Command And Control: As It Applies To Maneuver Warfare
AUTHOR Major Thomas M. Kinnear, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA C4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: COMMAND AND CONTROL: AS IT APPLIES TO MANEUVER WARFARE
THESIS: Commanders in the Marine Corps must have a clear
understanding of command and control as it applies to Maneuver
Warfare to be efficient and effective in combat.
ISSUES: The Marine Corps has adopted a new doctrine to conduct
warfare. Unlike the attrition style of warfare used by the U.S.
military over the past century, the Corps cannot accept nor the
American public tolerate, the high cost in men and material
associated with attrition warfare. "Maneuver Warfare" is the
current philosophy described in the Fleet Marine Force Manual 1
entitled "Warfighting." The publication describes, in great
detail, the doctrine of maneuver warfare. It provides commanders
with the necessary insight to conduct warfare in other terms than
attrition. However, it leaves a tremendous void on the subject of
command and control. The heart of maneuver warfare is based on a
clear understanding of command and control as a philosophy and as a
system. This paper discusses the differences between command and
control as a system, based on high technology, equipment and
facilities and command and control as a philosophy, based on
leadership , commander's intent and mission type orders.
CONCLUSION: Commander's must change their previous concepts of
what command and control is and is not, if they are to be successful
in applying the principles of maneuver warfare. They must
understand the limitations of the command and control system and be
capable of exploiting the strengths of the command and control
philosophy.
COMMAND AND CONTROL: AS IT APPLIES TO MANEUVER WARFARE
OUTLINE
I. Command and Control
A. Defining Command and Control.
B. Command and Control system components
1. Organization
2. Equipment
II. Dimensions of War
A. Fog
B. Friction
C. Fluidity
D. Fleeting Opportunities
E. Attrition vs Maneuver Warfare
III. Command and Control System
A. Technology and Equipment
B. Explicit Communication
C. Centralized Control
D. Enemy Capabilities
IV. Command and Control Philosophy
A. Based on Leadership
B. Implicit Communication
C. Decentralized Control
D. Commander's Intent
E. Mission Type Orders
V. Summary
COMMAND AND CONTROL: AS IT APPLIES TO MANEUVER WARFARE
The basic concept of command and control is a relatively
new term in the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff define
command and control as "the facilities, equipment, communications,
procedures and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing and controlling operations of assigned forces to
accomplish assigned missions."1
The Marine Corps, over the past few years, has changed its
philosophy on the nature of warfighting. "Maneuver Warfare" is the
doctrine which directs how the the Marine Corps will conduct combat
operations now and into the 21st. century.
It is important to examine what war is to understand how
maneuver warfare applies to command and control. War is generally
characterized by the application of military power in a hostile and
violent clash of wills in order to impose our will on our enemy.
The ultimate objective of war, through the application of military
power, is the physical destruction of an individuals ability to
resist the will of the force applying power.2 Typically, all
wars which use military power end with the cessation of
1 Armed Forces Staff College, Pub.1, The Joint Officer's Guide,
(Norfolk, Va. 1988), p.309.
2 USMC, Warfighting, FMFM 1, (Headquarters USMC, Washington, D.C.
1989),p.3.
hostilities. Victory comes to the individual who was able to impose
his will over his opponent.
War has many dimensions; to be successful in war, the
leaders of marines must attempt to understand the characteristics of
war and learn to operate within the environment which makes up the
battlefield. Friction, as described by Carl von Clausewitz, "is
the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."3 As it
applies to war, friction is the force that prevents the imposition
of our will on the enemy. War is manifested in uncertainty (the fog
of war), fluidity and fleeting opportunities. Friction in combat
can derive from poor leadership or overly restrictive control
measures placed on individuals and units. There are endless sources
of friction for every action attempted in battle; no matter how
simple the task or goal, there will be a certain amount of friction
which will inhibit a military operation.4 The key to being
successful in battle is the ability to fight effectively within the
medium of friction and to adapt to constantly changing situations.
There are primarily two styles of warfare, attrition and
maneuver. Attrition is based on firepower, while maneuver is based
on movement.5 The Marine Corps, with its fully integrated air
ground team, is able to capitalize on the best of both styles of
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and ed. M. Howard and P.
Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 119.
4 Warfighting, p.6.
5 Ibid. p.27.
warfare. Attrition warfare requires the capability of massing fire
power, and incorporates the systematic destruction of enemy
targets. Maneuver warfare, on the other hand, is the ability to
move forces with speed and surprise to exploit enemy
vulnerabilities. It is important to understand that depending on
the tactical situation, a commander will capitalize on the value of
massing fire power and the systematic destruction of enemy targets,
without paying the high price in men and material that is normally
associated with attrition warfare. There in lies the difference,
exploit the benefit without the cost. The essence of maneuver
warfare is based on speed of execution (relative to the enemy's
ability to react), the concentration of combat power (fires),
surprise, boldness, and exploiting enemy vulnerabilities. The
objective is to shatter the enemy's cohesion and provide him with a
deteriorating situation which he cannot cope with.6 It is prudent
that the Marine Corps adopt the doctrine of maneuver warfare. As
Sir Winston Churchill so aptly put it:
Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the
general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in
slaughter.7
Command and control as it applies to maneuver warfare
provides a unique dichotomy in terms. There is the Command and
6 Ibid. p.59.
7 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1923), vol.II, p.5.
Control system and the Command and Control philosophy, both of which
are essential to maneuver warfare. At the first glimpse, one would
seem to be the antithesis of the other. The system and philosophy
are made up of separate and distinct characteristics which
compliment the extraordinary organization of the Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF). The command and control system is fundamental
to the Corps; it is the glue that binds together the air ground
team. It was developed for the coordination of supporting arms and
aviation assets. The system to be effective requires state of the
art technology, explicit communication, and centralized control of
personnel and equipment. Conversely, the command and control
philosophy is constitutive to maneuver warfare which requires
leadership, implicit communication and decentralized control of
personnel. Both the system and philosophy are necessary; they both
help to reduce the fog of war and gain certainty during battles for
the commander.
The purpose of the command and control system is to
coordinate the efforts of the MAGTF to produce the desired
"synergistic" effect on the battlefield. The heart of the systems
is primarily made up of communications equipment and facilities. As
mentioned previously, the system requires explicit communications
and centralized control for the coordination of the various
supporting arms. In the Marine Corps, the organization and
equipment to effectively orchestrate the command and control system
over the past decade has continued to improve and develop tremendous
capabilities. The equipment which the Marine Corps has acquired for
its command and control system has, quite literally, kept pace with
the space age technology.8
Because of the vast improvement in the system, the
battlefield characteristics of fog and friction have been reduced.
The MAGTF commander now has a decided advantage over a third world
foe who lacks the sophistication, or the means to thwart the use of
the Marine Corps command and control system.
Fluidity on the battlefield is the rapidity in which the
situation changes; it leads to fleeting opportunities. These two
characteristics of friction, are now minimized and capitalized on
respectively in the Corps. Commanders are capable of directing
devastating fires rapidly and accurately on enemy positions, because
of the advance concepts and characteristics in the command and
control system. The commander who is in the best position to take
advantage of the situations, the one who shapes and develops the
battlefield, will ultimately be the victor.
The command and control system has evolved and is
compatible with the needs of MAGTF commanders as they apply the
concepts of maneuver warfare. The system helps to eliminate
uncertainty during the fog of war. The system which uses state of
the art communications equipment is both flexible and survivable
under most conditions. Today's command and control system
facilitates freedom of action, making it responsive to the
8 Col. L.G. Norwork, U.S. Army, "Synchronizing Deep Attack Support:
The Corps Troops Operations Cell", Military Review, (July, 1988),
p.23.
commander's will.9
Every commander has what Von Crevald would describe as "the
futile quest." Commanders seeking to apply the doctrine of
maneuver warfare probe for certainty. However, they need not be
preoccupied with their search. The improved capabilities of the
command and control system decrease the uncertainty and move the
commander to a more certain position in the execution of his
decisions. He is able to coordinate the proper combination of
supporting arms and aviation assets to execute the mission in the
most effective and efficient manner. The centralized control and
execution of his supporting arms, makes war a science, battles
deterministic and the results more certain.
However, as wonderful as this sounds, it must be kept in
the proper perspective; there is a down side. As the Corps'
technology has improved, so have the enemy's systems which are
capable of detecting and destroying the Marines' command and control
system. Electromagnetic signatures of links and nodes emits unique
electromagnetic characteristics that distinguish elements of the
MAGTF.10 High, very high and ultra high frequency emissions from
a single site are indicators of tactical air and fire support
coordination and control systems. Certain radar frequencies and
parameters identify specific weapon systems by providing the
9 Ibid. p.25.
10 Maj. T.L. McMahon, U.S. Army, "The Key to Success: Developing a
Command and Control System", Military Review, (Nov. 1988), p.31.
signature of their emitters.
The key to protecting our command and control system is an
in-depth understanding of the threat. The Marine Corps must realize
that military operations today cannot be conducted without a massive
effort to deny enemy sensors the physical and electronic signature
needed to identify critical elements of the MAGTF's command and
control structure.
There are both passive and active counter measures which
can be employed. Passive counter measures are achieved by:
communicating only when required and using burst transmissions, use
nonelectronic means when possible, focus on the commander's critical
elements of information and keep reports to an absolute minimum.
Active counter measures employ: tactical military deception
techniques, such as, electronic simulators, multiple emitter sites,
decoys and dummy command post.11 If these measures are
incorporated by the MAGTF, they would significantly aid in the
survivability of the command and control system.
Still and all, the Marine Corps has only precious few
communications assets. The corps at the division and wing level
will be hard pressed to maintain a sufficient command and control
system to adequately sustain operations, if they experience minimal
combat damage. It is unrealistic to expect an elaborate active
counter measure system made up of decoy transmitters and dummy
11 Ibid. p.33.
command posts, given the fiscal limitations in which the Corps must
operate. These must be discounted as serious consideration for the
protection of our command and control assets. Passive counter
measures provide the Marines with the most practical means of
protection.
The ability of the Marine Corps to coordinate its
supporting arms and aviation assets is one of its greater
strengths. The Corps needs to develop a system which is able to
operate in an austere fiscal and sophisticated combat environment
without the use of telecommunications and emitters. Granted, there
is no easy answer and this will be a particularly hard task for the
Marine Corps to accomplish. However, this problem could be
significantly reduce if all the major subordinate elements of the
MAGTF have a complete understanding of the commander's intent.
Before the Marine Corps adopted the doctrine of maneuver
warfare, the primary function of the command and control system was
to coordinate and provide the commander with a means to relay his
decisions vertically through the chain of command. It allowed the
commander to translate decisions into orders, and communicate those
orders to subordinate commanders for execution. Control was the
centralized means to gain certainty over the battlefield through
direct intervention with instructions to subordinates. For example,
during the Vietnam war, it was considered "state of the art" command
and control for a battalion commander, with the aid of a VHF radio,
to direct the actions of his infantry companies in combat from the
vantage point offered by a Huey helicopter. This allowed the
battalion commander to give explicit instructions and maintain
centralized control of his units.
The basic premise of maneuver warfare is based on
leadership; it requires implicit communications and decentralized
control. It relies on a clear understanding of the commander's
intent and the use mission type orders.12 The term command and
control is redundant when applied to maneuver warfare. It indicated
an inability to think of command in other than its control aspects.
Prior to the doctrine of maneuver warfare, command and control was
based on some antiquated idea that command equated simply to
authority and control. Now, however, command and control is the
philosophy which directs maneuver warfare.
Control can be thought of as a tool on a straight line. At
one end of the line you have complete control which is characterized
by the terms regimentation, regulations and norms. Subordinates are
not allowed to exercise initiative under this state of control. At
the other end of the line, the state of control is complete
discipline. This end of the line is characterized by self control
and obedience based on understanding of the commander's intent, with
subordinates exercising complete initiative.13 For maneuver
warfare to be effective, it is vital that the command and control
philosophy exploit the characteristics of self control and
incorporate commander's intent with mission type orders.
12 Warfighting, p.63.
13 Maj. T.M. Tanhsley, U.S. Army, "Command and Control: Finding
the Middle Ground." Military Review, (Sept. 1988) p.46.
Command and control with respect to maneuver warfare is the
entire process by which military forces and their organizations
operate. When discussing command and control there are some
questions one should ask: What will be the future of the Marine
Corps? What will be their role? What environment will they operate
in? As the Soviet threat in central Europe declines, the Corps
mission in NATO maybe substantially reduced. However, low intensity
conflict throughout third world regions such as, Central and South
America, and the Middle East will most likely be trouble spots in
which American interest will be at stake. The cutback in the
defense budget will force the Marines to operate with reduced
personnel and equipment. This does not necessarily mean that the
Corps will become less capable. But it will require that the Marine
Corps adopt, in earnest, a command and control philosophy that
complements the doctrine of maneuver warfare as described in FMFM 1,
Warfighting.
The Marines must optimize the effectiveness of its most
valued resources, its personnel. The primary means to accomplish
this is through a command and control philosophy that provides for a
more rapid decision making process, particularly at the Regimental,
Battalion and Company levels. A rapid decision making process is
developed through training. It eliminates the cumbersome chain of
command which delay decisions that are vital to the "on seen
commander." The ability to make rapid decisions helps to eliminate
fleeting opportunities. This ability is not dependent on state of
the art communications systems.
The Marine Corps is a complex warfighting organization
designed around the MAGTF. The Corps must be the architects of a
command and control philosophy that exemplifies the doctrine of
maneuver warfare. A philosophy that develops individuals to their
utmost potential. To accomplish the mission, Marines must be
capable of incorporating the philosophy that produces the leadership
potential of each individual in the Corps. The Corps seeks the
synergetic effects of its air and ground team. They can capitalize
on the skills of Marines who are motivated, loyal and through
training display initiative and self discipline to provide the
synergism of a cohesive combat unit.
The self discipline and dedication of every Marine is
achieved through unit cohesiveness and education. This process
begins at boot camp, continues into the fleet and throughout a
career. Unit cohesiveness is not achieved by wearing the insignia
of the Marines. The corps must make an active effort to keep
individual members of the team together, if they want to achieve the
synergistic effect of a cohesive units. Every member of a unit
develops leadership qualities through education. Each person must
be allowed to make tactical mistakes and everyone in the unit must
be allowed the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of others.
During times of peace this is an inexpensive and valuable learning
tool. A tool, that the aviation community has exploited for a
number of years without destroying the individual professionally.
Aviation publication such as, "Approach" and "Flight Fax" base a
number of their articles on tactical and other judgemental errors
made by flight crews. In any readyroom throughout the fleet you can
hear pilots discussing the mistakes of brother pilots from the CO
down to the nugget, without malice or recalcitrance.
The conversation foster learning by exposing mistakes not hiding
them. As long as the team continues to grow and learn it will be
capable of completing its assigned task.
The ability to communicate intent is the key to the
development of a command and control philosophy that is responsive
to the Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare. Ideally, every
part of the organization should be able to communicate amongst
itself. This is particularly true at the Battalion and Squadron
level. Commanders and their staff must be able to communicate not
only vertically up and down the chain of command, but circularly.
The effect of this type of communication provides the commander with
an open exchange of ideas. The round table style of communication
provides that the information will reach the right individual and
decisions can be made quickly. The commander makes his intent clear
and ensures that no one unit is over taxed. Once the intent is
understood, each person is free to decide on how he will accomplish
his mission. For this system to be effective, everyone must
understand their role and be capable of providing feedback in a
timely manner.
The only way this type of command and control can work is
through experience, gained through realistic training. The unit
that is intimately familiar with each of its members, from the
commander down to the fire team leader or squadron pilot, will be
able to execute the mission based trust and confidence gained
through experience. Trust is not granted to members of the unit
simply because he bares the units name; it is earned through
demonstrated ability to accomplish the mission. Once the commander
has made his intent clear, he allows his subordinates the freedom
necessary to execute the mission.14
Decision making at the lowest level facilitates speed of
execution and insures the commander of certainty on the
battlefield. Decision quality is improved because it eliminates the
chain of command; responsibility for action is retained with
individual who is in the best tactical position; fleeting
opportunities are reduced. The unit engaged in combat has been
trained to respond to the rapidly changing environment and is
capable of functioning effectively. Unlike the Corps experience in
Vietnam, decentralized control of units does not create uncertainty
at the top levels of command. The ability of units to operate
effectively in an uncertain environment, the fog of war, is a factor
of leadership, training and unit cohesiveness. The commander gains
certainty through trust and confidence.
The commander who conceptualizes maneuver warfare and
applies the principles of command and control will understand the
differences between leadership and coordination, implicit and
explicit communication, decentralized and centralized control.
Commanders must now seek to communicate their intent in person and
orally; he must use key, well understood phrases and use mission
14 Warfighting, p.64.
type orders.15 There needs to be standardization throughout the
Marine Corps in unit operating procedures and training. Unit
cohesion and solidarity is a vital requirement. Subordinates must
know their commander well enough to be able to read his thoughts.
This is a more effective and faster way to communicate intent. It
enhances flexibility, responsiveness and survivability.
However, the current Marine Corps personnel policies of
transferring personnel from coast to coast every few years does not
facilitate unit cohesion. For implicit communication to be
effective it requires a long term relationship with commanders and
their subordinates. If the Marine Corps is serious about maneuver
warfare then it will seek to inseminate these requirements for unit
cohesion throughout the Corps, instead of providing lip-service to
the principles. This will require some serious soul searching at
the top levels of the Corps.
The measure of an effective command and control philosophy
is realized when a commander's force functions more effectively and
expeditiously than the enemy. The commander on the battlefield has
gained certainty by providing his subordinates with his intent and a
means to coordinate his supporting arms and aviation assets. The
use of commanders intent and mission type orders will all but
eliminate the need for a vulnerable communication systems involving
decentralized control.
15 Ibid., p.71.
In summary: The Marine Corps has a command and control
system and philosophy. They both apply to maneuver warfare. The
system and philosophy are separate and independent. Both are vital
to the Corps. The command and control system is based on high
technology, facilities and equipment. It is used to coordinate
supporting arms and aviation assets of the MAGTF. It requires
explicit communications and centralized control of personnel and
equipment to be effective.
The command and control philosophy is based on leadership.
It provides for a rapid decision making process based on the
commander's intent and mission type orders. It requires implicit
communications and decentralized control of personnel to be
effective. Both the system and the philosophy are responsive to the
commander and both reduce uncertainty during the fog of war. If the
Marine Corps is to be successful in future conflicts, commanders
must understand the limitations and strengths of both the command
and control system and philosophy.
Bibliography
Books
Churchill, Winston. S. The World Crisis, (New York: Charles
Scriber's Sons, 1923).
Clausewitz. Carl. von. On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P.
Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Sun Tzu. The Art of War, trans. S.B. Griffith (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
Government Documents
Armed Forces Staff College, Pub. 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide.
(Norfolk, Va. 1988)
U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. (Washington. D.C. 1989)
Articles and Periodicals
Major D.A. Hahn, USA, Leadership: The Heart of Command and
Control. Military Review, November, 1988
Major T.L. McMahon, USA, "The Key to Sucess: Developing Command and
Control. Military Review, November. 1988
Col. L.G. Nowok. USA, Synchronizing Deep Attack Support: The Corps
Troops Operations Cell." Military Review. July, 1988
Lt. Col. R.L. Schmit, USA, "A Doctrine for Command." Military
Review, November, 1985
Major D.M. Tanhsley, USA, "Command and Control: Finding the Middle
Ground." Military Review, November, 1989
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