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Military Reorganization:  Challenge And Opportunity
AUTHOR Major David D. Dyche, USAF
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
                         EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THESIS:   The present military structure of three and one
half   (the  Marine  Corps)   services,  with  their  many
overlapping  functions  and  encroaching  roles,  no  longer
reflects the strategic needs of the United States or the
fiscally constrained realities of the federal budget.  Now
is the time to reorganize the Department of Defense along
functional lines into five separate military services.
BACKGROUND:   For nearly 150 years the military forces of the
United States were divided into the two separate but equal
Army and Navy services.  Other than the President, there was
no  centralized  control  over  them  to  coordinate  their
activities.   New technology and the necessity for joint
operations caused military and civilian leaders to consider
reorganizing the services in World War II.  However, it was
not until Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947
that the military was restructured to meet the strategic
needs  and threats  of the post-war era.    The Key West
Agreement of 1948 delineated service roles and missions.
PROBLEM:  The security environment of the United States has
changed significantly since 1948.   Additionally,  Congress
now seems likely to force stiff budget reductions on the
military which will result in much smaller force levels.
Unfortunately, the military's organization has not kept pace
with these realities.   Instead, the service alignment has
resulted in overlapping missions, unclear or dual chains of
command, and an unnecessary growth of headquarters and staff
layers.  The result has been a "unified" structure with two
"armies", two transportation forces, and four "air forces."
RECOMMENDATIONS:   Rather than dividing the armed forces by
medium (land, sea, air), the military should be organized
along functional lines.  Today's Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps should be eliminated and their assets sent to
the new functional services they logically support.   A
structure with five services formed according to the roles
and missions they must perform makes sense operationally and
fiscally.   The new "Forces" should be Strategic,  Naval,
Heavy Land, Low Intensity Conflict, and Transportation.  In
addition, the present unified and specified commands would
be replaced by the functional services, Joint Task Forces,
and two geographic coordinating commands.   This proposal
would  create  a  general  force  structure  which  provides
flexibility,    responsiveness,    and    clear    command
THESIS STATEMENT.  The present military structure of three
and one half (the Marine Corps) services, with their many
overlapping  functions  and  encroaching  roles,  no  longer
reflects the strategic needs of the United States or the
fiscally constrained realities of the federal budget.  Now
is the time to reorganize the Department of Defense along
functional lines into five separate military services.
I.    Origins of the present service structure
      A.  Influence of technology and world leadership
      B.  Joint Chiefs of Staff consider reorganization
      C.  National Security Act of 1947 revamps service
      D.  Key West Agreement of 1948 delineates service
          roles and missions
II.   A new organization to meet today's realities
      A.  Current structure no longer reflects environment
          1.  New global political and military situation
          2.  Congressional pressure to reduce budgets
          3.  Present services divided into mediums, not
      B.  Proposed new structure with five services formed
          along functional mission lines
III.  No more Air Force?
      A.  Separate Air Force created for wrong reasons
      B.  Tactical fighters go to their supported commanders
IV.   The five new services
      A.  Strategic Forces for nuclear and space missions
      B.  Naval Forces for sea control and power projection
      C.  LIC Forces formed from Special Operations, Light
          Infantry, and Marines to meet today's threat
      D.  Heavy Land Forces put most armor and mechanized
          infantry into flexible, responsive reserve
      E.  Transportation Forces combine air, sea, and land
          lift assets to support all services
V.    The future for unified and specified commands
      A.  Purpose of combatant commands no longer valid
      B.  Replace with functional services, Joint Task
          Forces, and two geographic coordinating commands
      When Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947,
it radically altered the military structure of the United
States which had existed generally unchanged for nearly 150
years.   The Act's creation of a centralized Department of
Defense, with its three separate services organized loosely
along mission lines, probably fit the nation's strategy and
needs in 1947.  However, the world has changed a great deal
over the past 43 years.   Even as early as the 1950s, our
leaders recognized the global military situation had shifted
and that the structure of the services no longer reflected
the current environment.   President Eisenhower certainly
recognized the blurring of service roles and missions when
he said in 1958, "modern weapons and methods of war have
scrambled the traditional service functions." (5:246-250)
      Today, more than ever, events around the world from the
Soviet Union to Europe to Central America presage a new and
very different security environment for the United States.
As we look toward the 1990s and beyond, the rapidly changing
nature of the threat, the potential emergence of new foes,
and the fiscal realities of drastically reduced defense
budgets all demand we reconsider the manner in which the
Defense Department is organized.  If the United States is to
maintain viable armed forces that fit the national strategy,
then  we  must  ensure  the  military  is  effectively  and
efficiently organized to meet the realities of today and
tomorrow.  The present structure of three and one half (the
Marine  Corps)   services,  with  their  many  overlapping
functions and encroaching roles,  no longer reflects the
strategic  needs  of  the  United  States  or  the  fiscally
constrained realities of the federal budget.   Now is the
time  to  reorganize  the  Department  of  Defense  along
functional  lines  into  five  separate  military  services.
However, appreciating the need for, and structure of, such a
major change first requires an understanding of how the
United States military arrived at its present organization.
      With the establishment of the United States Navy in
1798, the military forces of the United States were divided
into two services under the separate but equal Departments
of War (Army) and Navy.  Their structure followed generally
functional lines and worked reasonably well for 150 years
during our country's isolationist infancy and adolescence.
However,  without any controlling agency between or over
them, the two military branches had to rely on the President
as their sole arbitrator and coordinator.  (7:91-92)   In
addition, major technological advances and the emergence of
the United States as a world power began to meld and blur
the roles of the separate services while demonstrating the
need for their centralized control.
      The most significant technological influence was the
airplane, first introduced in World War I.  The "air forces"
were put under Army control since their primary purpose was
to support the soldier in land warfare.  However, farsighted
Navy officers recognized the potential of the airplane as a
means to greatly increase their service's combat power.
During  the  1920s  and  1930s  the  airplane's  utility  and
capabilities were advanced by both services to meet their
particular needs and missions, although never as much as the
aviators sought.   By World War II the Army Air Force and
Naval Aviation were vital components of their respective
services and critical to the triumph of our war strategy.
Navy, Marine, and Army Air Force aircraft all flew missions
supporting  land  as well  as  sea  battles  throughout  the
conflict.    This  highly  successful  crossover  of  roles
signified an end to any notion of service claims to a total
monopoly on a particular air mission.   The airplane was
recognized as a very powerful and flexible weapon with
enormous value to all the services, but particularly during
joint operations when under the centralized control of the
supported commander.
      Besides more effective use of the airplane, World War
II also saw our emergence as the allied leader bring about
the need for close cooperation between the services  (and
nations) under centralized control.  Joint operations were
an absolute requirement to achieve victory against a well
organized and experienced enemy.  Unity of command dictated
one individual be empowered to control all of the forces
within a given theater, regardless of service (or nation).
The necessity and success of "jointness" caused our senior
leaders to consider a reorganization of the military.
      In May of 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the
four-member Special Committee on Reorganization of National
Defense to study options for a revised military structure.
Nearly  a  year  later,  on  11  April  1945,  the  committee
released its recommendations.   It proposed eliminating the
existing Departments of Navy and War,  along with their
respective service secretaries and chiefs of  staff,  and
replacing them with a single Department of Defense headed by
a Secretary of the Armed Forces.  The proposal also called
for a single chief of staff commanding a unified service
divided into separate Army, Navy, and Air Force components.
      The Navy put up a vigorous defense based upon several
factors  including  its  fear  of  domination  by  a  highly
centralized structure dominated by the larger Army and Army
Air Force as well as concerns over the future of naval
aviation and the Marine Corps.  The Navy's counterproposal,
known as the Eberstadt Plan, was presented by Navy Secretary
James Forrestal and emphasized the successes of past joint
operations under the wartime system then in place.   It
argued  for  continuing  the  separate  service  departments
supported by an array of interservice boards and agencies,
proposed the creation of a national security council, and
encouraged  the  concept  of  unity  of  command  for  joint
operations. (6:23-24) (9:18-19)
      The often heated debates among and between members of
the Congress and the military over these and other plans
finally led to the passage of the National Security Act of
1947.  As is the norm in Congress, the Act was a compromise
of many views, both military and civilian, including those
of President Truman.  The primary elements of the Act were:
      - the establishment of the Department of Defense
        (replacing the Navy and War Departments) with each
        service "semi" subordinate to it
      - the establishment of a separate Air Force but with
        an allowance for the Navy to retain its own aviation
      - the retention (under the Navy) of the Marine Corps
        with its responsibility for amphibious operations
The limited subordination of the individual services and
their secretaries to the Defense Secretary would later be
corrected through additional legislation in the late 1940s
and 1950s. (9:24-25)
      While the National Security Act of 1947 set the new
organization of the armed forces,  there were still many
differences to be worked out concerning the roles of each
branch.   Just eight months after the Act's passage,  the
service chiefs met with the new Secretary of Defense, James
Forrestal,  (who ironically had argued against creation of
the Defense Department when he was Navy Secretary) to work
out their differences on service roles and missions.  Their
settlement, known as the Key West Agreement of 1948, served
as the basis for defining the functional boundaries of each
service. (1:114) (9:395-396)  The key points of the Key West
Agreement were
      - the Navy retained the Marine Corps (and the Corps'
        aviation arm for close air support), its own naval
        air arm to support sea battles, its own aircraft for
        air transportation, control of antisubmarine
        warfare, and the sealift support for the Army
      - the Army maintained responsibility for operations on
        land including ground-based air defense but gave up
        ownership of close air support as well as both
        strategic and tactical airlift and sealift
      - the Air Force gained responsibility for the Army's
        close air support, as well as strategic and tactical
        airlift, and maintained primary responsibility for
        strategic aerial warfare and defense of the United
        States against air attack
Although the Agreement clarified the missions and roles of
each service, what really emerged was a "unified" Department
of Defense with two armies  (Army and Marine Corps),  two
transportation forces (Air Force and Navy),  and four air
forces (Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and, with a soon to
be sizeable helicopter force, the Army).
      Over the years since the Key West Agreement was reached
there have been a host of other efforts regarding defense
reorganization.   Most notable among these were the 1949
Amendments to the National Security Act, the Reorganization
Acts of 1953 and 1958,  and most recently the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986.  However, these pieces of legislation,
along with a number of Executive Orders issued by several
Presidents, were aimed not at altering the service structure
but instead focussed on revising the roles and powers of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Unified and Specified Commands. (3:37,73,95,221)
        What was not given serious consideration was the
organization  of  the  services  themselves.    Perhaps  the
present  structure  fit the  security  requirements  of  the
United States in 1947.  Now however, the continuing onrush
of events around the world, combined with the potential of
major budget reductions, foreshadows a significantly smaller
military in the very near future.   Indeed,  a number of
senior Congressional leaders, including the Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee,  Senator James Sasser of
Tennessee, have already advocated taking advantage of the
so-called  "peace dividend"  and proposed military  budget
cutbacks of 10 to 20 billion dollars.  Meanwhile, Secretary
of Defense Richard Cheney is on record saying he would
rather have a smaller military than the  "hollow shell"
forces of the 1970s. (12)
      No matter how much the armed forces are reduced, this
leaner military must still meet our strategic needs of today
and tomorrow.  Unfortunately, our present service alignment
has clearly resulted in duplication of effort, overlapping
missions,  unclear  or  dual  chains  of  command,  and  an
unnecessary  growth  of  headquarters  and  staff  layers.
(11:139-479)  It also no longer meets the global political
and military  situation.    Any revised  organization must
overcome these problems and yet retain the flexibility to
shrink or expand depending upon the changing threat and
fiscal constraints.  It must also effectively respond to the
two  most  portentous  changes  in  our  nation's  security
environment -- the quickly decreasing threat to NATO and the
steadily  increasing  threat  to  United  States'  interests
outside of NATO.   The solution is a military structure
formed more closely along functional lines.
      The current service structure is roughly divided into
land, sea, and air forces.  But these roles are not adhered
to  and  besides,  these  classifications  are mediums,  not
missions.   Splitting the armed forces into five services
according  to  the  functions  and  missions  they  must  be
prepared to perform makes sense operationally and fiscally.
The names of the new services are not important (although
old service traditions and loyalties will not die easily).
Also,  attempting to  specifically define  the  numbers  of
different forces within each new service at this particular
moment in time is next to impossible, especially given the
rapidly  changing  national  and  international  situation.
Instead, the proposal outlined below creates a general force
structure which provides flexibility,  responsiveness,  and
clear command responsibility:
      - Strategic Forces
          --  Strategic Nuclear Missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs)
          --  Strategic Air Forces (Bombers and Tankers)
          --  Space and Strategic Surveillance Forces
          --  Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
     -  Naval  Forces
          --   Surface Combatant Forces (including aviation)
          --   Submarines (except SLBMs)
     -  Heavy  Land Forces
          --   Armor and Mechanized Forces (large majority)
          --   Tactical Air Forces (most deep interdiction)
     -  Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Forces
          --   Special Operations Forces
          --   Light Infantry Forces
               --   Army's Light Infantry Divisions
               --   Marine Divisions
           --   LIC Air Forces (Special Operations plus most
               conventional fighter and helicopter assets)
     -  Transportation Forces
          --   Strategic and Tactical Airlift
          --   Strategic Sealift (including Maritime
               Prepositioning Force (MPF) shipping)
          --   Amphibious Shipping
          --   Land Transport (present Army MTMC)
      The biggest shake-up under this proposal is obviously
the elimination of the current Air Force.  The Air Force is
the most blatant example of a service formed in an attempt
to control a medium or platform rather than to support
specific functions or roles.   The principle reason behind
creating an autonomous Air Force in 1947 was the belief that
strategic bombing, in particular long range nuclear bombing,
would be the decisive factor in preventing or deciding any
future war.   During World War II, Army Air Force leaders
felt the special requirements of strategic bombing were not
understood by Army or Navy leaders and required a separate
air commander. (8:356)  After the war, these feelings formed
the basis of the argument for a separate Air Force service.
Unfortunately, history has shown that strategic bombing was
not nearly as successful as was first believed,  both in
World War II and Viet Nam.   Meanwhile,  the Air Forces'
preoccupation with  strategic bombers,  missiles,  and  air
superiority  has  led  to  lapses  in  other  areas  of  its
responsibility.   Close air support had to be learned and
relearned in World War II, Korea, and Viet Nam.  Meanwhile,
the airlift of Army and Marine forces, both strategic and
tactical, has been relegated to a tertiary priority at best.
      Perhaps the most telling argument supporting the need
to divide up the air forces along functional lines is that
the only Air Force generals who head unified or specified
commands oversee functional not geographic commands.   The
three are CINCs of Strategic Air, Space, and Transportation.
The first two would be combined into a separate service and
the third would itself become a new service,  with all
gaining some additional forces from other services.
      The only major remaining piece of the Air Force is
tactical fighter air.  Close air support, interdiction, and
air superiority are missions merely extend the land or sea
battle into a third dimension and should come under the
authority of the supported land or naval commander.   The
Navy successfully used this argument to retain its aviation
arm in 1947 and 1948.  (2:2-3)   Certainly the Marine Corps
demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of this unity
of command, both in Korea and Viet Nam, especially relative
to the far less responsive coordination between Army ground
units and Air Force close air support forces.
      Along those lines, tactical fighter (and helicopter)
forces should be parcel led out to the land or naval forces
they support.  The majority of close air support (CAS) and
assault  support  aircraft  should  go  to  the  LIC  Forces.
Mission success and survival of these air forces is much
more likely in a LIC environment than over the high tech
battlefields of a large scale mechanized war, such as that
to be expected in NATO.   Still,  some fighter aircraft,
especially those designed for deep interdiction and stealth,
should go to the Heavy Land Forces.  These forces will need
such aircraft in a conflict where the depth and technology
requirements of the battlefield would most likely be far
greater than in a LIC scenario.
      The new Strategic Forces must control all strategic
nuclear and space  forces  in order to provide unity of
command and responsible prioritization in the development
and  support  of  the  different  weapons  systems.    Our
military's strategic deterrence mission has been invested in
the so-called "Triad" so it only makes sense to place all
three pieces under one service and commander, especially for
effective command and control.  Choosing the proper type and
mix of manned bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs will certainly be
more fiscally and operationally realistic when one commander
is directly responsible for all three.  Meanwhile, space and
surveillance forces are already commingled, are inherently
strategic in nature, and support nuclear deterrence along
with other critical missions.  In fact, most Air Force space
and surveillance assets were at one time under the Strategic
Air Command.  Air and missile defense of the United States
also logically comes under the Strategic Forces function
since such defense depends upon early warning provided by
the detection assets of the space and surveillance forces.
      The revamped Naval Forces could now concentrate on the
primary  missions  of  sea  control  and  power  projection,
unencumbered  by  ancillary  ties  to  ballistic  missile
submarines, sealift, and amphibious shipping.  Additionally,
the Marine Corps' poor stepchild affiliation with the Navy
can be ended, to the advantage of both services.  It is time
the Marine Corps was recognized for what it is -- light
infantry with excellent organic air support and a very
limited capability for mechanized and amphibious operations.
      While maintaining some capability is worthwhile, the
need for major amphibious forces is questionable.  The last
large scale beach invasion against any meaningful opposition
was during World War II  (enemy defenses at Inchon were
almost nonexistent).   During the war our forces normally
enjoyed  near  total  air  and  sea  supremacy  as  well  as
overwhelming superiority of land combatants and yet there
was never a guarantee of success.  Even the huge force that
attacked Normandy might well have been defeated had the
enemy made faster and better decisions.   Meanwhile,  the
worldwide spread of today's very lethal, easily concealable,
and highly mobile weapons systems makes even a brigade-sized
amphibious  operation against  a  reasonably well  equipped
Third World country a very dubious proposition at best.
Still, the Marines and their limited amphibious capability
do have a place in the new military structure as an integral
part of the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Forces, the land
forces designed to meet the future threat.
      The primary danger to the global concerns of the United
States is surely shifting away from a Soviet attack on NATO.
Our new challenge comes from those Third World countries who
are  unfriendly  to  the  United  States  and,  perhaps  more
importantly, from those governments now friendly to us but
who could be overthrown by hostile forces, either foreign
sponsored or indigenous.  Several of the former, including
Libya, Iran, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Viet Nam, and Cuba, all
lie  along  vital  sea  lines  of  communication  and  could
threaten our economic vitality in peacetime and military
responsiveness in wartime.  Meanwhile, economic hardship and
political discontent in countries such as the Philippines
could well turn old friends into new foes. (10:155-156)  If
United States military forces are committed to conflicts in
these or similar countries,  our forces must possess the
flexibility  and  capability  to  respond  quickly   and
effectively throughout the world.
      The combination of units proposed for the LIC Forces is
quite similar to that which was so successful in Grenada and
Panama.    Special  operations,  airborne,  light  infantry
(including the Marines), and close air support forces all
learned a great deal from Grenada.  Two major lessons were
that effective unity of command and proper force integration
were found lacking and resulted in numerous lapses on the
battlefield.  Congress noticed the shortcomings and, against
the service's parochial dissent, created the unified Special
Operations Command.  The problem is that Congress did not go
far enough, particularly with the types of troops it put
into the command.  The LIC Forces will fill the gaps in the
present  Special  Operations  Command  by  providing  more
proficient and flexible air,  light infantry,  and Marine
units  (including their associated armor,  mechanized,  air
defense,  and artillery units)  to work with the  special
operations forces.   The result will be a fully integrated
team  capable  of  conducting  operations  over  a  broader
spectrum of conflict than is currently possible.
      The obvious question now is where does the creation of
the LIC Forces leave today's Army?  The loss of their light
infantry and special operations units, along with a majority
of their helicopter assets, leaves only the heavy armor and
mechanized divisions which were built to fight the Warsaw
Pact in Central Europe.  With the increasing unlikelihood of
such a conflict occurring in the foreseeable future, the
need to maintain these large and expensive forces appears
rather doubtful.   However, we must not be too quick to
dismantle all of these units for their deterrent effect
alone has made possible many of the changes in Europe.
Additionally,  they can serve as a stabilizing influence
between countries, especially in Europe.  On the other hand,
these forces can certainly be reduced and should remain
concentrated in one service, the Heavy Land Forces.  Many,
perhaps most, of these units can revert to reserve status
with  a  flexible  readiness  posture  in  order  to  remain
responsive to any change in the threat.   Meanwhile,  the
remaining  active  units will  maintain  a  vital  cadre  of
experience and be ready to provide augmentation to the LIC
Forces should the need arise.   The creation of the Heavy
Land Forces truly reflects today's realities.  Large amounts
of money will be saved,  active duty forces will be cut
significantly, and the service will still be fully capable
of responding to the changing threat.
      Having the LIC and Heavy Land Forces available does not
do much good if they can not be quickly dispatched in
significant numbers to a troubled region anywhere around the
globe.  When the unified Transportation Command was formed
several years ago,  its creators recognized the absolute
necessity for centralized command and control of all service
strategic and operational level transportation assets in
order to expeditiously carry our forces to battlefields far
from our shores.  Unfortunately, the forces assigned are not
very glamorous and so have often been given the budget
leftovers from their respective services.   The result has
been  three  components  who  are  marginally  capable  of
supporting anything more than a small scale operation such
as Panama and are in danger of deteriorating even further.
          In  the past we have met  our power projection
commitments  mostly  through  the  use  of  forward  basing.
However, our force levels abroad will soon drop to levels
that will only exacerbate the need for rapid reinforcement
from stateside units in the event of a crisis.  Airlift and
sealift,   as   well   the   CONUS   land   transportation
infrastructure to the get personnel and equipment to their
departure points, will only continue to increase in value
and necessity.  Rather than count on a unified command made
up  of  service  "second  thoughts,"  our  nation's  future
strategy requires an entire service capable of expediently
moving  large  forces,  along  with  their  equipment  and
supplies, to any spot in the world.
      To achieve this goal, we must embark upon a program to
greatly expand our transportation assets.  A proper mix of
aircraft  and  ships  should  be  procured  and  maintained
including the C-17 as well as more Fast Sealift and Maritime
Prepositioning Ships.   The limited amphibious capability
must also be protected and modernized.  Experience has shown
that a unified command is not able to accomplish such a
task.  Only a separate service, the Transportation Forces,
can adequately prioritize, acquire, maintain,  and control
the   resources   necessary   to   meet   the   increasing
transportation needs of the armed forces.
      The creation of these five services would obviously
necessitate a reorganization of the nation's reserve forces
as well.  Quite simply, these units would be transferred to
the new service they functionally support,  just as their
active duty counterparts were allocated.   National Guard
units would still belong to their states but would also
report to their appropriate functional services if called up
during a national crisis.
      The creation of the five services and the resultant
elimination of the two specified as well  as  the three
functional  unified  commands  also  affords  the  excellent
opportunity  to  revamp  the  present  combatant  command
structure.   The history of these commands dates back to
World War II although they were not formally mandated until
passage of the National Security Act of 1947.  Their purpose
was "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the
armed forces," for "their operation under unified control,"
and for "their integration into an efficient team of land,
naval and air forces." (4:42)  Unfortunately, these commands
have  evolved  into  a  separate  military  structure  unto
themselves, tasked with conducting the actual warfighting
but not given all the means to do so.   Meanwhile,  the
services have been relegated to personnel, equipment, and
logistic support agencies.  Yet the service chiefs, not the
combatant CINCs,  sit as members of the JCS and make the
major policy and budgetary decisions under which the CINCs
must operate.  This fragmentation of effort and command has
only increased the parochial nature of the military since
most  forces  now must deal with two separate chains  of
      We must also recognize that today's regional CINCs do
not, and will not, fight any actual conflicts short of a
theater-wide war.   Instead, Joint Task Forces  (JTFs)  are
formed both from forces belonging to the regional CINC who
has responsibility for the conflict area and from those
"owned" by other CINCs, both area and functional.  Grenada
and Panama are excellent examples where the "supported CINC"
did not fight the battle but actually became just another
"supporting CINC" who supplied forces to the JTF Commander.
The way to end these problems is to take advantage of the
functionally integrated nature of the reorganized services.
The JCS staff should be expanded and made responsible for
developing the individual theater and regional OPLANS and
OPORDS.  The geographic unified commands can be eliminated
and  replaced  by  two  Coordinating  Commands  (COORDCOMs),
Pacific and Atlantic, with new roles and missions.   Given
today's immediate,  responsive,  and worldwide command and
control  capabilities,  the  COORDCOMs  would  not  actually
command forces.  They would instead act as direct extensions
of the JCS, primarily to serve as skeletal structures for
actual  and  exercise  operations  in  their  areas,  and
secondarily  to  coordinate  service  forces  within  their
regions.    Forces  would  now  come  directly  under  their
respective services, except when assigned to a JTF for a
joint operation.
      Thus, the primary fighting organizations will remain
what  they  are  today,  the  JTFs,  with  their  commanders
designated by the JCS.  The JTFs can either be permanent or
temporary  but  would  be  charged  with  conduct  of  joint
operations,  both actual and exercise.    In  lieu of  our
present system where a "supported CINC" has to coordinate
his service components as well as the forces from other
"supporting CINCs," we can now have a "supported service" be
the primary warf ighter through a JTF with additional forces
from the other "supporting services" as needed.   The only
exceptions to this scheme would be in the cases of NATO and
Korea where the United States has major treaty commitments
to combined forces.   The affected sub-unified commands in
these regions should become permanent JTFs until such time
as the threat no longer requires their continued existence.
      Why must we reorganize the United States Armed Forces
at this time?  Because, a nation develops its military to
support  its  national  security  objectives  and  the  armed
forces must be structured to effectively and efficiently
achieve those objectives, both in peace and in war.   When
the organization of the United States military was revamped
in 1947 it may well have reflected the needs of that day.
However, the world's political and military framework has
undergone a substantial transformation over the past 43
years.  Yet, the organization of the military services has
not been updated to reflect the times,  in particular the
changing level and nature of the threat.   Meanwhile, the
fiscal realities of dramatically reduced defense budgets in
the coming years portend a much leaner military that must
become more efficient.  Eliminating redundant staffs and the
overlap in service missions will reduce the loss of combat
power in the field and must be paramount in our planning.
      The answer to the dilemmas of changing threat and less
money  is  a  flexible  military  structure  formed  along
functional lines.  Reorganizing the armed forces into five
new services, each with the distinct roles and missions as
proposed in this paper, best suits the needs of the United
States at this time to respond quickly and effectively to a
crisis anywhere in the world.   It does not eliminate the
need for "jointness."  Instead, it makes prosecuting joint
operations far simpler and more effective since each service
will have most, if not all, of the necessary joint forces
organic to it in order to meets its assigned mission.   In
his 1958 proposal to revise the National Security Act of
1947, President Eisenhower argued,  "separate ground,  sea,
and air warfare is gone forever.  If ever again we should be
involved in war, we will fight it in all elements.  as one
single concentrated effort."  (11:277)    The best way to
concentrate our efforts is to restructure our armed services
so that each branch has all the elements necessary to fight
its assigned missions.   If we fail to properly reorganize
now to meet the peacetime challenges of today, we may not
have the opportunity should war breakout tomorrow.
1. Blechman, Barry M. and William J. Lynn, eds.  Toward
        a More Effective Defense.  Cambridge, MA:
        Ballinger, 1985.
2. Byron, John L.  Reorginization of the US Armed
        Forces.  Washington, DC: National Defense
        University, 1987
3. Department of Defense.  Joint Chiefs of Staff
        Special Historical Study: Roles and Functions
        of the JCS, a Chronology. Washington, DC, 1987.
4. Department of Defense.  The Joint Staff Officer's
        Guide 1988, AFSC Pub l.  Washington, DC, 1988.
5. Eisenhower, Dwight D.  The White House Years: Waging
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6. Hooper, Edwin B.  The Navy Department: Evolution and
        Fragmentation.  Washington, DC: Naval
        Historical Press, 1978.
7. Kaufman, Daniel J.  "National Security: Organizing
        the Armed Forces."  Armed Forces and Society,
        14, (Fall 1987), 85-112.
8. Potter, E. B.  Nimitz.  Annapolis, MD: Naval
        Institute Press, 1976.
9. Reardon, Steven L.  History of the Office of the
        Secretary of Defense, Volume l, The Formative
        Years.  Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary
        of Defense, 1984.
10. Record, Jeffrey.  "Implications of a Global
        Strategy for US Forces," in The Defense Reform
        Debate: Issues and Analysis.  Eds. Asa A. Clark
        IV, et al.  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
        University Press, 1984.
11. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
        Defense Organization: The Need for Change.
        Staff Report to the Committee on Armed
        Services. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985
12. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services.
        The FY 1991 President's Budget Proposal for the
        Department of Defense.  Testimony before the
        Committee on Armed Services by the Honorable
        Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense. 101st
        Cong., 2d sess., 1990.

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