Strategic Mobility: The Crumbling Cornerstone?
AUTHOR Major Paul L. Ladd, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Training
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: STRATEGIC MOBILITY: THE CRUMBLING CORNERSTONE?
THESIS: Regardless of changes brought about by reducing and
restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability for strategic
deployment of military power must remain a strong cornerstone of
both current and future U.S. policy.
BACKGROUND: The United States is a maritime power, placing heavy
reliance on forward-deployed Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force
units stationed world wide. When called on for either combat or
peace keeping missions, these forces have been augmented by a
combination of prepositioned equipment and supplies, strategic
airlift of troops and critical supplies, and strategic sealift for
the heavy equipment, ammunition, fuel, and supplies needed to sustain
a military power projection.
ISSUE: As a result of the sweeping changes taking place in the
world political arena, United States leaders are facing mounting
pressure to reduce military expenditures to parallel a perceived
reduction of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Allies.
In the face of this pressure, both political and military leaders
are struggling to identify where the military budget will be cut
and by how much. The major cuts will certainly be in equipment
and personnel. However, our leaders must remember that the
remaining forces must be transported overseas if needed, and to
accomplish that, the country needs strategic lift assets.
CONCLUSION: Regardless of how many divisions, ships, and aircraft
squadrons are eventual victims of budget cuts, the requirements
for highway, railroad, airlift, and sealift assets to deploy the
remaining forces will become ever more critical. Separately, each
of these transportation modes must be considered as a strategic asset,
essential in its own right, but absolutely critical to the survival
of our nation when combined with the other three.
STRATEGIC MOBILITY: THE CRUMBLING CORNERSTONE ?
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. Regardless of changes brought about by
reducing and restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability
for strategic deployment of military power must remain a strong
cornerstone of both current and future U.S. policy.
I. Changes sweeping the world political arena
A. Recent initiatives by Gorbachev
B. Emergence of Third World nationa
C. Interdependence of international economies
D. Rise of Nationalism
II. Pressure applied to U.S. leaders to reduce military spending
A. Perceived reduction in Warsaw Pact Threat
B. Proposed reductions in U.S. military budget
1. by 1991
2. by 1995
3. by 2000
III. Need to maintain strategic mobility
A. Combination of:
1. Highway
2. Railroad
3. Airlift
4. Sealift
B. Interdependence of each with regard to the other
IV. Recent declines by transportation mode
A. Railroad tracks and facilities
B. Airlift (with emphasis on C-17)
C. OMB memo on merchant marine and maritime industry
V. Potential for future improvements
A. STRACNET for railroads
B. STRAHNET for highways
C. C-17 aircraft fleet
D. Designation of sealift as a third mission for the Navy
E. President's Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense
F. Creation of CINCUSTRANSCOM
STRATEGIC MOBILITY: THE CRUMBLING CORNERSTONE ?
In his 1988 statement of America's National Security Strategy,
President Reagan outlined the values that we, as a nation, prize:
human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights, the pursuit
of happiness, peace and prosperity. He continued by stating that
these values lead us to seek an international order encouraging
self-determination, democratic institutions, economic development,
and human rights. (1) By careful and skillful use of the elements
of national power, our leaders attempt to combine diplomatic,
informational, and economic measures to promote our values peacefully
and avert using the final element of national power, the military.
America's values and interests are likely to remain consistent
throughout the foreseeable future. However, the threats to these
values and interests are changing. Recent initiatives by Soviet
General Secretary Gorbachev, continued emergence of Third World
nations, the increasing interdependence of the international
economic system, and the rise of nationalism around the globe
all present clear challenges to American leaders.
As a direct result of these global political changes, United
States leadership is attempting to come to grips with the apparent
reduction in the Warsaw Pact military capabilities. A recent
offer by President Bush to the leaders of the Soviet Union to cut
both U.S. and Soviet presence in Central Europe to 195,000 troops
and 4,700 aircraft for each side seems to bear out the desire to
reduce America's military. (2) In Congress, economics have
combined with the perception of a reduced Soviet threat, resulting
in bitter fights to resolve the question of how much defense is
enough, and how should America's defense be structured. Respected
military analysts argue that if the changes in the Soviet Union
continue (under best case projections), the military can make far
deeper cuts without endangering Western security. Harvard
University's William Kaufman contends that the Pentagon budget
be reduced to save as much as 10% in 1991, 25% by 1995, and up to
50% by the year 2000. (3)
Even though it is unclear where the political and military
changes will lead, pressure is being brought to bear simultaneously
on political leaders to significantly reduce United States military
expenditures and on military leaders to restructure the Armed
Forces to parallel the perception of a declining threat posed by
the Soviet Union and its allies. As one defense analyst phrases
it, "The Warsaw Pact, for all practical purposes, is dead as a
military alliance. Soviet troops might have to fight their way
through Warsaw, Prague, and even Berlin before getting anywhere
near the Fulda Gap, much less Bonn, Rotterdam, or Paris." (4)
Given a reduction in Soviet threat, whether perceived or
real, the time may well have arrived for significant reduction
and restructuring of our Armed Forces. However, our leaders must
remain cognizant of the warning issued by former Secretary of
Defense Carlucci in his Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year
1990:
The key to continuing America's security successes is
to recognize the pivotal importance of strength. United
States military strength remains essential to ensure our
survival, protect our interests abroad, and encourage
diplomatic initiatives to reduce and resolve conflict. (5)
Regardless of changes brought about by reducing and
restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability for strategic
deployment of military power must remain a strong cornerstone
of both current and future U.S. policy.
The United States is a maritime power, traditionally placing
heavy reliance on forward-deployed elements of the Army, Marine
Corps, Navy, and Air Force. If necessary, these forward-deployed
elements can be quickly augmented by a combination of prepositioned
equipment, airlift of troops and critical supplies, and sealift
for heavy equipment, bulk fuel, ammunition, and other supplies
necessary to sustain a power projection of military force. An
example of this reinforcement capability is the United States'
commitment to supply NATO with six additional Army divisions,
sixty additional fighter aircraft squadrons, and one Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) within ten days of a decision to do
so. (6) The airlifted troops would fall in on prepositioned
equipment and supplies, while the sixty aircraft squadrons would
fly over from bases located in the United States.
In Southwest Asia, America is committed to deployment of a non-
specific sized force within six weeks of receipt of a request for
assistance by a friendly government in that region. (7) As
in Europe, heavy reliance is placed on prepositioned equipment,
munitions, and sustaining supplies. Unlike Europe, where the
prepositioned equipment is housed in warehouses and depots, the
prepositioned equipment for Southwest Asia is primarily afloat in
three separate Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons of ships, each
squadron containing enough equipment to outfit and sustain a
MEB for up to sixty days of combat operations.
The key decisions regarding force structure of the military will,
and probably should, be made to reduce overall size of active duty
Armed Forces. Yet, it must be recognized that any deployment of
military forces, regardless of size, has a common thread; nothing
happens until something moves, and nothing moves without transportation.
Transportation requirements necessary for deployment of a
military force are very similar in both training and combat
operations. There are four separate, yet directly related,
transportation modes: rail, highway, airlift, and sealift. Each
is critical to the deployment and sustainment of military
combat power. It does no good to have ships and aircraft
available if there is no way to move personnel and equipment to
the point of embarkation. Conversely, a viable rail and highway
network is worthless, from a military view, if sufficient ships
and aircraft are not available to move troops and equipment overseas
once they arrive at the domestic ports and airfields. A closer
look at each transportation mode follows.
RAIL:
The military places heavy and direct reliance on railroads to
integrate bases and connect installations to predominantly maritime
ports of embarkation. Mainlines, connectors, and clearance lines
must all combine to support movement of heavy and/or oversized
equipment. To ensure that military needs are factored into
railroad industry decisions that may impact on national defense,
the Department of Defense relies on the Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC). In this capacity, MTMC identifies facilities
of the railroad infrastructure important to national defense,
informs the commercial and civil sectors of Defense needs, and
encourages the retention and upkeep of railroad assets vital to
support military movements.
To ensure this continuity and coordination, MTMC has created
the Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET). To date, STRACNET
has identified 32,500 miles of rail line critical for movement of
essential military equipment to ports located around the country
as well as another 5,000 miles of track essential to connect one
facility to another. (8)
In addition to identifying key lines and facilities, MTMC also
conducts analysis of potential railroad industry construction,
mergers, bankruptcies, and abandonments to determine how any of
these actions may affect DOD mobility capabilities. Since 1976, MTMC
has reviewed more than 2,100 abandonments affecting 33,000 miles
of track, as well as eight bankruptcies affecting more 1/3 of the
nation's railroad network. (9) MTMC analysis and reviews are
the main source of DOD input to the railroad industry in attempts
to preclude the loss of a critical section of track or facility
that is essential to effective movement of heavy military lift
requirements.
HIGHWAY:
During the Spanish-American War and World War I, the
United States discovered the inadequacy of its road network with
regard to military mobilization. Prior to these conflicts, the
primary use for roads was mostly local or regional traffic. When
the country moved to a wartime mobilization base, it found that
perishable supplies often spoiled in transit and that delivery of
large amounts of personnel and equipment to ports of embarkation
was unreliable and usually late. The Federal-Aid Road Act of
1916 initiated federal and state cooperation to improve farm-to-
market roads, but it was not until the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1944 that the problem was truly addressed and resolved on a
national level with the creation of the Interstate System. (10)
Drawing on lessons he had learned during World War II,
President Eisenhower established the Highway Trust Fund to create
a funding mechanism that enabled the United States to build a
national road network similar to the German Autobahn. From the
outset of construction of the Interstate System, the DOD has
monitored its progress closely, ensuring direct military input to
all phases of construction. Now nearly 97% complete, the
Interstate System provides the key road links for both civilian
and military users. (11)
The DOD uses MTMC for continuous monitoring of the Interstate System.
Using the Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STRAHNET), MTMC ensures
that the entire Interstate System, and an additional 11,000 miles
of other essential highways, is capable of supporting the massive
personnel and equipment movements required for full mobilization.
AIRLIFT:
Strategic airlift of military personnel and equipment is
coordinated by the Military Airlift Command (MAC), United States
Air Force. Although only 5% of the military supplies and equipment
requiring overseas shipment are transported by MAC, the current DOD
target for strategic airlift of 66 million ton miles per day (MTM/D)
is still not being met. It is anticipated that the shortfall
will not be corrected until the new C-17 aircraft fleet is fully
fielded in 1998. (12) The proposed, but politically endangered
quantity of 210 aircraft will lift 27.3 MTM/D, augmenting the
current fleets of C-5s, KC-10s, and C-141s. (13)
In the event of mobilization, MAC would be augmented with 238
commercial aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The
CRAF program identifies aircraft that would be converted to haul
personnel and high priority military cargo. CRAF represents
virtually all wartime passenger airlift capabilities as well as 25%
of wartime cargo airlift capacity. (14)
SEALIFT:
From the end of World War II through the late 1960s, the United
States reigned as the foremost maritime power in the world. Yet, though
unchallenged in sea control and power projection, decay of our
ability to deploy military forces had already set in. By the late
1970s, our Navy was in shambles. The 10 year period between 1968
and 1978 had seen the number of active ships decrease by over
50%. (15) Qualitative improvements had off-set many of these losses,
but the actual reduction in ships resulted in a higher deployment
tempo for those that remained. Higher deployment tempo resulted in
more sea time which caused personnel to leave the Navy at dangerously
high rates, further eroding the United States' sea control and power
projection capabilities.
By 1980, the United Stated had recognized the disastrous decline
of the Navy and embarked on an unprecedented peacetime expansion
and modernization effort. The goal of this massive buildup,
commonly referred to as the 600-Ship Navy, was to rebuild America's
ability to respond to the rising challenge of the Soviet Navy and to
support treaty relationships that bind us to over 40 mutual defense
coalitions with nations scattered around the world. While the
total quantity of ships fell short of the original 600-Ship Fleet,
few would argue that the United States Navy was restored to a status
of at least equal, if not superior, to the Soviet Navy. (16)
While the U.S. Navy was surviving decline and subsequent
resurgence, the other traditional key to American maritime power
projection, the Merchant Marine Fleet continued in a downward
spiral that had begun almost immediately following the ending of
World War II.
U.S. strategic objective for sealift are simple: transport
assault troops to combat zones, resupply those troops, and
reinforce allied nations. The importance of strategic
sealift was best emphasized by General of the Army Eisenhower in
1944 in his statement, "When final victory is ours, there is no
organization that will share more deservedly than the American
merchant marine." (17)
The United States emerged from the war as the world's largest
merchant marine, boasting a fleet of over 3,000 merchant ships.
However, by the late 1980s, the U.S. merchant fleet had lost its
dominance and declined to an eleventh place fleet consisting of
mostly old and outdated ships. (18) The decline of the merchant
marine fleet can be blamed on a combination of many factors:
failure of American ship yards to compete effectively with foreign
ship builders subsidized by their government, increased use
of containerized cargo, and American businesses using readily
available and cheaper foreign flagged ships.
The decrease in physical numbers of merchant marine hulls has
been accompanied in proportional decreases in shipbuilding facilities.
In 1982, there were 110 privately owned shipyards in the country,
employing 112,000 people. By the end of 1987, the number of active
yards had dropped to 69 (11 of which are in Chapter 11 bankruptcy)
and employment had fallen to 80,000 workers. (19)
Former Commander of the Military Sealift Command (MSC), Vice Adm
W.T. Piotti, estimates that approximately 95% of the supplies
and 99% of the fuel necessary to fight a war will be transported
by strategic sealift. (20) This would tend to make almost anyone
aware of the need for a sound merchant marine. Yet, benign neglect
by the U.S. government has allowed its strategic sealift assets to
evaporate to dangerously low levels. The actual death blow of the
merchant marine appeared to have been delivered by a May 1987
memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB):
National Security arguments do not provide a strong
justification for the provision of public assistance
to the [maritime] industries. Navy ship construction
and private ship overhaul and repair work are sufficient
to maintain the shipbuilding mobilization base determined
to be required in a national emergency... (21)
Proponents of a viable U.S. merchant marine fleet were quick to
respond to the OMB memorandum. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Logistics), Yice Admiral Hughes responded, "The merchant marine
is absolutely essential to our forward collective defense [and] the
national military strategy of the United States." (22) Similar
views were expressed by Congressman Bennett (D-FL), Chairman of
the Seapower Committee of the House Armed Services Committee, "The
only readily apparent alternative to reversing the decline of our
maritime industries is to change basic U.S. military strategy by
ruling out military responses requiring sealift. This, however,
is a price this nation cannot afford to pay if it wishes to remain
a leader of the Free World and to determine its own political and
economic destiny." (23)
While the current picture of strategic lift certainly appears to
be bleak, there are significant bright spots. The first of these
bright spots is a 1984 decision by (then) Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman, that established strategic sealift as a third primary
mission for the U.S. Navy, making sealift co-equal with traditional
missions of sea control and power projection. (24) While no concrete
evidence of Navy's commitment to this new mission has surfaced,
the formal identification of a need for strategic sealift is promising.
The second bright spot was the release of the President's Commission
on Merchant Marine and Defense, urging the President and Congress
to initiate prompt action to resurrect the maritime industry. Headed
by former Senator (and Admiral) Jeremiah Denton, the Commission
recommended:
1. that the President issue an Executive Order establishing a
National Maritime Policy.
2. that the 50 year old subsidy laws regarding shiplines be re-
written.
3. that an average of twelve ships a year be built by the U.S.
government and chartered to private U.S. flag operators.
4. that the shipment of all government cargo, both defense
and non-defense goods, be moved to U.S. flag ships. (25)
Finally, and of greatest significance, was the April 1987
creation of the Unified Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). (26)
The creation of TRANSCOM finally identified the importance of
transportation to the military. Empowered to speak as the the
single voice for defense transportation, TRANSCOM speaks as both
the sole DOD proponent of strategic lift and as the owner of all
assets belonging to MTMC, MSC, and MAC, ensuring integration
of all modes of transportation under a unified Commander in Chief
with the authority to use them.
In summary, it is safe to say that current and future political
changes are going to drive military changes at speeds not seen in
recent decades. Regardless of how many tank divisions, infantry
divisions, aircraft carriers, or fighter aircraft are cut, it is
expected that a viable force commensurate with America's role as a
world power will remain. We must hope that our leaders, both
military and civilian, recognize the need for strategic deployment
of these restructured forces and ensure the survival of the
strategic lift combinations necessary to deploy them.
In this era of change, the cornerstones on which America
defense rests will be tested as never before. They must not be
allowed to crumble.
ENDNOTES
1. President Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the
United States, The White House, 1988, p. 1.
2. Theresa Hitchens, "NATO Concessions on Tanks, Aircraft Could
Speed CFE Talks," Defense News, 12 February 1990, p. 23.
3. Jay Peterzell and Bruce van Voorst, "How Much Is Too Much?"
Time, 12 February 1990, p. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 17.
5. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress for Fiscal Year 1990, Department of
Defense, p. 2.
6. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, January 1990, Department of
Defense, p. 49.
7. Ibid.
8. Duke Niebur, "Railroads for National Defense," TRANSLOG
August 1987, p. 9.
9. Ibid., p. 10.
10. Joseph Bonfiglio, "Highways for National defense," TRANSLOG
August 1987, p. 11.
11. Ibid.
12. Jeffrey Rhodes, "The First C-17," Air Force Magazine,
August 1988, p. 54.
13. Ibid., p. 56.
14. Ibid., p. 54.
15. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime
World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 188.
16. Major Bradley Smith, "Maritime Challenge to Sustaining the
Force," Military Review, September 1989, p. 28.
17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World
in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 189.
19. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World
in 1987," Proceedings, May 1988, p. 184.
20. Representative Charles Bennett, "A Merchant Marine Strategy,"
Proceedings, May 1989, p. 187.
21. John Aquilino and James Sanders, "Strategic Sealift: The
Achilles Heel of America's Defense," USMC Command and Staff College
Handout, p. 1-2.
22. Ibid.
23. Representative Charles Bennett, "A Merchant Marine Strategy,"
Proceedings, May 1989, p. 187.
24. John Aquilino and James Sanders, "Strategic Sealift: The
Achilles Heel of America's Defense," USMC Command and Staff College
Handout, p. 1-3.
25. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and Maritime World
in 1988," Proceedings, May 1988, p. 188.
26. Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1988, Armed Forces Staff College,
Norfolk, VA 23511-6097, p. 55.
BIBILOGRAPHY
Aquilino, John and Sanders, James, "Strategic Sealift: The
Achilles Heel of America's Defense," USMC Command and Staff
Handout, p. 1-2 - 1-3.
Asher, James, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime
World in 1987," Proceedings, May 1988, p. 184 -185.
Asher, James, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime
World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 188 - 193.
Bennett, Charles, "A Merchant Marine Strategy," Proceedings,
May 1989, p. 187-188.
Bonfiglio, Joseph, "Highways for National Defense," TRANSLOG,
August, 1987, p. 11.
Carlucci, Frank, Annual Report to the President and the Congress
for Fiscal year 1989, Department of Defense.
Cheney, Dick, Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
January 1990, p. 49.
Hitchens, Theresa, "NATO Concessions on Tanks, Aircraft Could
Speed CFE Talks," Defense News, 12 February 1990, p. 23.
Joint Staff Officer's Guide, July 1988, Armed Forces Staff College,
Norfolk, VA, 23511-6097, p. 55.
Niebur, Duke, "Railroads for National Defense," TRANSLOG,
August 1987, p. 9-10.
Peterzell, Jay and van Voorst, Bruce, "How Much Is Too Much?"
Time, 12 February 1990, p. 16-21.
Reagan, Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States,
The White House, 1988, p. 1.
Rhodes, Jeffrey, "The First C-17," Air Force Magazine,
August, 1988, p. 54.
Smith, Bradley, "Maritime Challenges to Sustaining the Force,"
Military Review, September 1989, p. 28.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
