El Dorado Canyon: Strategic Strike, National Objectives
AUTHOR Major Ralph J. Jodice II, USAF
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: EL DORADO CANYON: STRATEGIC STRIKE, NATIONAL
OBJECTIVES
THESIS: El Dorado Canyon was designed to be a strategic
airstrike aimed at achieving the national security objectives
of the United States.
ISSUES: State sponsored terrorism was on the rise in the
early to mid 1980's. Leading the attack was Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi and the country of Libya. Solely, Qaddafi singled
out the United States and was determined to undermine its
influence around the globe. Training, funding, equipping,
and diplomatically supporting international terrorist
organizations became the norm for Qaddafi. The potential for
hijackings and bombings put the United States, its allies and
friends in danger anywhere in the world. The United States
attempted to counter Qaddafi's state sponsored terrorism with
economic, political, and diplomatic elements of power.
However, none proved effective leaving innocent people as
victims. El Dorado Canyon was the United States' answer to
employing its military element of power. By using a joint
precise, powerful, night, surprise attack, President Reagan
unleashed the military might of the United States.
Destruction of the infrastructure of state sponsored
terrorism inside Libya was the military objective. However,
the national security objectives were to give credibility,
clarity, and consistency to the remaining elements of power.
What had been futilely attempted prior to El Dorado Canyon
was successfully achieved on 15 April 1986. El Dorado
Canyon, and the events surrounding it, showed all terrorist
that the United States was determined to, and capable of,
combating terrorism worldwide.
CONCLUSION: A military airstrike like El Dorado Canyon is
not the answer to combating every terrorist situation.
Rather, El Dorado Canyon is a prime example that for the
political, economic, and diplomatic elements of power to be
effective there must be, as a minimum, the threat of a
significant military element of power. Any country must
closely coordinate all its elements of power in order to
effectively counter state sponsored terrorism.
EL DORADO CANYON: STRATEGIC STRIKE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: El Dorado Canyon was designed to be a
strategic airstrike aimed at achieving the national security
objectives of the United States.
I. The continual increase of terrorism in the 1980s
A. Employing the elements of power
B. State sponsored terrorism defined
II. The role of Libya
A. Funding, equipping, and training terrorists
B. Operations supported by Qaddafi
III. Events leading up to El Dorado Canyon
A. Terrorism against the United States
B. Events prior to March and April 1986
1. Line of death
2. More terrorism - the Berlin disco bombing
IV. The joint airstrike - Operation El Dorado Canyon
A. Short and long term objectives
1. National security objectives
2. Military objectives
B. Selection of forces and targets
1. Rules of Engagement
2. Execution
C. Initial strike results
V. Short term results
A. American public, media, and congressional responses
B. Libyan, Soviet, and Arab responses
C. World opinion
1. Western Europe
VI. What did El Dorado Canyon accomplish?
A. Credibility, clarity, and consistency
B. National security objectives achieved
VII. National objectives and the military element of power
EL DORADO CANYON: STRATEGIC STRIKE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
In the early to mid 1980's, the United States was at
war. The "war" was not a conventional war as thought of in
today's modern society nor in the classical Clausewitzen
sense. Rather, it was a very unconventional "war". The
"war" was declared upon the U.S. and many western nations by
state sponsored terrorists. Spearheading the terrorist's
effort was the nation of Libya and its radical, irrational
leader -- Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Since his overthrow of the
Sanusi government and assumption of power in 1969, Qaddafi
continually confronted the U.S. The new Libyan leader was
determined to declare "victory" over the "capitalist"
superpower. Whether smuggling weapons into Sudan, supporting
Black September terrorists, desiring the assassination of
Henry Kissinger during the Middle East peace accords, or
attempting subversion of the White House, labor unions, black
organizations, oil companies, and politically influential
individuals, Colonel Qaddafi made his realities of state
sponsored terrorism felt worldwide.1
By 1986, the terrorist activities of Libya, specifically
aimed at the United States, were at an all time high. The
hijackings of TWA Flight 847, the cruise ship the Achille
1 Focus On Libya; February 1984 to June 1989. A Resource
Compendium, PEMCON Ltd. Washington D.C., 1989, p. 5.
Laro, and Egypt Air Flight 648, followed by the Rome and
Vienna Airport massacres, and the Berlin Disco bombing, all
inflicted numerous, unnecessary deaths to American and
international citizens. Leading the charge against state
sponsored terrorism was the United States under President
Ronald Reagan. In an attempt to influence terrorist states
and to achieve the United States' national security
objectives, diplomatic, economic, and political elements of
power were put in motion. However, none proved effective,
and Qaddafi's violent activities continued unabated.
Following many discussions with advisors and
international leaders, President Reagan concluded that
Qaddafi would only understand the reprisal of military might.
The U.S. had not yet employed its military element of power
aimed specifically at the heart of state sponsored terrorism.
Shooting down a few MIGs and sinking some patrol boats had no
impact on Qaddafi's actions and was only a prelude of things
to come. Consequently, in late 1985, the U.S. began planning
for a strategic strike intended to inflict significant damage
to the heart of the terrorist's infrastructure. The concept
for El Dorado Canyon was born. El Dorado Canyon was designed
to be a strategic airstrike aimed at achieving the national
security objectives of the United States. Libya's role
amongst the terrorist's camps was very influential. It was
time to topple the Libyan leader's reign of fear on citizens
worldwide.
State sponsored terrorism poses a unique problem to any
nation. A state that makes its resources -- financial,
logistic, training, intelligence, and political -- available
for terrorism vastly enhances the striking power of
terrorists. Of even more profound concern is the damage done
by state sponsored terrorism to the fragile international
order. State support is what helps to transform terrorism
from an intelligence and law enforcement problem into the
international political threat.2 This was the position of
Libya and the regime of Qaddafi by the mid 1980's.
To Muammar Qaddafi, terrorism is a means to an end -- his
"victory". He sees himself as having the sole responsibility
of uniting the Arab world and ridding it of the state of
Israel. To achieve these objectives, Qaddafi has pursued a
foreign policy with four purposes: to weaken the role of
Western (Christian) Democracies in the Middle East, to
destroy Israel, to attack Israeli supporters, and to expand
Libya's role in the Middle East and Africa.3 With limited
economic and political capability to achieve these goals,
Libya has relied on a revolutionary armed struggle. Through
the use of state sponsored terrorism, Qaddafi possessed the
2 Levitt, Geoffrey M. Democracies Against Terror; The
Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism, The Center for
Strategic and International Studies Washington D.C., Praeger
1988, p. 1.
3 Parks, Hays W., Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
"Crossing the Line." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
November 1986, pp. 40-52.
capability to influence the world without being a world
leader. As early as 1977, Libya was listed in the annual
report to the U.S. Department of Defense as the fourth major
threat to the U.S. behind the Soviet Union, Communist China,
and North Korea. Cuba was ranked fifth.4
During this period, Qaddafi's support of terrorism was
total. Through the use of East Germans, Syrians,
Palestinians, Soviets, and their corresponding nation's
support, Libya was capable of training, equipping, funding,
and diplomatically supporting a host of international
terrorist organizations. Qaddafi made Libya the most visible
participant in terrorism. He acquired the much needed
publicity to meet his own internal requirements of legitimacy
and to demonstrate his effectiveness. Qaddafi's tool of
using state sponsored terrorism to accomplish his goals was
working. He was successfully eroding Western influence in
the Middle East while striking directly at the foremost
superpower in the world.
The events leading to the potential employment of a
strategic strike against the heart of state sponsored
terrorism was continually rising, especially in 1984 and
1985. Regardless of the economic and political measures by
the United States, Americans were the targets of terrorism in
all corners of the world. In June 1985, the hijacking of TWA
4 Focus On Libya, p. 5.
Flight 847 resulted in the death on an off duty Navy diver.
During the process, 37 American men were taken hostage and
subsequently dispersed throughout Southern Beirut. As the
summer progressed, two attacks linked to the Abu Nidal
terrorist organization resulted in the injury of nine
Americans. On 7 October, the Achille Laro was hijacked and a
69 year old disabled American was killed. Shortly
thereafter, the Abu Nidal struck again and hijacked Egypt Air
Flight 684. Immediately, Americans and Israelis were singled
out. The last and most deadly act of 1985 occurred on 27
December. The Abu Nidal attacked at the TWA and El Al ticket
counters in the Rome and Vienna Airports. Eighteen people
were killed -- five were Americans. In all cases, the
"fingerprints" of Qaddafi and his "strangest collection of
misfits, looney tunes, and squalid criminals"5 were clearly
on the deaths of many innocent people.
Again, the United States answered these attacks with
more unilateral political and economic measures. On 7
January 1986, the President declared a "national emergency"
and issued an Executive Order to deal with the immediate
threat to U.S. national security.6 Libyan assets in the
5 Reagan, Ronald. "The New Network of Terrorist States."
Terrorism, Volume 9, Number 2, 1987, pp. 101-112.
6 Trebon, Gregory L., Major, U.S. Air Force. "Libyan
State Sponsored Terrorism -- What Did Operation El Dorado
Canyon Accomplish?" Air Command and Staff College, Air
University, 1988, p. 15.
U.S. were frozen. All remaining economic ties were severed.
Any Americans still in Libya were ordered to leave
immediately. Also, the U.S. attempted to get further support
from its European Allies, with little avail. President
Reagan and the American people were tired of waiting for
economic sanctions to work. As each day passed, the
prospects for employing the military element of power grew
larger.
The events that followed in March 1986 were essential to
the execution of El Dorado Canyon. The United States was
employing its strong military arm through a Freedom of
Navigation exercise challenging Qaddafi's "line of death" in
the Gulf of Sidra. During the exercise, Libyan patrol boats
and surface-to-air missiles sites were attacked as they
presented a potential threat to the Navy's Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean. Qaddafi reacted by sending a message to the
Libyan Embassy in East Berlin directing them "...to conduct a
terrorist attack against Americans to cause maximum and
indiscriminate casualties."7 The interception of this
message was essential to accelerating the on-going planning
for a punitive strike against Qaddafi's terrorism.
Before the President could react with a well planned
strike, terrorists struck twice within three days. On 2
7 "Reagan Ordered Air Strikes to Preempt Libyan
Terrorists." Aviation Week and Space Technoloay, April 27,
1987, pp. 22-23.
April, a bomb exploded aboard TWA Flight 840 enroute to
Athens. Four Americans were killed. Although the attack
appeared to be Syrian sponsored, Qaddafi was quick to
congratulate the terrorists and warned of continued
escalation of violent acts toward Americans around the
world.8 Intelligence data from the Berlin Disco bombing on
5 April clearly showed Libyan knowledge and support of the
attack. Again, Qaddafi was full of congratulatory comments
to the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin on its success. This
event finally triggered the Administration. President Reagan
was determined to retaliate and had built a dossier with
substantial evidence against the Qaddafi regime. Contrary to
the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency, the President
decided to use military force. He was determined to destroy
the infrastructure of state sponsored terrorism in Libya.
There were five primary national security objectives
that the United States wanted to accomplish with El Dorado
Canyon. First, the U.S. wanted to deter Qaddafi from
continued support of state sponsored terrorism. Second, the
President wanted people in power in Libya to see that
Qaddafi's positions on state sponsored terrorism would be
detrimental to their country. Possibly, this could force a
change in Libyan leadership. Third, the U.S. wanted to prove
to the world its commitment to fighting state sponsored
8 Trebon, "Libyan State Sponsored Terrorism," p. 18.
terrorism. Fourth, this would be a warning shot to
terrorists. Finally, the U.S. hoped to gather tougher
support from its allies and friends in the combined effort in
deterring terrorism.9
On 15 April 1986, the United States Air Force and Navy
launched Operation El Dorado Canyon aimed at destroying
Qaddafi's terrorist infrastructure. The military goals of
the raid were to destroy the terrorist training and command
and control facilities. However, the national objective was
to impose the will of the United States over the will of the
terrorist activities stemming from Libya. In classic
Clausewitzian terms, the U.S. was using its military element
of power to accomplish its political will. Wishing to deter
future terrorist activities, the U.S. was showing terrorists
worldwide that they would pay the price for conducting such
aggressive acts. President Reagan stated the purpose of the
attack was to "...not only diminish Colonel Qaddafi's ability
to export terror; it will provide him with incentives and
reason to alter his criminal behavior."10 Additionally,
the President hoped the attack would provide significant
impetus to the Libyan people to force Qaddafi from power.
The raid was designed to strike directly at the heart of
Qaddafi's ability to export terrorism. The final targets
9 Trebon, "Libyan State Sponsored Terrprism," p. 31.
10 Ibid, p. 22.
were selected at the National Security Council level and
within the circle of the President's advisors. Ultimately,
five targets were selected:
1. The command and control headquarters for Libyan
terrorism at the Aziziyah barracks,
2. The military facilities at Tripoli's main
airport,
3. The underwater sabotage training facility at
Side Bilal,
4. Another terrorist command post at the
Jamahiriyah military barracks in Benghazi, and
5. The Benina Air Base southeast of Benghazi.11
The first four targets were selected because of their
direct connection to terrorist activities. The Benina
airfield was attacked to preempt Libyan fighter aircraft from
intercepting the incoming strike package.
In order to accomplish the desired political and
military objectives, the selected forces needed the
capability to strike all five targets simultaneously with
pinpoint accuracy, carry enough firepower to do significant
damage, and employ the element of surprise. The current
Naval aviation assets in the Mediterranean could not perform
11 Anno, Stephen E., Colonel, U.S. Air Force, and
Einspahr, William E., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force.
"Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned:
Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya
Raid." The Air War College, Air University, 1988, pp. 49-50.
the mission alone. Therefore, the United States Air Force's
F-111F's stationed in the United Kingdom were added. Between
the Air Force's F-111F's and the Navy's A-6E's, the President
had the aircraft necessary to conduct a precise, damaging
night attack. Overall, approximately 100 aircraft (including
the EF-111, KC-10, KC-135, A-7, F/A-18, F-14, and E-2C) were
employed to achieve the desired results.12
Target area deconfliction between the services was
accomplished by assigning the Navy the Benghazi targets and
the Air Force the Tripoli targets. This insured each service
had its own area of operations and decreased the need for
extensive interservice planning within this joint operation.
Destroying the targets, reducing the probability of
collateral damage and casualties, and minimizing the possible
loss of American aircraft were the foundation for the rules
of engagement (ROE) developed for El Dorado Canyon. The
mission ROE required that the aircrews make only one pass
over the target (no reattacks), weapon systems be fully
operational, and the targets be positively identified on
radar prior to bomb release. With the concept of operations
12 Anno and Einspahr, "Command and Control and
Communications Lessons Learned," p. 51.
developed, targets identified, forces selected, and the
mission ROE established, there only remained obtaining
diplomatic approval for staging the overflight.13
Prime Minister Thatcher approved the staging of Air
Force refueling aircraft and F/EF-111's from bases within
England. However, overflight permission from France and
Spain was not granted. This added approximately 1300
nautical miles each way to the route of flight (equating to
six to seven hours of additional flight time for the Air
Force aircraft), not to mention the additional air refueling
support requirement.
At 0200 (local Libyan time) on 15 April i986, the
devastating might of the United States' military element of
power fell on the leader of state sponsored terrorism with
overpowering success. Tactical surprise was achieved, and
the required damage to all targets accomplished. Collateral
damage was kept to a minimum (even though the French Embassy
was damaged), while the Air Force lost one F-111F. The
military objectives of the U.S. were achieved, but only time
would tell if the full effect of U.S. political goals would
be accomplished.
The reaction on the home front was extremely positive.
The American people responded with overwhelming support.
Well over 70% of the people agreed with the President's
13 Trebon, "Libyan State Sponsored Terrorism," p. 25.
actions and would back him again, if necessary. The media
reaction was also in favor of the strike, while reaction in
the political arena was mixed. Some politicians were afraid
that even though the U.S. used military force this would not
deter Qaddafi. Rather, this would strengthen his position
and further increase his use of terrorism.
The European community was generally critical and
bitter. As allies, most felt excluded by not being consulted
in the ultimate decision to use military force. The European
Economic Community (EEC) was harsh. They felt "up-staged" by
the U.S. because they had finally decided in the previous few
days to exert tougher sanctions on Libya. They were also
afraid the strike would bring increased terrorism' to Europe.
The United States offered plenty of opportunities to the
Europeans for a collective response prior to the strike.
However, none were fully accepted. President Reagan and the
American people were pushed to the limit. As far as both
were concerned, the U.S. military successfully completed
their assigned task.
Response from the Soviets was critital. They claimed it
was just another attempt by the United States to bring the
world closer to a global conflict. The Arab reaction was
mixed. They had to back a fellow Arab nation but were slow
to condemn the American raid. Furthermore, they did not want
to join in unilateral economic sanctions called for by
Qaddafi against the U.S.. The mild reaction by the Arab
states showed how Qaddafi was isolating himself, and his
country, from the rest of the world.
On the negative side, El Dorado Canyon did not
immediately stop terrorism aimed at the United States. Two
days after the raid an American and two British hostages in
Lebanon were killed. A note on one of the bodies said the
killings were in retaliation for the U.S. airstrikes. On the
same day, the communications officer at the U.S. Embassy in
Sudan was shot and seriously wounded. On 19 April 1986, four
Libyan terrorists attempting to bomb the U.S. Armed Forces
Officer's Club in Ankara were arrested by Turkish police.
Meanwhile, bomb threats were received by U.S. airlines,
government, and military installations around the world.14
In all cases, Libyan involvement was evident.
For the political, economic, diplomatic, and military
elements of power to be effective, the United States had to
establish comprehensive positions of credibility, clarity,
and consistency from which it could further employ its
national security policies.
Credibility was important to demonstrate a determination
by the U.S. to oppose terrorism and to help foster an
atmosphere in which the prohibitions against state sponsored
14 Marineau, Charles R., Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.
"The 1986 U.S. Airstrikes on Libya: A Prototype for Future
Military Action Against Terrorism?" The Naval War College,
1988, pp. 14-15.
terrorism were taken seriously.15 It is fair to say, that
the strength shown by the U.S. against Libya in 1986 has
played some role in the marked decrease in Libyan supported
terrorism. The combined effect of the U.S. military action,
followed closely by a strong demonstration of united Western
political opposition to Libyan terrorism, proved significant
in the decrease of state sponsored terrorism against the U.S.
and Western Europe.
The attempt to achieve collective enforcement against
terrorist activities from many allies and friends can fall
apart when confronted with the complex and ambiguous
realities of specific situations.16 Such was the case
between the United States and Western Europe. Clearly,
Qaddafi could see that the U.S. and Europe could not agree on
economic and political sanctions prior to the raid. However,
following El Dorado Canyon and the EEC's resolve to support
collective sanctions, it became obvious to Qaddafi, and other
terrorist states, that a united economic front can be
hazardous to a nation's well being. The people of Libya
would suffer because of Qaddafi's policies. Consequently,
internal dissension from the Libyan people would pressure
Qaddafi to stop his support of state sponsored terrorism.
15 Levitt, Democracies Against Terrors, pp. 98-99.
16 Ibid, pp. 100-101.
The most difficult and important element of collective
counterterrorism action was finding the proper balance
between the requirements of economic and political sanctions
and preserving the principles which a country represents.17
The element of consistency from the nations attempting to
counter state sponsored terrorism needed to be established.
When the European Community joined the U.S. with collective
actions aimed at Libyan terrorism, the full effect of
cooperative sanctions made their impact. Finally, Qaddafi
felt the combined, consistent economic and political
ramifications being inflicted upon his country. This proved
to have more of a lasting effect on his support of terrorism
than the short term military actions of El Dorado Canyon.
Today, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi is still the leader of
Libya and remains active in state sponsored terrorism. Was
the United States' effort on 15 April 1986 in vain?
El Dorado Canyon solidified the efforts to combat Libyan
sponsored terrorism over a decade and a half in one single
strike. It brought the democratic countries of the world
together in a united front to allow significant sanctions
against Libya. The most important outcome -- Americans are
not being attacked by terrorists at the alarming rate of the
early to mid 1980's. The President demonstrated his
willingness to use military force, as a last resort, against
17 Levitt, Democracies Against Terror, pp. 101-104.
state sponsored terrorism. Meanwhile, the American military
proved its capability to deliver military might quickly,
powerfully, and precisely at targets anywhere in the world.
From the onset, the United States knew that El Dorado
Canyon could not singularly bring a complete end to state
sponsored terrorism. The U.S. wanted to reduce terrorism to
a level where it no longer threatened the lives of American
people or infringed upon the country's international affairs.
In order to achieve these national security objective, the
efforts of the economic, political, diplomatic, and military
elements of power had to be coordinated. The U.S. learned
that terrorism escalated when the military element was
absent. As a minimum, there must be the threat of military
reprisal to give credibility to the remaining elements of
power. El Dorado Canyon did just that. It proved to
terrorists, and their sponsoring states, that behind the
economic and political actions stands the military power
capable of inflicting an appropriate and timely response.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Anno, Stephen E., Colonel, U.S. Air Force, and Einspahr,
William E., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force.
"Command and Control and Communications Lessons
Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada
Invasion, Libya Raid." The Air War College, Air
University, 1988.
2. Blundy, David and Lycett, Andrew. Qaddafi and the Libyan
Revolution. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Ma.
1987.
3. Focus on Libya: February 1984 to June 1989. A Resource
Compendium, PEMCON Ltd., Washington D.C. 1989.
4. Hewitt, Christopher. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist
Policies'. University of America Press, Lanham, Md.
1984.
5. Jenkins, Brian M. Military Force May Not Be Ruled Out.
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Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington D.C., Praeger, 1988.
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Navy. "The 1986 U.S. Airstrikes on Libya: A
Prototype for Future Military Action Against
Terrorism?" The Naval War College, 1988.
8. Micholus, Edward F., Snadler, Todd and Murdock, Jean M.
International Terrorism in the 1980's: A Chronology
of Events, Volume I, 1980-1983. Iowa State
University Press, Ames, Ia. 1989.
9. Parks, Hays W., Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.
"Crossing the Line." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. November 1986, pp. 40-52.
10. "Reagan Ordered Air Strikes to Preempt Libyan
Terrorists." Aviation Week and Space Technology.
April 21, 1987, pp. 22-23.
11. Reagan, Ronald. "The New Network of Terrorist States."
Terrorism, Volume 9, Number 2, 1987, pp. 101-112.
12. Trebon, Gregory L., Major, U.S. Air Force. "Libyan
State Sponsored Terrorism -- What Did Operation El
Dorado Canyon Accomplish?" Air Command and Staff
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Operational Challenge: Defining Victory in
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Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, 1988.
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