Maneuver Warfare: Can The Ace Adopt This Philosophy
Of War?
AUTHORS Major Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr., USMC
Major Gorden C. O'Neill, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MANEUVER WARFARE: CAN THE ACE ADOPT THIS
PHILOSOPHY OF WAR?
In March, 1989, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made maneuver
warfare doctrine for all Marines when he published FMFM 1. Over the last
two years, the Marine Corps Gazette has published numerous articles about
Marine Aviation and its role in maneuver. These articles, and maneuver, in
general have stirred up quite a bit of controversy about Marine Aviation, and
its perceived reluctance to adopt maneuver. The ACE can successfully adopt
maneuver warfare and all that it represents. In order to accomplish this,
Marine Aviation must enhance its training programs with respect to the
MAGTF.
First, Marine aviators must understand the different levels of war, and
where the Marine Corps fits into the big picture. The three levels of war
consist of strategy, operations, and tactics. The MAGTF commander will
operate at the operational and tactical levels, as he seeks to achieve the
CINC's strategic aim over time through the campaign plan.
Second, successful MAGTF Anti Air Warfare will prevent enemy air/air
defense assets from interfering with the elements of the MAGTF. Many
military reformers believe that Marine fighters are not needed, and that
AAW sorties should be diverted to Offensive Air Support. History clearly
shows that ground operations will not be successful without air superiority.
Third, Offensive Air Support is the MAGTF's "Sunday punch." When
integrated in to the ground scheme of maneuver, this combat power will put
the enemy into the combined arms dilemma. If he moves to reinforce his
front lines, then he is hit by air; if the enemy does not move, then he will
reduce his losses from air, but fail to reinforce the front.
Fourth, Assault Support provides the MAGTF commander with
operational mobility by extending the range the GCE can place his maneuver
units. Additionally, the MAGTF can task attack helicopters, coupled with
LAI battalion and fixed wing aircraft, as a maneuver element. Maneuver
concepts consist of commander's intent, focus of effort, center of gravity,
surfaces/gaps, and more. Marine aviators must communicate in this
fashion, with all members of the MAGTF. The ACE can and will successfully
adopt maneuver; professional military education and MAWTS- 1's command
element MEB training will significantly help close the gap.
MANEUVER WARFARE: CAN THE ACE ADOPT THIS
PHILOSPHY OF WAR?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: The ACE can successfully adopt maneuver warfare and
all that it represents. In order to accomplish this task, Marine Aviation
must enhance its MAGTF training programs and emphasize:
I. The Different Levels of War
A. Strategy and Tactics
B. Operational Level of War
C. The MAGTF Commander Is a Fighter at the Operational and
Tactical Levels of War
II. Antiair Warfare (AAW)
A. MAGTF AAW Defined
B. AAW Historical Perspectives from the Middle East
C. Military Reformer's AAW Myths
III. Offensive Airsupport (OAS)
A. MAGTF OAS Defined
B. OAS Historical Examples from WWlI/Korea
C. OAS Integration with the MAGTF Focus
IV. Assault Support
A. MAGTF Assault Support Defined
B. Rotary Wing Employment
C. Asset Allocation
D. Future Developments
V. Recommendations
A. ACE Maneuver Element Examples
B. Institutionalize Maneuver Warfare
C. MAGTF Focus of Effort
MANEUVER WARFARE: CAN THE ACE ADOPT
THIS PHILOSPHY OF WAR?
In March, 1989, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made maneuver
warfare doctrine for Marines when he published FMFM l. Over the last 2
years, the Marine Corps Gazette has published numerous articles addressing
Marine Aviation and its role in maneuver warfare; these articles have also
Included some thoughts on maneuver from members of the military reform
movement in Washington. These articles, and maneuver in general, have
stirred up quite a bit of controversy about Marine Aviation and its
reluctance to accept maneuver in its training programs. As we Marines
approach the turn of the century, this self-evaluation is healthy for us,
especially as Communism re-trenches in Europe. In the next 5 years,
Congress will continue to cut the defense budget, and as the Marine Corps
shrinks, we must learn to fight "smarter." Maneuver warfare will enable us
to accomplish this.
On future battlefields, one of the keys to success will be how well
Marines communicate with the elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF). In fact, the better we communicate, the better we'll be able to
make timely and sound decisions in the heat of battle. This principle
applies equally inside each element of the MAGTF. Maneuver concepts
include mission-type orders, commander's intent, focus of effort, center of
gravity, surfaces/gaps, recon-pull, logistics-push, and more. As aviators,
we must communicate with our ground counterparts in this fashion. The
Aviation Combat Element (ACE) can successfully adopt maneuver warfare
and all that it represents; in order to accomplish this, Marine Aviation must
enhance its training programs with respect to the MAGTF.
This article will examine some of the precepts of maneuver, and what
they mean to Marine aviators, and all Marines no matter what their MOS.
Obviously, our thoughts are not all-inclusive of everything that maneuver
represents. In fact, only three of six Marine Aviation functions are
discussed due to time and space considerations. However, this is a starting
point; perhaps our thoughts and conclusions will help resolve part of the
maneuver controversy.
The Different Levels of War The Marine Corps is a unique and widely
envied military organization throughout the world. This respect is well
deserved and based on the Corps' valor and determination in wars throughout
our nation's history. But why is the Marine Corps unique? What makes us
different from other fighting outfits, and more importantly, why do other
services envy our organization? The answer is simple. The Marines are the
only air-ground-logistics team in the world task-organized to deploy and
fight against any threat to our nation; the Marine Corps is the nation's
force-in-readiness, a fact that makes all Marines very proud.
Because of our unique heritage, every Marine must understand not only
his MOS, but also where Marines fit into the "big picture" with regard to
strategy and operations. We all feel comfortable with the tactical level of
war because this is the area that we train in every day. However, we must
also be familiar with the campaign plan that we are fighting under, and the
strategic objective we are fighting to achieve. Is this a limited campaign
as in Korea and Vietnam, or an unlimited war like World War II? What
objective will bring victory in a total war or conflict termination in a
limited war? Many might ask, "Why is this important to me; as a squadron
S-3, I'm worried and concerned about tactics?" Simply stated, your
subordinates will better understand your mission-type orders if you, and
they, comprehend the big picture. What is the MAGTF mission and
commander's intent? What is the strategic objective which will end the
war? How does the operational commander's campaign plan achieve that
strategic aim?
When the MAGTF goes to war, it will fight for one of the unified
combatant commands throughout the world.1 Since the 1986 Goldwater
Nichols DOD reorganization act, Congress and the Joint Chiefs have placed
new emphasis on the joint nature we in the military will fight. In order to
succeed in this arena, the MAGTF commander and his staff must be able to
operate in this joint and possibly combined environment. This will allow us
to ask the right questions when tasked to perform a mission, and at the
same time educate our sister service counterparts about the MAGTF's
capabilities. In order to do this, we must be familiar with the different
levels of war, and where the MAGTF fits in.
Through strategy, or the strategic level of war, our government
achieves its national policy and objectives; the ends of strategy are the
vital interests of national policy. The means of strategy are the
instruments of national power-political, diplomatic, economic, and
military-by which the President achieves these objectives; the ways are the
strategic concepts that establish broad plans to attain the ends, the
1Armed Forces Stafff College. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, AFCS PUB 1,
Norfolk, Virginia, 1 July 1988, pp. 32-50.
national objectives.2 The National Command Authority (NCA), comprised of
the President and Secretary of Defense, determine when military force, or
the threat of military force, will be used to achieve national policy.
Military strategy is the art of making and winning war.3
Tactics, or the tactical level of war, is combat and "the level of war at
which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish
military objectives" through fire and maneuver.4 As Marines, we take pride
in our ability to excel at this level of war. The means of tactics include the
hardware we design to destroy the enemy; the ways include the techniques
and tactics we develop to defeat the enemy in order to achieve the ends,
victory. Tactics is the art of winning battles and engagements.5
Operations, or the operational level of war, is the level of war "at
which campaigns are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish
strategic objectives within a theater of war."6 The operational
commander's primary tool to organize and synthesize all military efforts in
his theater of operations is the campaign plan. The operational commander
decides when and where to give battle to the enemy, or conversely, not to
give battle. If battle will not help achieve the desired strategic aim, then
the "headknocking" should be avoided until it suits the operational
2The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department Of Defense Dictionary Of Military and
Associated Terms, JCS PUB 1, Washington, DC. 1 June 1987, p 349.
3Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Campainging,FMFM 1-1, Advance Copy.
Washington, DC, 25 January 1990, p 7.
4Ibid, p. 90.
5Ibid, p. 5.
6Ibid., p. 90.
commander's best interests to give battle at a time and place of his
choosing.
The essence of operational art is the enemy's center-of-gravity, his
critical vulnerability, and the application of our superior combat power
against that source to achieve the strategic aim over time through the
campaign plan.7 As Marines, we seek to put our strength against the
enemy's critical weaknesses-CSS units, supply depots, lines of
communication, airfields, command posts-in order to exploit these
weaknesses and force him to lose cohesion. Marines call this maneuver
warfare; it is our philosophy of warfighting. We use maneuver, in space as
well as time, to gain an advantage against the enemy commander, and
exploit it by operating at a higher tempo than the enemy.8 The precepts of
maneuver warfare apply equally at the operational and tactical levels of
war.
At this point, many Marine aviators might ask, "Why is this important
to me? What is the connection between the different levels of war, and why
do I need to know them? I'm a squadron S-3, and I don't have time to delve
into the theater campaign plan." The questions are all good ones, and the
answers depend on, "How successful do you want to be?"
The operational level of war interconnects strategy with tactics. The
NCA at the strategic level determines the objective, allocates resources,
and imposes restrictions on the operational commander. The operational
commander takes that strategic direction and transforms it into a campaign
7HQ, Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5, Washington, DC,
6 May 1986, p. 10.
8Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM 1, Washington, DC,
6 March 1989, pp. 58-61.
plan, that will guide tactical commanders to victory in battles and
engagements over time in order to achieve the strategic aim.
Where do we Marines fit into this picture? In a high/mid intensity
conflict, the Marines will task organize and deploy to the conflict as Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), and fight as a Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) once in country. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) will employ in
low/mid intensity conflicts; MAGTFs will task organize and deploy to meet
any contingency needed. Recent examples of MAGTFs smaller than a MEU
employed in combat are the contingency MAGTFs that deployed to the
Persian Gulf and Panama.
The MAGTF commander will operate at both the operational and tactical
levels of war. His superior will normally be a combatant command
Commander-In-Chief (CINC), and the MAGTF commander will advise him
regarding the capabilities and best employment of the MAGTF. The MAGTF
staff will work very closely with its CINC staff counterparts, and possibly
operate in a combined environment, as well. At the tactical level, the
MAGTFs commander will best employ his ACE, GCE, and Combat Service
Support Element (CSSE) in order to achieve the CINC's strategic aim. When
these elements are combined and fought as a MAGTF, their combat power
significantly increases.
The commander's area of influence is described as that area in which he
can influence combat operations through maneuver or fire support, organic
to his command.9 The GCE commander's area of influence is roughly 18-20
kilometers, which is the maximum range of his organic artillery. On the
other hand, the MAGTF commander's area of influence is several hundred
9 JCS PUB 1, p. 34.
miles beyond the FEBA, and is reflected in the long spear of the ACE's
combat power...AV-8, A-6, F/A- 18, AH- 1...as well as the other components
of Marine Aviation. This makes the Marine Corps unique and very lethal, and
is reflected in the MAGTF commander's role as a fighter, and not just a
facilitator. For these reasons, the ACE's combat power must communicate
with the GCE and CSSE in order to synthesize their individual combat power
into a hammer and anvil delivered with speed, and sustained with a system
of logistics push.
Anti Air Warfare (AAW) AAW is one of the six functions of Marine
Aviation; the others include Offensive Air Support, Assault Support,
Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, and Control of Aircraft and Missiles.
Every MAGTF Marine will participate to some degree in AAW. AAW is
subdivided into 2 phases called Air Defense and Offensive AAW. Air Defense
includes all means, active and passive, to destroy enemy aircraft and
missiles, and to nullify or reduce their effectiveness if an attack is made.
Active air defense is a direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking
enemy aircraft and missiles, and includes aircraft, air/ground-launched
missile intercepts, air defense artillery, automatic weapons, small arms,
and electronic countermeasures. The MAGTF employs passive air defense to
reduce the effectiveness of air attack and includes the use of cover,
concealment, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and protective
construction. Marine Aviation conducts Offensive AAW against enemy
air/air defense assets and installations before they can be used against
us.10
10JCS PUB 1, p. 30.
The ACE, through his Tactical Air Commander (TAC), executes the six
functions of Marine Aviation in order to support the MAGTF commander's
intent and focus of effort against the enemy's critical vulnerability. The
TAC's first priority in this process is to dedicate assets to AAW.11 This
fact confuses and upsets many Marines, and military reformers, because
they interpret AAW's priority to mean there will be no assets for the other
five functions of Marine Aviation, and therefore, no CAS. This simply is not
the case. The ACE must accomplish all MAGTF requirements with his
limited assets, and also survive against the enemy air threat. AAW is vital
to the success of the MAGTF mission, and really separates the Marines from
our sister services because the MAGTF commander owns these tactical air
assets. Perhaps a couple of AAW historical examples might help clarify this
situation.
The Arab-Israeli October War of 1973. At 1400 on 6 October 1973; the
Egyptian armed forces achieved strategic and tactical surprise as they
launched a preemptive attack against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
stationed along the broad front of the Suez Canal. Simultaneously, the
Syrian armed forces attacked the IDF in the Golan Heights in northern Israel.
Both the Egyptians and Syrians used their Air Defense Commands (ADC) as
the primary weapon against the vaunted Israeli Air Force (IAF) which had
decimated the Arabs in the 1967 Six-Day War. The USSR completely re-
vamped the Arab ADCs after the 1967 war; this effort included new
surface-to-air missile equipment such as the SAM 2, SAM 3, SAM 6, SAM 7,
and the ZSU 23/4 mechanized antiaircraft artillery system.
11Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Antair Warfighting, OH 5-5,
Quantico, Virginia, June 1987,p.3-15.
In the first 3 days of the war, the IAF flew into the most formidable
air defense umbrellas since Hanoi-Haiphong in Vietnam. The Israeli ground
forces desperately needed air support to blunt the Arab attacks on two
fronts, with the IDF "air-armor team" as they had done so successfully in
the 1967 war. When the IDF employed these tactics, they met very stiff
Egyptian resistance, and could not knock them back from their positions
along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal; the lDF had similar results against
the Syrians in the Golan Heights.
During the initial Israeli air strikes, the IAF met with disaster! The
Syrians and Egyptians shot down approximately 25 A-4 Skyhawks and 5 F-4
Phantoms within the first 90 minutes of combat. At 1600 on 6 October,
General Elazar, the Israeli Chief of Staff, suspended all tactical sorties
until the IAF could devise new tactics that would counter this Arab air
defense threat. By 1730, the IAF was airborne again using new tactics
which meant staying away from the surface-to-air threats. However, the
IAF losses continued to rise at a staggering rate.
By the end of the first day, the IAF lost 40 aircraft consisting of 30
Skyhawks and 10 Phantoms. "The shock to the Israeli government and
General Headquarters was immense, and an example of the reaction was the
almost panic move of the Sinai Air HQ to El Arish."12 On 10 October after 3
days of combat, the IAF had lost approximately 70 tactical aircraft to the
surface-to-air threat, primarily the SAM 6 and ZSU 23/4. This was the
IAF's darkest hour, since it started the war with only 240 jet aircraft. Even
more critical, the IAF lost 50 front line combat pilots. Although the IAF
12Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished; The Yom Kippur War (San
Raphael, California Presidio Press, 1978). p. 291.
owned the skies against Arab MiGs, they failed to suppress the Arab air
defense barrier and did not gain air superiority. The Israeli Air Force
suffered prohibitive combat losses while providing air support. This was a
very hard lesson the IAF would not soon forget; they changed tactics on 10
October, destroyed the Arab surface-to-air threat, and significantly helped
the IDF win the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973.
The 1982 Israeli "Peace for Galilee" Operation On 6 June 1982-after
repeated PLO artillery shellings from southern Lebanon into Israel, and
numerous terrorist acts worldwide against Israeli citizens-the IDF attacked
into southern Lebanon. The IDF mission was to demilitarize the area from
all enemy forces up to a range of 40 kilometers in order to prevent further
shellings into northern Israel, also known as Galilee. The PLO and Syrian
Army manned this area in Lebanon. The PLO consisted of 15,000 freedom
fighters equipped with light and heavy infantry weapons, artillery ranging
up to 13Omm, 122mm Katysusha rocket launchers, 100 T-34 tanks, and a
large number of antitank and antiaircraft weapons. The Syrian army
consisted of a division-size force that included two tank brigades; two
infantry brigades; over 20 air defense batteries that included SAM 2, SAM 3,
SAM 6, SAM 7; and hundreds of AAA pieces.13
On 9 June, after 2 days of beating back the PLO, the Israeli ground
forces encountered heavy fighting against the Syrian army in Lebanon's
Bekaa Valley. At this point, the IAF decisively entered the battle. The IAF
provided critical close air support for the heavily engaged Israeli ground
forces. However, from lessons learned in the 1973 war, the IAF knew it had
to successfully neutralize the Syrian surface-to-air missile threat in order
13Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1982),
pp. 343-344.
to gain local air superiority prior to flying any CAS missions. In this
fashion, the IAF prevented the huge aircraft losses they had seen in 1973.
At 1400 on 9 June, the IAF launched a massive air strike against the
SAM sites in the Bekaa Valley. Within 10 minutes, the IAF destroyed 19 SAM
sites and severely damaged 4 more. At this point, the IAF began a steady
flow of CAS sorties for the Israeli ground forces. The Syrian Air Force
reacted immediately, and over the next 3 days the largest air battles since
World War II took place. When they were over, the Syrian Air Force was
shattered. Amazingly, the IAF shot down 86 Syrian MiGs without any
losses!14 From this moment, the IAF dominated the skies over the
battlefield; they had neutralized the surface-to-air threat, and now
provided CAS for their ground brethren with no trouble!
In combat, the ACE will face many difficult decisions. Based on the
MAGTF mission, commander's intent, concept of operations, and the enemy
center of gravity he must make an intelligent recommendation to the MAGTF
commander about the apportionment and allocation of his unique Marine
Aviation assets. The ACE commander must ask himself, "How can I best
support the MAGTF focus of effort, and how can I best employ my aviation
assets to decisively defeat the enemy?" AAW priority is not "some
abstract rule" as the military reformers suggest, but rather a necessary
requirement to achieve mission success as history so clearly shows. 15
Successful MAGTF AAW will ensure that enemy air does not impede the
other five functions of Marine Aviation or the GCE/CSSE.
14Ibid, p. 348.
15William S. Lind, "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation," Marine Corps
Gazette,May 1989,p. 60.
Offensive Air Support (OAS) Marine Aviation conducts OAS against
enemy ground forces in order to neutralize or destroy their installations,
equipment, and personnel. OAS is divided into 2 areas depending on the
proximity of friendly troops when the ordnance is delivered; these are Deep
Air Support (DAS) and Close Air Support (CAS). DAS is an air action
conducted against enemy targets which are beyond the Fire Support
Coordination Line (FSCL) in order to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy
from attacking our GCE units. DAS does not require detailed coordination
with the fire and movement of Marine ground units, but it must be
integrated with the MAGTF commander's overall focus of effort. CAS, either
pre-planned or immediate, is an air action against hostile enemy targets in
close proximity to friendly troops, and requires detailed integration for
each mission with the supported unit's scheme of maneuver and fires.16 In
order to successfully conduct both DAS and CAS, Marine Aviation must gain
and maintain air superiority against enemy fighters and air defenses, so we
do not suffer terrible losses that the IAF experienced in the Yom Kippur War
of 1973. If the air threat is not a large one, then we can divert more of the
AAW sorties to OAS.
What is the best employment of Marine Aviation performing OAS?
Should all the assets be dedicated to CAS at the expense of DAS? How does
the MAGTF commander shape the battlefield 12-72 hours away? Why does
OAS work, and are there any examples of US failures in OAS, or as the USAF
calls it, Air Interdiction? Marine Aviation decisively effects battles and
16Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1,
Quantico, Virginia, 24 August 1979, p. 7.
engagements at the tactical level of war delivering ordnance in support of
the GCE during CAS. In the defense, CAS supports the GCE commander, and
is a last resort, almost worst-case scenario. DAS and GCE indirect fire has
failed to destroy the enemy, and therefore, CAS is used. In the offense, the
GCE will use aviation and artillery to shape the battle.
Deep Air Support, on the other hand, supports the MAGTF commander and
his ability to effect or shape the battlefield 12-72 hours away (or more).
DAS sorties decisively effect campaigns, and help the MAGTF commander
achieve strategic objectives at the operational level of war. The ACE and
GCE commanders must integrate and synchronize their efforts in order to
maximize the destructive capabilities of both DAS and CAS. Campaigns in
World War II and Korea show the importance of integrating the air campaign
with ground maneuver.
World War II, Italy. In the spring of 1944, the Allied armies exhausted
themselves in 3 attempts to break the Gustav Line in Italy, despite their
total air superiority. Subsequently, Allied air planners saw a chance to
isolate the German army with air interdiction bombing alone, without the
combined efforts of the Allied armies. On 19 March 1944, the airmen issued
their bombing campaign directive for Operation Strangle; its purpose was
"to reduce the enemy's flow of supplies to a level which will make it
impractical for him to maintain and operate his forces in Central Italy."17
After an intense 5-week bombing campaign with limited results, the Allied
airmen realized that the air campaign alone could not isolate the German
army in the field. Consequently on 25 April 1944, the Allies issued
17Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Force in World War II,
VoIume Three, Euroupe: Argument to V-E Day January 1944 to May 1945, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, l949),p. 373; cited by Bingham, p. 19.
Instructions for a new offensive called Operation Diadem. This operation
was a "combined air and ground " thrust to isolate and defeat the German
army.18
The Allied armies began their attack against the Germans, while the
Allied air forces stepped up their bombing sorties against critical enemy
weaknesses identified as lines of communication, armor, and reserve
formations. The German high command faced a terrible dilemma. If they
moved their vital reserves and resupply forward during daylight hours, they
sustained massive losses; yet, if they waited until dark to move, the battle
was already lost. Most German commanders decided not to move formations
during daylight hours in order to prevent heavy losses. German General von
Senger, commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, made the following remarks
concerning the Allied offensive:
The enemy's mastery of the air space immediately behind the front
under attack was a major source of worry to the defender, for it
prevented all daylight movements, especially the bringing up of
reserves. We were accustomed to making all necessary movements by
night, but in the event of a real breakthrough this was not good enough.
In a battle of movement a commander who can only make the tactically
essential moves by night resembles a chess player who for three
of his opponent's moves has the right to only one.19
World War II, Normandy. During the spring of 1944, the Allies prepared
for the Normandy invasion. Army and air force planners wanted to interdict
enemy lines of communication, especially railroads and bridges, in order to
18Price T. Bingham, "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational
Art," Parameters, Macch 1989, p.19-20.
19Frido von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear nor Hope, (New York: E. P.
Dutton, 1964). p. 224; cited by Bingham, p. 20.
prevent enemy reserves and reinforcements from making an impact during
the Overlord landings. Field Marshall Rommel, who commanded the "Atlantic
Wall" from Brittany to the Netherlands, wanted to disperse his mobile
reserves, and move them closer to the beaches in order to negate the Allied
air interdiction effectiveness, which he had seen in North Africa. Rommel's
senior, Field Marshall von Runstedt, unfamiliar with the Allied air
effectiveness, disagreed. He insisted that Rommel keep his mobile reserves
inland, where they would be easier to concentrate once the Germans
identified the Allied main effort. Von Runstedt promised Rommel that the
beach reinforcement would only take 24-48 hours once the Allied landings
came.
The outcome of the Overlord landings is well known. Allied deceptions
coupled with the bombing campaign, significantly hampered the Germans
from reinforcing the invasion beaches. The Allied bombing campaign forced
German reserves to make long detours after Allied bombers destroyed
bridges and railroads west of Paris. This exacerbated the German problem
since the detours made their armor formations prime targets for enemy air,
which enjoyed complete air superiority. Once again, German commanders
ceased daylight movement which made matters even worse. On 10 June
1944, Field Marshall Rommel reported:
During the day, practically our entire traffic-on roads, trucks, and in
open county-is pinned down by powerful fighter/bombers and bomber
formations, with the result that the movement of our troops on the
battlefield is almost completely paralyzed, while the enemy can
maneuver freely. Every traffic defile in the rear area is under
continual attack, and it is very difficult to get essential supplies of
ammunition and petrol up to the troops.20
2OB. H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953)
pp. 476-77; cited by Bingham p. 21.
The Korean War. On 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army
(NKPA) stormed south across the demilitarized zone, and began a war to
unify the Korean peninsula. General MacArthur, the United Nations Korea
Commander, requested Marine reinforcements to help beat back this NKPA
preemptive attack. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, embarked on Navy transports one week
after JCS notification. It arrived in Korea on 3 August 1950, less than 30
days after receiving the JCS warning order. This brigade was the advance
unit for the follow-on 1St Marine Division/1st Marine Aircraft Wing team,
which arrived in Korea in early September, 1950.
The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, composed primarily of the
reinforced 5th Marines and the squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group-33,
"went to the Korean War as a truly integrated air-ground team."21 During
their first 30 days of combat, the 5th Marines fought 3 battles in the Pusan
perimeter. These included counterattacks against the NKPA in the Chinju
corridor as part of Task Force Keane, 7- 14 August; in the Naktong Bulge at
Obong-Ni, 17-20 August; and again at Obong-Ni, 3-5 September. Flying
Corsairs from the carriers Sicily and Badoeng Straits, Marine aviators
flew close air support missions for each of these counterattacks. They used
highly successful WWII Marine-developed CAS tactics, which they practiced
after the war. Repeatedly, Marine aviators provided the margin needed for
victory as they consistently destroyed enemy armor, machine-gun nests,
21Allen R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History ofthe United States Marine
Corps, (New York: Macmillan Pub. Company, 1980). p. 480.
artillery and other targets. The low-flying "Leathernecks" became heroes to
the 5th Marines they supported.22
On 6 September, 8th Army HQ pulled the 5th Marines out of the line so
the regiment could join the rest of the 1st Marine Division, embarked on
Navy transports at Pohang. On 15 September, the 1st Marine Division landed
at Inchon and began a 10-day campaign to retake Seoul. Following this
operation, the division made an unopposed landing at Wonsan, North Korea on
25 October, and attacked north towards the Chosin Reservoir and the Yalu
River. In a model for successful air-aground tactics, the Marines took Seoul
in a bitter fight, and then fought the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army's 9th
Army Group. The Marines destroyed 7 enemy divisions in freezing-cold
mountain warfare during the 1st Marine Division's fighting withdrawal.
The Marine successes during the last 5 months of 1950 once again
verified the concept of the air-ground team. Marine Aviation integrated air
support into the ground scheme of maneuver with devastating results for
the North Korean and Chinese Communists. Unfortunately, later in the war
Marine Aviation fell under 5th Air Force as part of "Theater Air," and its
ability to provide air support to the 1st Marine Division was significantly
reduced. The 1st Marine Division's wait for close air support rose from an
average of 15 minutes with 1st MAW to as high as 45 minutes.
Offensive Air Support cannot be planned and executed in the dark
without a clear understanding of what the MAGTF commander wants to
achieve, and how he visualizes air support effecting the battle. When the
GCE is the MAGTF focus of effort, which will be most of the time, the ACE
cannot plan OAS sorties alone! The ACE and GCE staffs must work together
22Ibid., p. 484-485.
to integrate their efforts in support of the MAGTF focus, and not just to
deconflict "their actions. "Thus, campaign success is likely to depend on the
ability to closely integrate the development of ground maneuver and air
interdiction plans, as well as on quickly adjusting the execution of both to
exploit fleeting opportunities."23
ASSAULT SUPPORT Assault Support includes those assets required to
conduct vertical assaults; air delivery, in-flight refueling, and air
evacuation.24 Assault Support tactical missions include helicopter-borne
assaults, combat resupply, movement of troops and equipment, command and
control, and casualty evacuation. Additionally, attack helicopters escort
transports, provide landing zone fire suppression, and conduct Close In Fire
Support (CIFS).25
The Marine Corps first employed helicopters in a combat role during the
Korean War. When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived in Korea in
August, 1950, its aviation assets included several light utility helicopters.
During the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, the Marines used these
helicopters for command liaison and medical evacuation. During the summer
of 1951, HMR- 161, the first helicopter transport squadron, lifted infantry
companies to and from the front lines. In 1952, the Marines employed
helicopters to execute troop movements, combat resupply, and tactical
inserts.26
23Bingham, p. 29.
24FMFM 5-1, p. 106-107.
25Department of the Navy, Assault Support Helicopter Tactical Manual, NWP
55-9-ASH, Washington, DC, March, 1984, pp. 16-2, 17-20.
26Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1954),
p. 9- 10.
In virtually every combat operation and major exercise since the
Korean War, Marine units have used Assault Support aircraft. As we look to
employ MAGTFs in maneuver warfare, Assault Support will continue to play
a critical role providing operational mobility for the MAGTF. The ACE
commander will employ his assets to accomplish the MAGTF commander's
intent, both in support of GCE/CSSE missions; and as a maneuver element. in
what manner can helicopters be employed as a maneuver element?
A MAGTF commander is not likely to employ a helicopter squadron as a
separate maneuver element. Transport helicopters move troops and
equipment in order to accomplish tactical; logistical, and administrative
missions. They may be an integral part of a maneuver element, but
transport helicopters do not lend themselves to independent action. Attack
helicopters are ideally suited for maneuver roles such as screening a flank
or conducting deep operations against armored or mechanized threats.
However, the relatively small number of attack helicopters in a Marine wing
limits the scope and duration of these operations. The ACE commander can
better accomplish these missions by task organizing fixed and rotary wing
units to achieve combined arms synergy.
Rotary wing aircraft provide the MAGTF commander with tactical
mobility as well as operational speed and flexibility requisite to pursue a
campaign of maneuver. During joint and combined operations ashore, the
CINC may use the MAGTF extensively for deep operations. The MAGTF Master
Plan states:
MAGTFs with both air and ground maneuver elements under a single
commander are more suitable for deep operations against critical
enemy centers of gravity than for holding terrain. Helicopter/VTOL
transported maneuver forces normally will comprise the main effort.27
By executing a helicopter-borne assault, the MAGTF commander extends
the area that he can influence with the GCE. Normally, the GCE can influence
an area of about 18-20 kilometers in depth. Employment of unrefueled CH-
46s extends this to a depth of approximately 80 nautical miles. This
helicopter-borne assault incorporates surprise and swiftness; it also
neutralizes the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to GCE
mobility.28
Many Marines criticize helicopter-borne assaults because once the
ground maneuver unit is inserted; it becomes a foot mobile force against a
mechanized threat. This is a significant limitation; however, it is not a
show-stopper. By employing Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs),
the helicopter unit can make itself available to rapidly withdraw or
reposition the ground maneuver element, as well as provide resupply,
casualty evacuation; and close in fire support.
A helicopter-borne assault will normally include provisions for the
inserted maneuver unit to link up with mechanized or motorized forces. An
employment option which does not require link up is the helicopter-borne
raid. Raids are swift and violent operations directed at enemy high value
targets; they are designed to make use of surprise and bold execution to
destroy, disrupt, or deceive the enemy.29 MAGTFs are well suited to
27Headquaters United States Marine Corps; Marine Air Ground Task Force
Master Plan, 1990-2004 Washington, DC, 7 July 1989, p. A-3-7.
28NWP 5-9-ASH, p. 16-1.
29HQ, Department of the Army, Attack Helicopter Battalion, FM 1-113,
Washington, DC, 28 October 1986, p. 3-14.
conduct helicopter-borne raids. The fixed wing support requirements,
particularly AAW and OAS, are planned along with assault support
requirements under a single commander, the ACE. CAS and CIFS aircraft are
available to the ground maneuver units immediately upon insertion.
Additionally, artillery units are helo-lifted into positions in order to
support the raid force mission. By employing FARPs, the transport
helicopters make themselves ready for the rapid withdrawal of the ground
unit. Command and control is enhanced through the use of utility
helicopters equipped with command communication modules.
In future combat operations, the MAGTF will likely encounter an enemy
who possesses a superior armored and mechanized capability. The MAGTF
commander will have to employ superior combined arms and maneuver skills
in order to defeat this threat. Recent Marine Corps Gazette articles
suggest adopting Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) within our OAS doctrine
in order to enhance the Marine Corps' combined arms capability.30 BAI is a
USAF term which encompasses air strikes against targets short of the FSCL,
but not directly under the control of the ground maneuver element. In a BAI
mission, the ACE would employ his assets as a maneuver element.31 But
what does this have to do with Assault Support?
Although BAI is largely an OAS mission, the ACE could easily integrate
helicopter assets into this operation. For attack helicopter employment, US
Army doctrine calls for a Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT). On a JAAT mission,
attack helicopters; USAF CAS aircraft, and field artillery conduct
30Steven B. Donnell, "The ACE as a Maneuver Element,"Marine Corps Gazette,
August, 1989, p. 64-65. John B. Saxman, "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver
Warfare, Marine Corps Gazette, August, 1989, p. 62-65.
31Donnell, p. 64-65.
simultaneous attacks against the same target. Army doctrine calls for
artillery indirect fire to engage the target while helicopters move into
attack positions. Once there, the helicopter flight engages the target; and
then the helicopter flight leader coordinates the air support between the
ground commander and the CAS flight leader.32 The ACE could easily use
similar tactics in support of the MAGTF.
BAI takes the tight to the enemy, and disrupts his scheme of maneuver
before he can make contact with the GCE. This gives the GCE commander
time and maneuver space to accomplish the MAGTF commander's mission and
intent. If required, transport helicopters can lift artillery into position to
support the JAAT. The ACE can improve JAAT responsiveness to identified
targets, by helo-lifting FARP packages during mission execution. The MAGTF
commander possesses built-in flexibility for this mission, since all
required aviation assets come under a single tactical commander, the ACE.
Screening a flank is a "maneuver mission" that the MAGTF commander
might assign to the ACE. The Light Armored Infantry (LAI) battalion
conducts screen, guard; and cover operations which are traditional security
missions.33 Although the speed and agility of the Light Armored Vehicle
(LAV) make it suitable for these missions, it is vulnerable to direct fire
weapons, particularly from enemy armored or mechanized forces.34 The
ACE can augment the fire power of the LAI battalion with attack
helicopters. With MAGTF approval, the ACE can integrate AH-1W Cobras,
32HQ, Department of the Army, Attack Helicopter Battalion, FM 1-112, Washington,
DC, July, 1986, p. 62-64.
33Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marin Lightarmor Employment, OH
6-6, Quantico, Virginia, 17 September 1986,p. 8-1.
34Ibid., p. 4-1 and 4-2.
using overwatch techniques, into the LAI mission. Cobras provide CIFS and
antiarmor punch, using both the TOW and Hellfire missiles. A habitual
relationship developed between the ACE and the LAI battalion, would provide
the MAGTF commander with an enhanced ability to shape the battlefield.
Assault Support assets provide a great deal of flexibility and mobility
to the MAGTF commander, if they are effectively used. As such, helicopters
play a major role in concentrating combat power against enemy critical
vulnerabilities. Helicopter effectiveness may be degraded when
requirements exceed the assets available. The ACE must ensure that the
allocation and employment of his helicopters most effectively supports the
MAGTF commander's intent.
Some constraints for asset allocation include the assignment of Direct
Support (DS) missions to attack helicopters, CIFS versus escort
requirements, and the multiple mission capability of transport helicopters.
The ACE's overriding consideration is to remain focused on the MAGTF
commander's intent. For example, the assignment of attack helicopters in
direct support of a ground maneuver element may be the best method of
supporting the GCE scheme of maneuver. However, using those same
helicopters in a JAAT team against an armored column may better
accomplish the MAGTF mission.
Transport helicopters are normally employed in a multi-mission role.
A large flight will perform an air assault, and then break down into smaller
elements for follow-on missions. The Direct Air Support Center (DASC)
coordinates on-call missions which allows the ACE to accomplish numerous
Assault Support missions with limited assets.35
35Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Control of Aircraft and Missilies,
OH 5-8, Quantlco, Virginia, February 1988, p. 4-2 through 4-4.
Future Assault Support aircraft will expand the maneuver capability of
the MAGTF. The MV-22, currently under flight test, will have a combat
radius of 200 nautical miles and a cruise speed of 250 knots.36 This is far
superior to the 120 knot cruise speed and 80 nautical mile combat radius of
the CH-46. The MV-22 will give Marine commanders a far better capability
to conduct air assaults deep into enemy territory. Current fiscal
constraints may jeopardize MV-22 procurement; however, we should
continue to develop tactics in line with tilt rotor capabilities. Just as
Marines developed doctrine for transport helicopters in 1947, we should
plan for the tilt rotor concept in 1990.37 While the Marines may not
procure the MV-22, this technology is clearly the new generation helicopter
we will take into any future conflict.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY The MAGTF has an awesome arsenal
of weapons and well-trained Marines to carry out any mission the NCA
directs. Clearly, the ACE maintains the preponderance of the MAGTF's
"Sunday punch." This combat power allows the MAGTF commander to shape
the battlefield 12-72 hours away, as well as influence the GCE's battle,
right nowl The MAGTF commander owns these aviation assets, and will use
them to best achieve the CINC's strategic aim. Although not used frequently
in the past; the MAGTF commander may use the ACE as the MAGTF focus of
effort or as a maneuver element. This is not new. History is full of
successful examples of using air as a maneuver element.
36John R. Taylor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1989-1990, (Surray,
United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group Limited, 1989), p. 369.
37Montross, p. 6-7.
In February, 1945, General MacArthur ordered Marine Aircraft Groups
(MAGs) 24 and 32 to support the Army's 1st Cavalry Division in its drive to
free Manila. From dawn until dusk, MAG-24/32 kept nine aircraft airborne,
and provided flank security, flying covering force and reconnaissance
missions, for the 1st Cavalry Division's open left flank. 1st Cavalry's drive
through Central Luzon was the longest of its type that used only air for
flank security, in the Southwestern Pacific theater.38 On today's
battlefield, there are many examples of missions the ACE could perform as a
maneuver element; these include screening forces, direct support CIFS/CAS
aircraft, deep raids; LAI/Helicopter reconnaissance, and more.
During the summer of l989, the Marine Corps University instituted
maneuver warfare training at all Marine officer schools and SNCO
academies. This education, coupled with CMC's new warfighting doctrine
articulated in FMFM 1, will accelerate all Marines' knowledge of and
experience in maneuver. As recent graduates from Amphibious Warfare
School and Command and Staff College return to the FMF, they will also
share their knowledge of maneuver from the academic environment.
However, is this enough? Are there any other ways, we in Marine Aviation
can increase our knowledge of things maneuver? We think so.
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron- 1 (MAWTS- 1) is the
Marine Corps' collection of duty experts regarding the best employment of
Marine Aviation. Twice a year, MAWTS- 1 conducts a Weapons and Tactics
Instructor (WTI) course at MCAS Yuma, Arizona. Marine Corps captains from
all the wings attend the course; they are chosen based on tactical
38Richard A. Menton, "Airpower on the Maneuver Battlefield," Marine Corps
Gazette, August, 1989, p. 67-69.
performance in their fleet aircraft and career potential. Upon completion
of the very rigorous WTI syllabus, they return home and assume the duty as
their squadron's tactics instructors.
Over the last two years, MAWTS- l has conducted real time command
element training for several MEB staffs. This training centered around the
best employment of the ACE; it followed the WTI course, but took place
before the aircraft returned home. In this fashion, a MEB staff had available
in excess of 100 Marine aircraft that represent typical force structure in
combat, coupled with the extensive training areas of MCAS Yuma.
Additionally, over the last year the Marine Corps University has conducted
MEB Battle Staff Training (BST) with each MEB, prior to the training
conducted at MAWTS- l. These programs are invaluable, and an ideal way to
get experts; not only in weapons and tactics, but also on maneuver back to
the FMF.
The common "sheet of music" for all Marines, whether it be in training
or in combat, is maneuver warfare, and the concepts that make up maneuver.
As Marine aviators, we must communicate with our ground brethren in a
clear, concise manner! Maneuver warfare concepts will enable us to
accomplish this at the operational and tactical levels of war. In FMFM 1,
General Gray, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, states that maneuver
"...represents not just guidance for actions in combat, but a way of thinking
in general....a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the field
and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty."39 For 75 years, Marine
aviators have answered the Marine infantrymen's call while engaged in
mortal combat. In the future, this will not change as Marine Aviation adopts
39FMFM 1, p. 1.
maneuver, and learns to fight "smarter" pitting strengths against enemy
weaknesses in order to make him lose cohesion and the will to fight.
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