Amphibious Warfare Procedures And Assets Must Be Improved
AUTHOR LCdr. Garrat E. Cooper, USN
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PROCEDURES AND ASSETS MUST BE IMPROVED
THESIS: The current philosophy in the Marine Corps is to deploy
as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified Marine
Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, the Navy's priorities are
not the same as the Marine Corps' and as a result amphibious
warfare procedures and assets have not been adequately improved
to support the Marines.
ISSUE: As the Defense Budget decreases, the number of
amphibious assets dwindles, although a significant number of real
world Marine/Navy conflicts involved the use of amphibious
platforms. The amphibious fleet is aging, has had little
improvements, and is still secondary to aircraft carriers,
cruisers, and destroyers. While research and development funds
continue to pour into Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare,
and Anti-Surface Warfare, Amphibious Warfare seems to remain in
the doldrums. To ease the situation, the Navy and Marine Corps
have looked at options like Maritime Prepositioning Shipping and
Over-The-Horizon concepts of operation. These options, while
valid, do have some problems and do not correct the current
shortfall in sealift and airlift requirements. It is imperative
that research and development in the area of Amphibious Warfare
be given higher priority by the Navy and Marine Corps.
CONCLUSION: Our Navy leaders must place more emphasis in the
amphibious community. If America is to maintain naval supremacy
and actively use Marines in Low Intensity Conflicts, amphibious
warfare ships and associated assets must be improved.
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PROCEDURES
AND ASSETS MUST BE IMPROVED
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. The current philosophy in the Marine Corps is
to deploy as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified
Marine Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, the Navy's priorities
are not the same as the Marine Corps' and as a result, amphibious
warfare procedures and assets have not been adequately improved
to support the Marines.
I. WHAT IS THE MARINE CORPS' CURRENT PHILOSOPHY
A. CRITICAL VULNERABILITY
B. COMPARISON OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS TO THE REST OF THE FLEET
C. STATE OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FLEET
II. THE AREA OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
A. PROCEDURES WITHIN THE AOA
B. THE OVER THE HORIZON CONCEPT
C. IMPROVEMENTS WITH THE LCAC
III. THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS
A. STRATEGIC AND AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS
B. WHY NAVY LEADERS SHOULD PRIORITIZE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
C. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW LHD
D. A CLOSE LOOK AT AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PROCEDURES AND ASSETS MUST BE IMPROVED.
Today, Marines place great emphasis on fighting as a Marine
Air Ground Task Force. The current philosophy is to deploy as
Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified Marine
Expeditionary Force (Pugh & Linn 1989). A great deal of effort
has been put into every aspect of this concept by the Marines, but
alas, the Navy is way behind. Unfortunately, amphibious warfare
procedures and assets have not been adequately improved. Movement
of forces from the port of embarkation to the Amphibious Objective
Area is an area of critical vulnerability, one that can lose a
campaign before a single Marine hits the beach. As the defense
budget decreases, the number of ships in the U.S. Fleet dwindles.
Although over 75% of the Marine/Navy real world conflicts involved
the use of amphibious ships, only 12% of the fleet is dedicated
towards amphibious platforms (Sharpe 1989). Aircraft carriers,
cruisers, and destroyers still continue to enjoy the spotlight
while amphibious platforms remain in the doldrums. Most
amphibious platforms have already served almost 20 of their
planned 25 years of commissioned service as illustrated
in Table #1 (Morison & Rowe 1983, 111). They are slow -maximum
speed 20-22 knots - and are not capable of significant
self-defense. Most of these platforms are equipped with manual
guns and depend on line of sight targets to be effective (Polman
1985). They are not the safest platforms into which Marines
should embark with their supporting arms and equipment.
Click here to view image
There are those who would argue that a great deal of emphasis
must be placed on aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers
because they are the fighting ships that ensure the protection of
the amphibious and auxiliary fleet. Amphibious platforms, they
argue, are merely troop carriers in the grand scheme of naval
warfare. They do not take into account that major amphibious
platforms get as close as two thousand yards to the beach in
order to discharge their precious cargo. It is, therefore,
imperative that more attention be given to amphibious ships.
Safe transportation of our fighting force is of vital importance.
The way the Navy practices with the amphibious fleet is probably
the way in which they will deploy during conflicts, without
protective escorts. In practice the cruisers and destroyers'
primary concern is the high value unit, "the aircraft carrier"
not the amphibious fleet.
Once in the Amphibious Objective Area, the main objective of
getting the Marines ashore is at hand. It must be noted,
however, that this involves procedures developed during World War
II. Currently, amphibious ships do not conduct landing
operations from over the horizon (Mack 1983, 442). The primary
troop carriers, such as the LST, LPD, LSD, and LCU will be within
12 nautical miles of the shore line. At designated points between
the ships and shore are boat waiting circles, wave forming
circles, departure lines, and other various collection and
departure points that are visible from the beach. Like the
amphibious landings of World War II, the amphibious platforms will
traverse courses as close as two thousand yards parallel to the
beach to launch LVTs and the like. These ships are also expected
to remain in the area to recover boats, LCACs, LCUs, and the like,
the majority of which can attain a maximum speed of 9 knots.
Needless to say, getting the Marines ashore is time consuming,
which offers the enemy an excellent opportunity to exploit a
critical vulnerability.
An argument could be made that the preceding is not entirely
correct. True, one could argue that today's amphibious fleet has
improved with such additions as the LCAC that are faster, have
a greater cargo capacity, and can be deployed from over the
horizon. That is correct. However, upon close examination, the
following must be considered. Our first generation LCACs are
noisy, labor intensive, and very rarely perform to design
standards. Significant improvements must be realized in order to
make them a viable force. The sole LHD also has its shortcomings
aside from being the only one in commission. The fact remains
that our current amphibious posture, in conjunction with
dwindling funds, dictates reliance on World War II methods to
deliver Marines to the beach.
Another major flaw in current thinking is that amphibious
ships can fight and accomplish their primary mission
simultaneously. That is a false pretext. Most amphibious
ships cannot go to DEFCON ONE while accomplishing special
amphibious tasks. General Quarters requires every soul aboard
ship to be in a prescribed billet in order to attain a credible
battle posture. Since ships are rarely at 100% manning, billets
are routinely gapped. Additionally, there are no relief
personnel when the ship is at General Quarters, so this already
compromised battle posture is usually limited to no more than
four hours. Consequently, it is difficult for any ship to engage
in special operations such as, flight operations, refueling, and
troop embarkation/debarkation while maintaining a credible battle
posture. As a result, ships do not practice amphibious
operations while at General Quarters. It is usually one or the
other. This lack of manpower forces the amphibious fleet to rely
on accompanying combatants for protection. This unfortunately
causes another dilemma. In practice exercises, combatants do not
accompany amphibious platforms. Once the requirement for gunfire
support is fulfilled, these escorts usually screen the aircraft
carrier, not the amphibious fleet. In order to enjoy freedom of
maneuver for favorable winds to launch and recover aircraft it is
imperative that the CV operate several miles off-shore and often
at speeds close to 30 knots. Thus escorts maneuver to screen the
CV and in essence abandon the amphibious ships. In light of the
preceding, the Commanding Officer of an amphibious platform must
make a delicate decision during a hostile amphibious landing.
Should he risk his ship to accomplish the amphibious mission
(place Marines and equipment on the beach) or fight as a surface
warfare warrior because the safety of his ship is paramount
(Van Creveld 1985, 272). He is forced to choose one or the other.
Napoleon once said that armed forces must change tactics
every decade in order to surprise the enemy and overcome his
customary attacking methods (Moore 1989). The Navy must accept
this concept because weapons are consistently being improved.
Our dated concept of operations is almost 20 years old. Let's
face it, there is nothing more fatal than blind acceptance of
ideas once accepted without contemplating whether they are still
valid or merely endorsed by habit. Today we fight in a highly
technical environment. The Navy must recognize the full power of
modern weapons and the importance of credible defense systems on
amphibious platforms. The operation and tactical procedures
employed by General McArthur can no longer be relied upon to
achieve decisive success. Modern portable weapons can be
unleashed upon amphibious ships by two or three man teams ashore,
with devastating results. We've come a long way since the
1950's, unfortunately, developments in amphibious warfare have
not.
Most Marines are aware that strategic airlift and sealift
are severely limited, particularly for amphibious operation. Quite
often, these limitations, rather than operational imperatives,
drive the task organization of the landing force. Even with the
Maritime Pre-positioning Program, Marines need an Air Force
commodity that may not always be available, particularly if they
must compete with Army forces to get to the battlefield. These
strategic limitations determine the type of battle an
expeditionary Marine Force will fight. Not only must the Marine
be able to achieve decisive results rapidly for strategic and
political reasons, he must do it without the forces or the
logistics buildup necessary to achieve overwhelming numerical
superiority. The Marine must be able to out-fight his opponent,
be it a mechanized desert army or a jungle-bound insurgency. The
extent to which Marines apply the principles of maneuver warfare
may well determine their success (USNI 1985, 94). In light of
this, considerable thought must be being devoted to modernizing
amphibious assets because:
It is apparent as we launch the 1990s that the
most likely use of U.S. military forces will be in
some yet-undefined third world situation. The
turmoil there is unending; since 1945, more than 16
million people have died as a result of conflict in
the third world. And since the end of World War
II, the Navy and Marine Corps have engaged in every
type of modern naval warfare save nuclear strike
and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in protecting U.S.
interest. (USNI 1985, 94)
Our naval leaders must appreciate this fact and re-orient
priorities. We cannot afford continually to pour scarce dollars
into the world's best Anti-Submarine Warfare systems. ASW is
important and already enjoys space age technology. On the other
hand we put minimal funds into research and development of our
amphibious capability and settle for the marginal improvements
that are attained in Service-life Extension Programs. Space age
technology must also be incorporated into the amphibious
community. Unfortunately, smaller defense budgets along with
steady commitment dictates maximum operational units with
functional dated hardware. In an attempt to improve the
situation, the Chief of Naval Operations has compromised and
accepted the following proposed improvements:
Twelve new Amphibious Assault Dock ships (LHDs), are
projected replacements for the seven Iwo Jima class LPHs that
were commissioned between 1961 and 1970. The first five or six
units will be used to augment the Navy's existing capabilities,
while the remainder will replace the Iwo Jimas beginning in the
1990s. These ships will provide improved command, control, and
communications spaces placed within the hull of the ship in
addition to a 600 bed hospital and six operating rooms. The
major advantage of this class of ship, is that it is designed to
be convertible into a V/STOL carrier in 24 hours.
New Whidby Island Dock Landing ships (LSD41 class) have been
designed to replace the Thomas ton class LSDs commissioned between
1954 and 1957. With the addition of these ships the Navy's lift
capability should be doubled in the 1990s. There is some concern
by both the Marines and Navy about this platform because its
design was based on the Anchorage (LSD-36) class commissioned in
1969. (Sharpe 1989)
Improvements in amphibious warfare craft have also been
realized. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) is designed to
move 60 tons of troops and/or equipment. Its primary role will
be to provide landing support to the Amphibious Task Force (ATF)
during the initial amphibious assault. Its secondary role is the
prime mover of logistics material during the general off-load
phase. LCACs will eventually replace such landing craft as the
LCUs and some smaller craft now in the Navy inventory: the
last LCU built was completed in 1976. Little improvements have
been realized in the Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM) and Landing
Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) crafts. While their
construction varies (some are aluminum vice steel), their maximum
speed is only 9 knots.
No real improvements have been realized in the following
active amphibious ships:
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In light of modern weapons and the vulnerability of major
amphibious platforms within 12 nautical miles of the beach, an
Over-The-Horizon (OTH) concept has been proposed as the next
direction amphibious warfare should take. The concept involves
the conduct of an amphibious operation more than 12 miles
off-shore. There are advantages to this concept from the Navy
viewpoint:
- Increased time available for the ship to react to
air-launched cruise missiles
- Reduced ship vulnerability to deep and shallow water mines
- Reduced ship vulnerability to shore-based direct and
indirect fire weapons
- Increased capability to conduct feints
The Marine assault force will enjoy increased benefits:
- Ability to attack at the time and place of their own
choosing
- Shorter window of vulnerability while crossing the beach
- Widely dispersed enemy defensive posture
- Access to more of the littoral due to increased stand-off
range.
While there are numerous advantages to the OTH concept, there
are also several factors that will limit our capability to mount
an OTH assault. These factors include the operation's duration,
insufficient amphibious shipping capable of carrying the LCAC,
and LCAC navigation problems.
Due to the distance assault craft with a maximum speed of 9
knots must travel , the operation will be of long duration. This
is especially true if the ATF stays over the horizon once the
general off-load phase of the operation begins.
Another limitation is the lack of adequate shipping required
to carry the 24 LCACs required for a notional MEB to hit the
beach. Current estimates indicate that 25 amphibious ships will
be required to support this task. Table 3 provides a listing of
the amphibious shipping capable of carrying the LCAC and the
number of LCACs that may be embarked aboard each. This table
clearly shows the Navy's LCAC carrying capacity is only about 50%
of what is needed.
Click here to view image
While the LCAC is considered the primary breakthrough for the
OTH concept is should be noted that it will only be part of the
assets required for a MEB landing. The remainder of the landing
force will have to be carried by aviation assets. Presently the
CH-46 helicopter is the primary means of air-lifting assault
forces ashore. Here also, we are using a 20 year old airframe
with 1950s' technology.
A total of 624 CH/UH-46 Sea Knights were
delivered to the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy
in the 1964-1971 period. With a view to
modernizing the fleet of CH-46s, two were
modified by Boeing Helicopters in 1975 and the
U.S. Marine Corps subsequently updated 273 CH-46s
to CH-46E configuration ... In December 1980, the
Naval Air systems command awarded Boeing
Helicopters the first of a series of contracts
for a multi-year U.S. Navy/Marine Corps
helicopter improvement programme known as the
Safety, Reliability, and Maintainability (SR&M)
Programme. this is aimed at reducing the
operating costs of HH-46A, CH-46D, and CH-46E
helicopters beyond the end of this century.
(Taylor, 1989, 385)
Clearly, this is another Service-life Extension Program to
keep outdated technology around vice modernizing. An OTH assault
launch from 50 nautical miles or more, however, will push current
helicopter assets to the limit. The MV-22 Osprey should be
capable of flying at speeds in excess of 250 knots and able to
make 4 complete 50 mile runs to the beach before refueling.
A third limitation is the problem of LCAC navigation. LCACs
will need radar navigation support from the ATF to get to the
beach successfully, under positive control. This requirement
will essentially void any emission control (EM CON) conditions
set by the commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF), making
the LCAC and ATF vulnerable to enemy detection efforts. The
position location reporting system (PLRS), and the NAVSTAR global
positioning system (GPS) are expected to solve this problem by
1992. (O"Neil, Hartway & Roe, March 1989)
I once read that a good military leader doesn't have to have
overwhelming combat power and superiority in numbers to be
victorious, if he can create the perception that his troops are
better and that he is more competent than his enemy. Now that
peace seems to be the major focus among the superpowers and
access to information seems readily available, perceptions are
giving way to reality. The U.S. military must now modernize its
amphibious assets and procedures in order to keep the advantage.
Unfortunately for the U.S. military, a careful review of Jane's
Military Review and other unclassified military periodicals
clearly shows the material assets of the U.S. Navy. We can no
longer rely on pure perception to keep our enemies and allies in
check. Our amphibious assets and procedures must be improved if
we are to maintain our image of being ten feet tall. The United
States has been characterized by innovation, determination, and
guts. We have been on the leading edge of technology and have
always prospered even when the odds were not in our favor. We
must now incorporate state of the art technology into our
amphibious fleet and associated assets. The time to change is
now. Patriotism and the unwillingness of the American public to
accept lengthy armed conflicts can be a critical vulnerability as
revealed in our recent past. This coupled with outdated
technology are ingredients for failure. Most seafaring nations
use missile bearing patrol boats to protect their shores. They
can deliver potent missiles with accuracy and attain speeds in
excess of 40 knots. Needless to say these boats present a
significant threat to any amphibious operation. In these days
of reduced budgets and equipment Service-Life Extensions, real
improvements in the amphibious community is slow. While aircraft
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers continue to receive priority
in modernization, amphibious platforms are subject to marginal
improvements. If America is to maintain naval supremacy and
actively use Marines in low intensity conflicts, amphibious
warfare ships and associated assets must be improved.
REFERENCES
Mack, Vice Admiral William P., US Navy (ret.) with Paulsen,
Captain Thomas D., US Navy, The Naval Officer's Guide,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland 1983, pp.
442-443, 448-450.
Moore, Major R. Scott, USMC, "The Art of MAGTF Warfare", Marine
Corps Gazette, March 1989.
Morison, Samuel L. and Rowe, John S., Warships of the U.S. Navy,
Jane's Publishing Company Limited, London, England 1983, pp
111-125.
O'Neil, Captain Michael S., USMC; Hartway, Captain Gordon E.,
USMC; and Roe, Captain Michael W., USMC, "Communications for
the Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Assault", Marine Corps
Gazette, March 1989.
Polman, Norman, The U.S. Navy Today, Volume 1, Arms and Armour
Press Limited, London, England, 1985.
Pugh, LtCol. Paul F., USMC, and Linn, Major Thomas C., USMC,
"Rediscovering the Force-in-Readiness", Armed Forces
Journal International, August 1989.
Sharpe, Captain Richard, RN, editor, Jane's Fighting Ships
1989-1990, Jane's Information Group, Ninety-second edition,
1989.
Taylor, John W. R., editor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft
1989-1990, Jane's Information Group, Eightieth Anniversary
Edition, Sentinel House, Surrey CR32NX, U.K. 1989, p.385.
U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, Volume 116/1/1,043, U.S. Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, January 1985, p. 94.
Van Creveld, Marten, Command In War, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1985, p.272.
STYLE REFERENCES
Strunk, William and White, E. B., The Elements of Style,
Macmillan Publishing Co., In., New York, 1979.
The University of Chicago, The Chicago Manual of Style, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1982.
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