME THE BEST:
THE NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF 1950
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT . The American High Command made several
critical assumptions prior to the fall/winter campaign of
1950 and those assumptions were wrong : It was those faulty
assumptions that assured defeat .
I. The Korean War
A. The first modern war
B. The North Korean Invasion of 25 June, 1950
1. Early success by the North
2. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA)
C. The United Nations' response
II. The Inchon / Seoul Campaign
A. Turns the tide of the war
B. Liberates South Korea
C. Leads to a decision to invade North Korea
III. The Campaign in North Korea
A. Planning was based on four faulty assumptions
B. Chinese issued warnings about their intentions
C. The Rebirth of the NKPA
D. US performance
E. Concept of total victory
IV. The Blame
A. Other factors were not critical
B. Commanders' and staffs' responsibilities
C. Consequences
ASSUME THE BEST:
THE NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF 1950
The Korean War stands as a milestone in American
military history . It divides the wars of the past from
modern wars . In retrospect , warfare prior to 1950 seems
almost simple and straight forward with a clear sense of
national purpose . Beginning with the Korean conflict
warfare has become a political event with cloudy goals and
muddy strategy .
Korea almost defines modern wars . There was never a
declaration of war by the United States government . It was
the first war fought under the deadly consideration of
atomic weapons . The war was fought over a Third World
country , for purely political reasons against a Soviet
equipped and trained enemy . There were many military
successes in the field , although the American troops had
quite ambivilant feelings about the war . Finally , the war
became unpopular at home , brought down a presidential
administration and has never really been resolved.
Unfortunately , America would see its like again .
The Korean War began on 25 June , 1950 when the North
Korean People's Army ( NKPA ) swept into South Korea across
the 38th Parallel . Their rapid and overwhelming success
startled the Western World . In a matter of days , the NKPA
had captured the South's capital of Seoul . Using seven
divisions in its first echelon and five more in its second
echelon , the NKPA swept south pushing the Republic of Korea
( ROK ) forces before it .( 8: 4 ) Without outside
intervention it seemed inevitable that the entire Korean
peninsula would be united under the communist leader , Kim
Il Sung .
Western military experts were stunned by the NKPA . It
was not what they had expected . The American intelligence
network knew very little about North Korea or its military .
There was no American intelligence network in North Korea
prior to the war . ( 5: 13 ) In fact , prior to 25 June ,
America had paid very little attention to North Korea at
all. If they had , it would have been frightening .
The NKPA was a well trained and modern force carefully
constructed along Soviet lines . For over two years
hundreds of Soviet advisers had molded the army . The
Russians had also generously supplied it with arms . Each
NKPA division , for example , was equipped with 12 122mm
howitzers , 24 76mm guns , and 12 45mm antitank guns . All
were recent World War II vintage . The Soviets also provided
the NKPA with tanks . Each infantry division had organic
tanks and there was also a separate tank division . The
105th Armored Division boasted 120 modern T-34 main battle
tanks .( 9: 17 ) The Chinese also lent a hand . They
released 16,000 Koreans from their army to join the NKPA .
The men had fought for the communists during the Chinese
Civil War . These battle hardened troops became the core of
the NKPA .
( 9: 18 )
The ROK forces were no match for the North Koreans .
The ROK army was intended to be only an internal security
force . It was trained and equipped by the United States for
that mission . They had neither the weaponry nor the
training to stand up to armored forces . Their retreat
quickly dissolved into a rout.
World reaction to the invasion was surprisingly swift .
On 27 June , the United Nations called on its members to
help South Korea " repel the attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area . " .( 2: 60 )
On the 7th of July , with the North Korean attack reaching
deep into South Korea , the United Nations approved a second
resolution authorizing the United States to form a combined
military force and appoint a Supreme Allied Commander to
fight in Korea . On 8 July , President Truman named General
of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Commander in Chief , United
Nations Forces ( CINCUN ) . ( 8: 1 )
Armed with the UN resolution , the United States
immediately rushed troops to the aide of South Korea . The
only troops available were those on occupation duty in
Japan. Pushed into a rapidly deteriorating situation ,
they proved to be ill trained and mentally and physically
unprepared for combat . They were no match for the North
Koreans . By the middle of July the United Nations forces
were pushed back to the southern end of the Korean
peninsula. As the troops huddled inside the Pusan
Perimeter, the war seemed lost.
In August , General MacArthur in a single stroke of
strategic brilliance , turned the war around . His World War
II experience had shown him the value of amphibious warfare
and the indirect approach . The Inchon amphibious landing
routed the North Koreans . This operation , hundreds of
miles to the rear of the North Koreans , cut their supply
lines and forced their withdrawal . By the end of September
the capital of Seoul was liberated and the border of South
Korea restored . MacArthur was hailed as a hero . President
Truman and his administration were applauded for their stand
against communist aggression . The conditions called for by
the original United Nations resolution were satisfied . The
war should have been over . Unfortunately , success produced
greater expectations .
The United Nations forces launched an invasion of
North Korea . The intent of the campaign was to destroy the
NKPA and unite the peninsula under the democratic auspices
of the South . It was one of the most disastrous and ill
conceived campaigns in American military history .
CINCUN's plan was simple . It envisioned a giant pincer
movement up both sides of North Korea . These pincers ,
Eight Army on the west and X Corps on the east , would meet
at the Yalu River . This double envelopment would trap the
remaining NKPA in the mountainous terrain in the center of
the country . ( 10: 9 ) To support the maneuver , a massive
air interdiction effort would be made to isolate North Korea
from her sources of supply across the Yalu in Russia and
China .
The plan ended in disaster . The attack was launched
in October against a disorganized and fleeing enemy . By
early December , the situation was entirely reversed . The
United Nations forces were in full retreat with four full
Chinese field armies in pursuit . Seoul fell once again .
There would be years of tough , bloody combat before the
Americans fought their way back to the 38th parallel .
All campaign plans are based upon assumptions . They
represent vital pieces of missing information , predictions
of future conditions or possible third party actions that
could have a crucial effect upon the plan . The high
command made several critical assumptions prior to
the fall/winter campaign of 1950 and those assumptions were
wrong : It was those faulty assumptions that assured defeat
in the cold , icy hills of North Korea . Those assumptions
were contrary to the indications contained in operational
and intelligence reports . Only General MacArthur really
accepted them , but his opinion was sufficient . His impact
was such that despite their misgivings , some of the best
minds in the American government and military approved in
his plan . By this point in the war , as General Matthew
Ridgeway pointed out :
Even his superiors ,it seemed ,began to doubt
if they should question any of MacArthur's
decisions and as a result he was deprived of
the advantage of forthright and informed
criticism , such as every commander should
have ... ( 1: 232 )
General MacArthur made four basic assumptions in the
fall of 1950 . They were : (1) The Chinese Communists would
not enter the war ; (2) The North Korean People's Army was
finished as a fighting force ; (3) The caliber of the
average United States fighting unit had dramatically
improved since the start of the war ; and (4) Only total
victory was an acceptable conclusion . Each was wrong .
MacArthur was America's expert on the oriental psyche.
He believed that , as did most people inside and outside the
United States government . This belief was based upon a
rather superficial look at his career . He had spent the
majority of his time in the Far East , but mainly in the
Phillipines . His victories over the Japanese during the
Second World War and his handling of them during the
occupation were magnificent . These accomplishments ,
however , did not make him an expert on the Chinese . His
dealings with the Chinese were exclusively with Chiang Kai
Shek and the Nationalists . He had never dealt with the
Chinese Communists , did not know their leaders , yet would
constantly insist that he could accurately predict their
behavior . ( 2: 66 )
The Chinese never attempted to conceal their
intentions. Author William Hopkins took part in the
campaign near the Chosin Reservoir . A Marine infantry
officer , he commented that " no commander in American
history had received more warnings of impending disaster ,
yet failed to heed those warnings than had MacArthur in
North Korea . ". ( 4: 13 ) That quote should have included
both MacArthur and the American government . The Chinese
were careful to issue warnings both diplomatically and
militarily.
The Chinese political leadership made the decision to
prepare for war in Korea in midsummer of 1950 . Their
decision was based on the assumption that the NKPA had over
extended itself logistically during its campaign in the
south. The Chinese leaders were sure that the Americans
would successfully counterattack and the North Koreans would
have to retreat. General Peng Dehuai , the Commander in
Chief of the Chinese forces in Manchuria , told his staff in
September " My instructions are to intervene if the
Americans cross into the Democratic Peoples Republic ". (
9: 78 )
The Chinese strength in Manchuria climbed as the
Americans approached the 38th parallel . In July , American
intelligence estimated their strength at about 115,000 . By
the end of August that had increased to 246,000 . By mid
September there were reports of 450,000 Chinese troops
massed in Manchuria . ( 8: 9)
In September , Chinese warnings about their
intentions came from numerous sources . In New Delhi , the
Indian Foreign Minister informed the American ambassador
that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel in Korea ,
China would enter the war . The British ambassador to the
United States told the State Department that he had seen
messages between the Chinese leaders and President Nehru of
India , indicating the Chinese willingness to fight if North
Korea was invaded . The American ambassador to Russia
received the same warning from the Dutch and British
ambassadors in Moscow . ( 5: 198 )
On the 27th of September , American airplanes strayed
over the Yalu River and attacked a Chinese airfield in
Manchuria . The American Government immediately issued an
apology ; however the Chinese Government regarded the
incident as a true indication of American intent . ( 5: 226)
The Chinese became more specific in their warnings to
the United States in October . On the 3rd of October , the
Chinese Foreign Minister , Chou En-lai summoned the Indian
ambassador to his office . Chou warned Mr. Panikkar that if
American or other United Nation troops crossed the 38th
parallel the Chinese would be compelled to come to the
North's defense. If only South Korean troops entered the
North then China would not get involved . This message was
relayed to Washington within 24 hours . ( 5: 211 )
General MacArthur was told about the various Chinese
warnings but his strategy remained unchanged. He continued
to assure everyone that the Chinese would not dare to
intervene in Korea . On 7 October the first American units
began to probe into North Korea . The probes quickly became
a general advance .
On the 9th of October, Chou En lai issued another
warning . " The American War of Invasion in Korea has been a
serious menace to the security of China from its very
start." . ( 5: 215 )
President Truman and General MacArthur met on Wake
Island in the Pacific on the 15th of October . The President
wanted to hear the general's opinion of the Chinese threat
in person. General MacArthur reassured the President that,
in his opinion , the Chinese would not enter the war . In
fact, one day earlier General Peng's troops had begun to
cross the Yalu . ( 9: 117 )
The 25th of October brought a remarkable event . South
Korean troops reported capturing Chinese prisoners . By the
end of the month , 55 Chinese prisoners were in American
hands . Each talked quite candidly about a massive Chinese
crossing of the Yalu River . ( 9: 160 )
Early November brought more ominous developments .
American pilots returning from missions over North Korea
reported seeing masses of Chinese troops and vehicles
crossing the Yalu River bridges . ( 6: 70 )
The evidence had become too overwhelming to ignore . By
the 6th of November CINCUN Headquarters in Tokyo began to
speak of limited and low level Chinese involvement in the
war . Although the most critical assumption of the strategy
had been radically altered , the campaign plan remained
unchanged .
The second pillar of the campaign strategy was the
assumption that the NKPA had been destroyed as a viable
fighting force . There was no doubt that they were in full
retreat , but they still retained a dangerous capacity to
resist .
The counterstroke at Inchon was brilliant but also
lucky . The Seoul / Inchon area was lightly defended by
second rate troops . All of North Korea's front line troops
and their strategic reserve had been pushed south for their
culminating attack against the Pusan Perimeter . The
American counterattack struck directly into a gap held by
weak , rear area units . ( 9: 96 )
The Chinese assumption about the North Korean attack
had been correct . The North Korean advance had outrun its
supply lines . Their supply system was never any better
than primitive and it collapsed under the American
counterattack . Exhausted by the effort of their successful
attack , their supply lines cut and in danger of being
caught between two American forces , the North Koreans
retreated . The Americans superior mobility and firepower
and the NKPA's lack of supplies turned the retreat into a
rout . The North Koreans raced north counting on the rugged
terrain , coming winter and possible Chinese support to save
them . General MacArthur's frequent calls for surrender went
unanswered .
On October 20th General MacArthur's Headquarters in
Tokyo issued this statement :
Organized resistance on any large scale
has ceased to be an enemy capability .
Indications are that the North Korean
military and political headquarters may
have fled to Manchuria . ( 2: 124 )
This declaration was premature . Two months later " The
most evident troops ( attacking the Americans ) were North
Koreans , who seemed to have regained their morale and
strength ." . ( 6: 198 )
The third assumption was closely tied to the second .
The rapid North Korean collapse convinced the American
commanders that they had achieved superiority at the
tactical level . They were convinced that the American
forces had overcome the peacetime mentality and lack of
training responsible for their initial defeats . This
assumption was also wrong .
The brunt of the difficult fighting during the
counterattacks was borne by selected American units .
General MacArthur said that the Inchon operation was only
possible " . .. if I had the First Marine Division..." . ( 1:
185 ) He knew that the troops currently in Korea were not up
to the task . The Inchon / Seoul operation was mainly the
work of the First Marine Division and the 7th Infantry
Division . The remainder of the American forces was involved
in pursuit operations that summer and fall against a
disorganized and retreating enemy . The rapid advance back
to the 38th parallel was not a true indication of
improvement among the American troops . This became only too
evident when they were subjected to the Chinese attacks . A
private in the 8th Cavalry spoke of his unit's reaction to
being attacked by the Chinese :
There was just hysteria on the position.
It was everyman for himself.... In the
end, I just ran with the crowd . We just
ran and ran until the bugles grew fainter.
( 2: 128 )
The disintegration of the NKPA produced a degree of
arrogance by the Americans . The early North Korean
victories had been shocking , but now the slumbering
American giant was aroused . The American High Command were
all veterans of World War II . They seem to recognize the
scenario . There would be three phases. .Phase one was a
blinding sneak attack by crafty orientals that failed to
deliver a knockout punch . Phase two was a slow and
disappointing American response . Those two phases were
behind them . Now came phase three ; a devastating
counteroffensive that culminated in total victory.
The American distain for the capability of the
oriental soldier was evident even after the Chinese entered
the war . On November 28th the American lines reeled from
massive Chinese attacks . Lieutenant General Almond , the
Commander of the X Corps , addressed the members of task
Force Faith , an army unit rushed forward to stem the
attacks :
We're still attacking and we're still going
all the way to the Yalu . Don't let a bunch
of chinese laundrymen stop you . ( 2: 154 )
Within twentyfour hours Task Force Faith was destroyed and
its commanding officer dead . These laundrymen could fight .
America had convinced itself that total victory was
possible . The fourth fatal assumption was that the entire
peninsula could be liberated from communism.
In 1950 , President Truman and his Democratic
Administration were being blamed in the United States for
the worldwide spread of communism and , in particular , the
loss of China . Now Truman saw an opportunity to roll back
overt communist aggression and actually eliminate a soviet
client state . On 1 September , President Truman approved
and issued a National Security Council Study ( NSC 81 ) that
declared that all Koreans " had the right to be free ,
independent and united" and directed the United States to
work toward that goal . ( 1: 236 )
The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new mission
statement to General MacArthur on the 27th of September:
Your military objective is the destruction of
the North Korean armed forces . In attaining
this objective you are authorized to conduct
military operations ... north of the 38th
Parallel in Korea ... as a matter of policy,
no non-Korean ground forces will be used in
the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet
Union or in the area along the Manchurian
border . ( 1: 237 )
On the 29th of September the new Secretary of Defense ,
George C. Marshall sent personal guidance to MacArthur." We
want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to
proceed north of the 38th Parallel .".( 1: 237 )
MacArthur certainly felt unhampered . He declared that
" This so called buffer zone ... would bankrupt our
political , military and psychological position in the Far
East . " . ( 6: 72 ) He never really paid attention to it .
On the 24th of November Lt General Almond flew to the very
border of China and gazed across the Yalu . The press
cameras captured the moment for the world .
General MacArthur made his intentions perfectly clear .
The day before his forces commenced their final push to the
Yalu he published this proclamation:
If successful , this should for all practical
purposes end the war , restore peace and unity
to Korea , enable the prompt withdrawal of the
United Nations military forces , and permit the
complete assumption by the Korean people and
nation of full sovereignty and international
equality . It is that for which we fight . ( 6:
78)
The reasons for the defeat of the American forces in
North Korea in 1950 are still debated . After the war, all
of the major American participants published reasons why
they were not to blame . All of them saw the defeat caused
by reasons beyond their span of control .
There is no doubt that some factors were beyond the
American span of control . Certainly the weather of that
Korean winter had an impact on the campaign . Temperatures
dropped to record lows and both sides suffered horribly from
frostbite . The rough ,mountainous terrain of North Korea
also played a part in the defeat . The Marines , however ,
overcame these obstacles during the Chosin Reservoir battles
and were victorious . These factors were not the crucial
ones .
America's allies maintained their support of the war .
The United States was not left alone to fight during this
part of the war . The British , the Turks and numerous
other allied armies fought along side the Americans and
South Koreans during the fall and winter of 1950 .
The campaign failed because the foundation of its
planning was based on hope rather than reality. In order for
the plan to be successful the assumptions behind it had to
be realistic predictions of future conditions . These were
not . The Americans planned assuming the best and the plan
fell to pieces.
It is clear that the key assumption was the one
concerning the Chinese entry into the war . The Chinese
intentions were so clear and their impact on the plan so
enormous that it is difficult to understand how the planners
could have dismissed them so easily .
The power of the MacArthur personality certainly played
a major part in the acceptance of the assumptions. His
impact may have been overstated, however . The President
,the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all
had a clear picture of the Chinese intentions and had the
authority to disapprove the plan . Each expressed concern
with the plan but deferred to the commander on the ground .
Certainly CINCUN's staff and subordinate commanders
share responsibility for the fiasco . Each of them was aware
of the weaknesses of the plan . Most of them were convinced
that the Chinese would intervene eventually , yet none of
them chose to challenge MacArthur .It is the responsibility
of staff officers and subordinate commanders to ensure plans
correlate capabilities with goals.
Telling a superior officer that he is
wrong is an act that requires enormous
moral courage ( "laying your commission
on the line " was the phase ...by
General George Marshall ). But a good
officer does so ... when he feels a
serious mistake is about to be made,
and lives lost as a result. ( 1: 232)
In the end there is a simple lesson in all this .
Military planners must assume the worst . Military plans
can't be based on what we hope is true, but rather must be
based on what we hope isn't true . The cost is too high to
do otherwise
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Goulden , Joseph C. Korea , The Untold Story of the War.
New York , New York . McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1982
2. Hastings , Max . The Korean War . New York , New York
Simon & Schuster Inc , 1987
3. Heinl , Robert D., Jr. Victory At High Tide .
Washington D.C. . The Nautical & Aviation
Publishing Company of America , 1979
4. Hopkins , William B. One Bugle No Drums . New York ,
New York . Avon Books , 1986
5. Hoyt , Edwin P. On To The Yalu . New York , New York
Stein and Day , 1984
6. Hoyt , Edwin P. The Bloody Road To Panmunjon . New
York , New York . Stein and Day , 1985
7. Manchester , William . American Caesar . Boston , Mass
Little , Brown and Company , 1978
8. One Year in Korea . General Headquarters , United
Nations Command , 1951
9. Spurr , Russell . Enter The Dragon . New York , New
York . New Market Press , 1988
10. U.S. Marine Operations in Korea , Vol III . HQMC .
Washington D.C. , 1957
11. Wilson , Jim . Retreat Hell . New York , New York
William Morrow and Company , 1988
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