Maritime Support Force - Is The S.O.S. Too Late?
AUTHOR Major Thomas A. Heffner, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE MARITIME SUPPORT FORCE - IS THE S.O.S. TOO LATE?
The U.S., as a maritime power, has long recognized and
depended on the dual functions of its maritime support force
as it relates to contributing to national security. In
peace, we rely upon the merchant marine for economic
viability and support; in war we turn to this force to
transport military reinforcements and sustenance. This
connectivity was cited by General Eisenhower who stated,
"When final victory is ours, there is no organization that
will share the credit more deservedly then the American
merchant marine."
However, even though various government programs have
been implemented in an attempt to maintain a healthy support
force, the results have been poor. Today's maritime force
has declined to a point where its existence is threatened.
Though the U.S. is still the largest economic trader, only
four percent of the material is carried by U.S. flag ships.
Today the U.S. ranks 10th in the world in size of fleets and
has no ships under construction.
Recognizing the potential of a dwindling maritime force,
the government , via the Military Sealift Command, created a
reserve force of merchant ships for recall in an emergency.
While the National Defense Reserve Fleet and The Ready
Reserve Force have acquired ships, they are plagued with a
fleet of near obsolete ships, in poor condition, and which in
all probability could not mobilize as planned or needed.
But the current condition of both the government owned
fleet and the commercial fleet did not happen over night.
The maritime industry has long been troubled by: the
elimination of government subsidies, the closing of
shipyards, the loss of guaranteed cargo hauling programs, and
a shrinking pool of mariners. These problems, when coupled
with the degraded reliability of the reserve fleet, produce a
serious challenge for the nation.
The challenge facing the nation is what size/shape the
merchant marine support force should be. Unfortunately,
though establishing a connection between the support force
and the nation's well being, it is the fiscal constraint
which will influence the size of the force. In today's
deficit reduction atmosphere, the likelihood of the
government spending $2.0 billion annually to rescue the
maritime support force is dim.
Therefore, though many recognize the historical and
contemporary role of the maritime support force, both to the
economy and the larger maritime strategy pursued by the
nation, the condition continues to worsen. Consequently, the
deteriorated maritime support capability may very well prove
to be the "Achilles Heel" to the nation's defense.
THE MARITIME SUPPORT FORCE: IS THE S.O.S. TOO LATE?
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. The national security in recent years of
the U.S. is directly linked to the ability of its maritime
support forces, (i.e. naval strategic fleet, merchant
marine fleet, and shipbuilding base) to project and sustain
combat forces overseas; however careful analysis reveals
the current maritime situation to be an "Achilles Heel" to
the national defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. National Security And Maritime Policy
B. U.S. Merchant Marine: Past And Present
II. ORIENTATION OF FEDERAL MARITIME FLEET
A. Military Sealift Command
B. National Defense Reserve Fleet
C. Ready Reserve Force
III. PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE MARITIME FORCES
A. Government Financial Support Programs
B. Shipyard Reduction
C. Military Useful Ships
D. Cargo Preference Legislation
E. Manning Deficits
IV. SIZING U.S. MARITIME FLEET FOR DEFENSE
A. Current Level
B. Epansion
C. Maintenance Of Existing Capability
D. Planned Shrinkage
THE MARITIME SUPPORT FORCE - IS THE S.O.S. TOO LATE?
In a 1984 memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy,
Admiral James D. Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations,
stated "it is timely that Strategic Sealift be formally
recognized as a distinct Navy function along with Sea
Control and Power Projection."1 The Strategic Sealift
Planning and Operations Doctrine of the U.S. Navy
defines Strategic Sealift as "the capability to deploy
and sustain military forces wherever needed through
afloat prepositioning, sea movement, and delivery ashore
of ammunition, equipment, supplies, petroleum products,
and personnel."2 The preceding reveals one of the less
glamorous, but very important elements of the big
picture of the U.S. Maritime Strategy --- STRATEGIC
SEALIFT. It does not involve very many uniformed naval
personnel, compared with the other naval unions: sealift
shipping is crewed by civilians, either civil servants
in the case of many Military Sealift Command(MSC)
nucleus fleet ships or employees of commercial
firms(i.e. Merchant Marines).
Every president since World War II has asserted his
support of a strong U.S. sealift capability, but for the
most part such statements have been little more than
rhetoric. The problems plaguing the nation's Merchant
Marine fleet are not new. However, in an environment
where contingency plans have as a premise "come as you
are," the lack of a viable merchant fleet becomes more
sensitive. The national security in recent years of the
U.S. is directly linked to the ability of its maritime
support forces,(i.e. naval strategic fleet, merchant
marine fleet, and shipbuilding base) to project and
sustain combat forces overseas; however careful analysis
reveals the current maritime situation to be an
"Achilles Heel" to the national defense.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND MARITIME POLICY. America's
security is tied to its military strategy which is
designed: to retain U.S. political identity; to protect
the U.S., including its allies; to enhance economic
security; and to encourage international stability
supportive of the vital interests of this country and
its allies. A supporting foundation to this strategy is
a maritime infrastructure capable of providing global
strategic mobility. America has long recognized the
ability to reinforce and resupply forward deployed
forces is essential to execution of its military
strategy. Further, that while airlift is the quickest
and most flexible of our mobility assets, it is
strategic sealift which will inevitably carry the bulk
of our reinforcement and resupply in any crisis. This
position is supported by the experiences of the Korea
and Vietnam wars in which "97 percent of all equipment,
ammunition, and other supplies and consumables used by
the U.S. was carried to the combat zone by ships."3
Accordingly, the U.S. has had a long track record
of implementing legislation in an attempt to more
clearly alighn its maritime policy with the security
role such policies are designed to support. This was
first seen with the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which
formally recognized the auxiliary role of merchant ships
in wartime and during emergencies. The act stated that
"the U.S. shall have a merchant marine capable of
serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of
war."4 This same legislation created a construction
loan fund which made available low-interest capital, in
the hope of stimulating shipbuilding. It did not.
Some years later President Roosevelt incorporated
in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 a more comprehensive
set of initiatives to develop and encourage the
maintenance of the merchant marine force through
favorable tax laws. Through a series of special
non-taxable capital reserve funds, operators of merchant
ships were encouraged to deposit earnings to ensure that
monies were available for vessel replacement. Thereby
attempting to ensure long-term viability of the
subsidized fleet.
More recently the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, and
later amendments, consolidated the special reserve funds
into a single capital construction fund which served the
same purpose as earlier accounts. The 1970 act also
made most segments of the merchant marine fleet eligible
for tax treatment previously only accorded to subsidized
operators. In an effort to control the high cost of
supporting a merchant marine fleet, the act also indexed
wages; set upper limits on subsidizes; and established
new crew limits for vessels. The act envisioned the
results being a 300 ship building program over a ten
year period. However, fewer than 200 ships were built
by 1980.
U.S. MERCHANT MARINE: PAST AND PRESENT. In the
past, as trade prospered, the various sectors of the
maritime community were tied together on the basis of
profitability. Since 1936, this profitability has been
based on the government's decision to attempt to
maintain the maritime industry through subsidization.
For decades, as the industry was challenged by overseas
competitors, U.S. government subsidies continued to
cushion and insulate the well being of the operators.
With the Construction Differential Subsidy(CDS) in
force, U.S. shipping purchased new ships that were
constructed in U.S. yards. Similarly, Operating
Differential Subsidies(ODS) have been provided to
certain U.S. flag flying ships. Thereby reducing the
wage costs encountered by owners of U.S. ships.
However, the trend has been a gradual decline in
the effectiveness of these subsidies in the last few
decades, with a marked drop-off during the Reagan
administration. Entering into office with policies
favoring both strong national security and free trade,
his administration sought to reduce or eliminate
subsidies to U.S. industries that otherwise could not
compete. Specifically, in the maritime area, the CDS
for private shipyards was deleted in 1982. The ODS
continues, but in reduced form.
Thus, as a result of market features and current
policies, U.S. commercial capabilities, both shipping
and shipbuilding,continue to decline. For most
Americans however, there is little appreciation of the
continued decline of the U.S. maritime industries and
the larger implication of this decline for the national
defense. In part this perception is due to the
un-glamorous nature associated with this industry and
the support role it does. Yet, a quick review of the
following facts highlight just how severe the current
situation is.
* In 1970 the U.S. had 18 major shipping companies.
Each operated five or more ships with a total of more
than 430 ships in service. Today by contrast, there
are four major companies, with a total of 88 ships that
operate in the foreign trade.
* U.S. is the largest trading nation in the world,
yet "our merchant marine only carries four percent of
our ocean going trade."5
* In 1980 "142 ocean going ships were being built
in 19 different U.S. shipyards. Today there are only
nine shipyards in business - all for the Navy."6
Presently there are no ocean going commercial ships
under construction in the U.S.
* The U.S. merchant fleet now ranks 10th in world
wide ships owned - the Soviets are number two.
* The average age of an American merchant marine is
50 years, and rising.
Further, projections are that the decline in U.S.
maritime industries will continue. While arguments can
be made regarding the impact of this decline, U.S.
history has shown "the well established need for
American flag shipping to serve as a reliable vehicle in
meeting the nation's economic and security needs."7
The preceding briefly addressed the national
security aspect of the maritime force and the current
state of the industry. Though recognizing that during
the Reagan administration the active duty USN fleet grew
significantly, it must be remembered that the bulk of
the sealift required to sustain contingency war plans
consist of other government owned/merchant marine
shipping. The U.S. government owns an active and a
inactive maritime fleet. The active fleet is controlled
by the MSC, while the inactive fleet is managed by the
Maritime Administration(MARAD). Accordingly, a proper
orientation of the federal maritime fleet must include a
detailed discussion of the MSC, the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF), and the Ready Reserve Force(RRF).
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND. The MSC was established
in 1949. Its primary mission is to "meet the sealift
requirements of the armed forces in a national emergency
and a nonmobilization contingency, as well as in
peacetime."8 An ancillary MSC mission is management of
the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, comprised of dedicated
sealift assets of the MSC force that provide direct
support for power projection of the U.S. Examples
are: oilers; stores ships; and ocean surveillance ships.
The MSC executes its mission through the employment of
sealift forces originating from two principal sources:
the U.S. government owned ships and the U.S. merchant
marine fleet. The Navy's sealift program attempts to
complement, rather than compete with the civilian
maritime industry. The MSC contracts for commercial
services, hires merchant crews, and maintains support
vessels that are not available in the private sector.
This program as defined by the Navy is "to ensure that
sufficient assets are available to meet pre-positioned,
surge and resupply requirements."9 In summary, the MSC
force is those ships on duty on a daily basis, supplying
U.S. forces around the world.
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET. In reserve to the
MSC is the NDRF. "The NDRF was created at the end of
World War II by mothballing a large number of Liberty
and Victory ships."10 The MARAD acquired these ships
after the war, ultimately reaching a level of "2,277
vessels in 1950."11 However, over time, older Liberty
and Victory ships were sold for scrap or other
non-transportation purposes. By "October 1986
approximately 272 ships"12 remained in the NDRF. The
original idea was to preserve them all in a operational
state to allow a speedy reactivation in time of national
emergency. Accordingly, NDRF ships are outfitted with
dehumidification and anti-corrosion equipment, and are
presumed to take no more than 20 days to activate.
However, MARAD conducted a study in 1976 that concluded
these ships are in such poor condition that it would
take a minimum of 30-40 days to activate.
Compounding the physical deterioration of the NDRF
ships is the lack of repair capacity available to fix
these ships. Most of the vessels in the NDRF as well as
requiring activation maintenance, undoubtedly need
significant upgrades to handle today's cargoes.
However, a Congressional committee stated "the base of
shipyards, repair facilities, and industrial suppliers
is currently inadequate to meet the needs envisioned in
a outbreak of conflict."13 Thus, it is very reasonable
to assume that it would take much longer than the 40
days estimated by the 1976 study to mobilize the fleet,
if at all. Because something had to be done, the RRF
was created in 1976.
READY RESERVE FORCE. The RRF, composed of post
World War II ships, is a portion of the NDRF that is
maintained in a higher state of readiness than the rest
of the NDRF. The force consists of ships that are to be
ready to embark cargo 5,10, or 20 days from
notification. These ships are also managed by MARAD,
but the difference is that overhaul and major
maintenance has been done and continues, to ensure rapid
deployment.
The RRF includes many ship types, including
tankers, freighters, container ships, barge carriers,
and roll-on/roll-off(RO/RO) ships. Notable new
additions to the RRF are the T-AVB aviation logistics
ship, the T-ACS auxiliary crane ship, and the T-AH
hospital ship. In total the RRF contains 78 of the 272
ships within the NDRF. While the development of the RRF
would appear to have brighten an otherwise dark picture,
there remain many problems plaguing the maritime support
force.
The MSC and its subordinate agencies, NDRF and RRF,
are charged with the responsibility of providing sealift
as part of the strategic mobility for the armed forces.
But, total reliance upon the government owned portion of
the maritime force is not feasible. Former MSC
commander, Vice Admiral Piotti estimates "that 95
percent of the dry cargo and 99 percent of the liquid
cargo needed to sustain land combat must go by sea."14
Yet, over the last decade or more, scores of articles
and reports have been written regarding the ailing U.S.
flag merchant marine fleet. To better grasp the present
condition of this fleet, an overview of the significant
problems plaguing the merchant force is detailed
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS. The
financing of ship construction and their operation is a
long standing problem. Various financial incentives,
designed to promote the merchant marine fleet have been
played with since the creation of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936. Soon after President Reagan took office in
1981 he directed a review of the two major subsidy
programs, the Operating Differential Subsidy(ODS) and
the Construction Differential Subsidy(CDS). The ODS was
designed to subsidize the higher prices of ships built
in U.S. shipyards. Though honoring existing long term
ODS contracts, the President's review directed that no
new applications for ODS be approved. Additionally,
neither of the Reagan/Bush administrations earmarked any
funds in their budgets for the CDS program.
Another important incentive the government has
eliminated is the favorable tax laws previously enacted
to assist U.S. flag shipping. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 substantially increased the tax burden of U.S.
vessels engaged in foreign commerce. Specifically,
"depreciation periods were doubled from 5 to 10
years"15, investment tax credit rules became more
restrictive, foreign sourcing of income rules were
narrowed, and the alternative minimum tax law was
applied. Most foreign countries do not impose a tax on
their ships involved in international commerce. Thus,
to impose additional taxes on U.S. operators involved in
foreign commerce is to handicap their efforts to
accumulate capital needed for ship replacement.
It is somewhat difficult to quantify the impact
resulting from discontinuation of the preceding
incentives. However, one tangible benefit from the CDS
program was the work generated in commercial U.S.
shipyards. Additionally, CDS resulted in a shipbuilding
base being maintained above a level associated with
"Navy only" construction, and thus available to serve
the national security. Likewise, the benefit derived
from the ODS program may have come from the continued
existence of companies now in business, that might have
gone bankrupt if ODS had not been in force.
SHIPYARD REDUCTION. Concurrent with the
elimination of incentives has been the decline in U.S.
shipyards and ship repair facilities. The last eight
years has seen the loss of "75 shipbuilding/repair
firms, the loss of approximately 52,000 skilled shipyard
workers"16, and the contraction of shipyard suppliers.
Retired Rear Admiral Denton, former U.S. Senator,
testified "that based on recent studies of our
industrial base the nation's shipbuilders will never be
able to effectively offset the sealift losses which will
invariably occur during combat."17 Specifically, at the
end of 1989 there were no merchant ships under
construction in American shipyards and only nine yards
building ships greater than 400 feet in length - all for
the U.S. Navy. The general impact has been the reduced
capabilIty of the shipbuilding industry to support
mobilization in time of a national emergency.
MILITARY USEFUL SHIPS. Closely associated with the
lack of shipyards is that many of the ships being
procured by U.S. operators are not military useful in
their present form. Ship types and their design are as
important as ship numbers for strategic sealift.
However, recent trends in the shipping industry have led
to increased containerization of cargoes for intermodal
transport. This standardization of cargo containers and
the container ships built to handle them has caused
problems for military sealift planners. Specifically,
"container ships are built with cells rather than with
holds and decks as in freighters of the past."18 These
cells enable containers to be stacked and unstacked by
automatic cranes. Cargo loading or unloading which used
to take days using pallets and stevedores, now takes
hours. Unfortunately, a large portion of military cargo
is not containerized. Within the limited inventory of
U.S. commercial shipping, there exists nearly 100
container ships. These ships lack the older cargo
handling gear, and would be incapable of offloading such
military items as helicopters, trucks, tanks, artillery
pieces, and other unique outsized equipment.
CARGO PREFERENCE LEGISLATION. Because of
inequities in the world shipping market and in an effort
to ensure adequate shipping existed on U.S. flag
vessels, The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established
cargo preference policies. In general, these policies
were applicable to all military shipments, "50 percent
of Export-Import Bank shipments, and 50 percent of U.S.
aid shipments."19 However, in recent years one factor
has significantly reduced the success of this incentive.
Specifically, the allocation of cargo was dependent upon
the availability of U.S. ships, at reasonable rates.
With that loophole, policymakers have been inclined not
to enforce the existing policy because of its high cost.
MANNING DEFICITS. The preceding problems dealt
with issues which could through a combination of
legislation and proper procurement, be corrected, albeit
at a cost. However, the manning of ships is a problem
which perhaps cannot be so easily corrected. As was
shown earlier, the MARAD working closely with the U.S.
Navy's sealift planners has been acquiring many of the
older type ships for the NDRF/RRF. These ships are less
modern and require a pool of mariners experienced in
equipment no longer used on today's ships. Thus, as the
size of the NDRF/RRF grows, the number of qualified
seamen to man these ships decreases and their average
age increases. The seriousness of this situation was
summed up by Senator Stevens(D-AK) who wrote "that
manning is the most serious challenge facing sealift
strategy."20
Recently the Commission on Merchant Marine and
Defense documented the manning shortage. Specifically,
the number of mariners dropped from "48,000 in 1960 to
13,400 in 1987."21 Still further, The Commission
discovered that there would be a mobilization shortfall
of "1,400 merchant seamen to meet the total sealift
requirement in a single-theater conflict today."22
Possibly even more frightening is the projection made by
the Transportation Institute, a maritime industry
research and education organization, which estimates "by
the year 1992 a seafarer deficit after mobilization of
15,000."23 The bottom line is that even if sufficient
shipping existed "DOD's limited policy objectives may
not be met."24
Given the linkage of strategic sealift to the
nation's security, the composition of the force, and the
problems plaguing the industry, let us turn to
addressing the size of the maritime force. The current
Defense Guidance for 1990-1994 specifies "that the U.S.
strategic mobility assets must continue to meet the
requirements of a global conventional war."25 And as
indicated previously, the bulk of the lift will come via
sealift.
CURRENT LEVEL. At the outset it must be recognized
that the current inventory of government owned and
merchant marine ships will not be adequate to fill the
sealift needs of the nation at war. "In 1950 the
privately owned U.S. merchant fleet consisted of 1,170
ships, the largest fleet in the world."26 Owing to a
variety of political and economic conditions the U.S.
fleet has steadily declined to a "1987 level of 369
active ships."27 Further the President's Commission has
stated "that an additional 455 ships would be required
just to support a Southeast Asia theater conflict."28
In sizing a maritime force it is perhaps better to
view the choices based on levels of capability the
various provide. These levels include expansion,
maintenance of existing capability, and managing a
planned shrinkage. Regardless of the option pursued,
the key elements should ensure efficiency,
effectiveness, and feasibility.
EXPANSION. The idea of expanding the merchant
marine force is in all likelihood, unfeasible because of
political and budgetary limits. This would require a
major effort to gain support from all sectors of the
U.S., as the structural realities that put the maritime
industries in their present condition would have to be
altered. Furthermore, the constraints imposed by the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollands deficit reduction law make
significant budget initiatives virtually out of the
question. Additionally, in the absence of a major
threat(i.e. Russia) or a military conflict, policies
that would expand U.S. maritime capacity are likewise
not feasible.
MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING CAPABILITY. The concept of
maintaing the existing level of capability is becoming a
more difficult proposition than in past years. With a
general consensus that the industry is in a decline, the
cost variable again plays a significant role in this
option. The Congressional Budget Office(CBO) assigns a
average "ODS value of $2.3 million per ship per year."29
For 15-20 ships, the annual cost for this policy ranges
from $34.5 to $46 million. For a construction subsidy,
whether in a CDS type package or direct procurement(i.e.
purchase of ships by MSC), the CBO has estimated the
cost to range from "$60 to $100 million per ship."30
Total costs to sustain a shipbuilding program at this
level range from $1.2 to $1.6 billion. Based on these
approximations, in aggregate, direct financial policies
to maintain current capabilities will cost between $1.5
to $2.0 billion annually. The question which must again
be asked is whether it is efficient, effective,
feasible, or in the interest of national security to pay
this cost in sizing the fleet at this level.
PLANNED SHRINKAGE. Because a decline in the
maritime industries seems inevitable, this broad option
of managing a planned shrinkage is perhaps the only
realistic one. That is, a smaller maritime base,
consisting of the most viable sectors of the maritime
industry, should survive. As with the other options,
the elements used could include direct and indirect
subsidizes, cargo preference reform, reform of tax laws,
and direct government ship procurement. Suffice it to
say the general costs outlined under the preceding
option are merely scaled down.
CONSTRAINT. As was indicated earlier the most
pressing constraint in selecting what option to choose
in sizing the force is the fiscal constraint. With the
deficit a real issue, there is little likelihood that
new spending policies will be approved. This is
especially true because past and present policies, such
as ODS and CDS, have done little to prevent the current
condition from developing. It has been stated that "the
greater the percentage of the gross national product
that an industry comprises, the more clout it is likely
to have."31 According to Data Resources Inc.,
shipbuilding will "constitute less than 0.5 percent of
GNP in 1987."32 Further, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
showed "overall shipyard employment in 1985 at 159
thousand versus 875 thousand in the automotive
industry."33 Thus, until such time as the maritime
industry generates enough economic or political
clout(i.e. through its number), the fiscal reality of
attempting to significantly change the present situation
will remain the primary constraint.
The interdependence between a viable maritime
support force capability and the national defense was
reaffirmed by President Reagan who in May 1986 stated
"the dual roles of the merchant marine in trade and
defense remain crucial to our national interests."32
Yet rhetoric aside, the actual status of our sealift
capacity is being eroded by the elimination of
government support programs, the dwindling capacity of
the shipbuilding base, the demise of military useful
ships, and the ever shrinking pool of seafarers.
Accordingly, the deficient condition of our maritime
strategic sealift capability, may very well prove to be
the "Achilles Heel" to the nation's defense.
ENDNOTES
1. Captain Wayne P. Wilcox, "Strategic Sealift: A Nayy
Function," Proceedings. (April 1987), p.99
2. Wilcox, (April 1987). p.99
3. Edgar L. Prina, "The Possibility of Military Defeat,"
Seapower, (December 1987), p.26
4. Clinton H. Whitehurst, The U.S. Merchant Marine, (Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983), p.26
5. General Duane H. Cassidy, "United States Transporta-
tion Command," Defense Transportation Journal,
(April 1989), p.31
6. Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, "SOS For The Merchant
Marine," Defense 89, (March/April 1989), p.115
7. Prina, (December 1987), p.29
8. Whitehurst, (1983), p.115
9. Major Bradley E. Smith, "Maritime Challenges To Sus-
taining The Force," Military Review (September
1989), p.25
10. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100
11. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100
12. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100
13. Prina, (December 1987), p.26
14. Smith, (September 1989), p.21
15. Peter J. Finnerty, "Maritime: U.S. Merchant Marine
Still Sliding," Seapower, (January 1989), p.84
16. Prina, (December 1987), p.34
17. Prina, (December 1987), p.34
18. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.102
19. Whitehurst, (1983), p.108
20. Commander Paul L. Higgins, "Manning The Future,"
Proceedingsù (February 1989), p.36
21. Finnerty, (January 1989), p.81
22. Higgins, (February 1989), p.36
23. Rodney W. Carlisle, Sovereignty For Sale. (Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1985), p.58
24. Captain Russell S. Hall, "United States Merchant
Marine, Past, Press and Future," Logistics
Spectrum, (Winter 1989) p.21
25. Third Report of The Commission on Merchant Marine And
Defense: Findings of Fact And Conclusions, U.S.
Government Printing Office (September 30, 1988)
p. 9
26. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100
27. Prina, (December 1987), p.33
28. Prina, (December 1987), p.33
29. Robert Hilton, Paula J. Pettavino and Harlan K.
Ullman, U.S. Maritime Industries: Down For The
Third Time?, (Center For Strategic And Inter-
national Studies, Washington, D.C., 1987), p.24
30. Hilton, Pettavino and Ullman, (1987), p.24
31. Whitehurst, (December 1987), p.158
32. Hilton, Pettavino and Ullman, (1987), p.18
33. Hilton, Pettavino and Ullman, (1987), p.l9
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