Tryannosaurus NATO Rex? NATO In The 21st Century
AUTHOR Major Simon T. Beet, United Kindgom Royal Marines
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Professional Military Education (PME)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title. TYRANNOSAURUS NATO REX? NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY
THESIS. The pressures at work in the world today mean that the NATO of
tomorrow will very different, if it is to survive at all.
THE NATO CHARTER. It is a Treaty of Alliance based on the United Nations
Charter. Essentially it is a political alliance designed to operate outside
the UN forum, which the Soviet veto has made largely impotent. The Treaty
has a dual aspect; affirming the importance of economic and social progress
on one hand, and the adoption of a defensive policy based on the inherent
right of collective self-defence on the other.
PRESSURES AT WORK TODAY. The economic and political changes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, are dramatic, perhaps too dramatic for
continued stability. We may find that it will be to revisionism or Russian
chauvinism that the regimes will turn. The political and economic
development of the EEC continues apace. This has produced friction within
the Alliance. The European's desire a greater say in security matters whilst
the US is demanding that Europe take on the defensive responsibilities
concomitant with its growing status. The Third World is becoming
increasingly unstable which may threaten the Alliance's supply of raw
materials. Meanwhile the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and the
threat of their use may have a direct impact on Alliance security.
NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY. There are two unassailable facts. First, Europe
will remain of strategic interest of the US. Second, force levels within the
Alliance will be markedly reduced. The Alliance is, and will remain, a
political instrument, although currently threatened by internal discord. The
threat remains from the Soviet Union, more perhaps the result of political
unrest. The Third World does not appear to be developing peacefully, which
may effect Europe and the United States. Europe currently possesses the
machinery to coordinate a defensive posture, in the form of the WEU, to
strengthen the "Europeans" pillar of the Alliance. The danger in this is the
possible alienation of the United States by the discussion of European
security outside NATO.
CONCLUSION. The Alliance of the next century must be a stronger political
institution in a more global context than at present, in order to
forestall any security threat to its members. Its military structure will
need considerable revision to take into account the reduction in the direct
threat to Europe. It must provide a forum outside the UN in which to
coordinate political action on security matters of mutual interest. The NATO
Alliance, formed as it is of independent democratic nations possessing such
political and economical strength, has as vital a role to play in the next
century, as it did on that day in April 1949.
TYRANNOSAURUS NATO REX?
NATO IN THE 21ST CENEEFY
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: The pressures at work in the world today mean that the
NATO of tomorrow will very different, if it is to survive at all.
I. Why NATO was established
A. Post WWII revolution in the balance of power
B. Anxiety about the military might and intentions of the Soviet Union
C. The destruction wreaked by two world wars
D. Early hopes for the UN dashed by frequent use of veto
E. US realization that to deter aggression better than making advance
preparations for meeting it
II. The Charter.
A. Linked in large part to UN Charter
B. A defensive arrangement
C. Socio-political element
III. Pressures at work today and their consequences
A. Evolution of Communist Block
B. Arms reductions?
C. Europe and its development
D. Shift in economic power towards the Far East
E. Growth and evolution of the Third World
IV. NATO in the 21st Century
A. Two unassailable facts,
l. Europe will continue to be of strategic interest to the US
2. The current military force structure will be reduced
B. NATO is a political alliance
C. The threat to the Alliance states in the next century
l. Russian chauvinism,and expansionism
2. Instability in Eastern Bloc nations
3. Third World regional conflicts with threat of chemical and nuclear
exchanges
4. Europe's development and stability
D. Thrust of NATO will became political rather than military
E. NATO structure
1. WEU will provide "European" voice to strengthen rather than disrupt
2. Political forum to coordinate western response to areas of mutual
security interests outside the UN
3. Military structure for defence of North Atlantic area will be
revised, becoming more "functional" and geographic
TYRANNOSAURUS NATO REX? NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY
This is an astonishing moment in the history of the NATO Alliance
and perhaps of the world. The events of the past few months in
eastern Europe, allied to those occurring within the Soviet Union
have called many of our long held beliefs into question, and the old
certainties have disappeared. Now something that appeared as a
distant dream for many appears to be on the doorstep, finding many
unprepared. President Gorbachev has thrown the future into the
melting pot, but the shape in which it will emerge remains very
uncertain(l).
Added to the tumultuous changes in Europe, we also see a rapid change in the
world order established after World War II. The Third World is developing
apace, whilst the Far East is rapidly becoming a significant economic power
base. NATO was formed in a time very different from that we know today. A
Europe emerging from a traumatic and damaging War, the very real threat
posed by an expansionist Soviet Union, and finally the emergence of the
United States as a Superpower. The world of today is a very different place
with socio-political change occurring at an alarming rate, this situation
will result in increasing instability unless we reassess our priorities,
international relationships and hence treaties. The pressures at work in the
world today mean that the NATO of tomorrow will very different, if it is to
survive at all.
NATO'S FORMATION
In order to understand the future form of the NATO Alliance it is
important to have a clear understanding of the conditions which led to the
Treaty's signature in Washington on April 4, 1949. Nato came into being
through the interaction of 5 basic factors.
First, World War II brought about a revolution in the international balance
of power, with the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as undisputed
giants. Eastern and Central Europe, which only a few years before had been
the habitat of four of the worlds greatest powers - France, Great Britain,
Germany and Italy - had become a power vacuum. For the first time in modern
history the area lacked the military might to protect itself from outside
aggression.
Second, there was in both Western Europe, and the United States a real
concern about the military might and behaviour of the Soviet Union. The USSR
had supported a communist guerrilla war in Greece, had seized control of
countries in Eastern Europe and finally, the year long Berlin Blockade in
1948 and the Communist coup d'etate in Czechoslovakia in the same year
supported by Soviet threat of military intervention, merely served to deepen
Western anxiety.
Third, the enormous destruction produced by two world wars left in most
Europeans a deep revulsion against international violence. It also resulted
in a profound wish to avoid a repetition of warfare amongst themselves, and
that hence forth all Europeans must learn to live together as peaceful
neighbours.
Fourth, the early hopes that the UN would provide the necessary forum to
avoid further wars proved unfounded. The fact that the permanent members of
the Security Council had been accorded veto power meant that the UN could
only force a peaceful solution with the agreement of the two key members,
the United States and the Soviet Union. The recurrent use of the Soviet veto
made it clear that such cooperation could not be counted on.
Fifth, having twice in fairly rapid succession felt compelled to intervene
in bloody European wars the United States was unwilling to become involved
in entangling alliances. Instead American leaders now felt that deterrence
against a possible conflict was preferable to preparing for it. They
realized that only the United States was strong enough to deter the USSR. (2)
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.
The text of the Treaty is very short and requires very little explanation.
It consists of a preamble and fourteen Articles. As Brig Gen Monroe
MacClosky writes: "It is a Treaty of Alliance within the framework of the
United Nations Charter (3) for the defense of a way of life, not only by
means of essential military measures, but also by co-operation in political,
social, cultural and economic fields." (4) The Treaty is in essence a
vehicle for continuous joint action in the political, economic and social
fields. It took on its current military significance only after the Korean
War. Thus the Treaty has a dual aspect; affirming the importance of
economic, and social progress on the one hand, and adopting a policy of
security based on the inherent right of collective self-defence on the
other. (5) The political nature of the Alliance emerges quite clearly from
the preamble and many of the operational provisions of the Treaty. The
political essence is manifested in the organizational structure in Brussels.
The Secretary General and the Permanent Representatives on the Council are
civilians as are the personnel of the international staffs. During this past
year there have been two NATO Summits (2-3 March and 29-30 May) held in
Brussels. The NATO Foreign Ministers, who in any case regularly come
together twice a year at the Council meetings - in addition to the Summits -
have met some l6 times in the past year. This political aspect is often
forgotten by NATO detractors, who instead, concentrate on the more visible
and tangible element, namely the necessary costs to ensure the maintenance
of the military structure.
PRESSURES AT WORK TODAY AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES.
As Narcis Serra(6) recently pointed out: "The monolithic edifice, both
political and ideological, which has hitherto been represented by the Warsaw
Pact is crumbling before the startled eyes of the rest of the world."(7) For
the past year the media has been full of the events within the Soviet Union
and her satellite states. Peristrioka and Glasnost have led to a reawakening
of nationalism in Eastern Europe as, one by one, the Warsaw Pact nations have
moved away in varying degrees from Soviet domination, resulting in a de
facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This has led to a somewhat euphoric
response from large sections of the western press and electorates. Thus
western governments have been placed under increasing domestic pressure to
reduce defence spending in the light of the perceived reduced threat.
Peristrioka continues to change the face of the Soviet government. After a
rancorous debate, the 249 member Central Committee of the Communist Party
approved a platform that will in effect end the Party's seven-decade-long
monopoly on political and economic life, and requiring the revision of
Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, in which is enshrined the Communist
Party's leading role. Furthermore it proposed an overhaul of its ruling
Politburo and the creation of a Presidential system of government, putting
extensive power into Gorbachev's hands and granting him, at least on paper,
more power than any other leader in Soviet history, but seemingly without
the checks and balances provided by a lower legislative assembly. This
overhaul has not been undertaken without opposition, Yegor Ligachev recently
said, "regrettably, we are beginning to discard everything old with ease,
including those things that could have been of use today." Some others fear
for the future, Vladimir Brovkikov, the Soviet Ambassador to Poland said
after the 12-14 February meeting, "We have brought the Motherland to an awful
state, turning it from an Empire admired throughout the World to a State
with an inglorious present and indefinite future."(8) On 14th March 1990,
President Gorbachev was elected by the Congress of Peoples Deputies for a
five year term, with presidential elections turned over to the people in
1995. He was however, not granted the powers he sought. As President
Gorbachev attempts to overhaul the Soviet political system, and shift power
away from the Communist Party, he is also faced with the seemingly
intractable ethnic discord in the southern republics of Armenia and
Azerbaijan, (9) and political discord provided by the independence movements
in the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania.The not too distant future will
see a dramatic reduction in the Communist Party's influence within the
Soviet Government, but bearing in mind the political and ethnic unrest
currently besetting the nation, what is there to replace it? Lord Belof
writes:
It has been a constant of Soviet foreign policy that what matters is
the ability to exploit political weakness wherever it occurs.... this
policy has been left where Lenin left it... In time of crisis and a
change in the Soviet political structure it is more likely that it
will be to Russian Chauvinism rather than western ideals that the
regime would turn to for help. (10)
The two world wars took a terrible toll on Soviet Russia, in both human and
economic terms. This has left the Soviet Union with a profound fear for its
security. This sense of insecurity is difficult for western nations to
understand, and as a result it is often overlooked or ignored. It is
tempting to believe that there is a place within the western Alliance and
EEC for the former Soviet satellite states, indeed Hungary has already
voiced a desire to join the EEC. This view is somewhat idealistic and does
not take into account legitimate Soviet security fears. Poland for example
views the future unification of Germany with profound disquiet. This has
been dramatically demonstrated by their reaction to Mr Kohl's discussion of
the East German border issue. This has firmly driven Poland back under
Soviet military influence, in spite of its non Communist Government. I think
that it might be true to say that the Eastern European states political
development may produce a representative style of government, but perhaps
misguided to believe that these will be anything but, very socialist.
It might be argued that the arms reductions undertaken by the Soviets to
date have merely been a means to restructure and modernize their forces, and
that the combat power remains, as does the ability to project political
power by military force (11). Therefore in the short term a NATO military
force structure will still be required until such time as real and effective
reductions of Soviet combat power are achieved, to ensure that the west in
general, and Europe in particular maintains the ability to resist any
applied pressure wherever it might fall. The emphasis must therefore remain
in the short term to maintain the military deterrence, but in the long term
the solution must lie in the provision of stable economic and political
alliances rather than purely military ones.
Europe, and in particular the European Economic Community (EEC) is developing
apace. The dissolution of the tariff barriers in 1992 is but the beginnings
of perhaps a total economic and hence political union. The implications of
the German unification are as yet unclear, but without doubt it will have a
major impact on the future of Europe. The former Soviet satellite states are
rapidly removing themselves from the charge of their former master, and
seeking to restructure their economies, and to an extent, politics. Thus in
both Eastern and Western Europe today dramatic developments unfold. There is
however a profound difference. On the one hand there is the continuing
development of a well structured and sound politic-economic base, whilst on
the other there is the struggle to reconstruct a fundamentally flawed
politic-economic system. The economic infrastructure of Eastern Europe has
suffered from almost 50 years of uninspired direction, hence it is old
fashioned, labour intensive and uneconomic. It will have to be radically
restructured if it is to compete in the free market place. This
restructuring may be traumatic, with wholesale unemployment, and a dramatic
reduction in the general standard of living. It is a moot point as whether
the populations of these countries will be prepared to accept this lack of
fulfillment of the free democratic socio-political ideal. This may result in
civil unrest, a massive exodus to the west, or perhaps the adoption of
revisionist policies. Added to this factor one must not forget the
historical enmities which exist in the area, particularly in the Balkans.
Thus the Europe of the future may not live up to the expectations of the
populations of its Eastern states. The resulting instability or revisionism
may have a profound effect on European stability, particularly if one
considers the Soviet Union's traditional sense of insecurity.
The growth of the EEC has provided a new twist to NATO's internal political
harmony in two main areas. Firstly, the desire by the EEC to have some say
in security matters. Although specifically barred from defence issues by the
1957 Treaty of Rome, participation in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) is not. Jacques Delors(Secretary General of the
EEC) last summer formed a staff to study the potential impact on European
security of the lowering of tariff barriers in 1992. In a recent interview
Giovanni Jannuzzi (Secretary General of the European Political Cooperation
Secretariat) indicated the EEC's desire to use the forthcoming CSCE Summit
to address "European" security issues with the EEC taking a leading
role (12). The EUROGROUP and IEPG meanwhile, are facets of Europe's
continuing desire to take a more active role in NATO. This "Europeanism" has
upset the United States as it appears to reduce the effectiveness of the
current arms negotiation process by increasing the number of players.
Secondly, all of the countries within NATO are facing considerable
difficulty in justifying defence expenditure in the face of recent events,
and all of NATO is looking to a reduction of force levels (13), especially
since these were established in the early 1950's. Added to this, the United
States considers that concomitant with Europe's increasing wealth and
political power must come greater responsibility for its own defence.
Similarly the United States must realize as Jeanne Kirkpatrick recently
pointed out, "that the Europeans do not consider her a European power, and
do not take kindly to suggestions made recently by Mr Baker for a new Europe
based on a new Atlanticism." (14) The United States will have to come to
terms with growing European economic and political power. The burden sharing
issue and Europeanism are not new,but are gaining force with increased
pressure on military budgets. Thus the Alliance is facing increasing
pressure from within, which might conceivably result in its dissolution, as
the unifying threat(from the Soviet Union) decreases.
The two oil shocks of the 1970's reminded the west that almost all of
Europe, Japan, and many other countries are largely dependent on oil coming
from the Persian Gulf. For that reason alone, it is of the utmost strategic
importance to maintain peace in the region. (15) To date this has been very
much the preserve of the United States which by virtue of very considerable
economic assistance has provided a measure of peace between Egypt and
Israel, but not the remainder of the region.
It seems unlikely that the United States or the West could bring
about a solution to this problem that could achieve a stabilized
peace. Only a Utopian idealist could suppose that this is
possible... The truth is that no one in the world could defend the
Persian Gulf. If some madman or terrorist group choose to, it could
set fire to and blow up the oil fields around the Gulf. Nor can any
one defend the world against the consequences of such an event. (16)
It must be pointed out however, that this region is as important to the
Soviets as it is to the West, for the results of any war in the Middle East
would be as incalculable for them as it would be for the West. By the same
token they will seek to expand their influence in the area step by step,
which makes containment as well as restraint, necessary on the western side.
The recent allied military activity in the Gulf provides us with a fine
example of cohesive political accord resulting in an effective military
response. The United States, United Kingdom and France has been providing
armed escorts for their tankers through the Gulf for some time. With an
increase in the mine threat a need was established to provide the necessary
mine counter measures which the United States could not. The European
response from the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands was coordinated by the
Western European Union(WEU) (17). Other notable successes achieved by the
WEU were the provision by France, UK and Italy in 1983 of peace keeping
contingents to Beirut, and in 1984 the same countries with the Netherlands
deployed mine counter measures vessels to clear the Gulf of Suez of
terrorist mines.
The Third World today suffers from accumulated debt and economic
mismanagement, extremist religious fundamentalism and growing demands for
political participation all of which accentuates its chronic
instability. (18) The papers are continually filled with minor national and
domestic conflicts around the world largely fueled by traditional
international or domestic enmities. These conflicts vary from conventional
warfare through to terrorist campaigns, some of which spill over into the
NATO area. An important facet of this instability is its possible effect on
the supply of raw materials on which both European and the United States
industries depend. This together with economic malaise, constitutes a rather
nebulous, but never the less important threat to the Alliance. It is
therefore in its interest to foster greater stability,and the easiest way of
achieving this is by economic assistance. This must take two forms, the
direct and the indirect.
Firstly, economic aid must be provided. A fine example of which is the Lome
Convention which governs the assistance provided, most notably to the former
French African colonies, from the EEC. Military aid may provide a short term
solution, in bolstering up a weak government, but in the long run often only
serves to exacerbate the instability, by encouraging opposing assistance,
causing greater political polarization, and the destruction of the economic
framework by warfare. A good example of what needs to be done is provided by
the situation in Mozambique where military assistance is only provided (by
the British) in the form of training teams with substantial economic aid and
assistance being provided from the EEC. This effort, linked with political
pressure on South Africa looks to a future economic solution rather than a
short term military one. 1989 saw European countries provide $16 billion in
official development aid, more than half as much again as the United States.
Secondly, the west must seek to provide a stable market for the Third
World's produce. This is without doubt the most difficult to achieve in the
free market place. Third World economies are often limited to one or two
major items which, if the price falls, or a cheaper synthetic substitute
discovered, often has a catastrophic effect on the economy. The nature of
the free market place cannot allow prices to remain at an artificial high.
Perhaps a more effective solution might be to provide these countries with
the industrial or economic knowhow to diversify their economies. Another
form of indirect aid might be in assistance in resolving debt problems with
the major Banks. This is particularly important to the South American States
which have no option but to continue rescheduling these debts, as their
economies fail to develop. Thus the west's responsibilities are not military
per se, but economic and political with the use of the military force as
only a last resort to help resurrect or establish a viable economic base,
and a political system, not necessarily based on western ideals, but those
needed by the ethic and sociological systems of the nations concerned.
Some nations within the Third World are becoming militarily powerful. India,
Pakistan, Israel and South Africa are believed to possess nuclear weapons or
the capacity to produce them. The technology to produce chemical weapons is
now widely available whilst they require little sophistication in terms of
modern technology to produce. We have seen their use in recent years by
Iraq, not only in its war with Iran but against its own Kurdish population,
and by Libya in its war with Chad. There are 16 Third World nations
currently believed to either possess chemical weapons or the ability to
produce them. (19) This provides Third World instability and traditional
enmities with truly terrifying possibilities.
THE NATO IN THE 21ST CENTNY.
There are two unassailable facts. The first, Europe is, and will continue
to be, of strategic interest to the United States both economically and
politically. The second, the current military force structure will be
considerably reduced by the start of the next century.
"The political alliance embodied in the NATO Treaty is the only one of its
kind in the world, uniting on the two sides of the Atlantic the major
democratic industrialized countries with similar traditions of civilization
and culture, and the same concept of moral values." (20) As time passes the
political nature of the Alliance becomes more active, but is currently being
threatened by internal discord across the Atlantic. NATO will without doubt
have a vital role to play in the next century, the difficulty lies in its
definition.
One must commence by attempting to define that threat. The Soviet Union will
remain a superpower. It has by tradition, even in Tsarist times, been
expansionist. Thus instead of Communism as we see it today we may be faced
with the chauvinistic style which characterized Russia's foreign policy up
to the revolution in 1917. This can only be exacerbated by an economic
revival or continuing domestic political and ethnic unrest. The current
Eastern Bloc nations are set for a period of perhaps considerable
instability, as nationalism and economic development take place, and their
societies evolve. On the World scene there remains the prospect of regional
conflict which may have a profound effect on both sea routes and the supply
of raw materials to the west, added to which any such conflict in the future
now has the prospect of nuclear or chemical exchanges, which the western
nations must be in a position to deter by both political and military means.
The World of the next century will be beset with uncertainty and
instability. Europe, on the other hand appears to be entering a time of
economic, and as a result political unity, as the EEC develops.
As the political and economic power of Europe increases transatlantic
political harmony can only become of greater importance to the United
States, it cannot afford either political, or more importantly, economic
isolationism. Thus the political structure provided by NATO will become as
important to the United States in the next century as is her military
contribution to the Alliance today is to Europe. The challenge therefore
that faces the NATO Alliance in the next century is not only the
preservation of stability in a world of increasing instability, but also a
reordering of the political structure which will be as difficult for Europe
as it will be for the United States. Since the threat to western security in
the next century will have a greater global context this will need to be
countered, in the main by political cooperation, with military action
designed to deter any aggression which might effect alliance members in
general. I do not propose a force structure to encompass a global police
role. The deployment of forces outside the NATO area must remain the remit
of individual governments as an instrument of their national power,
particularly since Europe, and the United States often do not view global
problems in the same context. NATO can never the less provide the political
forum to discuss an appropriate western response.
Since the Soviet military threat to Western Europe will be very considerably
reduced the need for substantial international forces committed to its
defence will decrease, thus the importance of the military alliance per se,
will similarly decrease. The current NATO structure is essentially
political one, whilst Europe in the form of the WEU has the forum to
accommodate military cooperation, not as an institution in itself, but as a
means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. One must however
be careful when-traveling down this European defence ideal, for the European
nations jealously guard their military as an instrument of national policy,
whilst political unity is some considerable way off. Furthermore, if this is
handled badly it will only serve to alienate the United States, the bastion
on which the western defensive alliance of NATO is based. This latter fact
is well understood by the European nations of NATO. The danger lies in
European security issues being discussed outside the NATO forum as the
economic and political strength of the EEC increases.
The Alliance of the next century may see few military forces deployed
forward in defence of Western Europe if the Soviet Union makes appropriate
reductions in its combat power, and significant progress is made at the CSCE
Summit. The military structure will be reduced to regional responsibilities
with the political backing of member states, and will thus perhaps require
significant revision. The WEU will become the main forum for coordination of
"European" defence issues. The United States, France and the United Kingdom
will provide the nuclear umbrella to a Western Alliance, not just in a
European context but perhaps a more global one, to deter the use of
unconventional weapons, not only by the Soviet Union, but by Third World
states as well. The political nature of the Alliance will become paramount
as a vehicle for coordinating political action on security matters of
consequence to its members outside the United Nations forum, and will remain
the guarantor of Alliance security. Any alliance must seek to evolve with
the threat and hence its raison d'etre might change in emphasis. NATO is no
exception. The threat will without doubt change, and will change in such a
way to require greater political cooperation to counter. Having said that it
is apparent that the transatlantic schism is growing as the EEC develops.
Only time will tell whether a NATO unity born of a common political and
ethnic heritage will remain strong enough to ensure its continued existence
in the face of a changing threat.
CONCLUSION
The North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique of the December 1989
meeting provides us with a look ahead:
The Alliance will increasingly be called upon to carry out its
political function. Recalling the origins of the North Atlantic
Treaty as a political alliance built upon common fundamental
values, our leaders affirmed at the May 1989 Summit that the
Alliance must reintensify its own efforts to overcome the
division of Europe. In doing so, it must take up new
challenges...in the pursuit of political change within
stability. Our political approach in support for positive
change must be multifacetted, seeking to encourage cooperative
action in dealing with common problems. (21)
Those of us alive today are privileged to be the audience, or indeed
participants in a global game, the rules of which constantly change, and
which can have no victor or vanquished. Never before in recorded history has
such profound change occurred with such speed, or with such dire
consequences of failure, on such a scale. The NATO Alliance, formed as it is
of independent democratic nations possessing such political and economical
strength, has as vital a role to play in the next century as it did on that
day in April 1949.
END NOTES
l. Sir Micheal Howard,"Military Grammar and Political Logic: can NATO
survive if Cold War won?" NATO Review, No. 6, December 1989, p. 7-12.
2. Klaus Knorr, "NATO: Past, Present, Prospect." Headline Series, No. 198,
December 1969, p. 3-5.
3. This is particularly true of Article l which is an almost literal
reproduction of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the UN Charter, and governs nations
international relations in the avoidance of war. Similarly Article 2 which
follows Article l of the UN Charter which defines the aims of UNO:
preservation of peace, the development of relations among nations and the
achievement of international co-operation in solving problems of an economic
and social character.
4. Brig Gen Monroe MacClosky, USAF(ret.), North Atlantic Treaty
Organization: Guardian of Peace and Security, Richards Rosen Press, Inc.,
New York, 1966, p. 24-25.
5. ibid.,p. 24.
6. Snr Narcis Serra is the Spanish Minister of Defence and the Chairman of
EURGROUP. EUROGROUP is an informal grouping of European members of NATO,
which was established in 1968 to ensure that the European contribution to
the common defence is as strong, cohesive and as effective as possible. Its
most prominent element is the Independent European Programme Group(IEPG)
which is the principle institution through which the European members of
NATO seek greater cooperation in armaments procurement.
7. Narcis Serra, "The Atlantic Alliance: facing a challenging new era," NATO
Review, No. 6, December 1989, p. 5-7.
8. John Kohan, "Let the Parties Begin", Time, February 19, 1990, p. 32-35.
9. Mr Ligachev, one of the Soviet Union's leading conservatives recently
asked during a central committee conference on peristrioka, when talking
about the security situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan. "How people could
support a government that was unable to ensure that they slept peacefully in
their beds at night," and went on to express mounting fears about the
potential breakup of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union itself. Both
of these possibilities are looking increasingly possible. John Rettie, "The
Decline and Fall of the Russian Empire?" The Manchester Guardian, Vol. 142,
No. 3, January 21, 1990, p. 7.
10. Max Belof, "A Farwell to Arms: A Rejoiner," International Affairs,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Butterworths Ltd., London,
Vol. 65, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 419.
11. Since the start of 1986 tank production has increased 5% and is
currently running at 3,500 per year. The Soviets have recently fielded the
very capable MIG 29 fighter and the MIG 31 interceptor. On the Naval front
building continues at about 150,000 standard tons per year. The first of the
Tbilisi-class aircraft carriers has joined the Northern Fleet, whilst hull 2
is fitting out and hull 3 will shortly be launched from the Nikolayef
shipyard. Strategic weapon production has increased, in the case of
submarine launched missiles by a factor of three. Soviet Military Power
1989, Department of Defence, United States of America, p. 34-35.
12. An interview with Giovanni Jannuzzi, the Secretary General of the
European Cooperation Secretariat, and quoted in; "EC Eager to Play Defense
Role in Arms Security Policy," Theressa Hitchens and Alessandro Politi,
Defense News, March 15, 1990, p. l.
13. Apart from the well publicized reduction of US forces to 195,000, the
Belgian Defence Minister Mr Guy Coeme announced on 25 Jan 89 that plans were
under consideration to remove all of his country's 25,000 troops (the forth
largest national contingent) from Germany. In the light of this it is likely
that both the Dutch, and the Danes will follow Belgium's lead. The Defence
Chiefs in the UK have become reconciled to a reduction in the British Army
of the Rhine(BAOR) from its current 60,000, by a restructuring of the force
from three Divisions to two.
14. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War", Foreign Affairs, The
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Vol. 69, No. l, 1990, p. 16.
15. Helmut Schmit, A Grand strategy for the West, Yale University Press, New
Haven and London, 1985, p. 86.
16. Ibid. p. 94-95.
17. The Western European Union was formed in 1954 with the aim of furthering
European integration through increased cooperation between the seven member
nations(France, UK, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Holland).
It is not within the EEC framework, since the Treaty of Rome specifically
excludes defence issues. The WEU became dormant until 1983/4 when the French
President Msr Mitterrand initiated the WEU as a forum to express a common
European response to President Reagan's launch of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, the military intervention in Grenada and the decision behind the
deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. The WEU's 30th anniversary
Rome declaration of 27 Oct 84 commited it to reactivate the WEU Council at
the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers, as a means of strengthening the
European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance, and recalled that, "that it
had preserved peace on the continent for 35 years. . .The Ministers are
convinced that a better utilization of the WEU would not only contribute to
the security of Western Europe. . .and greater solidarity amongst its
members." Ian Gambles, "Prospect for West European Security Cooperation,"
Adelphi Paper, No. 244, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1989, p. 29.
18. Alan N. Sabrosky, ed., Alliances in US Foreign Policy, Westview Press,
Boulder and London, 1988, p, 108.
19. Syria, Iran(alleged to have nerve gas), Pakistan, Afghanistan, China,
North Korea, Taiwan(500 tons of mustard gas), Burma(alleged to produce
mustard gas), Vietnam, Thailand, Iraq (produces 30-40 tons per year),
Isreal(produces nerve and mustard gas), Ethiopia, Egypt(holds old British
stock), Libya (alleged to be able to produce nerve agent) and Cuba. The
Manchester Guardian, Vol. 141, No. 13, October l, 1989, p. l.
20. Abbassador Niels Hansen, "NATO as a political Alliance: the primacy of
politics," NATO Review, No. 6, December 1989, p. 14.
21. North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 1989, NATO
Review, No. 6, December 1989, p. 25.
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