National Security Strategy: The Threat Is As Great As Ever
AUTHOR Major Duane V. Hegna, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE THREAT IS AS GREAT
AS EVER
I. PURPOSE: To discuss the current and projected threat
that the Soviet Union will present to the United States.
II. PROBLEM: The Soviets have been the focus of U.S. Na-
tional Security Strategy for over 40 years due to their
strategic nuclear force capability. Today, however, the
Soviet Union is attempting to convince the U.S. that they
no longer possess hostile intentions and therefore are no
longer a threat to U.S. national interests. While the
Soviets are trying to convince the U.S. of their non-
hostile intentions, their actions would lead one to think
otherwise as they are continuing to modernize their stra-
tegic and theater nuclear forces, as well as their conven-
tional forces, at an alarming rate. It is therefore clear
that despite what the Soviets want the U.S. to believe,
they remain the most significant threat to U.S. security
interests.
III. DATA: General Secretary Gorbachev is conducting a
public relations campaign to change Western perceptions of
the Soviet Union. The Soviets are doing a superb job at
convincing the American people and the West that they are
indeed serious about their political reform-Glasnost-and
their economic reform-Perestroika. However, despite Gor-
bachev's stated commitment to a military doctrine that is
defensive in nature, the Soviet Union continues to modernize
its forces and improve their capabilities. Although some
military units and equipment have been withdrawn from
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will remain the world's
largest military power even if Gorbachev's promised re-
ductions take place. It is therefore clear that even with
the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and
the Soviet leadership's declarations of non-hostile inten-
tions toward the U.S. and our Western allies, the Soviet
military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat
to the security of the U.S. and our allies.
IV. CONCLUSION: The Soviet Union confronts the U.S. with
a large, modern, conventional air, ground, and sea military
force that has a powerful strategic and theater nuclear
arsenal. The U.S. must therefore continue to modernize its
strategic and conventional weapon systems and use technol-
ogy to its fullest to ensure the U.S. retains its strategic
edge over the Soviet Union.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE THREAT IS AS GREAT AS EVER
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. Although the Soviets current National
Security Strategy appears to reflect a "new thinking" in
terms of its outlook towards the United States and its
allies, the Soviet threat is as great today as it has ever
been.
I. National Security Strategy from a historical perspective
A. U.S. national interests and national objectives
B. Evolution of U.S. National Security Strategy
C. Soviet National Security Strategy and objectives
D. Evolution of Soviet National Security Strategy
II. Budgetary trends and their impact on:
A. U.S. National Security Strategy
B. Makeup of U.S. military forces
III. Future initiatives in the military modernization process
A. Soviet modernization initiatives
B. U.S. modernization initiatives
IV. Key elements to an effective National Security Strategy
A. U.S. must deal from a position of strength
B. U.S. must pursue high-technology weapons
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE THREAT IS AS GREAT AS EVER
There has been much talk about the Soviets and their
"new thinking" towards the United States and the impact
this "new thinking" will have on the U.S. strategy towards
the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated
in his January 1990 Annual Report to the President and the
Congress that the events of 1989 have reduced the threat
of a sudden Soviet attack in Europe. He further stated
that these changes in the Soviet strategy "clearly call
for a review of U.S. defense policy priorities for the
1990's."1
The changes occurring in the Soviet Union and the
implications of such changes in terms of the Soviet mili-
tary capabilities must be looked at very carefully. General
Secretary Gorbachev seems to have taken far-reaching ini-
tiatives in the domestic, foreign, and military policy
arena that appear to mark a significant change in the
Soviet Union's strategy and tactics used for achieving
its national goals. Robert Schuller, the well known evan-
gelist, was even invited by Soviet officials to deliver a
sermon on prime-time Soviet TV, which represents the first
appearance ever by a foreign minister on Soviet soil.2 The
Soviets' public relations campaign to change Western per-
ceptions of the Soviet Union has demonstrated their keen
understanding of the influence that the media has on the
American people. The Soviets appear to be doing a superb
job of convincing the American people that they are indeed
serious about their political reform-Glasnost-and their
economic reform-Perestroika. However, despite Gorbachev's
stated commitment to a military doctrine that is defensive
in nature, the Soviet Union continues to modernize its
forces and improve their capabilities. Although some mili-
tary units and equipment have been withdrawn from Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union remains the world's largest mili-
tary power, and will remain so even if Gorbachev's promised
reductions take place. It is therefore clear that even with
the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and
the Soviet leadership's declarations of non-hostile inten-
tions toward the U.S. and our Western allies, the Soviet
military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat
to the security of the U.S. and our allies. One can there-
fore conclude that although the Soviets current National
Security Strategy appears to reflect a "new thinking" in
terms of its outlook towards the U.S. and its allies, the
Soviet threat is as great today as it has ever been.
U.S. National Interests and Objectives
To fully understand the U.S. National Security Strat-
egy, we must first understand the ultimate purpose of our
National Security Strategy which is to protect our key
national interests. These national interests are defined
by the President and represent the foundation from which
our National Security Strategy is based. These national
interests include the following:
1. The survival of the U.S. as a free and inde-
pendent nation, with its fundamental values intact
and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide
opportunity for individual prosperity and a re-
source base for our national endeavors.
3. A stable and secure world, free of major
threats to U.S. interests.
4. The growth of human freedom, democratic in-
stitutions, and free market economies throughout
the world, linked by a fair and open international
trading system.
5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.3
In support of our national interests, the President
has identified major U.S. national security objectives.
These objectives provide a general guide for strategy in
situations which call for the exercise of either the dip-
lomatic, political, or military instrument of national
power. These national security objectives are as follows:
1. To maintain the security of our nation and
our allies.
2. To respond to the challenges of the global
economy.
3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy,
freedom, and human rights throughout the world.
4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect
U.S. interests in troubled regions of the world.
5. To build effective and friendly relationships
with all nations with whom there is a basis of
shared concern.4
Evolution of U.S. National Security Strategy
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has sought
to prevent the Soviet Union from capitalizing on its geo-
strategic advantage to dominate its neighbors in Western
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. We have endeavored to
prevent the Soviets from achieving their fundamental goal
of altering the global balance of power in their favor.5
The U.S. national strategy that counters this Soviet goal
has focused on the objective of containment of communism.
Some Administrations have differed over which instruments
of national power-diplomatic, economic, or military-to
use in their containment strategy; however, every Admin-
istration since the end of World War II has endorsed the
idea that the U.S., in concert with its allies, must pre-
vent the Soviet Union from dominating the great concentra-
tions of industrial power and the human capability that
are available in Western Europe and East Asia.6 Thus, after
World War II, the U.S. drafted the Marshall plan as the
guide to help rebuild the war-ravaged economies of Europe,
with the objective of limiting Soviet opportunities to
exploit Europe's economic distress. The U.S. also forward-
deployed military forces to help deter and contain Soviet
military expansionism. As the Soviet capabilities increased,
our security strategy required a larger strategic nuclear
force to augment the forward-deployed conventional forces
and to reinforce our deterrence of both nuclear and conven-
tional attacks on the U.S. and our allies.7
With the advent of nuclear weapons and their inter-
continental delivery systems, another dimension was added
to our National Security Strategy as these weapons became
the major threat to our survival. Consequently, for over
forty years, the deterrence of nuclear war and the reduc-
tion of the threat of nuclear war have become the primary
goals of U.S. National Security Strategy.
Soviet National Security Strategy
The Soviet National Security Strategy has maintained
relatively consistent national goals and objectives since
the end of World War II. These goals and objectives are
based on the concept that the Soviet Union must expand
both their military and political influence beyond their
borders to reinforce their security requirements and to
satisfy their imperialistic urge. Accordingly, the Soviet
National Security Strategy has evolved around the following
objectives:
1. To strengthen the Soviet political system and
preserve rule by the communist party of the Soviet
Union.
2. To extend and enhance Soviet influence world-
wide.
3. To defend the Soviet homeland and state against
potential aggression.
4. To maintain dominance over the land and sea
areas adjacent to Soviet borders.8
Although the Soviets would like us to believe that
they wish to pursue their objectives by peaceful means,
the current Soviet military posture would lead one to think
otherwise. This is based on the fact that the Soviet Union
has had a steady increase in its military capability, very
much in excess of what is required for the defense of the
Soviet Union. The Soviets, as was demonstrated in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, will not hesitate to use
military force to advance their interests if intimidation
or diplomatic pressure fail to achieve their desires.
Although the Soviet leadership recognizes the devas-
tation that nuclear weapons can cause, their military doc-
trine stresses the flexibility to achieve victory both in
a limited conventional war and in a strategic nuclear war.
The Soviets define victory both in the conventional and
nuclear sense, as either defeating or neutralizing the
U.S. or its NATO allies and the survival of the party-
dominated politico-economic structure on their homeland.9
Evolution of Soviet National Security Strategy
Soviet National Security Strategy and military doc-
trine have become more sophisticated over the years in
response to technological advances and changes in the
political environment. Although some tenets of the Soviet
doctrine have remained consistent over the years, others
have been modified to compete with the current and pro-
jected status of the east-west competition.
Until 1964, the Soviet leadership expected the next
world war to start with nuclear weapons and believed that
conventional forces would be used to seize enemy territory
thus exploiting the success brought about by the nuclear
strikes. However, starting in the mid-196Os the Soviet
doctrine began discussing the possibility of a short con-
ventional phase of warfare. In response to this change in
strategy, the Soviets, in addition to their nuclear build-
up, undertook a wide-range of conventional force moderniza-
tion programs to ensure they could fight effectively both
on a nuclear and conventional battlefield.
The Soviets began to modify their strategy again in
the late 1970s because of the nuclear parity between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union. They began to think more in
terms of an extended conventional war, and that the possi-
bility existed that war between the superpowers might not
escalate into the nuclear arena. This doctrinal shift was
due in part to the technological developments in advanced
conventional weaponry, and also to the NATO strategy of
"flexible response." The Soviet emphasis on conventional
warfare can also be seen in their force modernization
effort as well as their training programs.
During the 1980s, the Soviet strategy began to in-
clude defensive operations into an overall offensive stra-
tegy. This was done in response to not only NATO's offen-
sive concepts of Follow-on Forces Attack, and Air-Land
Battle, but also to NATO's improved conventional forces.10
Under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev, the
Soviets have attempted to project a strategy that is defen-
sive in nature, however, in reality, Soviet training con-
tinues to stress the conventional battlefield and a pro-
trated period of conventional warfare within an overall
offensive context. The Soviet strategy also continues to
stress the importance of emerging victorious in all phases
of warfare, including a protracted nuclear war.
Soviet military doctrine presently recognizes that
neither strategic nuclear nor conventional forces are alone
decisive in any future war, but that they must be used
together to realize their maximum effectiveness.11 The
Soviets have spent much of their defense dollars on the
modernization and expansion of both conventional forces
and strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces,
emphasizing their ability to fight under both nuclear and
conventional conditions.
To date, there is great uncertainty as to the actual
intentions of Soviet strategy. Gorbachev and his allies are
aware, as were their predecessors, that the Soviet Union's
superpower status and its ability to achieve its strategic
objectives must be built on the strength of its military.
The Soviet commitment to modernizing both its nuclear and
conventional forces would seem to bear this out. Thus, the
U.S. must not plan its strategy on Soviet pronouncements,
but must guide its strategy by Soviet actions.
Budgetary Trends and Their Impact
The headlines for Defense News, 8 January 1990 edi-
tion read "Cheney Orders Reassessment of DOD Strategy,
Weapons Systems." The U.S. News & World Report for Decem-
ber 11, 1989 featured an article that posed the question
"Does America Need an Army?" The tantalizing prospect of
an end to the cold war is generating political pressure
to bring our forward deployed forces in Europe and Korea
home and to slash the nations $300 billion defense budget.
Yet, at a time when the fast paced world events would seem
to recommend caution, political and budgetary forces are
pushing Congress and the Pentagon to make some fast deci-
sions on what our military will look like and what our
"new" National Security Strategy will consist of.
In concert with the defense budget cuts, Secretary
of Defense Cheney has ordered the services to plan for
$150 billion in cuts from projected spending over the
next five years.12 The various services are making some
tough decisions in regards to their future procurement
strategy and what military technology they will seek to
possess for future warfare. The Army is considering elimi-
nating at least 135,000 troops, and reducing its active-
duty divisions by one sixth; the Navy has proposed abandon-
ing its long cherished goal of a 600 ship fleet, eliminat-
ing three aircraft carriers and approximately 60 other
vessels; the Air Force is reviewing its B-2 stealth bomber,
the C-17 cargo aircraft, and its Advanced Tactical Fighter
aircraft; and the Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor
aircraft, which was to be a key player in the Marine Corps
future warfighting strategy, will undoubtedly be cut in
the future defense budget reductions.13 Representative
Barney Frank (D-Mass) puts the budget reduction and its
implications on the military budget succinctly when he
stated, "We're going to cut the hell out of it."14
Out of all this discussion, emerges a concern that
if the nation is to avoid a dangerous military collapse,
the inevitable budget cuts must be accomplished by a cau-
tious redefinition of America's National Security Strategy
and what that strategy expects its military to achieve.
The key question that must be answered is how should our
military forces be structured to deal with the current and
future threats to our national security in an era of limit-
ed resources; however, the following specific questions
also need to be addressed by our policy makers.
--If strategic nuclear weapons are cut on each side
under the new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), how
should the smaller U.S. nuclear forces be modernized and
restructured to retain a credible deterrence?
--How large should the conventional forces of the
U.S. be that remain in Europe, and how should they be
equipped and organized?
I will now address each of the above questions sepa-
rately and discuss the implications that they have on our
National Security Strategy and the makeup of our future
military forces that must carry out our national strategy.
Strategic Nuclear Weapons
The most important task of the U.S. military is to
prevent a nuclear war through deterrence. The goal of the
U.S. nuclear strategy is to maintain an ability to survive
a surprise-bolt out of the blue-nuclear attack and still
be able to execute the Single Integrated Operations Plan
(SIOP) (which is the plan that launches our strategic bomb-
ers and missiles) with enough nuclear weapons to conduct a
counterattack on militarily significant targets in the
Soviet Union. The goal of our nuclear strategy is there-
fore to maintain a balance between reductions of our force
structure and missile inventory, add still maintain a
credible deterrence towards the Soviet Union.
Conventional Forces in Europe
The strategic nuclear forces will be shaped by the
START agreement; however, the conventional forces in Europe
will be shaped by a re-evaluation of the Soviet military
threat. The Soviets are in the process of withdrawing
240,000 of their 600,000 troops from Eastern Europe, and
at least 10,000 more could be pulled out based on the Con-
ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement which is slash-
ing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.15 Exactly how many U.S.
and NATO forces will be cut is unknown; however, we must
carefully plan our force reductions as NATO's longtime
strategy of "forward defense" could be jeopardized if we
reduce our forces too much. If we have too few forces in
Europe, there will simply be too few soldiers to fill
gaps in our defenses and guard the East-West frontier,
even against a smaller, less heavily armored attack. It
is therefore essential that our strategy for conventional
forces in Europe focus on maintaining the credibility of
the NATO alliance.
New Threats
There are a multitude of challenges that our nation
will confront in the upcoming years. These threats include
terrorist attacks, threats to the oil supplies that flow
through the Persian Gulf, and other local and regional
conflicts in Third World countries. Some say that these
threats will replace the single "evil empire" threat and
that containing communism is no longer the overriding pur-
pose of U.S. national strategy. Those that support this
belief would lean towards a smaller and lighter military,
which would be on line with the smaller defense budget that
we will face. However, in redefining the threat in these
terms, will our national strategy be focused on the real
threat? I say no, as the Soviet Union still posesses the
greatest threat to the U.S. and our way of life because
of its strategic nuclear capability. Yes, we will need to
protect and guard our national interests in the low inten-
sity conflict arena; however, the Soviet Union with its
massive military machine is still public enemy number one,
no-matter how many lesser threats present themselves. The
bottom line is that no other nation poses a military threat
to the U.S. and its allies even remotely comparable to that
posed by the Soviet Union.
Soviet Military Modernization Initiatives
Although General Secretary Gorbachev has announced
that the Soviets will reduce their defense budget by 14.2
percent over the next two years, Soviet defense expendi-
tures have increased by an average of 3 percent per year
in real terms. This is in contrast to U.S. defense spending
which has declined in real terms by over 11 percent during
the same period and with present budget reductions will
decline much further.16 Therefore, the Soviets confront
the U.S. with a large, modern, conventional air, ground,
and sea military force that has a powerful strategic and
theater nuclear arsenal.
The most impressive feature of Soviet military power
today is the rapid pace by which its offensive strategic
nuclear forces are being modernized. This modernization
includes the new silo-based SS-18 Mod 5 heavy Interconti-
nental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which has at least ten
nuclear warheads, and provides greater accuracy then pre-
vious versions of the missile, and increases the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces' capability to destroy targets such
as U.S. based ICBM silos.17
The Soviets are also upgrading their mobile ICBM's.
They have approximately 170 SS-25 road-mobile missiles and
about eighteen rail-mobile SS-24s. Each version of the mo-
bile ICBM has multiple warheads to increase its devasta-
tion. The Soviets strategy of deploying these weapons in
large numbers has improved the survivability of the Soviets
Strategic Rocket Forces significantly.18
The Soviets have also augmented their strategic bal-
listic missile forces by launching upgraded versions of
their Typhoon and Delta class submarines, and have contin-
ued to upgrade their strategic bomber forces. New versions
of the Bear H and supersonic Blackjack bombers have pro-
duced strategic bombers that have a launch platform for
their 3,000 kilometer-range, air-launched nuclear cruise
missiles.19
The Soviet's modernization of their ground forces
is also continuing at a fast pace. New tanks such as the
T-64, T-72 and T-80 are entering the ground forces inven-
tory at numbers so great that in another year or two they
will more than offset the Soviets' announced tank reduc-
tions for Eastern Europe.20 The Soviets are also moderniz-
ing their air forces with newer, more capable aircraft
like the Su-27 Flanker and MIG-31 Foxhound.21
The Soviet Navy is also modernizing its fleet, scrap-
ping older submarines, and producing more of the Akulu-
class cruise missile submarines.22 New major surface com-
batants, such as the Vdaloy and Sovremennyy-class guided
missile destroyers, a Kirov-class nuclear powered cruiser,
and a Kiev-class aircraft carrier, have also recently
joined the Soviet fleet. Furthermore, Soviet naval force
reduction initiatives have made no mention of the two new
Tbilisi-class carriers now being produced.23
It must therefore be clear that Soviet military plan-
ning has yet to match Moscow's rhetoric. The Soviet Union
should be encouraged to continue its initiatives, however,
we cannot act unilaterally to Soviet initiatives that have
not yet been implemented or to proposals by the Soviet
leadership that could easily be reversed by the present
or future leadership. The U.S. must therefore pursue a
policy that will keep this country more effective militar-
ily than the Soviet Union. The U.S. must pursue a strategy
that allows us to bargain from a position of strength.
This is the only thing the Soviets understand.
U.S. Military Modernization Initiatives
To offset the Soviet military modernization initia-
tives, the U.S. strategy employs the competitive strategies
approach to our defense initiatives. This method seeks to
arrive at new or improved U.S. military capabilities de-
rived from a combination of innovative operational and
doctrinal concepts and superior weapon systems and technol-
ogies. Competitive strategies aim at identifying, develop-
ing, and prioritizing key U.S. defense efforts that can
shape the pace and direction of the superpower military
competition. The objective is not to bankrupt the Soviet
Union or undermine its economy. Instead, the U.S. strategy
strives to get the most from our defense resources, and
influence the way the Soviets allocate theirs by forcing
the Soviets to react to our technology.24
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is considered
by our current Administration to be the centerpiece of our
strategic defense forces.25 The potential for the various
programs that fall under the SDI umbrella include rocket
interceptors, and laser, particle beam directed energy
weapons. These options are integral to the SDI program's
success in combating the Soviet offensive and defensive
programs that include countermeasures against strategic
defenses.
In concert with the competitive strategies approach,
the U.S. has steadily modernized both its nuclear forces
and its strategic defenses in order for it to possess the
most current, capable weapon's systems available. For exam-
ple, the Peacekeepeer missile system, which is replacing
the Minuteman missile system, carries more nuclear warheads
and is much more accurate than the Minuteman system.26
Furthermore, by removing the Peacekeeper missiles from
their silos and placing them on specially configured rail-
road cars, the U.S. will improve the survivability of its
ICBM force.27 The survivability and flexibility created
by rail basing will greatly strengthen deterrence by com-
plicating the Soviets' ability to attack these missiles
through their targeting process, thereby reducing their
confidence in being able to strike our forces successfully.
The U.S. is also pursuing the development of the new
small ICBM. This lightweight, road-mobile, single-weapon
missile has the ability to move rapidly in response to
attack warning. Its high degree of resistance to the effects
of even a nearby nuclear explosion makes it a highly surviv-
able weapon.28
The modernization of our strategic submarine force
is also strengthening the overall contribution of the force
to nuclear deterrence. Specifically, the Trident II subma-
rines will soon be armed with the D-5 missile, which offers
improved accuracy and greater range for equivalent pay-
loads than our current Submarine Launched Ballistic Mis-
siles (SLBMs) and can also carry higher yield warheads.29
The U.S. strategic bomber forces have also been mod-
ernized. The installation of the Air Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) on the B-52, the deployment of the B-1B bomber, and
the development of an advanced technology bomber (B-2) are
among the key strategic bomber force modernization efforts.30
Improvements to aircraft navigation systems have also lead
to an overall increase in the accuracy of bomber-delivered
systems. To complement these strategic bomber improvements,
programs have been undertaken to develop an advanced cruise
missile (ACM) and a short-range attack missile (SRAM) to be
carried by the bomber force.31 Finally, our modernization
effort includes improvements to the tanker force that sup-
ports our strategic bombers.
The Air Force has continued to modernize its tacti-
cal aircraft to maintain a qualitative superiority over
the Soviets. This modernization effort includes the modern
F-15Es and F-16s which are replacing the F-4s, and also
includes the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA). Additionally,
the U.S. frontline aircraft are being upgraded with more
advanced systems, such as the Airborne-Self-Protection
Jammer (ASPJ) on the F-16 and the Low-Altitude Navigation
and Targeting Infrared System for Night (LANTIRN) on the
F-15E and F-16, all designed to keep pace with the Soviets
current technology.32
The ability to project our forces by sea to strate-
gically critical areas of the world is paramount to our
modernization effort. Accordingly, a strong Navy is required
to meet the commitments that our global alliance system
establishes and to deter the growing challenges posed by
the Soviet navy, as well as Third World countries. We must
have forces that are not only ready for war, but forces that
can be sustained while operating across the entire spectrum
of contingencies ranging from forces routinely deployed in
forward areas in peacetime, to crisis management forces
sent to trouble spots to deter aggression, to fully mobilized
forces capable of undertaking a variety of maritime missions
if deterrence fails. Accordingly, during the period from
1980 to 1988 our Navy's deployable battle ship force in-
creased from 479 to 565 ships.33 Our future goals for sur-
face combatants calls for building 120 multi-mission (battle
force capable) ships.34 This new ship category combines the
two previous categories of antiair warfare (AAW) cruiser/
destroyer and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) destroyers.
These ships will be assigned as battle force combatants
while the Navy builds towards its multi-mission ship goal.
The Navy also has a goal of maintaining its present air-
craft carrier level at fourteen and its battleship level
at four.35 Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps tactical
aircraft modernization efforts affect active squadrons which
are being upgraded with new F/A-18s, AV-8Bs, and F-14Ds,
and their reserve squadrons which are receiving the A-6s,
F-14s, and F/A-18s.36
The modernization effort for our land forces is also
continuing and on pace with our air and naval forces. The
Army has upgraded its tank fleet with the deployment of the
M-1 Abrams tank, fielded the Bradley fighting vehicle, and
initiated a development program to keep its anti-armor weap-
ons competitive with advances in Soviet armor. The Army has
also improved its attack helicopter inventory with the de-
ployment of the Apache (AH-64) helicopter, while assault
helicopter forces have been modernized with the Blackhawk
(VH-60) aircraft.37 Additionally, the Marine Corps has added
the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), as well as the F/A-18 fix-
ed-wing aircraft, and the AH-1W and CH-53E helicopters to
its inventory.38
Key Elements to an Effective National Security Strategy
To deter Soviet aggression, the U.S. must be strong
enough militarily to convince Moscow that aggression either
would not succeed, or would involve unacceptable costs. To
do this requires not only a strong military, but also
strong alliance relationships with our allies, since only
our combined strength can achieve the necessary level of
deterrence.
There is no substitute for strength. Although we
should work towards better relations with the Soviets,
the security of the U.S. cannot be based on Soviet pro-
nouncements or Soviet intentions. Yet some in the West
ignore lessons of the past and advocate a policy that we
lower our defense preparations to encourage the Soviets to
continue their reforms. Still others believe that technol-
ogy transfers will give Moscow the incentive to prefer
peace. History clearly shows that none of these alternatives
can replace a strong defense posture. Stanislov Levchenko,
a former KGB officer who defected to the West in 1979, stated
the following when asked the question if there was any sub-
stitute for the U.S. possessing a strong military and de-
fense posture in dealing with the Soviets:
No, no, no. There is no substitute at all. I don't
mean we need to have a dramatic increase in all kinds
of weapon systems in this country. But America de-
finitely has to pursue a policy that will keep this
country more effective militarily than the Soviet
Union. That is the only way to talk to the Soviets.
That is what they understand.39
To keep a strong military, high technology weapon
systems must be maintained. Regardless of improved U.S.-
Soviet relations and potential arms control agreements,
the Soviet ability to initiate strategic warfare against
the United States will persist, and a crisis or political
change in the Soviet Union could occur faster than we could
rebuild our strategic forces. As discussed earlier, the
Soviet Union is presently pursuing a major strategic mod-
ernization program. We therefore must continue with the
modernization of U.S. strategic forces and pursue such
programs as SDI, both because of Soviet strategic capabil-
ities and because of the spread of ballistic technology
to other countries. We must maintain that qualitative su-
periority, so that the next breakthrough in weapons tech-
nology comes from the West not from the Soviet Union. The
modernization of both our strategic and conventional weap-
on systems is therefore essential to ensure the credibility
of deterrence and the effectiveness of our flexible re-
sponse strategy.
Conclusion
While the Soviets have been on a steady course of
expanding their military capabilities, they realize that
the high-technology programs of the West could widen the
technological gap between them and the West and thereby
hinder their plans for future strategies. The Soviets have
therefore pursued broad-based political and economic ini-
tiatives meant to slow the West's high technology military
buildup/modernization effort and gain time for them to ac-
quire a more modern industrial base and a healthier econ-
omy. While obviously trying to change Western perceptions,
the Soviet Union has not yet shown any evidence of chang-
ing their long-term goals or their long standing ambition
to become the dominant global power.
In the upcoming years there will be much uncertainty
about Soviet intentions. The current leadership's ultimate
goals are known only to them, and the duration of their
present initiatives are uncertain. Furthermore, the Soviet
regime is inherently capable of sudden policy shifts. In
January 1988, former President Reagan stated Soviet inten-
tions best when he concluded, "Their goal has been, and
remains, an effective disarming first strike capability."40
I submit that the Soviets have changed their strategy by
which they are pursuing their goals, but they have not
changed their goals. This can be easily substantiated when
one looks at Soviet actions and their rapid military mod-
ernization effort. When one looks at the verifiable facts,
its easy to conclude that the Soviet threat is as great
today as it has ever been.
ENDNOTES
1Cheney, Dick, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
President and the Congress," (U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, January 1990), preface.
2Schuller, Robert, "Schuller Preaches on Soviet Television,"
Washington Times, (December 31, 1989), p. 10.
3Reagan, Ronald, "National Security Strategy of the United
States," (The White House Printing Office, January
1988), p. 3.
4Reagan, p. 3 and 4.
5Reagan, p. 1.
6Reagan, p. 1.
7Reagan, p. 1.
8Carlucci, Frank C., "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment
of the Threat-1988," (U.S. Government Printing Office,
April 1988), p. 8.
9Carlucci (April 1988), p. 11.
10Carlucci (April 1988), p. 12.
11Carlucci (April 1988), p. 11.
12Walcott, John, "Does America Need An Army?," U.S. News
& World Report, (December 11, 1989), p. 22.
13Scarborough, Rowan, "Arms Crunch Cometh," Washington Times,
(January 30, 1990), p. 6.
14Walcott, p. 22.
15Walcott, p. 24.
16Cheney, Richard B., "Soviet Military Power: Prospects For
Change-1989," (U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep-
tember 1989), preface.
17Cheney, (September 1989), p. 45-47.
18Cheney, (September 1989), p. 44 and 45.
19Cheney, (September 1989), p. 46.
20Cheney, (September 1989), p. 66.
21Cheney, (September 1989), p. 51.
22Cheney, (September 1989), p. 47.
23Cheney, (September 1989), p. 78.
24Carlucci, Frank C., "Report of the Secretary of Defense
Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress," (U.S. Government
Printing Office, January 1989), p. 47.
25Cheney, (January 1990), p. 33 and 35.
26Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32.
27Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32.
28Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32.
29Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32.
30Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32.
31Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 189.
32Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 160.
33Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 141.
34Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 141.
35Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 144.
36Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 163.
37Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 127.
38Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 128.
39Levchenko, Stanislov, "Lies Behind The Smiles," American
Legion Magazine, (December 1989), p. 51.
40Reagan, Ronald, Public Papers of President Reagan, Book 1 for
1988, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 20.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carlucci, Frank C., "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment
of The Threat-1988," (U.S. Government Printing Office,
April 1988), p. 1-17.
Carlucci, Frank C., "Report of the Secretary of Defense
Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress," (U.S. Government
Printing Office, January 1989), p. 3-189.
Cheney, Richard B., "Soviet Military Power: Prospects For
Change-1989," (U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep-
tember 1989), p. 1-78.
Cheney, Dick, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
President and the Congress," (U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, January 1990), p. 1-35.
Levchenko, Stanislov, "Lies Behind The Smiles," American
Legion Magazine, (December 1989), p. 51.
Reagan, Ronald, "National Security Strategy of The United
States," (The White House Printing Office, January
1988), p. 1-24.
Reagan, Ronald, Public Papers of President Reagan, Book 1
for 1988, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990),
p. 20.
Scarborough, Rowan, "Arms Crunch Cometh," Washington Times,
(January 30, 1990), p. 1 and 6.
Schuller, Robert, "Schuller Preaches on Soviet Television,"
Washington Times, (December 31, 1989), p. 10.
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