Marine Aviation - Time For Change
AUTHOR Major Thomas M. Davis, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: MARINE AVIATION - TIME FOR CHANGE
THESIS: The aviation combat element of the Marine Air Ground Task
Force should be reorganized and trained in peacetime as it is ex-
expected to fight in time of war.
ISSUE: Our Marine Aircraft Wings are currently organized by func-
tional area into seperate Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG). The attack
squadrons are assigned to one MAG while the fighter squadrons are
assigned to another. A major problem exists when an aviation corn-
bat element (ACE) is formed to support a Marine Expeditionary Bri-
gade (MEB). The combat ef fectiveness of the ACE is questionable
when the squadrons and the group staff do not train together on a
permanent basis.
There is a definite lack of continuity in our aviation
force structure when the composition of a fixed-wing ACE has to
come from five seperate Marine Aircraft Groups and four different
airbases. In todays force structure the squadrons, who would be
tasked to operate as an integrated team, have not worked together
on a personal, logistical, or tactical basis. The ACE commander
does not know the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinates nor
has he trained the group staff as a continuum.
The Navy carrier Airwing is a good example of a well trained
and effective aircraft group. Their focus of effort is to train as
an integrated Airwing so that they can be a dominating force on the
battlefield. The Marine Aircraft Group should be reorganized to
reflect a similar type of force structure. The opportunity to en-
hance the strategic mobility of our TACAIR assets could be improved
if Marines would deploy their composite FW Aircraft Group on air-
craft carriers. This author believes the historical lessons of
WW II and the Korean War should be reviewed. In order to guarantee
Marine air support, the deployment of Marine Aircraft Groups aboard
escort carriers would be a beneficial concept.
CONCLUSION: It is time for Marine aviation to change. A new re-
organization of the existing aircraft groups would assign one
permanent composite aircraft group to support each of our six
MEBs. This would include the relocation of several squadrons to
a single airbase so that the ACE commander could conduct integrat-
ed training with his entire aircraft group.
"MARINE AVIATION - TIME FOR CHANGE"
Thesis: The aviation combat element of the Marine Air Ground Task
Force should be reorganized and trained in peacetime as it is ex-
pected to fight in time of war.
I. National Security Act of 1947 (with 1952 amendment)
A. Division/Regiment Cohesion
B. Wing/Aircraft Group Fallacy
C. Lack of Strategic Lift
D. Future Marine War - MEB Structure as Foundation
II. Current Marine Aircraft Wing Organization
A. Structure Based on Functional area
B. ACE Employment Concept - Composite Force
1. MEU - One Helo Squadron
2. MEB - Two Aircraft Groups (FW and Rotary Wing)
3. MEB ACE Composition - FW Example
4. Lack of Continuity
III. Disadvantages to Current Aircraft Wing Organization
A. Training/Integrated Exercises
B. Maintenance/Logistic Support
C. ACE Staff
D. Requirement to Surge Air Early in Operation
IV. Navy Carrier Air Wing
A. Effective Example of Composite Air Group
B. Composition
C. Focus of Effort - Training as Unit
D. Battle Staff
V. New Marine Aircraft Organization
A. One Composite Aircraft Group per MEB
B. Acceptable Transition
C. Emphasis on Training
D. Focus of FW - Largest Gap in Combat Readiness
VI. New Opportunity
A. Marine Aircraft Group - Deploy on CV
B. Escort Carrier History
1. WW II
2. Korea
C. Realistic Missions/Training Tradeoffs
The U. S. Marine Corps prides itself in the synergism of
the air - ground team. The Marine on the ground always feels
better when he sees Marine aircraft flying overhead. This
comes from a long history of Marine pilots understanding the
realities of ground combat. Even today many leaders in our
Corps are thinking of using our Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
as a seperate maneuver element to support the commander's in-
tent on the battlefield. But I believe there is a serious
misconception on the effectiveness of our ACE if a Marine Ex-
peditionary Brigade (MEB) is employed on short notice.
The ACE is one of the three combat elements that make up
the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).1 The ACE is not a
permanent organization. It is formed by tasking unfamiliar
squadrons, from different Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs), to
make up a composite Aircraft Group. The MEB ACE will consist
of one fixed wing (FW) and one rotary wing (RW) Aircraft Group.
The newly formed composite Aircraft Group has its current
assets based at airfields all over the country. The ACE staff
is not manned on a permanent basis and it does not have repre-
sentatives assigned to its organization from each aircraft type
within the Group. The FW squadrons will flight ferry their air-
craft via Air Force strategic tanking to conflict areas of oper-
ation. The RW squadrons and Marine Aircraft Control Group (MACG)
assets will embark on Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft and
marry up with their FW counterparts in theatre. The key problem
to understand is that the personnel who belong to these aviation
units have not trained together as a fighting aircraft Group.
Additionally, they have not been tasked or lead by the ACE staff
on a daily basis. The aviation Combat Element of the Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) should be organized and trained in
peacetime as it is expected to fight in time of war.
The National Security act of 1947, as amended in 1952, spe-
cified the organization of the Marine Corps: " The Marine Corps,
within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to
include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings,
and such other land, combat, aviation and other services as may-
be organic therein. "2 Congress statutorily mandated the minimum
force level of the Corps, but it did not decide on the actual
makeup of each fighting component.3 I believe the internal or-
ganization of the "combat division", that is the infantry division,
is effective. All of it's units are garrisoned on the same base.
The division is made up of three infantry regiments, one artillery
regiment, one amphibious assault vehicle battalion, one tank
battalion, and other combat service support units. The division
is the foundation of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of the
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).4 The MEF is a very powerful
combat force with over 50,000 personnel and requires an enormous
amount of dedicated air Force and Navy assets to transport
it into a conflict area.
Our Navy barely has the amphibious shipping required to
embark one MEB (15-25 ships) in each major fleet command (CINC-
LANT or CINCPAC). The Air Force is hard pressed to give us the
247 dedicated MAC sorties required to lift the Maritime Preposi-
tioned Force (MPF). The MPF is also a MEB size unit. Therefore,
I believe the Marine Corps is most likely going to fight our next
battle as a MEB. I also believe our next battle will be in the low
to mid intensity conflict spectrum. The GCE of the MEB is a rein-
forced infantry regiment. The ACE of the MEB is a composite air-
craft group.
The regiment is made up of three infantry battalions. It
will usually be reinforced with one tank company, one artillery
battalion, one LAI company, and one amphibious assualt vehicle
company when task organized to carry out the mission of the GCE.5
All of these combat units are located at the same base and there-
fore have more opportunities to train together. The regimental
commander knows the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinate
commanders. The regimental staff functions well together during
many field exercises. The regiment can deploy on a moments notice
and have full confidence that it can operate tactically as an
integrated unit. It is organized in peacetime as it is expected
to fight in war.
This is not the case for the ACE. Each Marine Air Wing is
organized by functional area into a variety of Air Groups. For
example, MAG-32 at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point,
N.C., is made up of five AV-8B attack squadrons.6 The weekly
training is controlled and monitored by the MAG-32 Group comman-
der and his staff (all AV-8B pilots). But in time of conflict,
a squadron of AV-8Bs will be transferred into a composite air
Group and will have to function within a new fighting organization.
These AV-8B pilots will have no prior experience planning with or
flying with the other squadrons in the ACE. All personnel inter-
relationships, supply readjustments, maintenance complexities, and
tactical synergism must be developed from ground zero.
Since each MAG is organized by functional specialty and not
by the composite force structure, the MEB commander lacks a har-
monious fighting machine which can carry out his intent on the
battlefield. In FMFM-1, the Commandant wants all of us to under-
stand maneuver warfare. Trust tactics,mission type orders, focus
of effort, and decentralized control can help us be combat effec-
tive on the battlefield.7 But all of these concepts are based
on the ability of our units to train together on a daily basis.
The following illustrates the lack of continuity of our FW
aviation assets as currently organized:8
Click here to view image
A MAG can become very proficient in its own functional
area but this does not mean that each tactical squadron can mesh
together into a composite Air Group as well. The closest we get
to training our ACE as a true composite fighting unit is at the
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level of the MAGTF. This fighting
force has a reinforced infantry battalion acting as the GCE. The
entire MEU is employed on three to five amphibious ships. The
ACE is embarked on either a LHA or a LPH and it is a true composite
helicopter squadron.9 Occasionally, the ACE will be augmented by a
detachment of six Av8B VSTOL jets. This organization is very
effective because the squadron stabilizes six to ten months prior
to their six month deployment. The squadron has plenty of time to
train directly with the specific battalion it is going to support.
The MEU will only be used on very small scale operations
because it does not have the sustainability or the firepower to
handle a major enemy threat in todays low to mid intensity con-
flict arena. It can be used in advance force operations in the
amphibious Operating Area (AOA) in order to augment the deploy-
ment of the MEB in a large scale operation. However, our FW
aircraft are not organized to support the deploying MEUs. Our
Marines have to rely on Navy carrier aviation to fly the close
air support and to provide the local air superiority during the
amphibious landing of the MEU. Navy carrier aviation's primary
mission, though, is to defend the carrier battlegroup not the
Marines fighting ashore.
The aircraft, personnel and support equipment required to
man a typical FW Air Group of an ACE can come from five dif-
ferent MAGs and four different airbases. The following il-
lustrates the FW composition of the ACE for the 4th MEB:10
Click here to view image
As one can plainly see, there is no continuity of the way
in which our MAGs are presently organized to train. The concept
of properly using the ACE is to focus the capabilities of an in-
tegrated air package over the MEB's area of influence. If this
tactical integration can occur, then a force multiplier will be
created which far surpasses the individual capability of a single
squadron. On the MEB level there are a number of training exer-
cises which give our aviators exposure to operating as a composite
ACE. Solid Shield, Northern Wedding and the Combined arms Ex-
ercises at 29 Palms are prime examples. Unfortunately there are
different squadrons making up the ACE each time there is one of
these exercises. Does the same ACE conduct any training or
planning with the same squadrons after the exercise is complete?
No. Individual squadrons go back to their own training plan and
the intent of working together as permanent fighting ACE disap-
pears.
The current process required to create a composite Air Group
is a complicated process. Our highly technical aircraft require
specific maintenance and logistical support. The personnel, air-
craft and spare parts from each unit must arrive simultaneously
in theatre to support flight operations. Each garrison MAG has
its own complement of maintenance and supply departments. This
nucleus is used to integrate the ACE's logistical support package
Each garrison MEG has it's own intermediate maintenance activity
(IMA).11 In order to deploy effectively, each squadron must
deploy with certain complements of it's own IMA. Under the ex-
isting doctrine, "a deployment contingency support package (CSP)
must be provided to the ACE from each aircrafts parent MAG."12
In other words, our tactical aircraft are currently designed to
be maintained and supported from a logistical system which func-
tions specifically by aircraft type.
When an ACE is formed, all of these assets and support person-
nel must come together and are expected to function smoothly.
I do not feel that this is the most efficient way to get the most
out of our aircraft and personnel.
The lack of the composite group structure prevents our avi-
ators from integrating their capabilities. After more than ten
years of flying tactical Marine aircraft, I believe the emphasis
on Marine aviation is at the squadron level. This is necessary
up to a point but we do not know how to fight as a combined air
package. There is integrated training accomplished on the lower
level if squadron S-3s are aggressive and follow up a tactical
training schedule. But this usually is done only to meet a short
term training goal. It is not done at the integrated group level
where all types of FW aircraft focus their main effort of
training on supporting a group mission. The greatest dis-
advantage to our current organization is the following: If
tonight a warning order was issued to employ a MEB, different
squadrons from various MAGs would be thrown together to meet the
call to arms. These units have not worked together, planned to-
gether or flown together. In aviation this can lead to mission
degradation, including safety hazards as well as lack of support
for the ground fighting units. Additionally, the MEB commander
needs the ACE capable of surging his air early during a campaign.
The ACE may be the focus of main effort in phase one of the MEB's
concept of operations ashore. This is not the time for squadron
commanders to be making decisions based on the intent of an ACE
commander who they just met upon arrival in theater.
A very successful model of a composite airgroup is the Navy
carrier Airwing. This Airwing is made up of eighty to ninety air-
craft and deploys aboard one of the Navy's fourteen aircraft car-
riers. The Airwing has a mixture of tactical aircraft: F14 fight-
er squadrons, A6 and F18 attack squadrons, an antisubmarine squad-
ron of S3s, an electronic warfare squadron of EA6Bs, an early warn-
ing and C2 detachment of E2s and a SAR or antisubmarine helo de-
tachment of H3s.13 This Airwing is created twelve months prior to
the carrier's scheduled deployment. The intent is to gradually
mold the capabilities of each squadron into a single fighting air-
wing. For example, the Airwing begins it's training during a
three week long heavy weapons deployment to Fallon, Nevada. The
squadrons fly together in sections (two planes) and eventually
strike packages may be flown with twenty-five to forty aircraft.
This deployment is followed by intense workups on the carrier.
Each workup period has a detailed objective to accomplish. The
advanced phase workup stresses flight operations around the
carrier which is then followed by the Battlegroup phase This
includes flight operations of the carrier as well as it's sup-
port of ten to twenty ships.
During these workups the personnel learn to work together
as a team. Maintenance practices, logistical support and
tactical procedures for the aircrew are standardized. The
Airwing staff is tactically oriented and they fly with all of
the squadrons. There is continuous planning by the Airwing for
real world contingencies. The end result is a very effective
fighting unit. They are so effective that they can be the domina-
ting force in their theater of operations. This type of organ-
ization and training is what the MEB ACE should have in order to
properly support the MAGTF commander. Upon occassion, one of
our Marine FW squadrons has been assigned to a carrier airwing
to augment one of the Navy carrier battlegroups. Unfortunately,
once this is done, the Marine squadron comes under command of
the Navy airwing and again the primary mission is to defend the
Naval carrier group and not the Marines fighting on the ground.
The current structure of the Marine Aircraft Wing should be
reorganized into a specific number of composite airgroups. Each
airgroup will be assigned to support one of the designated six
MEBs.14 The ACE staff will be a unit with representation from
each squadron working at the group level. The CSP of the com-
posite airgroup will be task organized so that the ACE could be
deployed on short notice.
The group commander would be better prepared to lead his ACE
because he knows their true capabilities. The aircrews will be
able to quickly respond to changes on the battlefield because they
have flown together many times before. The key idea is adapt-
ability and flexibility. There will come a time when a flight of
Marine jets will have to change their plan while airborne. The
flight leader will be able to give a precise mission type order
to his flight with only a few key words of instruction. They
will understand his intent and carry out their newly assigned
mission to perfection. This sixth sense of how to perform under
pressure only comes from knowing your men and your men knowing
you. It comes from hours of training together and having the
opportunity to learn from your mistakes
Many will say it will cost too much money to relocate ex-
isting squadrons. If you look at the future inventory of our
FW community, the transition could be done without too much
cost. The F18D is currently replacing three older Marine air-
craft (A6E, OA4, and RF4B) in the early 1990's. Our FW aircraft
primarily will be made up of the FI8C/D, AV8B, and C130. The
single EA6B squadron of twenty aircraft stationed at Cherry
Point could easily be split up to support all three Marine Air-
wings.
If you look at the west coast as an example, the following
reorganization could be introduced:
Click here to view image
This would be the basic nucleus of each FW Group making up
the Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The idea of redistributing
our EA6B aircraft from one base into multiple air bases is being
seriously considered at this time. The concept of creating a
mini squadron of six aircraft instead of a standard squadron of
twenty aircraft has been implemented by the Navy. In order to
meet their commitments to support fourteen aircraft carriers,
the Naval EA6B squadrons have been organized as they will deploy.
This creates more leadership opportunities for their aviators and
it supports my basic concept of training as an integrated unit.
The newly formed composite air group would focus their an-
nual training schedule on supporting their designated MEB Ground
Combat Element (GCE). The helo composite air group could also
focus their training on supporting the GCE and the Combat Service
Support Element (CSSE).
The same reorganization could be introduced with the Brigade
in Hawaii and with MAG-12 in Iwakuni, Japan. In fact, MAG-12 is
currently made up of two F18C squadrons, one AV8B squadron, one
A6E squadron, and one EA6B detachment. All of these units deploy
to Iwakuni on the six month Unit Deployment Program. With a few
modifications, MAG-12 could be the first Marine air group to fully
implement my composite doctrine.
I have focused my attention on the FW community because I feel
this is where the largest gap in combat readiness exists. Most of
our helo units are located on the same base as at MCAS New River,
N.C. although many of these squadrons deploy as a member of a com-
posite squadron with the MEU, the helo community still needs to
sharpen their skills in fighting as a composite helo group.
If our FW squadrons are reorganized into the permanent
force structure needed to support our six MEBs, then another
unique opportunity is created which would give the MAGTF com-
mander a force multiplier on the battlefield. This composite
FW air group could be employed on an aircraft carrier. It
could be tasked to directly support the amphibious landing and
subsequent operations ashore. This concept was practiced in
World War II and in the Korean War by Marine squadrons flying
off of escort carriers.
The escort carrier augmented the fast attack carrier by
providing air support for the Marines during and after the
amphibious landing. This capability allowed the fast attack
carriers the opportunity to prosecute the rest of their missions
at an earlier time.
In both wars some of our most decorated and innovated lead-
ers wanted Marines flying from dedicated aircraft carriers. In
the aftermath of the bloody landing at Tarawa and again after
the battle on Guam, General Holland Smith saw a specific need
for pilots who were better trained in close air support. Smith
stated that "sufficient air groups be designated and trained as
direct support groups and be assigned to escort carriers."15 In
the book U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Jeter Isely and Philip
Crowl focused on the prosecution of a successful amphibious oper-
ation:
Marine officers from the commandant down had repeatedly
recommended the assignment of escort carriers for the ex-
clusive use of Marine aviation. Only thus, they maintained,
could their ground troops be guaranteed uninterrupted and
efficient close air support during the assualt phase of
their amphibious operations. Not until the very end of the
war, and then too late for active employment, did the Navy
designate escort carriers for the sole use of Marine avia-
tion.16
In the Korean War Marine F4U Corsairs were deployed aboard
the escort carriers Badoeng Strait and Sicily in order to provide
air support for the First Provisional Marine Brigade within the
Pusan perimeter. These two squadrons, VMF-323 and VMF-214, were
also instrumental in the amphibious landing at Inchon.17 The
concept of the escort carrier disappeared at the end of the
the Korean War. Although Marine FW squadrons have flown effec-
tively off of aircraft carriers, they were not employed as a com-
posite air group. In our present inventory of amphibious shipping
the LHA, LPH, and the new LHD could be classified as escort car-
riers. The only problem is that they were designed specifically
for helicopter and VSTOL capable aircraft utilization. These
platforms lack the arresting gear, catapults, and deck length
required to support normal FW carrier operations.
If the Marine Aircraft Wing was reorganized to reflect the
permanent composite air group concept, maybe the Navy would be
willing to employ a "Marine Carrier Airwing" on several of their
carriers. The Coral Sea and the Midway were recently retired from
the active carrier fleet. These two platforms could be recommis-
sioned and/or sent through the Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP).18 The strategic mobility of our ACE could be greatly
improved if the Marine Corps could deploy from dedicated FW escort
carriers.
Our Marines on the ground deserve the best air support our
pilots can bring to bear on the enemy. In the future, the Marine
Air Ground Task Force commander will need highly trained Marine
aviators who can quickly adapt to changing situations. Our avia-
tors can be flexible and responsive once they have trained to-
gether in a permanent composite air group. The time has come
to reorganize our Marine Airwing so that our aviators can train
in peacetime as they are expected to fight in time of war.
ENDNOTES
1 Saxman, John B. Maj USAF, "The Role of Marine Aviation in
Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1989), p. 59
2 National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253,as amend-
ed through September 30, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office 1973), p. 16-17
3 Keiser, Gordan W., The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Uni-
fication 1944-1947, (Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National De-
fense University Press, 1982), p. 129
4 Marine Corps Development and Education Command, U.S. Marine
Corps, Marine Division, FMFM 6-1 (Quantico, 1978), p. 176
5 FMFM 6-1, p. 6
6 Junette, Timothy E. Capt USMC, "Reorganizing Marine Corps
Aviation", Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1988), p. 18
7 Marine Corps Development and Education Command, U.S. Marine
Corps, Warfighting, FMFM-1 (Quantico,1989), p. 63, 70, 72
8 Junette, p. 18
9 FMFM 6-1, p. 9
10 Junette, p. 18
11 Junette, p. 19
12 Junette, p. 19
13 Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices - The
Washington Papers, Vol VI, No 52, (The Center for Strategic and
International Studies: Georgetown Univ, 1978), p. 24-32
14 Junette, p. 20
15 Crowl, Philip and Isely, J.A., U.S. Marines and Amphibious
War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1951), p. 385
16 Crowl and Isely, p. 586
17 Mersky, Peter B., U.S. Marine Corps Aviation - 1912 to
Present, (Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Com-
pany of America,1983), p. 130-L33
18 Geiger, Charles R. Lt Col USMC, Marine Corps Tacair and
Strategic Mobility, (The Naval War College for Advanced Research,
March 1983), p. 6, 14
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