Credible Mobilization Crucial For The Defense Of The Nation
AUTHOR Major Rosemary L. McCammond, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Professional Military Education (PME)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: CREDIBLE MOBILIZATION CRUCIAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF THE NATION
I. PURPOSE: To examine our ability to mobilize the industrial
base and to assess obstacles impairing credible mobilization for
defense purposes.
II. PROBLEM: Although the concept of isolationism and reliance
on the oceans as adequate defense dissolved with technology
advances, increasing world interests, and a more unstable world,
experience from the World Wars has failed to teach us the
importance of maintaining adequate mobilization measures.
III. DATA: Dismantling of post WWII mobilization system began
1953 with emphasis on expanded forces and current production for
new flexible defence concept; less on mobilization. Key studies
and reports by Congress and DOD Defense Science Board Reviews
started in the mid-1970s identified decline of our industrial
base. At start of Cold War, DOD created a demand for high tech-
nology research. Now supply has diminished along with demand due
to: Less DOD dollars, ineffective education system, no incentive
in U.S. for technological research, and foreign competitors
having the supply and demand for technological research.
IV: PROBLEM AREA: DOD is concerned with declining industrial
base, technological lead, and economic stature affecting our
deterrent posture, much which is beyond the control of the
Department of Defense to correct. The nation has known problems
meeting surge operations -- mobilization is much more extensive.
U.S. has to import strategic minerals to maintain our high
standard of living and to make military goods. The Soviet Union
has or access to strategic materials for weapons -- and the
ability to deny our access. Although stockpiling is insurance
for war when sea lines of communication are in jeopardy, we are
near half of the stockpile goals. New Executive Order with DOD
as manager and other managerial improvements and renewed interest
help, but fiscal constraints will hurt.
V. CONCLUSIONS: We must have credible mobilization for
effective deterrence. Our industrial base needs modernization,
bottlenecks eliminated, imported strategic materials on-hand and
close to industrial centers, and educated, trainable manpower.
We must have the National Will to regain the industrial base and
make other needed measures by educating the public to the real
threat verse illusions; increasing public sophistication in
worldly affairs and linking events to one's way of life.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: We must be a technological and industrial
leader to be a first rate world power. Refocus of energies are
required for long term rewards vice short term gains.
Legislation and policies are needed to promote new long term
approach and self-sustainment in national emergency.
CREDIBLE MOBILIZATION CRUCIAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE NATION
Outline
I. Historical perspective:
A. U.S. didn't want large standing army or involved
preparations, defense relied on helter-skelter mobilization
for war.
B. Isolation with oceans as viable defense dissolved with:
1. technology advances
2. increasing world interests
3. more unstable world
II. Mobilization
A. Key Legislation
1. Defense Act 1947 initiated legislation.
2. Defense Production Act 1950 in response to Korea
and greater Soviet Threat.
3. Dismantling of system began 1953 with expanded
forces and current production, less on mobilization.
B. Key Studies and Reports identifies problems with
industrial base.
1. 1976 Civil Preparedness Review (House)
2. 1976, 1980, 1988, DOD Defense Science Board
3. Cheney reports concerns with industrial base, that
competitiveness is at the heart of the problem, that
defense industrial base is dependent on the nation's
industrial base for its strength.
III. Deterrence
A. Mobilization required for deterrence and flexible
response to work.
B. Scenarios for short war do not include mobilization.
IV. Strategic Implications
A. Strategic warning necessary to begin process.
B. Successful Mobilization Tempo formula requires will of
the people.
V. Relationship between Defense Demand and Industrial Base
A. Three levels of Defense demand:
1. Peacetime (current)
2. Surge (small war)
3. Mobilization (long war)
B. Types of Industrial Capacity:
1. basic
2. sub-tier
3. end product
a. dedicated defense base
b. civilian production
C. Problem area: Sub-tier excess capacity could not meet
surge operation. Problem emerged with increased civilian
demand in the 1970's.
D. Civilian excess and convertible capacity for defense use
is only ready source available during mobilization, and is
not there.
VI. Strategic Materials
A. U.S. required to import strategic materials to maintain
high standard of living and to make military goods.
B. Soviet Union has waged a resource war with his access to
materials for weapons and denial of our access.
C. Stockpiling good insurance for war when sea lines of
communication is in jeopardy.
D. Presidential policies through the years prevented our
completion of stockpile goals, worsening the situation.
E. New Executive Order with DOD as manager vice Department
of the Interior, plus renewed interest, but fiscal
constraints will hurt.
VII. Technology
A. At start of Cold War, DOD created "demand" for high
technology research.
B. Now "supply" has diminished along with "demand".
1. Less DOD dollars
2. Ineffective education system
3. No incentive in U.S. for technological research
4. Foreign competitors have "supply" and "demand" for
technological research.
C. Technology in weaponry not enough, must consider
logistics tail, reliability and hardiness of weapon.
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Must first address war scenarios, then plan for short
war surge and concurrent long war mobilization.
B. Must be a technological and industrial leader to be
a first rate world power.
1. Refocus of energies required for long term rewards
vice short term gains.
2. Legislation and policies needed to promote new long
term approach.
3. Nation must be self-sustaining in national
emergency.
C. Must have credible mobilization for effective deterrence.
1. Must modernize industrial base.
2. Must eliminate bottlenecks
3. Get imported raw materials on-hand, close to
industrial centers.
4. Get (grow) educated, trainable manpower.
D. Must cultivate the National Will in regaining the
industrial base and other mobilization requirements by:
1. Educating the public to real threat verse illusions
2. Making public sophisticated in worldly affairs and
its link to each individual's way of life.
CREDIBLE MOBILIZATION CRUCIAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF THE NATION
INTRODUCTION
There are two basic military functions: waging war
and preparing for war. ....clearly, we cannot afford
to separate conduct and preparation. They must be
intimately related because failure in preparation leads
to disaster on the battlefield.1
The industrial supremacy of the United States is
extremely important to the Department of Defense. Our
National Security is based on a strategy of deterrence.
We cannot match our adversaries soldier for soldier or
bullet for bullet. Instead, we must maintain a degree
of technological superiority sufficient to overcome our
numerical disadvantage. A strong, internationally
competitive industrial base is absolutely necessary if
we want to sustain the effectiveness of our deterrent
capability. The greatest destabilizer today would be
the disintegration of the U.S. industrial and economic
base.2
Throughout most of her history, the United States had been
unwilling to maintain a large military establishment in
peacetime. Mobilization was the method of choice to meet the
bulk of wartime needs. When war neared or broke out, the nation
hurriedly attempted to build up immense defense resources. Then
production mobilization was allowed to fall to its former
1 FMFM 1, Warfighting, p. 54.
2 Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood, "Industrial
Base: Vital to Defense", Defense 90, p. 15.
peacetime level soon after the cessation of hostilities.3
Before World War II, the risk of being unprepared was
accepted because of our geographical isolation and the stable
world order (then maintained by Great Britain). The world
situation provided time for us to gear up for mobilization. Our
isolationist concept of national defense began to dissolve with
the emergence of World War I. First, Great Britain, whose
interests paralleled our own, declined as a world power. Second,
Germany and Japan, and later the Soviet Union and Communist
China, rose as powerful adversaries. Third, radical
technological advances in military science altered the defensive
value of the oceans between the United States and these powerful
adversaries. Fourth, our economic maturity created vital
interests throughout the world with a need for a wide range of
raw materials from foreign countries. Prior to our entry in the
ongoing World Wars, we had time to build up massive outputs of
weapons and to mobilize powerful armed forces which, in the end,
were decisive. The concept of the need to maintain a strong
industrial base emerged from our World War experiences.4
3 Ralph Sanders & Joseph E. Muckerman II, "A Strategic
Rationale for Mobilization", ed. Hardy Merritt & Luther F.
Carter, Mobilization and the National Defense, (National Defense
University Press, Washington, D.C., 1985), p.8.
4 Neil H. Jacoby and J. A. Stockfisch, The Scope and
Nature of the Defense Dector of the U. S. Economy," Planning and
Forecasting in the Defense Industries,as quoted in Harry B.
Yoshpe, Charles F. Franke, Production for Defense, (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C. 1968), pp. 3 - 5.
The need to maintain a strong industrial base is even more true
today.
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: DEFINITION
Industrial mobilization is defined by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) Publication 1 as the transformation of industry from
its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to
support national military objectives. It includes the
mobilization of materials, labor, capital, production facilities,
and contributory items and services essential to the industrial
program.
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: KEY LEGISLATION
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 attempted to
institutionalize Government-wide mobilization planning using the
lessons learned in the previous World Wars. The National
Security Resources Board (NSRB) was the first of a series of
agencies which has now evolved into the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). In 1950, just three months after the
beginning of the Korean conflict, the Defense Production Act
(DPA) was enacted into law. The climate of the times in which
this fundamental piece of industrial preparedness legislation was
put together and approved is noteworthy. World War II had ended
just five years earlier with its memory and lessons learned
sharply focused in the minds of the Congress, the executive
branch, industrial leaders, veterans, and informed citizens. The
scope of the DNA was in the context of the Soviet threat and was
much broader than the material needs of the Korean war.5 For a
variety of reasons, the U. S. Government gradually dismantled the
devised mobilization system beginning in 1953. We began to rely
more on deterrence and forces in being and less on the
mobilization process for force expansion and sustainment.6
INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: KEY STUDIES AND REPORTS
During the mid-1970's, the first indications of problems in
the defense portion of the industrial base began to come to
public attention. In 1976, the House's Joint Committee on
Defense Production conducted an extensive study and published its
results in June, 1976 entitled "Civil Preparedness Review, Part
1, Emergency Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization". It found
no basis for suggesting that the U.S. was not economically
prepared to mobilize, although it did find that there had been an
erosion of the defense industrial base. During this same time
frame, DOD appointed a Defense Science Board task force on
Industrial Readiness Plans and Programs. The board found that
5 Leon N. Katadbil and Roderick L. Vawter, "The Defense
Production Act: Crucial Component of Mobilization Preparedness",
Mobilization and the National Defense, Ed. Hardy Merritt & Luther
F. Carter, (National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.,
1985), pp.37 - 38.
6 U.S. Congress. House. Defense Industrial Base Panel of
the Committee on Armed Services, "The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base: Unready for Crisis", Report to the 96th Congress, 2d
Session, 1980.
the U.S. could better achieve effective deterrence and
warfighting capability by requiring adequate war reserve
materiel, by requiring a realistic rapid production surge
capability, and by creating effective industrial mobilization
plans for the entire U.S. industrial base.7
Donald J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense, said in his
remarks prepared for the National Forum Foundation on November 6,
1989, that the deterioration of America's industrial base is one
of the most pressing issues facing the nation today. In 1980,
the Defense Science Board again published a study concluding that
the industrial and technology base was in trouble.8 In 1980, the
House Armed Services committee issued a report, "The Ailing
Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis", citing major
deficiencies in producing items needed in the event of
hostilities.9 In 1988, the Defense Science Board published
another study concluding that our industrial and technology base
had further deteriorated since its last report and that a
coordinated response by government and industry is needed before
our credibility in deterrent capability is lost.10
7 Leon N. Karadbil and Roderick L. Vawter, pp. 37 - 42.
8 Donald J. Atwood, "Industrial Base, Vital to U.S.
Defense", Defense 90, (DOD publication, Alexandria, Va) pp. 13-16.
9 U.S. Congress, House, Defense Industrial Base Panel of
the Committee on Armed Services, "The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base: Unready for Crisis", 96th Congress, 2d Session, 1980.
10 Donald J. Atwood, pp. 13-16.
In his 1990 Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
January, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that the
Department of Defense is concerned with an alarming erosion in
the U.S. industrial base. Three items were cited as reasons for
concern: (1) a decline in the total number of defense suppliers;
(2) accelerating penetration of foreign goods into U.S. markets
and a growing dependency on foreign sources for vital components
and subassemblies; and (3) decreasing returns of fixed assets,
declining capital investments and lagging productivity in key
defense sectors. America's competitive strength was cited to be
at the heart of the problem:
This is a highly complex issue, involving many factors
beyond the reach or responsibility of any Defense
Department policy or program. Exchange rates, tax
policy, the cost of capital, labor-management
relations, and industry's willingness to plan for long-
term profitable growth instead of short-term profits
all affect the competitiveness of American-made
products. In addition, the trade policies of other
countries can undermine domestic industries if they aim
at gaining a market share in the United States by
dumping goods at unreasonably low prices.
The decline of the nation's industrial base has serious
implications for the defense of the nation. A dedicated defense
industrial base relies on the strength of the nation's basic
industrial base as its foundation.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The balance of military power contributes to a stable world.
Over the years, the conditions of that military balance have
changed. The Soviets have achieved nuclear parity, maybe
superiority. They have also amassed a much stronger conventional
capability and credibility than at the onset of the cold war,
including power projection forces. This evolution has garnered
an interest in our mobilization potential. Mobilization has
relevance for both concepts of deterrence and flexible response,
key elements in current U.S. military strategy. The connection
between mobilization and flexible response is critical in
avoiding or at least postponing resort to nuclear warfare by
maintaining strong conventional capability. To contemplate war
from the Soviet Union's perspective, she faces two unattractive
prospects: one, the introduction of nuclear weapons by either
belligerent might cause uncontrolled escalation to general
nuclear war, and two, in the case of a long war, the defense
industrial potential of the United States might overwhelm her.
In thinking about the strategic dimensions of war, it is
imperative that a primary military consideration and objective
must be the protection of the mobilization base. Prudence and
logic dictates that a rational and controlled mobilization whose
intent, character, and limits are communicated clearly to a
potential aggressor presents less risk than being woefully
unprepared to counter a military attack.11
11 Ralph Sanders and Joseph E. Mickerman II, "A Strategic
Rationale for Mobilization", Mobilization and the National
Defense, ed. Hardy L. Merritt & Luther F. Carter, (National
Defense University Press, Washington D.C. 1985), pp. 17 - 19.
The provision of likely scenarios is an important part of
our Defense process. Secretary Cheney believes that the most
likely war scenario will be in the form of low intensity conflict
involving U.S. interests.
In general, planning scenarios usually contain that point at
which mobilization is decided upon, and embodies a long series of
best case assumptions about the whole strategic place of
mobilization. The limited war scenario, selected as the most
likely to occur, does not reflect the deterrent effect of
perceived mobilization capability. One must be careful in
relying on scenarios for planning and consider elements beyond
simple face value.
STRATEGIC WARNING
A successful mobilization tempo can be reflected in the
formula below:
political reaction time + mobilization gear-up time
< unreinforced hold-out time 12
National reaction to strategic warning should be rapid; that
such recognition of national peril, however, seems doubtful.
Mobilization preparations must involve clear public understanding
and participation. Gear-up time, the building up of military
12 Ibid.
power through the use of non-military resources, are rooted more
deeply than in our governmental or market-based allocation
arrangements. Some segments of broader American society appear
either to have no usable skills in the best of circumstances, or
to be caught up in various forms of pleasure seeking activities,
drug abuse, and other societal aberrations, or else to be
alienated from (or simply alienated to) U.S. ideals or
institutions.13
These situations have serious implications, not only for our
national will and morale, but in our declining industrial base
and mobilization of suitable manpower.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE DEMAND AND INDUSTRIAL BASE
Defense demand can be divided into three levels: Peacetime,
surge, and mobilization. These levels interact with the three
types or levels of industrial capacity: basic, sub-tier, and
end-product. Peacetime buys are at the lowest levels of demand.
Surge is a rapid expansion of peacetime production to some higher
level to meet the circumstances of an emergency. Mobilization
requirements are radically higher than any type of peacetime
demand. Wartime losses must be replaced while concurrently
meeting the materiel requirements of force roundout and
expansion. During WWII, the peak of defense demand came in 1944
13 Ibid.
at 45% of the Gross National Product. Basic industry includes
various foundation industries such as steel, copper, aluminum and
nickel alloys, chemicals, petroleum, and electric power which are
essential to civilian and military production. Sub-tier consists
of the broad, intermediate structure which produces the
components, parts, and sub-assemblies that go into civilian and
military end products. End productivity industry falls into two
general categories, dedicated defense base and civilian
production base, which could be converted into defense
production.14
It is in the sub-tier structure that substantive problems
started appearing several years ago. During periods of rising
civilian demand, lengthened lead times and rising costs for
defense materiel occurred as capacity failed to react to the
peacetime demand. This highlighted the lack of excess capacity
for surge operations. The migration of industrial capacity to
other countries for economic reasons is another specific cause of
problems in the sub-tier structure. Fasteners and electronics
production and minerals processing capabilities at the basic
level have undergone real deterioration. At both the sub-tier
and end-product levels, the essential element that limits surge
capacity is the lack of excess or under-utilized capacity which
can be readily turned on to provide rapidly increased deliveries
of defense material. Some bottlenecks already exist,
14 Ibid.
particularly in aerospace systems components such as: bearings,
castings, connectors, forgings, and integrated circuits. These
bottlenecks increase lead time for when a product is ordered to
when it is delivered.15 Improved manufacturing technologies at
the end-product level can help shorten manufacturing times from
previous manufacturing techniques as a way to gain or "create"
excess capacity, but is only a part of the solution.
The sub-tier and end-product capacities that are available
for mobilization come from at least three sources: existing
excess capacity, convertible capacity available in private
industry, and new capacity created after the start of the war.16
Many large contractors are sustaining considerable excess
capacity, many in unhealthy financial positions with aging plants
and equipment. This excess capacity is not at the sub-contractor
level. Parts bottlenecks are well predicted because of this
situation.17 Because there is not now and probably never will be
adequate mobilization capacity due to the high levels of
Government investment required, other sources of capacity from
the civilian sector are of greater importance. This leads to the
key point of whether the existing national industrial base is
adequate. It is in this context that the documented trends of
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry, (MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass, 1984), p. 5.
deteriorating domestic capacities must be evaluated.
STRATEGIC MATERIALS
One typical U.S. commuter - oblivious to the international
proportions of the lifestyle he enjoys - is probably not
uncommon:
The commuter slipped behind the wheel of his
Detroit-built sedan. Switching on an ignition system
built with Zambian copper and Ghanaian aluminum, he
drew on power from a battery of Missouri lead and South
African antimony to start an engine of Pittsburgh steel
strengthened by South African manganese and hardened
with chrome from Zimbabwe. The car rolled on tire
treads blended from natural rubber from an Algerian
petrochemical base. The exhaust from Nigerian gasoline
was cleansed by Russian Platinum. The commuter
switched on a radio with its invisible traces of cobalt
from Zaire and tantalum from Mozambique, heard a
newscaster's report of a Communist-led coup in a small
country in Southern Africa. What's that to me, he
thought, switching to a station carrying the latest
sports results.18
Many of the critical or strategic materials have no
substitute at any price. Industrialized societies must have them
or write off a good part of the technological advances of the
last 75 years. The "Big Four": chromium, cobalt, manganese, and
the platinum group are the most critical. Without the Big Four
we couldn't continue our way of life much less the defense of our
nation. They are needed in the manufacture of jet engines,
automobiles, anti-pollution devices for air and water, computers,
medical and surgical equipment, restaurant sanitation, building
18 James E. Sinclair and Robert Parker, The Strategic
Metals War, (Arlington House, New York, 1983), p. 1.
an oil refinery, or power plant. Our nation is totally dependent
on importing the Big Four, the one exception being that which may
be recovered in recycling efforts.19
In a report presented by the Defense Industrial Base Panel
released in 1980, it noted that:
Much of the world's production and reserves of a
number of our critical materials are located in two
areas of the world: Siberia and Southern Africa.
These two nations contain 99 percent of the world's
manganese ore, 97 percent of the world's vanadium, 96
percent of the world's chrome, 87 percent of the
world's diamonds, 60 percent of the world's
vermiculite, and 50 percent of the world's fluorspar,
iron ore, asbestos, and uranium. Zaire and Zambia now
provide 65 percent of the world's cobalt.
Alexander Haig, before his appointment as Secretary of
State, told the U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Mines and
Mining, on September, 1980:
As one assesses the recent step up of Soviet proxy
activity in the Third World -- in Angola, Ethiopia,
Southern Yemen, Northern Yemen, Southeast Asia, Central
America and the Caribbean, and the ...unprecedented
invasion of Afghanistan by regular Soviet forces--
then one can only conclude that the era of the
"resource war" has arrived.
Although no developed nation can be totally self-sufficient
in minerals, excessive foreign dependency can deprive the U.S. of
freedom of action in other areas such as: political, economic,
and defense. Total self-sufficiency is an unattainable goal in
the foreseeable future.20
19 Ibid., p. 5.
20 Ibid.
Figured 1-3 illustrate the percentage and sources of import
reliance on approximately 36 minerals for the United States,
Economic European Community, Japan, and the Soviet Union.
Figure 4 represents the strategic materials required for the
Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan jet engine.21
Click here to view image
21 Figures 1 - 4: U S. Bureau of Mines, 1977.
The federal government's most decisive action to avert
wartime shortages was its creation of a strategic stockpile,
beginning in 1949. Ninety three substances in 62 families of
materials were designated as strategic. Each substance was to be
purchased and stored in sufficient quantities to meet our
country's defense for a three year period. Because successive
administrations and Congresses failed to provide the necessary
funds, in 1981 the stockpile was at about 50% of its goals.
Rising prices in the minerals market has made our $3.5 billion
expenditure grown in market value to $12.56 Billion in 1981.22
With every succeeding administration, new ideas about national
policy and priorities change. During the Kennedy administration,
stockpile goals were reduced and some of the metals accumulated
since the close of World War II were sold. Among them were: 60
million pounds of cobalt, all of the aluminum, all the nickel,
all of the copper, most of the zinc, and half of the lead.
During the Reagan Administration, a new review of stockpile
policy was accomplished. The report from FEMA in March, 1981
estimated the stockpile to $4.2 billion excess in some materials
and $20.14 shortage. President Reagan ordered stockpile
administrators to give priority to 13 metals, including cobalt,
columbium, aluminum oxide, nickel, platinum group, tantalum, and
vanadium. All stockpile purchases must be approved through the
legislative process.23
By an 1988 Executive Order, the Secretary of Defense was
designated as the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) Manager,
formally a responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior. In
addition to the new assignment of NDS manager, the Executive
Order directs proceeds from sales of excess materials to be
placed in a fund specifically for the purchase of new materials
or processing inventories of existing materials to a form more
suitable for storage or use. (Formerly, the proceeds from sales
22 James E. Sinclar and Robert Parker, pp. 8-9.
23 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
would go back into the treasury.) Also, major steps are now
underway to synchronize stockpile planning with military
strategies. Estimates of military requirements for strategic and
critical materials are now being derived directly from
warfighting plans. DOD has launched efforts to modernize the
stockpile. The efforts include: upgrading quality and form of
existing inventories to support the accelerated production of
military hardware and materiel during a national emergency; the
identification and acquisition of new advanced materials needed
to support emergency defense production; the upgrading of
specifications for NDS materials to modern industrial standards
and use; and the modernization of methods for acquiring/
upgrading/ disposing of NDS materials to conform to present
commercial practices.
TECHNOLOGY
In the 1950's, the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S.
government created the market for high-technology production
through defense spending. Nuclear strategy engendered a "demand"
for high-tech research; products and processes of high technology
were highly secret and the spin-off for consumer products was
often limited.24 In a climate of today's predicted drastic
defense budget cuts, the thought that DOD can drive technological
research is much less likely.
24 Simon Ramo, "National Security and our Technology
Edge", Harvard Business Review, (Nov/Dec, 1989), p. 175.
Technological advance in weaponry will continue to be needed
into the foreseeable future, and U.S. government policies and
actions (and, in some cases, sponsorship) will continue to exert
powerful influence on the business opportunities of well-managed
technological companies. We need to cultivate the "supply" of
technology - engineers who can contribute to making companies
competitive. The conviction that technology, or more accurately,
the atmosphere that produces creative application of technology,
is critical for economic growth, national security, and social
stability. The totality of advances produced everywhere in the
globe influences the technology originating in any one place.25
To be a world leader, we must regain and keep our place as a
world leader in technology.
Technology itself does not automatically confer military
advantages. Blind faith in technology uncoupled with strategic
analysis and deliberate participation in a technological war can
lead to disaster. Like all wars, technological war requires
deliberate strategy, and it must be conducted by commanders who
understand fully the objectives they have been instructed to
reach.26 Application of new technology in military equipment is
only useful if it increases combat effectiveness. Any piece of
equipment requires support: operator training, maintenance,
25 Ibid.
26 Stefan Thomas Possony & J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology, Winning the Decisive War, (University Press of
Cambridge, Mass, 1970), p. 5.
power sources or fuel, and transport. The enhancement of
existing capabilities must justify these support requirements and
employment of the equipment must take these requirements into
account.27
What can the government do now that military spending is
ceasing to be the paramount driver of breakthrough technology?
We have never used tax incentives deliberately to foster
technological superiority, and we should now. Our immigration
policies should be changed to make it easy for technological
brainpower from foreign countries to become Americans. The more
we become and are seen to be an entrepreneurial, free-enterprise,
low-tax land, the more we will attract the cream of the world's
technologists.28
EDUCATION
"The education system has failed the nation." concludes a
September 1988 report of the Air Force Association Aerospace
Foundation entitled "America's Next Crisis: The Shortfall in
Technical Manpower". It further concludes that the U.S....
"...has not produced enough well-educated, technically
qualified graduates who can enter the work force and
become productive members of society. This is true at
every tier from entry level technician to research
scientist. And the future doesn't look any better."
27 FMFM 1, Warfighting, pp. 52-3.
28 Simon Ramo, p. 175.
The National Science Foundation predicts that the U.S. will be
short more than 700 scientists and engineers between 1989 and
2010, and that the number of engineer graduates will decline by
forty percent while demand will increase by seventy percent.
What is the real answer to our industrial competitiveness
problem? Many sources point to education in all its phases as a
long term solution. Numerous articles in daily newspapers, U.S.
News and World Report and other magazines, and lessor known
studies by educators, CEOs, and community leaders call for
massive educational reform. Simon Ramo, frequent contributor to
the Harvard Business Review, best sums up the education solution
by emphatically stating that "every sector of society must call
for change. We must declare education's singular leverage in the
coming, more technological world, and make funds available to
pursue innovative approaches to it."29
CONCLUSIONS
U. S. national security objectives provide the essential
elements upon which our defense strategy and policy should be
structured. The basic and most fundamental objective being the
preservation of the United States as a free nation. To continue
to successfully employ a deterrent strategy, we must reverse the
decline of our industrial base. The crucial question is what
level of conflict must we be prepared for? To successfully
29 Ibid., p. 115.
survive the future, we must determine the level of conflict and
then have a plan of action.
First, we have to consider possible war scenarios. These
scenarios range from a low level conflict to a long term
conventional war possibly with some tactical nuclear weapon use
to finally and all out nuclear war. At the minimum, we should
have an industrial capability to surge production adequately for
a low level conflict while and taking necessary steps to be
prepared for a general war, i.e. a long conventional war in
Europe.
Second, to be a first rate world power we must be a first
rate technological and industrial power, capable of self
sustainment in a national emergency. To attain this goal, we
must stop thinking in terms of short term gains and refocus our
energies into long term strategies having greater rewards. We
must provide incentive for forward-thinking approaches and create
an environment where technological thinking can flourish.
Third, we must insure credible mobilization capability.
This capability is an inestimatable deterrent to aggression. To
do this, we must modernize our general national industrial base
and correct the deficiencies which account for predicted
bottlenecks. We must ensure sufficient supplies of raw materials
close to industrial centers. And we must have an educated,
trainable population to supply the needed manpower to achieve
these goals.
Finally and most importantly, we must educate the public to
the continuing Soviet military threat despite the comforting
appearances presented by glasnost. The public must be made more
aware of the linkage between international events and our way of
life, i.e. how the formation of OPEC resulted in the subsequent
hikes in oil prices and a reduction in the available supply of
fuel. Technology in today's world has outdated isolationist
concepts of defense. This education effort is necessary in order
to ensure that the National Will is available to dedicate the
resources necessary for military and industrial preparedness.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Donald J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Industrial Base:
Vital to Defense, Defense 90, Department of Defense,
American Forces Information Service, Alexandria, Va, 1990.
Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President
and Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., January 1990.
Neil H. Jacoby and J.A. Stockfish, "The Scope and Nature of the
Defense Sector of the U.S. Economy", cited in Harry B.
Yoshpe and Charles F. Franke, National Security Management,
Production for Defense, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1968.
Leon N. Karadbil and Roderick L. Vawter, "The Defense Production
Act: Crucial Component of Mobilization Preparedness",
Mobilization and the National Defense, ed. Hardy Merritt &
Luther F. Carter, National Defense University Press,
Washington, D.C. 1985.
Joseph E. Mickerman II and Ralph Sanders , "A Strategic Rationale
for Mobilization", Mobilization and the National Defense,
ed. Hardy Merritt & Luther F. Carter, National Defense
University Press, Washington D.C., 1985.
Stefan Thomas Possony & J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy of
Technology, Winning the Decisive War, University Press of
Cambridge, Mass, 1970.
Simon Ramo, "National Security and our Technology Edge", Harvard
Business Review, Nov/Dec, 1989.
James E. Sinclair and Robert Parker, The Strategic Metals War,
Arlington House, New York, 1983.
U.S. Congress. House. Defense Industrial Base Panel of the
Committee on Armed Services, "The Ailing Defense Industrial
Base: Unready for Crisis", Report to the 96th Congress, 2d
Session, 1980.
U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1, Warfighting, 1989.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
