Fighting The MAGTF: A Doctrinal Vacuum
AUTHOR Major Leonard A. Blasiol, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FIGHTING THE MAGTF: A DOCTRINAL VACUUM
Thesis: The MAGTF possesses sufficient firepower, sustainment
capability, and flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions, but
the Corps lacks a truly workable body of doctrine which would
enable the MAGTF to fight effectively. It is within the capability
of the Corps to develop effective doctrine by focusing its vast
mental resources on this challenge.
In the coming era of fiscal austerity, the armed forces will face severe
budget cuts. In order to survive this experience intact, the Marine Corps
must offer the nation a unique capability. The amphibious mission is losing
credibility. Dwindling amphibious lift capability and lack of recent
historical evidence for the utility of amphibious forces combine to
undermine the Corps' reliance on this once important role as the guarantor
of institutional survival. The unique character of the MAGTF is the attribute
which can hold a place for the Marine Corps in national defense strategy.
Despite the overwhelming importance of the MAGTF, current doctrine for
its employment is seriously flawed. A number of specific cases illustrate
this point, including: focus on the GCE, rear area security, compositing, and
MAGTFs wih multiple GCEs. In some instances, the doctrine fails to address
seemingly obvious contradictions; in other cases, doctrinal solutions to
pressing problems are impractical or not fully developed.
Deficiencies in MAGTF doctrine can be corrected. First, FMF commanders
must participate energetically in the development of doctrinal concepts.
Second, the vast reservoir of knowledge resident in Marine Corps schools
must be pressed into service. Finally, the Marine Corps GAZETTE should
encourage an open debate concerning MAGTF warfighting issues.
FIGHTING THE MAGTF: A DOCTRINAL VACUUM
OUTLINE
The MAGTF possesses sufficient firepower, sustainment capability, and
flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions, but the Marine Corps lacks a
truly workable body of doctrine which would enable the MAGTF to fight
effectively. It is within the capability of the Corps to develop effective
doctrine by focusing its vast mental resources on this challenge.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Potential effectiveness of the MAGTF
B. Weakness of doctrine reduces MAGTF effectiveness
II. WHY THE MAGTF?
A. Amphibious capability a "dead issue"
B. Unique MAGTF capability the Marine Corps' greatest asset
III. DOCTRINE
A. Definition
B. Sources
C. MAGTF doctrine development
IV. FOCUS ON THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT
A. Proper employment of the MAGTF requires non-traditional approach
B. Doctrine establishes a focus on the GCE
V. REAR AREA SECURITY
A. Rear area: the MAGTF's critical vulnerability
B. Doctrine requires rear area units to protect themselves
C. Rear area units cannot possibly counter the anticipated threat
VI. COMPOSITING
A. Extended combat missions require a MEF
B. MEFs can only deploy by compositing
C Compositing doctrine is not workable
VII. THE "TWO DIVISION MEF"
A. Doctrine does not fully address the question of a "two division
MEF"
B. Doctrinal schemes for fire support coordination with multiple
GCEs are not sound
VIII. FINDING THE RIGHT ANSWERS
A. Require FMF commanders to participate fully in the review of draft
doctrinal publications
B. Utilize the knowledge and experience base present in Marine Corps
schools
C. Fuel a Corps-wide discussion in the Marine Corps GAZETTE
IX.CONCLUSIONS
A. Unrealistic, unworkable doctrine can be corrected
B. "Turn on the brainpower"
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary i
Outline ii
Table of Contents iv
Introduction 1
Why the MAGTF? 2
Doctrine 5
Focus on the Ground Combat Element 7
Rear Area Security 9
Compositing 14
The "Two Division MEF" 17
Finding the Right Answers 20
Conclusion 23
Footnotes 25
Bibliography 27
FIGHTING THE MAGTF: A DOCTRINAL VACUUM
Introduction
Marine forces are most effective in battle when employed as a
strategic mobile combined arms air-ground combat force
possessing its own combat service support, all under a single
commander. This doctrine is based upon tasking in the National
Security Act of 1947. It is the foundation for the structure and
operation of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force . . . .
-- The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, OH 2
The Marine Corps is heavily committed to fulfilling its national defense
responsibilities by employing its fighting power in the form of Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Combining aviation combat, ground
combat, and combat service support units under a single commander with
his own staff, the MAGTF theoretically represents a formidable, flexible,
self-sufficient fighting organization. Indeed, considering the array of
combat capabilities available to the MAGTF commander, this would seem to
be the case. Unfortunately, it is not.
Combat power is more than a quantity of men, weapons, ammunition,
communications equipment, trucks, and so forth placed under the leadership
of a commander, however competent he might be. To effectively apply the
capabilities of men, equipment, and systems against an enemy, a combat
organization must have a commonly understood concept of the fashion in
which its various elements should integrate their resources to achieve
victory. Such a concept is referred to as doctrine. The MAGTF possesses
sufficient firepower, sustainment capability, and flexibility to accomplish
a variety of missions, but the Marine Corps lacks a truly workable body of
doctrine which would enable the MAGTF to fight effectively. It is within the
capability of the Corps to develop effective doctrine by focusing its vast
mental resources on this challenge.
Why the MAGTF?
The world is changing. Communist regimes are toppling in Eastern
Europe and Central America, the Germans are dismantling the Berlin Wall,
and Soviet republics are unilaterally declaring their independence from
their former Kremlin masters. The "threat," it would seem, is disappearing.
In response to the suddenly diminished risk of war, U.S. legislators have
already begun the process of dramatically paring down defense spending.
The armed forces face personnel reductions on a dramatic scale, as well as
the outright loss of programs for the upgrade and modernization of
equipment and fighting capabilities. It is a Darwinian environment of
competition for scarce resources and adaptation to change, and only the
truly "capable" will survive. Any of the services found wanting will go the
way of the dodo bird and the Tasmanian wolf.
It is not surprising that the Marine Corps has often been a favorite
target of budget cutters. In a nation which already maintains a large army,
a second major land combat force seems redundant. The Corps has answered
this type of criticism in the past by touting the two capabilities which
make it unique among the armed forces of the United States: the ability to
forcibly enter enemy-held territory through amphibious assault and the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organization, with its special
warfighting characteristics.
Of these two arguments, the first is rapidly losing credibility. Since the
1st Marine Division's landing at Inchon in 1950, Marine Corps units have
conducted only a few minor amphibious assaults under combat conditions (or
conditions which could even remotely be considered to approximate the
threat of combat), and then only by the smallest of the MAGTFs, Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEUs).1 Conversely, the U.S. Army has participated in a
number of intervention actions using airborne and air-landed units of
brigade and division size. Recent history indicates that, in situations
which can probably be resolved by a battalion-sized force augmented by
helicopters, the Marines might get the call. In circumstances likely to
involve serious combat, the U.S. Army's 82d Airborne Division, Rangers, or
light infantry units will probably respond, with or without Marines.2
Marines argue that an amphibious force can remain offshore in a
threatening posture almost indefinitely, placing at risk a large stretch of an
adversary's coastline. While this is true, it is a fact unlikely to imbue U.S.
legislators with the inspiration to dedicate major resources toward the
maintenance of a force whose sole virtue is the ability to conduct
amphibious operations. While amphibious capability has merit, the Corps
must offer the nation something more if it expects to survive the
budget-cutter's axe.
The Corps does indeed have "something more" to offer: the MAGTF. The
uniqueness of the MAGTF in the armed forces of the United States is
guaranteed by the National Security Act of 1947, which requires the Marine
Corps to maintain divisions and aircraft wings. Alone among the services
in this regard, the Marine Corps can thus organize forces capable of
employing air and ground combat power under a single headquarters.
It is not amphibious capability, but the unique character of the MAGTF
that makes the Marine Corps valuable to the nation. Experience indicates
that legislators are not swayed by such esoteric qualities as an outstanding
combat record (although they are quickly roused to take action against the
perpetrators of combat failure). Instead, they demand evidence of
warfighting capabilities of use to the nation in the forseeable future. The
MAGTF is the embodiment of such a capability. It is the key to the salvation
of the Corps in the coming era of fiscal austerity.
Doctrine
In the military, doctrine is supremely important. In the
confusion of battle, those who understand it have a frame of
reference and a vocabulary with which they can effectively
judge the situation, think about it, effect coordination, and
issue orders.
-- Guide to Doctrinal Publications. OH 0
Doctrine is a general form of guidance for employing units and weapons.
The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS
Pub. 1 tells us that doctrine is "authoritative but requires judgment in
application." The Marine Corps' philosophy on warfighting is faithful to this
concept.3
There are two types of Marine Corps doctrinal publications: Fleet Marine
Force Manuals (FMFMs) and developmental publications (also known as
Operational Handbooks, or OHs).4 Taken together, these publications
document the Marine Corps' theoretical point of departure for the conduct of
war.
Warfighting doctrine can evolve either from historical experience (in
combat or in exercises) or from "brainstorming." Marine Corps combat
experience with the MAGTF in Vietnam holds few lessons of relevance to our
current expectations. Other MAGTF combat operations -- the Dominican
Republic (1962), Lebanon and Grenada (1983)-- were of such small scale as
to be of little use for the development of doctrine applicable to MAGTF
warfighting. Similarly, exercises involving larger versions of the MAGTF --
the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the Marine Expedltionary Force
(MEF) -- are few and infrequent.
MAGTF doctrine, then, is mainly the product of intellectual exercise on
the part of a few inspired officers in Washington and Quantico whose duties
require them to grapple with legions of unanswered questions. However
talented and experienced these officers might be, many MAGTF issues are so
unique that few, if any, of those involved in writing doctrine have ever
encountered them before. In such cases, a resort to the imagination is the
only possible approach. The resulting untested concepts carry the grave
danger of being found inadequate at the worst possible moment: in the heat
of battle. Some questions are so significant that doctrinal failure could
reduce the MAGTF to a disjointed force of limited combat capability.
Several cases will serve to illustrate this danger.
Focus on the Ground Combat Element
A MAGTF is an integrated, balanced air-ground combined arms
force organized for combat, with its own combat service
support element (CSSE). . . . MAGTFs are employed to apply
ground combat power supported by the MAGTF's own aviation
combat element and CSSE.
-- The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. OH 2
The major subordinate elements of the MAGTF represent diverse forms of
fighting power and sustainment capability which can be fused into a combat
organization of extraordinary strength and flexibility. Realization of the
MAGTF's full combat potential requires bold, imaginative, and unorthodox
employment of its elements.
Consider the possibility of using the aviation combat element (ACE) as a
maneuver element. Although Marine aircraft cannot physically occupy
terrain, they can control it. Better still, aviation combat units are fully
capable of operating in a maneuver warfare environment by focusing on the
enemy and carrying out appropriate mission-type orders to fulfill the MAGTF
commander's intent. The ACE is a highly flexible source of great combat
power which allows the MAGTF commander to influence the battle in a
dimension not readily available to other tactical commanders.
Unfortunately, years of tradition have sustained the narrow-minded
notion that the ACE exists primarily to support the needs of the ground
combat element (GCE). While MAGTF warfighting doctrine should establish a
pattern for radical departure from traditional relationships between ground
combat and aviation combat forces, this is not the case. Doctrine clearly
establishes a focus on the GCE. One source of MAGTF warfighting doctrine
emphasizes this point clearly, stating that:
MAGTFs are employed to apply ground combat power, supported
by the MAGTF's own aviation and combat service support
elements. Only ground forces possess the power to exercise
direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its
resources, and its people. Land power can make permanent the
otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval
forces.5
Other publications persist in referring to the ACE as "a supporting
commander," who is responsible for merely providing air support to all
MAGTF elements. Likewise, we read that "the GCE commander is given an
area of operations appropriate to accomplishing the MAGTF/GCE mission
[Italics added]."6
The MAGTF staff planning process further establishes the primacy of the
GCE. According to the prescribed sequence, the GCE commander studies the
MAGTF mission and develops ground courses of action for the MAGTF
commander's approval. The ACE and CSSE commanders then prepare
"concepts of employment" for support of the GCE courses of action. In the
final step, the GCE commander presents a recommendation to the MAGTF
commander.7 This process perpetuates the idea that the purpose of the ACE
is not to carry out appropriate missions assigned by the MAGTF commander,
but simply to support the GCE.
Rear Area Security
Any major disruption in the functions of friendly rear area
support will adversely affect combat operations . . . . The
key to success on the battlefield lies in the generation of
combat power. If organizations such as the combat service
support element or the aviation combat element cannot
adequately defend themselves, then combat power will be
degraded and this will contribute to defeat.
-- MAGTF Rear Area Security, OH 2-6
According to doctrine, the MAGTF's rear area is "that area extending
rearward from the rear boundary of the ground combat element to the MAGTF
rear boundary."8 Included in the MAGTF's rear area are the vital facilities of
the ACE and the CSSE, as well as portions of the lines of communication
leading from these facilities to the units of the GCE. The lack of proper
arrangements for the security of the rear area will often represent the
MAGTF's critical vulnerability, especially in independent operations which
require the MAGTF to protect its own facilities while simultaneously
undertaking ventures which extend its lines of communication.
Doctrine for rear area security operations follows a fundamental
principle of minimum reliance upon the GCE. Only in an emergency, when the
rear area is threatened by large enemy ground formations, and "the
accomplishment of the MAGTF mission has become jeopardized" does
doctrine call for the MAGTF commander to task the GCE with rear area
security operations. Under normal circumstances, the mission is to be
assigned to either the ACE commander or the CSSE commander (usually the
latter), who is designated the "rear area security coordinator (RASC)."9
While the RASC is responsible to the MAGTF commander for security of the
entire MAGTF rear area, his only power over units outside his own command
is the almost useless "coordinating authority," defined in JCS Pub. 1 as "the
authority to require consultation between the agencies involved. . . but
not. . . to compel agreement." This somewhat weak command relationship
seriously degrades the RASC's ability to carry out his responsibilities,
thereby rendering the vital MAGTF rear area even more vulnerable.10
In keeping with the principle of "minimum reliance on the GCE," doctrine
charges the RASC with organizing ad hoc units for the conduct of rear area
security operations. Typical organizations to be fielded from a Force
Service Support Group (FSSG) include a Rear Area Operations Center, up to
two Provisional Mobile Security Platoons of 1 officer and 38 enlisted
Marines each, and a Provisional Helicopterborne Security Company
containing 5 officers and 183 enlisted Marines. These units are intended to
augment local security efforts of ACE and CSSE units, working in
conjunction with the Military Police Company, which also has rear area
security responsibilities. The Marines who are to man these organizations
come from different units and are, by military occupational specialty,
drivers, mechanics, heavy equipment operators, and the like.11 Doctrinally,
these units are supposed to be capable of "finding, fixing (depriving the
enemy of freedom of movement), and destroying an enemy company-sized
unit (100-150 personnel) without GCE assistance. . . . [and of] finding and
fixing an enemy battalion-sized unit (500-600 personnel) while awaiting
GCE assistance."12
Considering the small size of the rear area security forces in question,
the minimal infantry training of their personnel, and the ad hoc nature of
their organization, the demands levied upon them by doctrine are quite
fantastic. To blithely state that these provisional units, comprising a total
strength of 266 Marines, will fix in position a battalion of trained enemy
infantry conducting a determined attack (probably with the aid of fire
support) is simply ludicrous. The rear area security units, operating
independently over a wide area in search of the enemy, would be unable to
concentrate quickly, in many cases. Even if they could join forces before
engaging the enemy, their paltry combat power would present little more in
the way of an obstacle to enemy movement than a "speed bump."
Doctrine recognizes the possibility of aiding rear area security units
with fire support from the GCE or the ACE. indeed, the organization of the
Rear Area Operations Center includes several fire support representatives
in a sort of "mini-fire support cooordination center." Unfortunately, this
simple expedient does not solve the many problems with rear area fire
support. For example, the provisional security units have no
communications access to the would-be supporting units (artillery, naval
gunfire, close air support). Further, even if the communications means were
available, the rear area security personnel do not have the training required
to call for and adjust these fires effectively. A few periods of instruction,
even when a modicum of practical application is included, will not qualify a
refrigerator repairman to adjust an artillery marking round for a close air
support mission against enemy units in close contact with friendly forces.
To make matters still worse, it is difficult to imagine a set of fire support
coordination measures established to cover any possible eventuality in the
MAGTF rear area. Such a plan would be so ponderous as to defy practical
use. In any event, GCE assets may be out of range, and certainly may be
otherwise engaged when a threat arises in the rear area, forcing the MAGTF
commander to make a difficult assessment of priorities at a moment of
crisis. This is exactly the type of opportunity a clever enemy might seek in
an effort to unhinge the fighting power of the MAGTF.
Rear area security doctrine is simply an attempt to "wish away" a
difficult problem which exposes an embarrassing weakness in MAGTF
warfighting capability. Clearly, there are severe limitations to the "self
defense" capabilities of the ACE and CSSE. Doctrine must realistically
assess those limitations and their impact on the MAGTF's ability to pursue
certain types of combat operations.
Compositing
Emphasis is directed to the fact that Marine air-ground task
forces are flexible organizations capable of smooth transition
into a larger force if required.
-- Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine FMFM 0-1
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the most capable form of MAGTF.
Its large size gives it more firepower, mobility, and combat service
support capability than smaller forms of the MAGTF, as well as the
flexibility provided by a wider array of functions in each of its subordinate
elements. Combat missions requiring participation by Marine Corps forces
on other than a temporary basis will necessitate the introduction of a MEF.
While the U.S. Navy possesses the amphibious shipping to lift an entire
MEF in a single echelon, it is unlikely that this could occur on short notice.
The shipping requirement is approximately 50 ships. The 62 ships of the
Navy's amphibious fleet are divided roughly equally between the two coasts,
creating a shortfall of about 35 percent when attempting to move a MEF
from either coast on such short notice as to preclude redeploying ships. On
the other hand, sufficient shipping would be available to move a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).13
Possibly the only realistic means of deploying a MEF is to do so
incrementally, using the process of "compositing," in which smaller MAGTFs
arrive in the area of operations first, and are joined later by other
elements, until an entire MEF is ashore. A compositing operation could
include elements of different MEFs, some arriving as part of a forward
deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), others as part of a Maritime
Prepositioning Force, still others in a "fly-in echelon" or on board additional
amphibious or merchant ships.14
Compositing holds many pitfalls. First, the units which join together to
form a MEF may be from many different parent organizations, each with its
own Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). Individuals who have never
worked or trained together before (and who may very well have never even
seen one another before) would be required to quickly establish rapport, a
common understanding of how the organization will fight, report formats
and procedures, and a litany of other details, any one of which could turn out
to be the "nail" for want of which the kingdom was lost.
Furthermore, the Marine Corps' official study on the compositing concept
provides for certain MAGTF headquarters units to assume new roles and
designations which they do not have a real capability to fulfill. In some
cases, for instance, a MEB headquarters is to temporarily become a division
headquarters, until an actual division headquarters arrives. The MEB
headquarters does not have many of the facilities or communications assets
it needs to carry out this new mission. Consider the difficulty of
attempting to accomplish fire support coordination for a division composed
of two regiments from different parent divisions, each of which has
battalions from different parent regiments, and which is supported by an
artillery regiment (which also has a new, skeleton, ad hoc headquarters)
made up of two battalions from different parent regiments! The prospect is
staggering. The MEB's supporting arms special staff is not organized,
trained, or equipped to undertake this task. Even after the follow-on
headquarters units arrive to save the day, the composite MEF is left with
the original problem of a lack of common training and procedures.15
There are numerous other potential compositing problems. For example,
communications equipment or procedures from different units could be
incompatible. Also, the MEF could face a shortage of test sets, tools,
technicians, or repair parts for equipment peculiar to one of the
compositing units.16
While the general concept of deploying a MEF in piecemeal fashion is,
perhaps, a valid solution to the problem of inadequate strategic lift, current
compositing doctrine does not adequately address many important issues.
Like some other elements of MAGTF doctrine, current compositing schemes
are workable on paper, but lack validity in the real world. To accomplish
the difficult, demanding, and challenging tasks the Marine Corps expects a
MEF to face in combat, compositing doctrine must carefully and realistically
address the many potential weaknesses inherent in such a system. It would
be criminal to attempt to fight a war in the same manner as we would play a
"pick-up" game of basketball.
The Two Division MEF
Doctrine provides for the possibility of forming additional ground
combat, aviation combat, or combat service support elements within a
MAGTF. In fact, this was accomplished during the Vietnam War. III Marine
Amphibious Force, the senior Marine operational headquarters to participate
in the war, included, during one period, two heavily reinforced Marine
Divisions, a U.S. Army corps of three divisions, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and a
Force Service Support Group.17
In cases involving MAGTFs smaller than a MEF, the doctrinally prescribed
process of adding additional elements is relatively straightforward. A MEU
which absorbs another Battalion Landing Team, for example, forms a
Regimental Landing Team headquarters to control the GCE. When a second
Marine Aircraft Group joins a MEB, a small Marine Aircraft Wing
headquarters must be established. In some cases, the resulting organization
should be redesignated as the next larger form of MAGTF.18
The simple system described above cannot be applied to the case of a MEF
with more than one division, wing, or FSSG. There is no already-established
tactical organization in the Marine Corps which can be used as a model for
the headquarters of a multi-division or multi-wing combat formation.
MAGTF doctrine is mute on this point, failing to address the problem at
all.19 Once again, a paper solution which only partially considers the issue
appears in a doctrinal publication in the guise of practical warfighting
guidance.
To compound the problem, doctrine specifically addresses the question of
fire support coordination in a muti-GCE MAGTF, but again comes up short of
the mark. Three options are provided. First, the fire support coordination
center (FSCC) of one of the GCEs can serve as the FSCC for the MAGTF while
simultaneously performing its normal functions for its own headquarters.
The conflict of interest involved in such a situation should serve to
eliminate this idea from serious consideration. A second procedure
described calls for the use of a higher headquarters FSCC common to both
GCEs. This is the only one of the three doctrinal approaches listed which is
compatible with the previously explained procedure prescribed for command
and control of multiple GCEs. As before, however, it must be noted that this
method cannot be applied to the case of a MEF through the use of any
currently existing FSCC organizational structure. The final method calls for
using the MAGTF supporting arms special staff (SASS) to accomplish fire
support coordination. The SASS can perform this mission with the proper
augmentation, and can actually allow the MAGTF commander to "fight the
MAGTF," (or at least to coordinate its fires). While this procedure is an
admirable step in the right direction, it cannot be reconciled with the
doctrinally prescribed method for command and control of multiple GCEs.20
In the case of fire support coordination, MAGTF doctrine is both
confusing and contradictory. There are sensible approaches which conflict
with other doctrine, and methods which appear to be consistent with
doctrine, but are not cogent. Such a paradox serves only to perplex those
who look to doctrine for guidance.
Finding the Right Answers
MAGTF doctrine is so significant to the future success of the Corps that
its development, testing, evaluation, and refinement should be of the most
urgent priority. While the reasonable leader does not expect to find all of
his questions answered in doctrinal publications, he likewise hardly
expects to be confounded, bewildered, and led astray. The MAGTF is a
complex and unusual combat organization which can operate to its maximum
potential only when its key leaders are guided by a cable body of
commonly understood guidance.
The capacity to rectify the problems with MAGTF doctrine is resident in
the Corps today. Basically, the answer lies in eschewing the previously
used system of excessive reliance on a tiny "sacred brain trust" and
broadening the base of knowledge which is used to develop the doctrine.
This can be partially accomplished within the existing procedures for
reviewing doctrinal concepts, but the process must also be expanded to
employ a number of Marine Corps institutions which currently lie fallow.
First, within the current system, the review of doctrinal publications
must be taken seriously by all Marines. When newly published Operational
Handbooks are distributed to the Fleet Marine Force for review and
comment, commanders must ensure that this important work receives the
attention it deserves. It is easy to make the excuse that other priorities
take precedence over the dull work of studying and analyzing doctrinal
publications. The usual result is a "negative response." Senior commanders
should not accept such an approach from their subordinates. FMF units can
test concepts in field exercises or command post exercises. Senior officers
can meet with their staffs and immediate subordinates to examine new
concepts and to provide the benefit of their knowledge and experience to the
valuable work of developing a workable body of doctrine.
Marine Corps schools can also provide valuable service in this effort. At
the Command and Staff College alone, the students, faculty, and staff
dispose of approximately 2,000 years of Marine Corps experience.21 In the
process of attempting to understand MAGTF doctrine, the students regularly
encounter its inconsistencies, and often informally discuss corrective
action. The practical exercises conducted at the Command and Staff College
(especially the "force-on-force" wargames using the Tactical Warfare
Simulation Evaluation and Analysis System) could serve as an initial test
for some of these student proposals. Those ideas which appear to have
merit could be further analyzed by students and faculty, then passed on to
the Warfighting Center, or directly to the FMF, for further serious
consideration.
Marine Corps schools represent a collection of experienced, thinking
officers who are capable of contributing to the process of improving the
MAGTF's warfighting capability. Unlike officers in the FMF, those at Marine
Corps schools are not isolated from those in other military occupational
specialties. Indeed, they study and interact professionally on a daily basis
with other officers of every conceivable type of training, background, and
experience. This unique situation is conducive to a fruitful exchange of
ideas which is unlike that which might be found anywhere else in the Marine
Corps.
Another institution to which Marines can turn for the exchange of ideas
concerning MAGTF doctrine is the Marine Corps GAZETTE. As a professional
journal, the GAZETTE reaches virtually all Marine Corps officers and many
staff noncommissioned officers. It is a ready forum for the frank and open
discussion of issues pertinent to the Marine Corps and it can certainly play
a major role in an effort to correct the deficiencies in MAGTF doctrine, just
as it led the way in the controversial introduction of maneuver warfare to
the Marine Corps several years ago. Unfortunately, MAGTF warfighting is
not a subject which has received much exposure in the GAZETTE. During the
entire decade of the 1980s, 37 articles purporting to concern the MAGTF
appeared in the GAZETTE. Only about half of these could reasonably be
considered to actually address issues related to MAGTF warfighting. These
pertinent articles totalled about 77 pages of text . . . the rough equivalent
of 1 full issue of the GAZETTE. Considering that 120 issues appeared during
this period, it is apparent that MAGTF warfighting has not been a subject of
great interest to GAZETTE readers.22 The senior leadership of the Marine
Corps should address this matter to the editorial board of the Marine Corps
GAZETTE and should seek their assistance in tapping the mental resources
of Marines.
Conclusion
Existing MAGTF doctrine simple does not provide a realistic basis for
common understanding among the Marines who will fight as part of a MAGTF.
Some difficult questions have been answered with weak, obviously
unworkable "paper" solutions, while others have gone completely
unrecognized. To fulfill its obligations to the nation -- and possibly to
ensure its own survival -- the Corps must seek to develop credible MAGTF
doctrine by focusing its considerable mental resources on this vital
challenge. The institutions and procedures for accomplishing this objective
are available today: the Marines of the FMF, the vast experience resident in
Marine Corps schools, and the Marine Corps GAZETTE with its capability to
encourage and focus intellectual exchange between Marines of all ranks and
experience levels throughout the Corps.
Upon assuming office as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. M.
Gray asked his Marines to "turn on the brainpower," and while this has
clearly occurred, it has been a somewhat unguided effort. Marines have
responded with thoughts and solutions concerning a diverse range of
problems. Some of these problems have been matters of importance to the
Marine Corps as an institution; others have been simply small nuisances
considered bothersome to isolated groups of Marines. It is time to direct
the mental energies of Marines toward finding truly workable doctrinal
answers to the many questions inherent in fighting the MAGTF. The Corps
has reached a culminating point; it is time to commit the reserve.
FOOTNOTES
1While the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) embarked on board
amphibious shipping during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it did not conduct an
amphibious assault. See J. Robert Moskin, The Story of the U.S. Marine
Corps (New York: Paddington Press, 1979), p. 595, hereafter Moskin.
2Moskin, pp. 598, 604, 611, 688-689; Caleb Barker, "Army, Marines Spar
Over Roles in Future Third World Conflicts," Defense News 19Mar90, p. 30;
Robert J. Ropelewski, "Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama
Successes," Armed Forces Journal International. Feb90, pp. 26-32;
Elizabeth P. Donovan, "By air or sea is question in Marine-Army role,"Navy
Times. 26Mar90, pp. 25-26.
3HQ, USMC, Warfiqhtinq, FMFM 1 (Washington, 1989), Foreword; JCS,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,JCS
Pub. 1 (Washington, 1987), p. 118, hereafter JCS Pub. 1.
4MCDEC, USMC, Guide to Doctrinal Publications. OH 0 (Quantico, 1986), pp.
2-2, 2-6, hereafter OH 0.
5MCDEC, USMC, Ground Combat Operations, OH 6- 1 (Quantico, 1988), p. 1-3,
hereafter OH 6-1.
6MCDEC, USMC, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. OH 2 (Quantico, 1987), pp.
3-5, 6-6, hereafter OH 2.
7Ibid., pp. 3-3, 3-4; HQ, USMC, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine. FMFM
0-1 (Washington, 1979), p. 3-6.
8MCCDC, USMC, MAGTF Rear Area Security. OH 2-6 (Quantico, 1989), p. 1-1.
9Ibid., p. 1-2; OH 2, p. 5-15.
10Ibid.,p. 1-4;JCSPub. 1.p.91.
11Ibid, pp. 3-1 through 3-6.
12Ibid.,p. 1-3.
13Capt Richard Sharpe, RN, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships. 1989-1990 (Surrey,
UK: Jane's Defence Data, 1989), pp. 740-748.
14OH 2, p. 2-8.
15Advanced Amphibious Study Group, HQ, USMC, Guidelines for Forming a
Composite MAGTF (Washington, 1985), p. I-3; OH 2, p. 5-9.
16Ibid., p. XI-1.
17BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam,
1968" in U.S. Naval Institute Naval Review 1970 (Annapolis, 1970). p. 293.
18OH 2 p. 2-6.
19lbid.
20Ibid., p. 5-14.
21Figure based on 120 USMC students with an average of 14 years of
service each; 3 USMC colonels (staff) with an average of 23 years of
service each; 11 USMC lieutenant colonels (faculty/staff) with an
average of 20 years of service each; 6 USMC majors (faculty/staff) with
an average of 15 years of service each; 1 USMC captain (faculty) with 8
years of service.
22Figures based on a survey of all Marine Corps GAZETTE issues from Jan80
through Dec89. For purposes of this study, articles which addressed
issues of concern to a MAGTF commander at MEB or MEF level were
considered to be of substantive interest.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
Advanced Amphibious Study Group. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Guidelines for Forming a Composite MAGTF. Washington, 1985.
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Doctrine FMFM 0-1. Washington, 1979.
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM 1.
Washington, 1989.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. JCS Pub. 1. Washington, 1987.
Marine Corps Combat Development Command. United States Marine Corps.
MAGTF Rear Area Security, OH 2-6. Quantico, 1989.
Marine Corps Development and Education Command. United States Marine
Corps. Ground Combat Operations. OH 6-1. Quontico, 1988.
Marine Corps Development and Education Command. United States Marine
Corps. Guide to Doctrinal Publications OH 0. Quantico, 1986.
Marine Corps Development and Education Command. United States Marine
Corps. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. OH 2. Quantico, 1987.
PUBLISHED BOOKS AND PERIODICALS
Caleb Barker. "Army, Marines Spar Over Roles in Future Third World
Conflicts." Defense News. 19Mar90, p. 30.
Elizabeth P. Donovan. "By air or sea is question in Marine-Army role." Navy
Times. 26Mar90, pp. 25-26.
Marine Corps GAZETTE Jan80 through Dec89.
J. Robert Moskin. The Story of the U.S. Marine Corns. New York: Paddington
Press, 1979.
Robert J. Ropelewski. "Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama
Successes." Armed Forces Journal International. Feb90, pp. 26-32.
Captain Richard Sharpe, RN, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships. 1989-1990. Surrey,
UK: Jane's Defence Data, 1989.
Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC. "Marine Corps Operations in
Vietnam, 1968." U.S. Naval Institute Naval Review 1970 p. 293.
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