Air Attacks: Making CAS Responsive
AUTHOR Major Theodore E. Dailey, Jr., USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AIR ATTACKS: MAKING CAS RESPONSIVE
THESIS: Factors causing unresponsive CAS are its technological
base, its bureaucracy, and its reliance on coordinated and highly
developed interactive human performance factors; therefore, future
success for the Marine Corps depends on acquiring effective
technology, designing functional command and control relationships
to support effective CAS, and fostering a common sense of objective
between both partners, air and ground, in the successful
accomplishment of the mission.
ISSUE: The configuration of the Marine air-ground team relies
heavily on its airpower to support ground operations. The
imperative for consistently responsive close air support is
particularly important due to the configuration of the ground
forces as light infantry characterized by a paucity of ground based
fire support when compared to units of the Army or those of other
nations. Since its advent in the 1930's, CAS has become
increasingly difficult to prosecute because of three factors.
Technological advances in aircraft have established physical and
organization distance between ground and aviation units which has
resulted in subsequent psychsocial distance at the implementing
level. Second, command and control agencies designed to bring air
and ground together are increasingly subject to degraded operations
which can effectively stifle all air support operations. The
command and control agencies also contribute to maintaining
psychosocial, cognitive distance between air and ground. Lastly,
because of the different environments of air and ground operatives,
a common frame of reference is often obscured contributing to
dysfunctional CAS employment. Solutions exist to correct these
deficient aspects of CAS operations. Quantum leaps in
technological application have provided the Marine Corps with
unprecedented aviation ordnance delivery capability in the form of
the F/A-18 and AV-8B. Forward basing capability and state of the
art communications serve to lessen the organizational and physical
distance between air and ground units. Simplified command and
control techniques such as aviation in direct support also allow
CAS to be more responsive. Finally, qualitative increases in
information flow between air and ground units will align the
purposes of the air and ground units to successful accomplishment
of the mission despite differing air and ground environments.
CONCLUSION: Solving challenges to responsive CAS in support of
the ground commander's plan cannot be solved simply by applications
of technology, shorter command and control relationships and
improving human performance factors addressed separately. The
approach must be holistic and comprehensive.
AIR ATTACKS: MAKING CAS RESPONSIVE
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: Factors causing unresponsive CAS are its
technological base, its bureaucracy, and its reliance on
coordinated and highly developed interactive human performance
factors; therefore, future success for the Marine Corps depends on
acquiring effective technology, designing functional command and
control relationships to support effective CAS, and fostering a
common sense of objective between both partners, air and ground, in
the successful accomplishment of the mission.
I. Challenges
A. Effects of technology
1. High communications requirement
2. Increased aircraft capability/requirements
3. Creation of organization/psychosocial distance between
air and ground
B. Command and control issues
1. DASC established to effect and coordinate CAS
2 Reinforces organizational distance
3. Vulnerable as a center of gravity
C. Ground commander versus flight leader
1. Differing perspectives
2. CAS success depends on highly developed skills of both
II. Considerations for success
A. Requirements-based procurement
B. Unconventional command and control relationships
1. Forward basing
2. Direct support provided by air units
3. Functional, effective lines of support in joint/combined
arena
C. Improving aviator awareness of the battlefield
III. Imperative for success: holistic approach
AIR ATTACKS: MAKING CAS RESPONSIVE
SITUATION: He was being shaken, rousing him from a brief,
delightful and mildly erotic respite from the rigors of his current
situation. He craved isolation and security. "WAKE UP!" It took
him a few eternities for his fatigued vision to focus, and he
finally recognized the Company Commander. "Enemy tanks are two
clicks north of us stuck in a minefield. I want MK-20 Rockeye on
them before they get loose!" Turning away, the Company Commander
dropped the question of life or death for the men of "G" Company in
the hands of the Forward Air Controller. Suddenly fully alert, the
FAC rose to obtain and direct the close air support that would
achieve the Company's defensive mission, and save the lives of the
men he had grown fond of in the short time he had been with them.
He prayed that the radios would work, the mortars could mark the
target and that the mission would be successful. He swallowed hard
knowing the odds were against him.
It appears to be so easy when one reads the manuals. It's
neatly depicted in charts showing the communication network, the
control agencies and the machinations required to ensure CAS is
consistently responsive to the ground commander's scheme of
maneuver. The charts and manuals are deceptive. Factors causing
unresponsive CAS are its technological base, its bureaucracy, and
its reliance on coordinated and highly developed interactive human
performance factors; therefore, future success for the Marine
Corps depends on acquiring effective technology, designing
functional command and control relationships to support effective
CAS, and fostering a common sense of objective between both
partners, air and ground, in the successful accomplishment of the
mission. One of the hardest tasks faced at the Forward Edge of the
Battle Area (FEBA) is integrating air and ground operations. As the
United States' force in readiness and only integrated air-ground
team, Marines, as light infantry, depend on close air support to
accommodate shortfalls in weapon systems found in traditional,
heavier land armies. CAS must be consistently responsive.
CAS, viewed as a system based on technology, depends almost
solely on the connectivity the communications system provides.
From the time an air support request is made and a mission reports
to the FAC for employment, at a minimum, seven communication
interfaces are made. A communication breakdown anywhere in the
system does not simply degrade the mission, it effectively cancels
the sortie and scores a "mission kill" for the enemy; he lives and
friendly forces remain vulnerable.
Technological advances in aviation have been a blessing and an
anathema for conducting CAS. Since CAS was pioneered in Nicaragua
in the 1920's, aircraft have become bigger, therefore allowing more
payload, faster, and more lethal due to increased weapons system
accuracy. The disadvantages, viewed objectively, can outweigh
aviation advantages. The bigger, faster, and accurate jets of
today require, in a secure area, complex applications of technical
skills to maintain availability as a viable tool in the
prosecution of military objectives. No longer does the Jenny
biplane land next to the company commander's command post for a
brief and a chat. This technological imperative creates both
physical and organizational distance between the operative
commanders in the application of CAS. The speed of current
aircraft can allow CAS to be responsive to the needs of the ground
commander; however, speed also degrades the pilot's ability to
acquire the target much less allow him to gain a real time
appreciation for the friendly and enemy situation along the FEBA.
Technological advances are not singularly the domain of CAS
aircraft; systems designed to eliminate aircraft from the skies
have similarly advanced over the last 60 years. A plethora of
diverse systems are arrayed against the performance of CAS or, for
that matter, any other aviation mission in the vicinity of the
FEBA. A spectrum of weapons, from light machine guns to heavy
anti-aircraft artillery, and complex strategic surface-to-air
missiles to individually issued hand-held, heat-seeking missiles,
has been designed with the interference of an air-ground synergy in
mind. Technology has assuredly advanced the capabilities of air
systems to have great effect on the battlefield, but it has also
increased organizational friction and adversarial friction in the
conduct of CAS.
Methods to employ CAS aircraft, largely resulting from
technological imperatives, have evolved to effectively and
efficiently apply airpower in support of the ground commander. The
principle in mind is sacred in doctrine: centralized command,
decentralized control. Translated for the uninitiated, this
principle means air assets are held by a supporting commander until
requested by the commander desiring support. The weakness in this
principle is glaring. It assumes dependable communications are
available to make the request, and that assets are plentiful
allowing routine aircraft assignment. Both are fallacious.
In recognition of this problem, a bureaucratic solution was
devised in that the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was
constituted to shorten communication links, consolidate requests,
and coordinate ground fires with aviation operations. Inspired as
its creation may have been, the DASC does not substitute for close
relationships between air and ground as compared to infantry and
direct support artillery. It creates organizational distance
between air and ground functional operatives (flight leader and
company commander) and, therefore, friction. Additionally, even
though communication links established by any one unit were shorter
with the establishment of the DASC, it can be a liability because
no alternative means of communication exists between air and ground
commanders. A DASC casualty functionally stops all air support, by
doctrine.
Finally, CAS depends on positive, coordinated, and interactive
human performance factors, without which, CAS cannot be responsive.
These factors are the performance of tactical skills and the
intuitive appreciation for the requirements of both the air and
ground operative for each other. The requisite technical and
tactical skills are apparent: the ground commander must know how
to request air (implying tactical communication skills), to
designate targets (implying weapons employment skill), and a
knowledge of ground to air communications; the flight commander
must know how to aviate, navigate, communicate, and employ his
aircraft as a total weapons system. Less apparent is the intuitive
awareness about the needs of each other held by the flight leader
and ground commander that adjusts the air-ground interface when
techniques or technical systems fail. A technically proficient
pilot will deliver ordnance on target on time. A technically
proficient pilot who understands the ground situation will not only
deliver ordnance on target, on time, but also report his
observations of the battlefield or prosecute missions under flight
leader control beyond the FEBA if he cannot communicate with the
ground commander. He can do this because he understands the scheme
of maneuver and knows all friendly positions, including security
forces. A proficient, technical pilot would return to base without
dropping his ordnance because he could not communicate with the
ground commander. An intuitively knowledgeable ground commander,
in a degraded communications situation, would ensure fires in
support of the air attack would be prosecuted and know the aircraft
ingress and egress routes.
Consistently supportive air attacks can be realized only when
the challenges presented by technology, bureaucratic systems, and
human performance factors are accommodated in a complementary and
integrated manner in order to effectively employ the Marine Corps
weapon of choice: the air-ground team. These challenges are
surmountable and, in fact, many steps have already been taken to
solve the CAS responsiveness problem.
During the 1980's, unprecedented technological advances were
realized. For the first time in recent memory, requirements
stipulated by the military departments dictated the equipment
configuration for the armed forces to the year 2000 and beyond.
Prior to this modernization, the defense industry proffered
equipment that could fulfill defense needs but did not necessarily
meet mission requirements. As a case in point, the F-4 Phantom was
a mind child of McDonnell Aircraft Co. The initial aircraft was
designed as a single-seat, supersonic attack aircraft. Responding
to Navy inquiries but no funding, the McDonnell company
reconfigured the aircraft to accommodate an air-to-air radar and
semi-active missiles with a mission of fleet air defense. In the
end, the Department of the Navy, and eventually the Air Force,
procured the F-4 as a fighter, fleet air defense interceptor, and
tactical bomber. The admirable fact that this aircraft was
designed and flown as a prototype at the expense of McDonnell
Aircraft is offset by the fact that, as a "jack of all trades"
aircraft, the F-4 did not truly meet the Marine Corps needs of the
day even though it had set many records for speed and payload. The
Marine Corps received the F-4 at the behest of the Navy. Its lack
of a flexible and reliable communications suite often proved to be
the undoing of an air-to-ground mission flown by an aircraft that
had sufficient accuracy and payload to carry the day for the forces
on the ground.
In contrast, the F/A-18 was designed out of the Phantom
experience. Coupled with 35 years of technological advances and
inputs from thousands of aircrews who flew the F-4, the F/A-18 was
largely an aircraft for Marine pilots designed by Marine pilots.
To this day, the F/A-18 enjoys the best circular error probable of
all air to ground aircraft in the free world. Additionally, its
air-to-air weapons system, in many regards, is similarly
unsurpassed. The communications capability of the F/A-18, its
design based on the failings of the F-4 single UHF radio, allows a
flexible capability to communicate over different frequency bands
allowing the pilot unprecedented capability to communicate with
tactical control agencies. Requirements-based procurement has
been, is and will continue to be key to solving the technological
aspect of the CAS equation.
Largely as a result of increased technological capability, the
bureaucracy of CAS can be modified to accommodate more responsive
methods of employment. Based on the communications connectivity
provided by technological advances of both airborne and
ground-based systems, novel approaches to requesting and satisfying
CAS requests can be entertained. The concept of aircraft in direct
support of ground maneuver units can now be accommodated.
Although largely conceived as a method of employment that
optimizes the capability of the AV-8B deployed in a forward base,
this concept can be easily adapted to more conventional aircraft
types. Direct communication between the ground unit air liaison
officer and the air unit operations duty officer is the only
requirement to fulfill CAS requests and effect fire support
coordination. Direct support relationships, such as those enjoyed
by infantry and artillery units, between ground and air units could
be practiced in garrison contributing to recognitional
relationships that would serve to accomplish the mission during
high intensity, fluid and dynamic operations. Intuitive
communication, shared experience, and trust tactics could well
determine the success or failure of CAS operations when traditional
control agencies may not be able to function. The challenge for
Marine commanders, particularly in joint and/or combined
operations, is to design and maintain the shortest support
relationships possible between MAGTF air and ground units.
Technology and streamlined command and control relationships
contribute to more responsive CAS. However, the consummate
responsibility for successful application of CAS depends on the
skill, knowledge and experience of the ground commander and the
flight leader. In this equation, aviators could do a great deal
more to contribute to CAS mission success.
The Marine Corps trumpets the fact that it is the only service
that truly trains its aviators from the ground up. In fact, the
Marine Corps insists each new officer serve his or her first five
months at The Basic School where, it could be said, the young
officer qualifies as a basically trained infantry platoon
commander. This is the last time the future aviator has to deal
with ground issues until he reports, if assigned, for a ground tour
later in his career. Somewhere between TBS and full MOS
qualification in his aircraft, the aviator effaces the lessons
learned at TBS. There is good reason for this. For up to two
years after TBS, the first tour pilot is learning techniques and
developing skills that require numerous sorties to learn. Add to
these demands on his talents and intellect his ground and
leadership duties as an officer of Marines, one may find the
aviator's mind distracted from the situation faced by his ground
counterpart. The fact remains, and is manifest at every CAX, that
many aircrews fly CAS missions with incomplete information on
friendly and enemy dispositions and can not articulate even a rough
idea of the FEBA's trace as they leave the ready room. This is a
sad indictment of the state of the Marine air-ground team. What is
more difficult to understand is when aviators do inquire as to the
friendly situation as some of them do, squadron, group, and/or ACE
S-2 or S-3 sections do not have the information. No amount of
technological gain or bureaucratic dissolution will ameliorate CAS
responsiveness without effective information flow.
In fact, the common theme in solving the challenges of increased
CAS responsiveness revolves around solving information
requirements. Information from the ground unit transmitted by high
technology means between shorter organizational distances to
operatives who understand and appreciate the ground situation
combine to bring success to any CAS effort. Clearly, the closer
air-ground operatives are (organizationally, through stipulated
command relationships) increases the quality of information and
lessens dependence on a transmission-receiver system.
Accepting the fact that ground and aviation units will not
likely enjoy collocation as often as is desired, the requirement
for understanding friendly and enemy dispositions remains key for
successful CAS. The information must be provided in a form that
provides the greatest utility for the aviator yet is easily
prepared and distributed by the supported agencies.
For example, the FSCC or ground unit receiving support would
periodically transmit an overlay (refer to Figure 1) to each
aircraft group depicting areas in which aircraft could prosecute
attacks without any coordination or control requirements. Armed
with this permissive overlay, aircrews could not only plan their
CAS mission, but also anticipate follow-on missions as may become
apparent during the conduct of the flight. The overlay would
further orient the aircrew to friendly dispositions allowing for
greater troop safety in air deliveries and assist the crew in
identifying egress routes. Additionally, no fire areas could be
depicted on this overlay indicating reconnaissance or screening
units including those that may be in advance of the FSCL. These
areas could be annotated with callsign and frequency of the unit
allowing the aviators the ability to contact those forward units as
may be deemed necessary in the course of the mission. The overlay
and the information depicted on it provides a great deal of
information to the aircrews which will allow them to understand the
tactical situation on the ground above and beyond the CAS brief.
This information would provide the flight leader a modicum of
awareness such that he may elect to prosecute air attacks with
Click here to view image
confidence in the event positive control agencies on the FEBA
become degraded. The utility of an overlay such as Figure 1 can be
measured in that it displays the tactical situation and provides
command and control information consolidated on one sheet that may
be affixed to an aviator's kneeboard; a single source of pertinent
mission data. No matter the format of the information, its
importance lies in its utility in orienting the aircrew thereby
enabling them to make a greater contribution to the ground effort.
For too long, CAS responsiveness has been a significant problem
in the employment of the Marine air-ground team due largely to the
organizational and cognitive distance between the air and ground
elements. It had been hoped that technological advances alone
would solve the challenges to the conduct of CAS in an uncertain
environment. However, command and control relationships as well as
the relationship between the ground commander and the flight leader
have significant impact on the ability to bring CAS to bear in any
given scenario. Indeed, an eclectic union of technological,
bureaucratic, and psychosocial accommodations must be entertained
to effectively employ the Marine Corps' weapon of choice: the
air-ground team. By employment of these techniques, the Marine
Corps can effectively return to the 1930's where air and ground
conferred under the same banana tree to provide the support
necessary to accomplish the mission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gunston, Bill and Spick, Mike. Modern Air Combat. New York:
Crescent, 1983.
Mason, Francis K. Phantom: A Legend In Its Own Time. Osceola:
Motor books, 1984.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, OH 1-100.
Quantico, 1989.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation.
Quantico, 1982.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Offensive Air Support, FMFM 5-4. Quantico,
1979.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support, FMFM 5-4A.
Quantico, 1988.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Control of Aircraft and Missiles OH 5-8. Quantico, 1988.
U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Marine Air Command and Control System Operational Concept
(MACCS 2000), FMFRP 14-5. Quantico, 1989.
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