The Northern Tier Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact: An Assessment
AUTHOR Major Ole Martin Hojem, Norwegian Army
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: The Northern Tier Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact: An Assessment
AUTHOR: Major Ole Martin Hojem, Norwegian Army
DESCRIPTION OF TASK: Conduct an evaluation of the non-Soviet
military forces in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact. What
role would they play in an open conflict between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact and how do the forces fit into the Warsaw Pact/Soviet
command system. Discuss further whether there can be reason to
question the reliability of these forces in a European conflict.
SUMMARY: The three northern tier non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)
nations are East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Their
unique backgrounds and characteristics, not easily discerned in
the glare of the their larger partner, tend to color the nature
of their membership. Their differing developmental experiences
reflect political and economic processes in the East Bloc, still
incomplete, which have influenced the development of the alliance
itself.
The birth of the Warsaw Pact (WP) in 1955 formalized a
series of bilateral relationships between the Soviet Union and
the nations it had "liberated" as World War II ended. The
admittance of rearmed West Germany to NATO that same year,
however, so concerned the Soviets that they felt compelled to
strengthen their western defenses by erecting an alliance under
their own control. Since that time, the WP structure has
undergone many changes, some enhancing Soviet control. others the
result of vigorous NSWP lobbying. Throughout, the Soviets have
been careful to limit their allies capacity for independent
military action, for the degree of trust is not very high.
The issue of NSWP reliability is naturally of great concern
to the Soviet Union, for the WP is, at its basic level, a
collection of ethnic groups with varying degrees of fondness for
each other, and the Russians are not highly regarded. The Pact's
Main Political Directorate has the primary responsibility for
ensuring that the "bottom line" remains favorable for the USSR.
In the context of an offensive against NATO, the East
Germans were thought to be both competent and reasonably
reliable, perhaps helped by the eighteen Russian divisions
stationed there. But growing contact with West German has
probably changed that. Poland's Solidarity problem is quiet, but
festering, so today East Germany and Poland could be graded as
equal and the Soviet armies could very easily end up fighting
their way across Poland and East Germany enroute to Bonn and
Paris. Czechoslovakia is undoubtedly, still suffering, from the
1968 Soviet invasion.
Today's picture looks very different from that of only nine
months ago, so the future picture could also look very different.
The success or failure of perestroika and glasnost will be
decisive.
OUTLINE - MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH PAPER
THESIS: As a member of an alliance, the purpose of which is not
so much to defend themselves as it is to defend the Soviet Union,
the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states approach their alliance
responsibility with varying degrees of enthusiasm and confidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
II. PURPOSE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
III. COMMAND STRUCTURE
IV. EVALUATION OF THE MEMBER NATIONS
A. East Germany
B. Poland
C. Czechoslovakia
V. RELIABILITY
A. Definition and Components
B. Political Framework
C. Reliability Enhancing Measures
VI. MEMBER STATE RELIABILITY
A. East Germany
B. Poland
C. Czechoslovakia
VII. CONCLUSION
Introduction
Since its creation nearly thirty-five years ago, the
Warsaw Pact (Pact or WP) has been the subject of exhaustive
research, conducted by dedicated political scientists who
have attempted to decipher its true form and purpose as a
means of predicting its future behavior. The task has not
been easy, for behind the Warsaw Pact's obscuring curtain
the dimly perceived movements of the various actors reveal
an unfolding drama centering on power, rivalry, and
survival. It is a play with a constantly changing script.
Too often, it is the star of the play who receives the
researcher's attention and the supporting players are
ignored. While the Warsaw Pact in its organization and
doctrine is a reflection of the wishes of the Soviet Union,
the other members bring to the alliance their own strengths
and weaknesses. They are very different political, social,
and economic organisms whose uniqueness defies
generalization.
This paper will examine the northern tier Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries and their relationship to the
Pact. The study will examine the Pact's purpose, history,
and structure to provide the necessary framework and will
affects pact membership. The paper will discuss possible
employment scenarios, will discuss the "bottom line"
question of reliability, as affected by internal and
external factors, and will conclude by offering views of the
future -- what the next act may bring.
Purpose and Historical Background
"The contracting parties..mindful..of the situation
created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris
Agreements, which envisage the formation of a new
military alignment in the shape of a `Western Euro-
pean Union', with the participation of a remilitarized
Western Germany and its integration in the North
Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of another
war and constitutes a threat to the national security
of peaceable states..have decided to conclude the
present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance."1
The above quote from the preamble of the Warsaw Treaty
indicates that at least from the Soviet view, the WP
organization was established purely as a response to what
the Soviet's viewed as aggressive behavior by the West. It
has, after all, been termed "the first multinational treaty
in human history aimed entirely at strengthening peace."2
It is generally accepted, however, that the Pact was
not merely a response to NATO, but a response to the entry
of a re-armed West Germany into that organization in 1955.
The Federal Republic's entry was a disturbing event for the
Soviets who saw that action as a potential threat to their
post-war efforts to mold the nations of Eastern Europe into
a protective buffer zone along their vulnerable western
frontier. The unopposed presence of a strong, democratic,
capitalist state, already proven to be a military threat to
the Soviet Union, could easily cause that buffer to erode if
left unchallenged. The Soviet Union needed to construct a
network of interlocking relationships, joining the destiny
of Eastern Europe to its own.
The early development of the WP reflects some of its
originator's uncertainty as to the organization's true role.
The period 1955 to 1960 was characterized by apparently
contradictory trends. On one hand, a measure of force
modernization did occur as MIG-17 aircraft and T-54 tanks
were introduced into the East European forces, but that was
not followed up by the kind of comprehensive exercise
program required to form a cohesive military alliance
period. The Soviet's primary concern was to devote the
greater effort to increasing the technological
sophistication of the East European forces in recognition of
NATO's advantage in that area.
(illegible text).... considerably more emphasis on the
development of the WP institutions. The Pact was
increasingly used as a forum for the advancement of Soviet
political programs pertaining to issues outside as well as
within Pact boundaries. The organization designed for this
purpose, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) saw far
more activity than during its early period and its meetings
were often the scene of political debates as various Pact
members, particularly the Rumanians, attempted to define
their intra-Pact relationships.
The renewal of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance took place on April 26, 1985, marked
by the signing of the Protocol of Prolongation. Extending
the Treaty another twenty years, with an additional ten year
automatic extension, was not as easy as the Soviet
leadership would have preferred it to have been. The NSWP
members made it plain that they wanted a larger role in the
decision making process.
Due to the uncertainties of the Pact's historical
development and future course, it is difficult to arrive at
a description which accurately portrays the nature of the
organization. It is perhaps right to say that it is:
"Primarily composed of armies of communist
status whose physical locus in Eastern
Europe, whose deployment as a froce in
action has only taken place in intra-systemic
conflict, and whose development and deploy-
ment has been generally in accordance with
the desires of the major actor of the alliance,
the Soviet Union."3
COMMAND STRUCTURE
The WP has gone through the kinds of evolutionary
changes common to all organizations, responding to
membership desires and new circumstances. With few
exceptions, these changes have tended to focus on the nearly
adversarial nature of the relationship between the Soviet
Union and its erstwhile allies.
The PCC is the highest policy-making body and provides
overall direction. Composed of the member nations' top
political leadership, the PCC allows the Pact to coordinate
foreign policy planning and, for the Soviets, constitutes a
platform from which to enunciate allied support and, at
times, arms control initiatives. (Appendix D)
The WP's top military body is the joint command of the
WP Forces, its highest positions occupied by Soviet general
officers. The NSWP countries are represented by their
deputy ministers of national defense. The staff of the
Joint Armed Forces, next in the hierarchy, is thought to be
the Pact's first permanent joint staff. As such, it adds
continuity and therefore increases the Pact's warfighting
capability.
Most observers tend to agree, however, that many of the
structural changes that have occurred are as a result of
actions taken by the NSWP members to enlarge their role
within the alliance. Romania has been in the forefront of
the agitation and receives informal support from other
members who cannot display such vociferousness themselves.
Such activities have increased in the atmosphere of greater
economic independence promised by perestroika.
The Member Nations
The NSWP countries bring to the alliance uniquely
different capabilities, backgrounds, and problem areas, all
of which must be examined in light of their impact on the
whole organization. This assessment will cover the Northern
Tier countries of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
East Germany
"Its normal now to talk with one
another, to be a German from one
side or the other of the border and
yet feel a member of the German nation."4
The eastern half of the divided German nation continues
to defy analysis and prediction, a schizoid enigma with
conflicting loyalties. Its people are justifiably proud of
having the highest living standard of the East Bloc nations,
yet they envy those who live on the other side of the inner-
German border. It has, until today, been a key member of
the WP and its military reflects that fact.
The Soviets wasted little time after the war in
remolding the East German military. Disarmed by the treaty
provisions and purged by Stalin, the military virtually
disappeared, to be replaced by a police force which quickly
grew to resemble a modern army. The official re-
stablishment of the East German military, now known as the
Nationale Yolksarmee (NYA), occurred in January 1956; it
was, however, a well-equipped fighting force long before
that.
The NVA is considered by most observers to be "at the
top of the WP league,"5 and on a par with the eighteen
divisions of the Western Group of Forces Germany. It is a
highly trained, well-equipped army without a nation, and
because of that lack of legitimacy, the NVA has developed an
unusually close relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed,
it may have the unique distinction of being the only army in
the world constitutionally linked to the military of another
state. According to its constitution, the German Democratic
Republic is "...forever irrevocably allied with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics."6 So what has happened and the
speculation about the future must be very frustrating and
demoralizing for the NVA.
The NVA is a multi-service organization, consisting of
ground, air, and naval components and is supplemented by
various para-military organizations. The ground force
component's 120,000 soldiers are divided between two corps-
sized army groups, each consisting of three divisions, two
motorized and one tank (Appendix A). The Air Force (which
includes air defense units) has air defense and ground
support roles. All the aircraft operated by the 37,000 man
force are Soviet made and the air defense system is tightly
interwoven into that of the Soviet Union. The Navy has a
strength of 15,000 and is primarily a coastal force with
the wartime mission of protecting the Baltic Coast in
conjunction with Polish and Soviet vessels. The WP role
envisioned for the NVA was as a part of the strategic first
echelon in an attack into West Germany.
POLAND
"The commitment of Polish military
professionals to their WP mission, and
the corresponding design of Polish
forces to serve it, is generally
Underestimated."7
For a non-front line, NSWP state, Poland occupies a
particularly crucial role in Soviet strategic thinking.
Poland's eight east west rail lines will be vital to the
support of WP advances into NATO territory and there is some
concern that those lines would require protection from,
rather than by, Polish forces.
Perhaps in the recognition of Poland's proud yet
potentially dangerous military tradition, the Soviet Union
quickly and firmly put its stamp on the Polish military
establishment it was rebuilding after World War II. Some
Polish forces had been fighting under Russian leadership
since 1943 and the Polish first army provided the foundation
for what was to become the Polish People's Army. The
obligatory period of post-war Stalinization brought with it
the imposition of the commissar system which, at its height,
saw the appointment of a Soviet General as Poland's minister
of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces.
The worker's riots in 1956 marked the beginning of the
re-professionalization of the Army following their refusal
to fire on their fellow citizehs. This was an act which
clearly signified to the civilian authorities that the
military could no longer be expected to serve as an
instrument of domestic repression. The opportunity again
presented itself in 1970 during the riots in Gdansk, and
again the military leaders resisted successfully. The
military's desire for political non-involvement was
emphasized in General Jaruzilski's statement during the 1976
Warsaw riots that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish
workers."8
The Polish Army was designed for a "massive, rapid
offensive into NATO territory."9 Its ground forces, at
230,000 are by far the largest amount in the NSWP countries
(Appendix B). The Polish Navy, the largest of the NSWP
states, has been designed to provide a limited coastal
defense force. Its mission would be to support WP
operations in the Baltic by performing mine-sweeping and
escort duties. The Navy's 1,000 man Marine force gives it a
minor amphibious capability. The Polish Air Force, with
92,000 personnel, is also the largest of the NSWP elements.
Its air defense assets, like those of its allies, are
incorporated into the Soviet system, which would provide
command and control functions dur,ing wartime.
The manner in which these forces could be employed
against NATO is largely determined by geographical
considerations. Due to Poland's distance from the likely
battle area, it is improbable that Polish forces would be
used in a first echelon role. Whatever scenario is
envisioned, one could easily imagine a requirement to employ
some portion of the Polish forces in the role of rear area
security. There is a credible partisan threat against
Soviet lines of communication and their situation will be
worsened by an effective application of NATO Follow-on
Forces attack doctrine.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is Czechoslovakia's misfortune to be stretched
across central Europe, anchored to the Soviet Union on one
end and to West Germany on the other. As a land bridge
between the two opposing alliances, and as a member of one,
Czechoslovakia has found itself under a wary Soviet gaze for
much of its brief national history. The events of 1968
continue to reverberate through the national structure and
the pressure of glasnost and perestroika are adding unneeded
aftershocks to a system already strained from twenty years
of anti-reformist failure. The military was particularly
hard hit by the "assistance" rendered by the WP in 1968.
The military's near disintegration, considered the most
important development in post war Czechoslovakia's military
(missing text (page 12))
beginning of the end of Alexander Dubcek's experiment in
socialism with a human face. The memorandum proposed three
possible choices for the country's national security:
Continued membership in the WP, to be re-examined after ten
or fifteen years; collective security without the USSR; or
neutrality, secured by self defense. The principal thrust
of the memorandum was to guarantee Soviet interests in
central Europe without the presence of Soviet forces as in
the case of Finland, but the message was too heretical and
served only to confirm the worst Soviet suspicions about the
Dubcek regime's willingness to discuss alternatives to the
existing system. The invasion followed in August and the
Gottwald Academy was dissolved in 1969.
The military establishment now found in Czechoslovakia,
as modified by Dubcek's successor Gustav Husak, has not
regained its former size, cohesion, or quality. Recent
equipment improvements have helped bring some areas back to
normal NSWP levels, however. Numbering 145,000 the CPA's
ground component is second in size only to Poland (Appendix
C). The Air Force is also among the largest in the Pact,
reflecting the important role its air defense assets must
play in the Soviet system.
Training and personnel quality are potential problem
areas. As is the case with their other NSWP comrades, the
CPA forces receive training closely patterned after the
Soviets which translates into a fair amount of realism and a
heavy dose of political indoctrination.
The events of 1968 caused, not surprisingly, a
reevaluation of the role the CPA would play in a WP/NATO
conflict. Pre-1968 strategy had apparently called for the
CPA to provide two, first echelon armies for a Czech front,
supported by second echelon forces formed by remaining Czech
divisions and units from the USSR's Carpathian Military
District. Now, however, the most likely use would be
against US and West German forces in Bavaria in an effort to
prevent their northward move to slow the main attack. One
writer has put it more bluntly, saying that the CPA "would
be used not as a component of the first echelon, but simply
as cannon fodder in tackling, American and West German
formations."12 Some support for this view can be inferred
from the rather low levels of equipment which could be
needed by a firstechelon attacker. Artillery holdings are
sixty percent of Soviet doctrinal norms.
RELIABILITY
"...Poland's volatile sociopolitical
conditions and economic malaise, East
Germany's anti-war sentiment and German
identity, Romania's non-participation in
joint maneuvers, the genuine lack of
military preparedness in Hungary and
Bulgaria, and an overarching
anti-Russian sentiment common to most
of Eastern Europe."13
The life of a Soviet strategic planner is not an easy
one and the above list of problems forms a major part of the
reason why. The issue of reliability represents the bottom
line of any alliance system. If the day comes when the
alliance is to be tested in combat, will it hold together?
Can its members all be counted on to perform their assigned
tasks so that there individual efforts will cause the
alliance's effort to be successful? These are the kinds of
questions the answers to which can only be guessed at, for
it is hoped that the true answer will never be known.
Nonetheless, it is important to know as accurately as
possible what tide answers might be.
Warsaw Pact forces can potentially be employed in four
different modes: internal offensive, internal defensive,
external defensive, and external offensive. The focus of
this study will be only on the last, as that is the one
which most concerns NATO.
Definition and Components
There are several aspects of NSWP reliability which
must be examined before proceeding further. First, it is
necessary to define the concept itself and its components.
Second, the political framework affecting the increase or
decrease in reliability must be examined. Third, some of
the measures taken to ensure reliability require a closer
look.
Analysts generally agree that the question of
reliability covers two main areas: The reliability of the
regime itself and the reliability of the military forces
under the control of that government. Regime reliability is
a function of the political, economic, and social
environment in which it operates- In this case, that refers
not only to domestic considerations, but also to the
relationships within the Pact, with the Soviet Union, and
with the West. Regarding the military forces, reliability
pertains to the conviction by the political leadership that
the armed forces will carry out the instructions given to
pertains to the conviction by the political leadership that
the armed forces will carry out the instructions given to
them as affected by the willingness of significant segments
of those forces to carry out those orders.
One way of viewing reliability is to look at people
rather than governments, believing that ethnic roots are far
deeper than those put down by political systems. If
traditional enemies were considered the relationship would
be as follows:
Nation Traditional
Enemies
East Germany Poles, Russians, Hungarians
Poland Germans, Russians, Czechs
Czechoslovakia Germans, Russians, Poles,
Hungarians
Hungary Rumanians, Russians, Czechs
Romania Hungarians, Russians,
Bulgarians
Bulgaria Yugoslavians, Greeks, Turks,
Rumanians14
The traditional enmity felt by one WP ally towards
another is particularly troubling to the Soviets, who made
nearly everyone's hit list, and who must overcome this
problem in all Pact activities. Of course a similar chart
could be drawn up for NATO but it would be far shorter.
(missing text (page 18))
the East European countries involved would have to identify
their own national interests closely with the Soviet Union.
Ironically, the new policies' success could also bring
trouble to the alliance. Increased standards of living
would result in less willingness to risk the status quo
through rash military action; similarly, increased exposure
to the West should reduce the desire to take such action.
Reliability Enhancing Measures
The WP has developed several measures designed to
combat threats to alliance cohesion. A lack of political
legitimacy has required the imposition of an artificial
structure to support adherence to Pact policy and doctrine.
Because the development of an independent military
capability among the NSWP states would threaten Pact
reliability, Pact doctrine has been formulated in such a way
as to decrease the likelihood of such a development. The
NSWP forces lack many of the elements necessary for
independent operations such as complete air defense systems
and adequate logistic capabilities. Further, the exclusive
use of Soviet weapons, whether produced in the USSR or a
NSWP country, ensures the continued reliance on the Soviet
Union for many end items and spare parts. Tactical or
operational doctrine is taught at the higher levels only in
the Soviet Union, ensuring educational dependency and the
development of a Soviet-dominated officer corp. Such an
agreement also effectively limits the opportunity to develop
a heretical territorial defense doctrine similar to
Rumania's.
The Warsaw Pacts exercise program provides an
effective means for reinforcing reliability. In addition to
the normal training benefits derived from exercising, WP
joint maneuvers require NSWP troop leaders to become
accustomed to working for Soviet commanders while testing
plans developed largely by Soviet staffs.
Member State Reliability
"There might well be just too many problems
within the Soviet military for an invasion
of Western Europe to succeed. By the fourth
day Pact troops might begin to desert and
sabotage the Soviet invasion. Near the end
of the first week, a few NATO units could
and up pushing through Eastern Europe and
into parts of the Soviet Union."16
It is difficult to say, however, how the NSWP members
may respond when NATO forces begin to bomb airfields,
bridges, troop concentrations, supply areas, communication
centers, and industrial areas in their home territories.
The effect may be heightened by fornal and informal contacts
by NATO offering reduced damage in exchange for pledges of
neutrality. Current Soviet doctrine emphasizing the need
for a quick, far reaching strike into NATO territory
indicates a desire to avoid giving its allies time to
reconsider.
East Germany
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is thought to be
one of the most reliable NSWP members, although a good deal
of credit for that has to go to the eighteen full strength
divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), on
its soil, almost twice as many Soviet units as the rest of
Eastern Europe combined. Integration of the East German
Army into the GSFG is illustrated by the oath taken by NVA
soldiers, who pledge to always be ready, side-by-side with
the Soviet Army and the armies of their socialist allies to
protect socialism against all enemies.
The "German question" has always troubled the Soviet
planners who realize that a WP attack would not pit the NVA
against a traditional enemy, but against friends and
relatives. Currently the consensus is that the East German
military is essentially incapable of any action. Morale is
low and discipline is gone. Soldiers have quit and
emigrated to West Germany. Recently, one battalion refused
to take part in a training exercise with Soviet troops.
The future of the NVA is uncertain. Since
reunification with West Germany is now certain, the role and
structure of the military will undergo radical changes.
Integration of the armed forces will not be easy given the
differences in equipment and training.
The victory of the "conservative" faction in the
election of 18 March 1990 will likely result in the
acceleration of reunification. What the election will mean
for the structure of the military in the interim remains to
be seen. However, small groups known as "block parties"
have been formed to discuss the possibilities of change in
the GDR. These groups have a high percentage of party
membership and East German opposition remains more repressed
than similar movements in the WP.
Poland
Too much has happened to allow Poland to be considered
a reliable participant in a WP offensive action. As the
threat from West Germany recedes, identification with Soviet
goals has declined significantly. This is particularly true
in the case of the Polish military who, as their
professionalism increases, have less desire to be associated
with the Soviet military. Instead of standing guard for
peace in fraternal alliance with the Soviet army, the
soldiers prefer to stand guard for the sovereignty and
independence of the Polish nation, its security, and peace.
Polish authorities have told Moscow that Poland will not
participate in upgrading WP forces, but their efforts to
negotiate cutbacks of Soviet troops have met with no
success.
Chechoslovakia
In 1968, the Soviet invasion struck a severe blow to
Chechoslovakia'a military leaving the Czech army's
reliability doubtful at best. In an effort to repair some
of the damage, Soviet political officers worked with their
Czech counterparts in trying to prevent a deformation of the
concept of the "probable enemy" but the identity of the
probable enemy is still not clear. Soviet troops have been
stationed in Czechoslovakia since the `68 crackdown, but
will be withdrawn by June of 1991 at the request of the
Czech government. In addition, the CPA is in the process of
restructuring its forces due, in part, to a commitment to
reduce troop and equipment strength by 1991.
Many weapon systems, including tanks and ground combat
vehicles have been removed from active status either by
being placed in storage or retired.
It is probable that troops will remain deployed along
the western border although the number will be lessened to
create a "zone of confidence" between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact.
Conclusion
During the East-West seminar on military doctrine held
in Vienna in January 1990, Geheral N. Chervov, the chief
arms control expert on the Soviet General Staff, stated that
there will be a major restructuring of the Eastern Bloc's
military command apparatus. Though he refused to go into
details, his statements suggest that in the future the WP
would probably be governed by heads of state or governments.
General Colin Powell, Chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, responded that he believed "the Warsaw Pact alliance
is shifting in its character to a more political
institution," but based upon discussions with each of the
WP's military chiefs, they "seem to making, in some cases,
unilateral judgements with respect to their production
activities, and their force structure, but they continue to
say that they are part of an alliance."
There is, indeed, a transformation taking place in the
Warsaw Pact. I believe the threat of deliberate aggression
directed against Europe and its extension to global conflict
is much reduced. Nevertheless, Soviet capabilities are
still formidable and the situation we face is very
unpredictable. The teeth are still there; whether the jaws
are tired and can still chew is another thing.
Given the recent sequence of events in Eastern Europe,
the Soviets must factor politital changes there into future
military planning equations. I believe these changes in
Eastern Europe reduce the Soviet Union's confidence and
capacity to wage coalition warfare. If Moscow judges its
allied forces to be unreliable, they would likely be forced
now to adopt a defensive posture in the event of a crisis
that could lead to war. In light of these developments, I
believe that the Soviets would consider large scale theater
operations against NATO with only their own forces as highly
risky, if not impractical. Whatever the Soviets needed a
year ago to pull off a short warning attack, they would need
twice as much time now.
The NSWP nations are very different collections of
political, social, and economic circumstances. Still, in
the process of defining their national identities, they must
work within the constraints associated with membership in
the Soviet-led alliance.
As members of an alliance, the purpose of which is not
so much to defend themselves as it is to defend the Soviet
Union, the NSWP states approach their alliance
responsibilities with varying degrees of enthusiasm and
competence, particularly as new governments in Berlin,
Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Sofia look away from Moscow
and to the West for political support and economic
salvation. Some have reconciled themselves to their role
adhering to a script they had no part in writing; others
have not, choosing instead to seek out roles in which they
can improvise. The result is a military alliance of dubious
value about which it can be said that, even after more than
thirty years of Moscow supplied training and indoctrination,
the East European military is neither completely loyal to
the USSR nor efficient.
The success or failure of the current Soviet political
and economic initiatives, to the extent that they are truly
substantive, will be decisive for the success or failure of
the Warsaw Pact and for the fortunes of the NSWP nations.
Pact reliability will be improved only if domestic
conditions are also made better and the Soviet Union is able
to retain its leading role within an atmosphere of
cooperation.
The final curtain has not come down so the reviews must
wait. There is always the chance that the play might close
before the run is over.
ENDNOTES
1. The Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Brussels: NATO
Information Service. Undated. pp. 10 - 11.
2. Lyntov, Ivan. "The Alliance For Peace." Soviet Military
Review. No.5, (May 1987). p. 47.
3. Volgyes, Ivan. "The Warsaw Pact: A Study of Vulnerabilities,
Tension, and Reliability." In the Future of European Alliance
Systems. Edited by Arlene Broadhurst. (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1982). p. 152.
4. Painton, Frederick. "The German Question." Time. (Sept.
1987). p. 9.
5. "The East German Army -- An Integral Part of the Conventional
Threat to NATO." International Defense Review. (4/1987). p.
401.
6. Baxter, William P. "National Security." In East Germany: A
Country Study. p. 219. Edited by Eugene K. Keefe. Washington,
D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982
7. Johnson, A. Ross; Dean, Robert W.; and Alexier, Alexander R.
"The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier." Survival. (Jul-
Aug 1981). p. 54.
8. Ehrenreich, Frederick. "National Security." In Poland: A
Country Study. p. 303. Edited by Harold D. Nelson. Washington,
D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1983.
9. Johnson, A. Ross; Dean, Robert W.; and Alexier, Alexander R.
"The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier." Survival. (Jul-
Aug 1981). p. 57.
10. Ibid, p. 56.
11. Whetten, Lawrence L. "The Warsaw Pact As An Instrument for
Inducting Political and Military Integration and
Interdependence." In the Future of European Alliance Systems,
Edited by Arlene Broadhurst. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1980). p. 254.
12. (illegible text)
13. Nelson Daniel N. "Moscow's Uncertain Allies." Armed Froces
Journal International. (Feb 1987). p. 38.
14. Hersping, Dale R. and Volgyes, Ivan. " How Reliable Are
Eastern European Armies?" Survival. (Sep-Oct 1980). p. 211.
15. Kraus, Michael. "Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe."
Current History. Vol. 86, No. 523 (November 1987). p. 391.
16. Scherer, John L. "Soviet Military Deficiencies: An Update."
Soviet Armed Forces Review Edited by David R. Jones, (Gulf
Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1985) p. 397.
Click here to view image
The Soviet Union stations 18 full-strength ground divisions
in East germany although this number is scheduled to be reduced
by 1991.
Unilateral East German defense cuts were announced in late
January 1989, following the Soviet Union's similar annoucement in
December 1988.
East Germany has a modern Air Force consisting of updated
Soviet equipment. In August 1988 East Germany became the first
WP nation outside of the Soviet Union to receive the MIG-29
Fulcrum fighter.
East Germany has indicated that some of the announced troop
cuts may involve the Navy, however, no reduction schedule has
been confirmed.
Click here to view image
Poland is host to the Soviet Ncrthern Group of Forces. Both
Polish and Soviet troops and equipment in Poland are scheduled to
undergo major reductions over the next few years. In early 1989,
Poland introduced a plan for reorganization of its armed forces.
The army is in the midst of the reorganization, which will
restructure all three military districts and the Naval Brigade.
In October 1989 Poland became the second NSWP member to
recieve the modern MIG-29 Fulcrum fighter.
The Polish Navy provides a potent amphibious assault
capability in the Baltic region as well as a significant anti-
ship missle attack force.
Click here to view image
Soviet troops will be withdrawn by 30 June 1991.
As part of a plan to cut defense spending 15% by 1992,
Czechoslovakia plans to retire aircraft and reduce the number of MIG-
29s ...(illegible text)
Click here to view image
The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) has been the
highest organ of the Warsaw Pact, and consists of the Party
First or General Secretary or Head of State of the member
nations. It was supplemented by two subcommittees -- the
Council of Foreign Ministers and the Council of Defense
Ministers. The PCC has set general policy and guidance to
the subcommittees, which formulated policy between sessions
of the PCC.
In January 1990 the Warsaw Pact disclosed that it was
abandoning the PCC and replacing it with a new group that
would not require membership in Communist Party. The final
from the committee will take has not yet been finalized.
(Notes: Military Council is the operational command of the
field forces during exercises and in wartime).
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