Ironies Of Maneuver Warfare
AUTHOR Major Douglas C. Duncan, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy
Executive Summary
Title: Ironies of Maneuver Warfare
Thesis: If we mandate a requirement to adopt maneuver
warfare as the doctrinal basis for fighting wars then we
had better be aware of the larger contradictions and
implicit ramifications which confront us and will tend to
militate against our success.
Issue: Although maneuver warfare is indeed a philosophy for
fighting smart, adopting the philosophy is going to be
problematical. Additionally, it may not be a smart
philosophy for all levels of warfare. Many forces both in
our society and from personalities in our own institution
may prevent successful implementation while economic forces
may render adoption of the philosophy untimely at this
juncture.
Conclusion: We need to be aware of these problems and
recognize that there are contradictory aspects to this new
philosophy which must be addressed in the implementation
process.
Ironies of Maneuver Warfare
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. If we mandate a requirement to adopt
maneuver warfare as the doctrinal basis for fighting wars
then we had better be aware of the larger contradictions
and implicit ramifications which confront us and will tend
to militate against our success.
I. Adoption of maneuver warfare philosophy
A. Impact of FMFM-1
B. Difficult concept
C. Concept raises ironies which may militate against
successful adoption
II. Polarization of styles (Attrition vs Maneuver)
A. Not a totally useful concept
B. Clouds objectivity
C. Effects on decision making
III. Levels of conflict and maneuver warfare
A. Maneuver approach smart by definition
B. Attrition may be appropriate response
C. Effect on deterrence
IV. Danger of public avowal of maneuver warfare philosophy
A. Philosophy implementation / entrenched oppositon
B. Impact of attritionist society
C. Time constraints
D. Force of economic problems
V. Need for awareness of the potential problems
Ironies of Maneuver Warfare
It is a very rare occurrence in the course of human
or institutional events when a point of demarcation both
occurs and, is at the same time, recognized for it's
obvious significance. The publishing of FMFM-1 Warfightlng
represents just such a transformational watershed for the
Marine Corps as an institution and, more importantly, for
the individual Marines who comprise our rapidly evolving
organization. Following over a decade of widespread and
healthy, though at times contentious debate, the Marine
Corps has elected to adopt a significantly different
conceptual framework for the conduct of war. the new
conceptual construct is maneuver warfare, the galvanizing
catalyst was the long term debate bubbling up from within
the Marine Corps as well as externally from critics and
reformers. The reagent of change is FMFM-1 which bears the
Commandant's imprimatur and stamp of credibility as well as
authority. As widely reviewed and as hotly debated as the
previous, long term argumentation which precede and gave
rise to it, FMFM-1 is surely the most widely read and
reread manual in our glut of operational directives. The
wide appeal or, in any case, the wide interest that this
eminently readable manual generates offers considerable
hope that this "new" style of warfare addressed there will
ultimately be adopted.
It is ironic that our earlier doctrinal manuals are
replete with specifics, techniques, details and clear
procedures yet generally lack a unifying or underpinning
theme or coherent vision. They do however, lend themselves
to easy, if unimaginative, implementation. By way of
contrast, the conceptual framework for maneuver warfare
described in FMFM-1 is a coherent if not easy or totally
clear, vision which is utterly devoid of constraining
specifics for implementation. An artful construct yet, seen
through a glass darkly, the maneuver war concept requires
concerted effort and deep thought in application, orders of
magnitude beyond our previous method.
Irony and subtle contradictions coexisting in a
state of tension abound in this new style of warfare making
it both interesting as well as problematical and vitally
necessary to master for future success as well as
inherently dangerous to us as incipient practitioners. If
we mandate a requirement to adopt maneuver warfare as the
doctrinal basis for fighting wars then we had better be
aware of the larger contradictions and implicit
ramifications which confront us and will tend to militate
against our success.
Maneuver warfare with it's analytical focus on the
enemy and it's emphasis on attacking cohesion and moral
factors is not new. What is new is that it has been
exhaustively scrutinized and organized into an organic,
visionary but implicitly unconfining whole and described
with economic clarity. Central to the transition process in
adopting this new style as a practicing principle is a
requirement to recognize differentiation. Specifically, one
must distinguish between two antithetically ( as described
in FMFM-1 ) defined styles of conflict, that of maneuver
warfare on the one hand and that of attrition warfare on
the other. Looking further, neither style is new. The
history of conflict abounds with clear examples of each.
Trench warfare and massed infantry assaults in World War I
epitomize attrition warfare while inspired coups to unhinge
the enemy such as MacArthur's surprise Inchon landing or
the surprise Egyptian cross canal assault in the Yom Kippur
war well characterize the best of maneuver warfare. What is
new as well as potentially dangerous which arises from our
new ideological construct is the polarization of views on a
formal basis. In spite of the fact that much of even the
most successful of wars has involved a combination and
succession of styles in tension, our polarization now tends
to obscure objective assessment in analytical
interpretation and forces a focus on the maneuver aspects
while submerging anything but the negative aspects of
attrition efforts. This lack of balance when attrition is
held in odium while the maneuver style is viewed as the
epitome of rectitude will prove problematical in the future
where analysis will tend to be in the light of our new and
well received doctrine rather than objective examination of
an issue on the basis of intrinsic merit. A doctrine which
clearly calls for an analytical and objective approach but
which tends to impel a skewed perspective is ironic indeed.
More to the point, it is a dangerous aspect against which
we must guard.
It is ironic that the very manual which describes
the nature of conflict as fluid and disorganized {1} can so
neatly polarize styles of dealing with the chaos of war.
More to the point, there are some implicit dangers in so
neat a split. Paul of Tarsus wrote in the Bible ( Romans,
Chapter 5, verse 13 ) "for until the law sin was in the
world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law". Our
new doctrinal Gospel which exerts considerable force,
produces a disturbing parallel because now, with the
adoption of maneuver warfare as our chosen doctrine, we
have defined rectitude of method in war as uniquely the
maneuver style and defined any attritionist tendencies
as rank heresy.
With no previous requirement for differentiation,
success was the yardstick for measurement in conflict. Now,
with the authority of a doctrine which emphasizes the
maneuver approach, success is less likely to be the final
arbiter in even the most rapid and economical success. The
degree to which maneuver warfare is practiced and attrition
warfare avoided will be a crucial and daunting concern.
Especially so given the increasingly analytical bent
impelled by our new doctrine. Analyzing the requirements to
achieve victory was never an easy task, yet now, with a new
doctrine which purports to both free the imagination and
avoid formula, we have injected the additional requirement
to achieve victory by thinking through stylistic
constraints which many comprehend only dimly and many find
alien. The likely ramification appears to be that, until
well inculcated within our military, our leaders are likely
to experience considerable hesitation in the decision
making process as they agonize over whether their approach
will lead to success and adhere to maneuverist precepts.
Those who do not comprehend the philosophy will seek to
formulize the more comprehensible aspects and will boldly
misapply it.
A weak argument at first glance, consideration
regarding how distressingly doctrinaire rather than
thoughtful and willing to act imaginatively on our own
initiative we have become combines with the fact that our
FMFM-1 doctrine is actually widely read and is being
haltingly implemented combines to give one pause. That this
new manual is being seized upon avidly, and in the virtual
absence of any other definitive, authoritative doctrinal
material for implementing a new, controversial and easy to
misconstrue doctrine should raise some concern. That many
previously doctrinaire attritionists are attempting a
similar doctrinaire approach to implementing maneuver
warfare should send off alarm bells somewhere. It is
somewhat amusing to reflect that although the FMFM-1 was
written in a non prescriptive fashion in order to maximize
and encourage creative latitude, the inference strongly
hints that a lack of military creativity was what caused
production of the manual in the first place. Ironically,
the confusion, hesitation and potentially formulistic
misapplication of the philosophy which will likely arise
as our non-creative pragmatists dutifully attempt to cope
is the antithesis of the bold, audacious but calculated
approach mandated by our new doctrine. {2}.
Is maneuver warfare applicable at every level in the
spectrum of conflict? It would appear that applying the
philosophy of maneuver warfare is certainly possible at
every level of both war and conflict or competition short
of war, but, whether it is smart to do so may be a more
germane question. With compelling logic FMFM-1 convincingly
leads one to the final, conclusive sentence stating that
In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating
the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least
possible cost to oneselves-- a philosophy for "fighting
smart"." {3}. The conclusion here is inescapable, maneuver
warfare is smart therefore, attrition warfare, by
extension, is not smart. This invidious breakout between
methods of warfare is curiously limiting for a philosophy
which ultimately seeks to free the imagination from
constraining doctrinal fetters. More to the point, it may
be smart to apply attrition warfare at one level of war
where a maneuver approach may be ineffectual. Defining
maneuver warfare as smart may preclude an
appropriate,scenario dependent attritionist response
because the respondent will not want to be viewed as in the
wrong doctrinal camp. Our contest against Japan in World
War II certainly provides evidence of the different styles
coexisting in harmony. FMFM-1 alludes to this example but
merely indicates that the styles coexist while strongly
implying that attrition warfare is always not smart. {4}. A
grinding, methodical attrition applied at the strategic
level combined well with an opportunistic and bold series
of advanced base seizing coups to which the enemy could not
effectively respond at the operational level. Local
circumstances combined to render the tactical level
predominantly attritionist. Arguably, one could make a case
that we could have been smarter (ie. more maneuverist ) at
every level, but it is hard to
conceive of the relevance of a maneuverist approach to the
tactical level requirements for seizing a Tarawa or an Iwo
Jima once the operational level decision to take it was
made.
At the strategic level, reliance on a maneuver
warfare orientation in lieu of a healthy emphasis on the
deterrent value of overwhelming attritionist capacity may
be not only a disadvantage, but also an invitation to
disaster. This is certainly the core thought on which
nuclear deterrence concepts hinge. Of more relevance to our
maneuverist exclusive aspiring Marine Corps, it is also
central to the rationale behind the conventional force
build up response to the massive Soviet build up of
conventional arms which arose, in part from our earlier
skewed reliance on a single, nuclear only, philosophy of
defense in the late 1950's early 1960's. It would appear
logical that a country or a military organization that
possesses the resources and willingness to fight large
scale attrition warfare at every level of war and in both
the conventional and nuclear arenas, reaps a considerable
degree of deterrence. While attritionist in concept, a
concomitant and resultant maintenance of peace is a worthy
dividend and probably, quite smart in spite of a heretical,
non maneuverist origin.
As a related matter, a country or an organization
that possesses the resources for successful attrition
warfare can be made to make the ideological leap to
practice maneuver warfare. In fact, it can do so with
diminished risk of failure. The converse, where a force or
country which has deemphasized the value of material
resources in war, and therefore probably does not possess
them, finds itself in a position where it must wage a
campaign of attrition or a war of material will initially,
find itself hard pressed to respond.
Of topical interest is the current debate raging
over just what combination of forces unhinged the Soviet
Union and Nicaragua and caused an obvious start towards
withdrawal from the arms race on the one hand and an
orderly hand over of power on the other. It is ironic at a
time when the Marine Corps is transitioning to a maneuver
emphasis that an entrenched, attritionist style, singularly
unprecedented arms build up by this country is attributed
by some commentators as the reason. Specifically, President
Reagan's obstinate willingness to match or approximate
Soviet defense expenditures and his determined support of
the Contras in their obvious if, low scale war of attrition
seems to be the key to success where other, more
maneuverist approaches failed. If true, it would appear
that this willingness to stubbornly pursue an attrition,
resource oriented strategy was smartness of a high order at
the strategic level.
Sophistry and tortured argumentation aside, the
maneuver philosophy espoused in FMFM-1 is, in fact, a smart
ethos with which to fight a war even if it may do little to
prevent one. While it may be smart for a warrior to
internalize the philosophy and it is probably right for the
Marine Corps to institutionalize the style within it's
ranks, publicly codifying the philosophy especially at this
juncture generates problems that a more informal approach
would have avoided. By boldly proclaiming our new
philosophy in the best maneuverist style, we may create
some of the very problems we wish to obviate.
An obvious danger in this regard was briefly alluded
to earlier. That is that the unimaginative and more
doctrine confined of us are implementing the new
metaphysics. This will require the concerted, hard, mental
effort of all participants, for if nothing else, the
maneuver style places great demand on individual initiative
and effort. It appears significant that the very
professionals who are to convert to the initiative and
thinking intensive style and, who are, more importantly, to
lead it to creative new directions so widely lacked the
curiosity and interest in their own profession that they
were directed to immerse themselves in a professional
reading program. The necessity of bootstrapping a
professional ethos in a self proclaimed military elite is
frighteningly ironic. Especially so in the complex
technologically, ideologically and highly politicized world
of today.
The real danger is not that we won't commit to the
change (ossified die-hards aside ) due to the intellectual
effort involved but, that we will get it woefully wrong by
default. James William Gibson describes with clarity the
relationship between practicing efficient attrition warfare
and it's beneficial effect on officer career advancement in
the attrition oriented Vietnam war. {5}. With further
elaboration he quotes from an Army War College study:
The fact alone that the leaders of the future
are those who survived and excelled within the
rules of the present system militates in part
against any self--starting incremental return
toward practical application of ideal values.(6).
In effect, at our mid and upper leadership echelons we have
a host of influential people who were well socialized in a
style of war largely opposite to what we seek to achieve.
Subtle and perhaps unintentional entrenchment from this
sphere may spoil the new wine to come but will definitely
render the decanting harder.
In addition to the personal animus of those
inappropriately socialized to carry the new banner, we have
significant societal pressure contending against success.
Gabriel Kolko pointed out the impact of society at large on
military society in his Vietnam war study:
An Army's internal world reflects the social
and class system from which it emerges. The
functions, actions, and values of officers and
soldiers are the inevitable consequences of the
kinds of societies they are seeking to create or to
defend... Strategy mirrors this reality and in turn
weighs strongly on the balance of forces.. . {7}.
If anything, our society reflects an overweening emphasis
on the material and physical aspects of reality. The focus
on wealth and quantifiable things characterize much of what
is most significant in our make up and, as a world view,
inevitably had much to do with developing our previous
attrition style. By extension, one could describe American
society as attritionist and therefore largely but
inherently inimical to a maneuverist approach on the part
of one of it's integral constituents. While ideas can form
a powerful impetus for positive change, societal pressure
usually offers a powerful drogue when the positive idea
fights the tide. It must be numbing to be the Commandant
striving to lobby for a concept which eschews format,
material emphasis and bean counting when ostensible
supporters mouth encouraging platitudes while inventing
ever newer methods for legume quantification.
Relegating a start on developing maneuver warfare to
the too hard category because of the uphill battle involved
is obviously not an answer for it is the smart philosophy
to adopt. Absolutely, we had to start somewhere in time to
make an appropriate transition but, time is what is
critical here. Had we the time, we could develop the
requisite mind set and analytical approach in a more
calculated and effective fashion by starting much lower
down the leadership chain and win success through force of
numbers, broad understanding and by a force of
institutionalized socialization that favors implementation.
Through this approach, the forces of entrenchment could
gracefully fade into obscurity as the new philosophy
matures into fruition. Instead, the largely top down
approach calls for implementation by many who subtally
oppose it.
Closely related to time is continuity. As opposed to
the lengthy periods of continuity offered by luminaries
such as Scharnhorst, Moltke and Seekt {8} in their
continuous labors to nurture excellence in a consistent and
methodical fashion, we have one forceful visionary (ie. the
Commandant ) attempting in a meager four year period to
accomplish similar ends. While an informal bottom up
approach applied with well thought out method by thoroughly
conversant practitioners would have been better and offered
greater continuity following a change of venue, time
constraints can, ironically delay or defeat the
philosophy's orderly fruition when left to the continuance
of the uncommitted who remain in service.
We are at a crucial juncture in time also from an
economic aspect. The facts that our defeat at the hands of
the Vietnamese through our adherence to an attrition style
of warfare, even though we earmarked over a trillion
dollars in that effort {9} or that the additional trillion
dollar Reagan defense build up is forcing exceptional
scrutiny and unusually adversarial proceedings in defense
expenditure debates are well understood. More to the point,
these facts are integral to the rationale which both
refined and supports the maneuver warfare movement. Central
to the philosophy is avoiding reliance on things, striving
for quick decisions and employment of small, cohesive
forces. FMFM-1 states as a lead in to maneuver warfare:
It requires a concept with which we can
succeed against a numerically superior foe,
because we can no longer presume a numerical
advantage. And, especially in expeditionary
situations in which public support for military
actions may be tepid and short--lived, it
requires a concept with which we can win
quickly against a larger foe on his home
soil, with minimal casualties and limited
external support. (10)
A laudable goal and one which manfully seizes the moral
high ground in this period of fiscal peril to the military
but, are we not offering a clear and untimely target by
grasping at the mantle of self sacrificing efficiency? Is
it perhaps not a bit premature to publicly proclaim this
philosophy in the midst of a severe budgetary crisis which
is likely to draw down on essentially minimal equipment
levels but is certainly going to draw down on Marines--many
of whom would have been the seed corn for effectively
socializing the philosophy we want? The attendant
disruption posed by this aspect of public avowal of our new
credo will inevitably tend to submerge the creed itself.
Ceding budget cutting ammunition to the unsympathetic in
both congress and to the other services will surely cause
more disruption than we may have had to experience had we
been more informal and circumspect. Ironically, instead of
unhinging an enemy and making him irrelevant with small
forces and light equipment through intelligent application
of our doctrine, our doctrine now has the ability to render
us unhinged and irrelevant due to the economic constraints
we will be forced to accommodate.
We have been boldly launched on a visionary new
course. The direction is only generally defined and the
destination largely uncharted. While offering considerable
hope for future success in combat, the uncharted aspects
may preclude or divert us from following the smart course.
As an institution and, more importantly, as individuals, we
are going to have to develope the insight to spot the
ironic and potentially dangerous ramifications implicit in
adopting maneuver warfare and we must be smart enough to
circumvent the problems.
End Notes
1. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico, l989
2. Ibid. P. 70
5. Ibid. P. 77
4. Ibid. P. 28
5. Gibson, James William, The Perfect War. Vintage Books.
New York. 1986, P. 225
5. Ibid. P. 442
7. Kolko, Gabriel, Anatomy of a War. Pantheon Press, 1985,
P. 225
8. Dupuy, T. N., A Genius for War. Prentice-Hall Inc. 1977
9. Gibson, James William, The Perfect War. Vintage Books.
New York. 1986, P. 17
10. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico,
1989. P. 58
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Dupuy, T. N., A Genius for War. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
Prentice--Hall Inc. (1977)
2. Gibson, James William, The Perfect War. Vintage Books.
New York. (l986)
3. Goerlitz, Walter, History of the German General Staff.
Praeger Inc., New York (1953)
4. Kolko, Gabriel, Anatomy of a War. Pantheon Press
(1985)
5. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico,
(1989)
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