Security Assistance Forces (SAF): A US Military Option For Counterinsurgency
AUTHOR Major Philip T. Klapakis, USA
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: Security Assistance Forces (SAF): A US Military
Option For Counterinsurgency
THESIS: The Security Assistance Forces (SAF) Concept
must be reinstated as an primary US military option for
counterinsurgency in order for the United States to
successfully conduct Low Intensity Conflicts operations
in the Third World in the future.
ISSUE: The most likely challenge to US national interests in
the future will be the Low Intensity Conflicts in the Third
World. While the US has had varying degrees of LIC success
in three of the four broad categories -- combating terrorism,
peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations;
insurgency and counterinsurgency operations have not fared as
well. This situation will continue until some adjustments
are made in military doctrine, national strategy, and at the
operational levels. Unless these adjustments are made the US
government and military will remain functionally unable to
plan and conduct effective operations in insurgency affected
friendly and allied nations in the future.
Nearly three decades ago the US was faced with this same
situation. The solution was a counterinsurgency strategy
that used all the elements of national power through an
indirect approach based on assistance programs. The US
military support for this strategy was the Security Action
Forces Concept (SAFs are now called Security Assistance
Forces). Although the SAF never eliminated insurgency
anywhere it did reduce the insurgent threat in many nations.
It appeared the US had found a viable strategy for the
future, but the concept was never allowed to mature. In an
effort to cast out the pain of Vietnam, the US stopped
executing a successful FID program that was aimed at
countering insurgency in the Third World.
CONCLUSION: So if it is true that the lessons of the past
provide a window to the future, then it is time that our
civilian and military leaders look back to the past for the
solution to the future. In order to regain the operational
capability to counter insurgent threats in the Third World in
the future, the National Command Authority and the military
must revive and update the old counterinsurgency SAF concept
of operations.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (SAF):
THE US MILITARY OPTION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: The Security Assistance Forces (SAF)
Concept must be reinstated as an primary US military option
for counterinsurgency in order for the United States to
successfully conduct Low Intensity Conflicts operations in
the Third World in the future.
I. SAF A BEGINNING-THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. CONCEPT
B. ORGANIZATION
C. MISSION
D. ACCOMPLISHMENTS
E. THE BUGLE BLOWS LAST CALL
II. SHIFTING STRATEGIC REALITIES AND A RENEWED INTEREST
A. US GOVERNMENT OPTIONS TO SUPPORT FID
B. US MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE SUPPORT
C. US MILITARY SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
III. SAF IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
A. PRIOR TO REVISION B. AFTER REVISION
IV. SAF IN THE FUTURE
A. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
B. STRATEGICAL ANALYSIS
C. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
V. CONCLUSIONS
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (SAF):
A US MILITARY OPTION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
Prologue
In the 1960s, faced with mounting insurgency threats
from within the Third World, the United States sought to find
a new strategy that would effectively ensure the collective
security of affected allied and friendly nations. Having
learned that the roots of insurgency resided often in the
political, economic, and societal failures of a country, the
US intended to use assistance programs as a means to help
counter these failures. This was to be done by using an
indirect approach instead of overt force through military
confrontation. For the military, this indirect approach led
to a counterinsurgency strategy that centered on the Special
Action Forces (SAF is now called Security Assistance Forces)
Concept. (5)
This concept significantly increased the US military's
ability to plan and conduct US Foreign Internal Defense
(FID) operations in insurgency affected nations. SAFs became
the "hands-on" tool at the operational level (theater and
in-country). It became the in-country bridge that linked
the military and State Department together as the US Country
Team (USCT). This organization provided the catalyst that
was needed to tie all the FID assistance programs into a
workable campaign plan. The genius behind the concept was
that it insured a unity of effort and a proactive response
between civilian, government, and military organizations.
For the first time the US could employ all the elements of
national power against the threat posed by an insurgency.
The United States appeared to be on the road to a continuous
and viable strategy that would alleviate insurgency threats
to US national interests in the Third World. This ended in
the mid-1970s when SAFs were no longer deployed as an
operational strategy against insurgency. The loss of the
SAFs caused the entire indirect approach to falter. With the
bridge missing, the US could no longer effectively apply all
the elements of national power to counter the threat of
insurgency. The real damage was done to the country teams.
They were left impotent without a complete organization to
implement the "hands-on" assistance.
Today, the US faces the same threat to its national
interests in the Third World that existed nearly three
decades ago. It never really went away. Even though a
national policy and strategy now exist, the articulation
of these concepts and the mechanism for implementation
remain incomplete. (20:1) In an effort to cast out the
pain of Vietnam, the US stopped executing a successful FID
program that was aimed at countering insurgency in the Third
World--SAF. To regain the operational capability to counter
these insurgency threats in the future, the US government
and military must build on the old SAF concept and it must
actively employ it in insurgency affected friendly and allied
nations.
SAF A Beginning-The Historical Perspective
Concept. In March of 1963, the US Army published its
concept for SAF--National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)
182. (5) NSAM 182 was used for strategic policy guidance to
determine FID activities.
NSAM No. 182 was comprehensive and not only
addressed the threat, objectives and strategy,
it addressed a plan for strategy implementation.
Methods of support for Third World nations in LIC
environments were outlined to include intelligence,
land reform, civic action, community development,
education, leader groups, police etc. The role of
multilateral organizations was covered as well as
the specific roles and missions of: Special Group
(C.I.), State Department, AID, DoD, CIA, and USIA.
A model country internal defense plan was even
included as an annex. (19:2-6)
The SAF concept called for USCTs to develop FID
plans that would guide the Department of Defense (DOD) in
planning for future Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
activities. Under the SAF concept, USCTs received military
resources from unified commands to support the military
aspects of a host country's FID plan. Military resourcing
for FID operations was managed through the in-country
Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG). Even though
a MAAG was part of the USCT, it came under the command of
unified commands (CINC) to which it was assigned. MAAGs were
responsible for providing the military planning, training and
advice, assistance, and equipment to host countries. (17)
Organization. SAF units were organized by the Army
under the command and control of a Special Forces Group (SFG)
as follows:
Built around the basic 1500 man Special Forces
Group organization with its thirty-six A detachments,
nine B detachments, and three C teams, the SAF
became a task force of specialized health, education,
sanitation, civil administration, public works, and
forestry. A Psychological Operations Battalion
had experts in radio and leaflet propaganda, public
information, entertainment, and education all
backed up by sophisticated mobile equipment. The
Engineer Detachment provided professional experience
in all kinds of construction, maintenance, road
building, water purification, and well drilling.
The all purpose A team "docs" were now backed up
by a Medical Detachment of experts in preventive
medicine, dentistry, hygiene, sanitation, and public
health, as well as general medicine and surgery.
An Intelligence Detachment brought professionals
for photo interpretation, agent handling and nets,
counterintelligence lie detection, lock picking,
wiretapping, bugging, and debugging, and even more
exotic enterprises. Some SAFs . . . even had Military
Police Detachments, skilled in riot control,
investigative procedures, and population and traffic
control. All SAFs had an Army Security Agency
unit, with classified capabilities and mobile and
man-portable equipment in the field of electronic
intelligence. (14:69)
Mission. When deployed these ready forces would support
commanders of a unified command in the execution of FID
missions. When SAFs were employed by the CINC in their IDAD
role it was to assist the MAAG's FID plan. They provided
training, operational advice, and assistance to host country
forces. (19:3-7)
Accomplishments. In the early 1960s the US military
deployed four SAF units to gain control of emerging
insurgencies that continued to effect US national interests
in the Third World. These SAFs were built around 1st Special
Forces Group (SAFASIA) on Okinawa, 8th Special Forces Group
for Latin America in Panama, and the other two were
established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina as part of 3rd and
6th Groups for Africa and the Middle East. (14:69-70)
Between these four SAF Groups, thousands of security
assistance missions were successfully conducted in support of
friendly host governments that were besieged by the threat of
insurgency. Although insurgency was never truly eliminated
anywhere, there was a great reduction in the effectiveness of
rural insurgency in many nations.
The Bugle Blows Last Call. The SAF concept appeared to
be working; yet, the effectiveness was difficult to measure
because the concept was never allowed to mature.
In the mid-1970s United States Special Forces (USSF) was
not only withdrawn from its role in Vietnam, but all the
forces were redeployed back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina
into a "retired on active duty" status.
Given an aversion by some segments of the Pentagon
leadership to Special Forces (SF) operations, this state of
affairs was not surprising. This phobia was caused by a fear
that using any "elite" type of force to deal with problems
that could not be resolved by conventional military methods
would lead to a criticism of the conventional military.
Therefore, elite forces of any type were viewed as a threat
by conventional military hierarchies. In the aftermath of
Vietnam, Special Forces (SF) were not considered in the
revision of US military doctrine, force posturing, or
contingency planning. The non-military instruments for
conducting special operations were largely dismantled.
Ultimately, this decision would lead the US down the path
of unpreparedness for the type of conflicts that it would
most likely encounter in the future in the Third World--Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC). By 1981, the ability of the US
to conduct LIC operations was almost nonexistent. (3:6)
Shifting Strategic Realities and a Renewed Interest
Since the early 1980s US policymakers and military
leaders have come to accept that as the US moves inextricably
into the 21st Century, our concerns and national interests
will continue to be challenged by events, actions, and
conflicts that are generated in developing Third World
nations. (4:3) To meet these Third World challenges the
United States embarked on a complex and comprehensive program
throughout the 1980s to revitalize efforts that had nearly
stopped after Vietnam. The source of these efforts stemmed
from a combined realization by US government officials and
the US military that the conditions under which policy and
strategy had developed were maligned for the following
reasons:
The U.S. response to the crisis in Southeast Asia
was indecisive and imprudent, and became focused
on a one-dimensional military solution to the
multi-dimensional problem. Policy, doctrine, and
ideas regarding LIC already established did not
seem to influence the U.S. response. The U.S.
overestimated its capabilities and underestimated
those of the enemy. Military force as an element
of national power was misapplied. (19:2-7)
Because of this view, substantial changes have occurred
in LIC policy, strategy, doctrine, and force structuring.
The revitalization of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
elements from 1986 to 1990 has in many ways significantly
increased the US government's capability to conduct LIC
operations. While this is true in three of the four broad
categories of LIC--combating terrorism, peacekeeping
operations and peacetime contingency operations; the United
States' counterinsurgency capability still needs some major
revisions. Without this, US FID operations will be nothing
more than a bandaid.
Current US Government Options to Support FID. At the
national level, the National Command Authority (NCA) has two
fundamental courses of action to assist an ally in defending
itself against a potential or actual threat to its internal
security. One of these is the deployment of US combat forces
to assist an ally in varying degrees. This may range from
providing a more secure and stable environment through
continued development or helping to defeat an internal threat
through large scale combat operations. (7:1-2)
The other of these fundamental courses of action is
the application of a wide variety of programs executed by
different US government agencies. These programs aid
developing nations to make economic, political, humanitarian,
and military improvements and are defined under the broad
title of US Foreign Assistance Programs. The US Foreign
Assistance Programs are divided into three major categories:
Development Assistance Programs, Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance Programs, and Security Assistance Programs.(7:103)
While the US military may participate in development
and humanitarian assistance, the primary response is directed
through Security Assistance Programs (SAP).
US Military SAP Support. The US military provides
security assistance to a host nation's (HN) operations in the
context of FID. This US security assistance includes:
. . . a variety of programs used to assist friendly
and allied countries in the establishment and
maintenance of an adequate defense posture. This
support is intended to insure internal security
and resistance to external aggression. The reason
for US assistance is based on the belief that the
security and economic well-being of friendly foreign
countries is essential to the security of the United
States. Security Assistance Programs are designed
to provide allied and friendly nations with the
capability to resist aggression in accordance with
regional defense agreements and US contingency
plans. (7:104)
Based on the above situation, the US military provides
material, advisors, trainers, and SAFs to support the HN's
counterinsurgency operations through Security Assistance
Organizations (SAO is the new acronym for MAAG).
Us Military Support for Counterinsurgency. Initially,
US efforts will be directed toward an assessment of the
threat to a host government and to US national interests.
It is the country team's responsibility, normally under the
Ambassador, to assess the situation in-country and recommend
what level of US assistance is required. If a host country
requests assistance and US national interests are involved,
the NCA may direct the US military to participate in FID
operations. When a Phase I level of insurgency is reached in
a HN the US may assist through a variety of SAPs. These SAPs
are designed to strengthen the HN's ability to handle the
insurgency threat. In this phase of insurgency SAO officials
can advise and assist, if requested and approved by the US
government, on the military aspects of internal defense. If
the SAOs do not have the expertise Mobile Training Teams
(MTTs) may be called upon to fulfill mission requirements.
Generally US troops are not employed to assist a HN unless
the level of insurgency appears to threaten the stability of
that HN. Usually this occurs after the level of insurgency
intensifies to Phase II or Phase III.
After the USCT has assessed the insurgency to be at
a Phase II level, then US assistance will most probably
increase to a much higher level. The SAO would request
and provide equipment, training, and in very limited cases
advisors to legitimate HN forces. Resourcing could come
from a specially trained SAF. It is possible that a
commitment of this size may cause the CINC to employ a
subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to take over
command and control from the SAO. The reason for using a JTF
headquarters is that usually there is more than a one service
involved in providing security assistance.
If the insurgency threat reaches a Phase III level
(a situation where insurgent forces may forcibly take over
the host country), the US response may be to employ combat
forces. This would be done only to support HN forces. At
this time the CINC would have to insure the establishment of
a combined forces headquarters to direct the campaign plan.
However, US forces would remain under the command and control
of either a unified command or a subordinate JTF command.
(7:16-17)
While the US may provide security assistance based
upon a long term insurgency threat that escalates slowly to
the point of combat operations it may happen in the reverse.
In other words, the US may send in combat forces to help
reduce an immediate threat and then follow this action up
with a SAF to stabilize the situation.
Despite the level of insurgency or the time frame,
the US must be able to respond quickly with the appropriate
level of assistance to help the HN gain the psychological,
political, military, and economic edge over the threat.
Because SAFs provide such a versatile capability, they
should be used both in long and short term security
assistance operations.
SAF in foreign Internal Defense.
Prior to Revision. The original SAF concept was
stratified to support a counterinsurgency doctrine. The
precepts under which this program was to work are as follows:
. . . [SAF] elements engaged in FID are primarily
oriented toward the development and training of
foreign military and paramilitary organizations.
The purpose of this training is to improve the
tactical proficiency of the foreign military
forces and to inculcate in them the idea that all
types of activities must be conducted to diminish
the credibility of the insurgencies among the
population. These additional activities include
civic action, civil assistance, and humanitarian-
type programs. (9:7)
To accomplish this diverse program, a SAF had to be
augmented by resources and units that could assist a host
country in developing internal defense programs. These
assets and resources were to be provided by civilian and
military organizations tied to the combined effort. This
augmentation even included backup forces that were organized
under a US Army Brigade, specially trained to perform FID
assistance to the SAF. When ready the SAF would support the
in-country FID plan by employing task organized MTTs. The
mission of these MTTs was to organize, train, and advise host
country military and paramilitary forces. When necessary a
SAF, in conjunction with host country forces, could conduct
the following missions:
* Operations against insurgent base areas to separate
the insurgent from his support and to destroy his
facilities.
* Operations against interior infiltration routes to
deny or limit insurgent movement.
* Remote area operations in contested areas or
areas under insurgent control populated by ethnic,
religious, or other isolated minority groups.
* Urban operations to assist local governments in
neutralizing the insurgent political leadership
and infrastructure.
* Border operations to provide surveillance and
control over possible infiltration routes.
* Civic action operations designed to improve the
quality of life of the host nation population and
to mobilize and motivate them to support their
government.
* Humanitarian relief operations, such as
distribution of food and medical supplies,
security and sanitation services, to provide
assistance to host country population and refugees
following natural or man made disasters.
* Liaison tasks upon the commitment of US
conventional forces. (9:8)
This counterinsurgency SAF package provided no only the
host country, but the US government and military an effective
campaign plan that could deter the effects of insurgency.
Prior to the December 1989 revision of FM 100-20, SAF's
were a composite organization of units organized under a
Special Forces Group headquarters. Figure 1 depicts the SAF
organization and its command relationships. Figure 2 shows
the composite organizations within the SAF.
Click here to view image
After Revision. Since the revision, which is now a joint
Army and Air Force manual, SAFs will no longer be just
organized around Special Forces Groups and counterinsurgency
operations. The Army now envisions the SAF as a diverse
organization that will be tailored to meet the requirements
of one of the four broad categories of LIC. Figure 3 depicts
a generic SAF organization that will consist of either a
joint or single service headquarters element with assets from
combat, combat support, and combat service support elements.
Special Forces, CA, PSYOP, engineer, medical, and military
police are just some units that may be included in the
organization. The revised concept still has a backup force
requirement, but this no longer comes from the US Army
brigade size force structure. The SAF backup organization
will now come from ground, air, and sea forces. The mixture
will be determined again based on mission. (7:2-35)
The change in doctrine and force organization was an
attempt to give greater organizational flexibility to the
SAF organization by drawing from a wider base of US military
forces.
Click here to view image
SAF in the Future
Since the real core of LIC is insurgency and
counterinsurgency, it is essential that the US focus on
reviving this type of SAF. While the US has had varying
degrees of LIC success with forces employed in three of the
four categories, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations
have not fared as well. This situation will continue until
some adjustments are made in military doctrine, national
strategy, and at the operational levels. Unless these
adjustments are made the US government and military will
remain functionally unable to plan and conduct effective FID
operations in insurgency affected friendly or allied nations
for the foreseeable future.
Doctrinal Analysis. There is no doubt that the US
military believes that the SAF concept is still viable as a
solution for FID operations. Doctrinally, the SAF concept
and organization have stayed on the books (FM 100-20,
Internal Defense and Development, November 1974; FM 100-20,
Low-Intensity Conflict, January 1981; and FM 100-20/AFM 2-20,
Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Final Draft),
June 1988) even though it was deleted as an operational
mission in 1973.
The basic problem with the doctrine and concept
throughout all revisions is that there is an illusion that
the SAF has been or will be a part of counterinsurgency LIC
operations. The truth is that for nearly twenty years SAFs
have not been employed in this type of mission. This reality
explains why both US government and military leaders have a
difficult time articulating and implementing a total LIC
strategy that works.
Between the first two military field manuals there is
almost no difference in the doctrinal SAF concept because it
was based solely on counterinsurgency. In the final draft
there are substantial changes that are cause for concern.
First, the SAF concept and organizations of the future are
generic and ill-defined based on each LIC type of mission.
When this occurs in military doctrine it causes confusion
not only at the operational and tactical level for military
units and USCTs, but at the strategic level for policymakers.
While there is a real need to update the SAF concept and
organization of the 1960s, current doctrine fails to define
clearly the who, what, when, how, and why for each specific
"hands-on" SAF organization. Before revision, the doctrine
defined in detail how a SAF would support counterinsurgency
operations. Revised doctrine must provide the same in-depth
guidance, only now it must do this for each broad category of
LIC.
Secondly, revised military doctrine does not explain
the special requirements of each SAF headquarters based on
mission. This gives the impression that a generic SAF
headquarters in the future could handle each diverse LIC
mission. The problem with this is that generic headquarters
tend to be led and staffed by elements that neither
understand the multidimensional LIC "phenomena" nor are they
trained to handle its diverse relationships. While this is
true for all LIC missions it is even more so for insurgency
and counterinsurgency. This situation is one of the primary
reasons that US FID operations have failed to successfully
counter insurgency in the Third World over the last 15 years.
The SAF supporting counterinsurgency operations can best
be commanded and controlled by the organization that has
always been trained for the mission--Special forces. The
counterinsurgency SAF must be wrapped around this type of
organization if the US intends to successfully counter future
insurgent threats in the Third World. Most of the current
rhetoric written about the revitalization of SOF validates
the idea that Special Forces' units are the force of choice
for counterinsurgency operations. They are trained in the
techniques of "nation building", which is the best indirect
way to counter insurgent threats. This does not mean that
this type of SAF is just one service because it must be joint
to be effective. The headquarters must be a "purple suit"
organization -- staffed by trained SOF assets from each
service, but led by US Special Forces.
The last substantial difference is in the organization
of backup forces. While the older field manuals provided a
detailed concept and organization, the final draft details
very little other than there is a need for ground, air, and
sea forces to backup the SAF. It is essential that these
backup forces be identified and designated for this type of
mission to develop forces that are partially language
qualified, area-oriented, and trained in IDAD. When trained
they must be able to supplement a SAF with operational units
consistent with mission requirements.
Strategical Analysis. While the SAF option provides
the best solution for counterinsurgency operations,
implementation will remain elusive without a definitive
national LIC strategy. The inability of the National Command
Authority (NCA) to establish an Umbrella Concept for LIC that
focuses on insurgency stems from the problem of altering core
policy-making systems. (19:3-2) This has been a difficult
task to accomplish because:
traditionally the processes, habits and
educational means of systems which are involved
in defense and foreign affairs policy-making are
entrenched in thinking based on conventional
Soviet/East-West terms. (19:2-21)
While this situation is changing, the NCA has not been
able to incorporate the political, economic, and military
instruments of power into a "work-together-without-rivalry"
package beyond support for crisis or ad-hoc situations. In
other words, the long term strategy requirements to support
counterinsurgency have been left barren. Without a
definitive Umbrella Concept that focuses all government
agencies into a unity of effort, there is no thread that
binds strategy to operations in an insurgency environment.
(20:1) For the SAF concept to work even better than it
did from 1962-1973 this unity of effort at the national
level must be in place and it must be proactive. (20:16-18)
Unless close interagency support exists between the civilian
and military working groups, LIC environments cannot be
effectively combat-managed. (20:3)
Besides implementing a complete Umbrella Concept of LIC,
the administration must get the mandated LIC Board going.
Once established as an executive board with representation
from all the key government and military departments, this
organization should help straighten out the strategic
entanglements that prevent a cohesive counterinsurgency
strategy from being executed.
Operational Analysis. The lack of a comprehensive
National LIC Umbrella Concept and a SAF organization to
support it impacts resoundingly at the operational levels.
The net effect is that the CINC and USCT organizations who
have to execute FID actions in an insurgent environment are
impotent. They remain hollow without the expertise,
resources, and guidance that allows them to develop effective
FID campaign plans in their regional areas or countries of
responsibility.
Each CINC now has a Special Operations Command (SOC)
Headquarters assigned in each theater. This subordinate
organization is responsible for all in-theater LIC operations
and it would become a JTF when required. Additionally, a
Tactical Army Special Operations Command (TASOC) has been
established (theoretically) under the SOC to command and
control US Army operations in support of LIC. This
organizational concept may be the beginning of the
revitalization of the SAF organization. However, it is far
from producing the "hands-on" forces and capabilities
required to support the FID requirements of USCTs in
insurgent affected countries.
While the actions being taken at the theater level are
encouraging, the in-country teams are still without the
immediate help they need. A near term solution to this
problem would be to assign SOF assets to the SAO. This would
provide the SAO with capabilities essential to the support of
FID counterinsurgency requirements, that do not currently
exist in-country. The SOF assets must be a core of trained
specialists in counterinsurgency operations, intelligence,
logistics, engineering, medical, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPs.
Addition specialties could be added based on requirements.
The team must be joint and represent the SOF assets of each
service. There also must be a liaison element on this team
for any designated backup forces. This organization must be
officially part of the in-country team, not a temporary
Mobile Training Team. Temporary teams do not produce
comprehensive results. This has been a large problem with
FID programs. This action would insure not only immediate
proactive support of the FID program, but it would give the
SAO a permanent organization for the long term. This quick
fix would put some "bite" back into the less than successful
FID programs; at least until a counterinsurgency SAF concept
becomes an active reality.
Conclusions
US military doctrine and national policy have remained
vague and unresponsive when it comes to executing an
effective counterinsurgency strategy in support of affected
friendly or allied nations. Unless this deficiency is
reversed the United States' ability to protect its national
interests and the security interests of its friends and
allies in the future will be difficult. Therefore, as the
NCA lays out its National Umbrella Concept for LIC it must
ensure the revitalization and modernization of a SAF concept
of operations that will counter insurgency in the Third World
in the future. While reviving this type of SAF concept is
only part of the solution for a complex environment, it will
restart a capability that should have never been lost. It
will insure that the focus is returned to the operational
level where the battle against insurgency is won or lost.
SAF provides the means to focus results from the bottom up
rather from the top down.
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8. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the
Air Force. Military Operations in Low-Intensity
Conflict (Final Draft), FM 100-20 and AFM 2-20.
Washington D.C., 24 June 1988.
9. Headquarters, Department of the Army. US Army
Operational Concept for Special Operations Forces
(SOF), TRADOC PAM 525-34. Fort Monroe, Virginia,
26 July 1984.
10. JCS Pub 3-07 (Working Draft). Doctrine for Joint
Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 6 September 1988.
11. Klare, Michael T. and Kornbluh, Peter, eds. Low
Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency.
Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties.
1988.
12. Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Commitment to
Freedom, Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy
Instrument in the Third World (RCWG-2). May 1988.
13. Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Supporting U.S.
Strategy for Third World Conflict (RCWG-1). June
1988, pp. 1-87.
14. Simpson, Charles M. III. Inside the Green Berets, The
First Thirty Years. California: Presido Press,
1983.
15. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. Conference Report.
16. The White House. National Security Action Memorandum
No. 124 (NSAM 124). 18 January 1962, declassified
on 11 August 1978.
17. The White House. National Security Action Memorandum
No. 182 (NSAM 182), 18 January 1962, declassified
on 11 August 1978.
18. The White House. National Security Strategy of the
United States (NSS). January 1988.
19. United States Special Operations Command. Umbrella
Concept for Low Intensity Conflict Volume I, May
1989.
20. United States Special Operations Command. Umbrella
Concept for Low Intensity Conflict Volume II, May
1989.
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