Airborne Electronic Warfare
AUTHOR Major James R. Brubaker, USMC
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE
I. Purpose: A dedicated airborne EW platform within the
Marine Corps is of vital importance to the MAGTF commander
of the future.
II. Problem: Given the age of declining budgets, we in the
Marine Corps must take a look at our future and anticipate
our needs. We will have to justify our budget requests
before Congress and must manage our acquisition programs
more efficiently. In light of future cutbacks within the
DOD, the Marine Corps will have to justify the requirement
of such expensive aircraft as the EA-6B.
III. Data: As we move into the 21st century, the need for an
airborne EW platform is real. However, with peace breaking
out all over, the impression held by many is that we in the
military no longer require all the high priced weaponry in
existence. Although the Soviet Union is now a lesser threat
than it was several years ago, the Third World nations are
becoming more and more a potential threat. The new weapons
and electronic gadgetry on the market today and the ease by
which these new weapons systems are acquired should make us
even more concerned about the world we live in. The low
intensity conflict of the future could potentially find us
fighting the weaponry intended for a mid intensity conflict.
We must maintain our military power as a deterrent against
world aggression. In order to preserve our expensive
aircraft, we need an airborne EW platform capable of dealing
with the enemy threats into the next century.
IV. Conclusion: We in the Marine Corps will be faced with
some difficult decisions in the future. In the years ahead,
we will be forced to make decisions that just a few years
ago were not required. Given a set of circumstances and
only a limited amount of funding, we will be required to
make some tough decisions in regards to the purchase of
weapon systems of the future. We cannot afford to be so
narrow minded that we fail to procure airborne EW platforms
capable of protecting our expensive aircraft of the future.
V. Recommendations: The Navy/Marine Corps team has been
together for many years now. In light of future defense
cutbacks, it is now more important than ever that we stick
together and act as a team. We in the Marine Corps should
continue our partnership with the Navy in the procurement of
expensive weapons systems such as airborne EW platforms.
The astronomical cost of trying to develop our own airborne
EW platform in this day and age is ridiculous. Even worse
is the idea that we cannot afford an airborne EW platform
capable of dealing with the threats of the future.
AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. As the next century approaches, the
requirement to have a dedicated airborne EW platform within
the Marine Corps is of vital importance to the MAGTF
commander.
I. Current EW Situation
A. Capabilities
B. Budget Limitations
C. Airborne EW Requirement
II. Marine Concept of VSTOL/STOVL Fleet
A. Commonality of Airframes
B. Close to FEBA
C. Responsive to CMDR
III. Marine Air into the 21st Century
A. Missions
B. Requirement to Support Missions
C. Ability to Support Missions
IV. Potential Platforms
A. EA-6B Prowler
B. MV-22 Osprey
C. H-60 Blackhawk
D. UAV/RPV
V. Summary/Conclusion
Airborne Electronic Warfare
The Marine Corps' current situation as it relates to
Electronic Warfare is good. The EA-6B Prowler provides the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander an enormous
capability. The EA-6B weapon system is capable of performing a
wide variety of Electronic Warfare (EW) missions which can either
be active or passive in nature. The limitations of the EA-6B lie
in the fact that it is a single mission aircraft, capable of
performing a limited type of mission. The overall position of
the Marine Corps is, however, to have multi-mission aircraft in
the future.
With the budget cutbacks within the Department of Defense
(DOD) that are forecasted for the next several years, we as
military leaders must begin preparing for the future. We must
preserve both the assets which currently exist and the programs
of the future, and become more judicious in the way in which we
buy these items for the DOD. One critical asset which will need
to be updated within the next decade is the EA-6B Prowler,
currently the Marine Corps' only airborne Electronic Warfare
platform capable of passive surveillance of the battlefield.
On one hand the MAGTF's airborne EW capabilities (the
EA-6B) are a result of requirements articulated by the
Fleet CINC's and developed into programs by CNO. Those
programs are distinctly "blue" in character and tend to
specifically support the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
force in high intensity, naval conflict and the
employment of the CVBG in support of maritime strategy.
On the other hand, our ground EW capabilities (Radio
Battalion) are a result of requirements articulated by
Force Commanders directly to the `Marine Corps'
developmental organs (MCCDC/MCCRDC) and are distinctly
green" in character. . .Clearly, existing USMC airborne
and ground based EW capabilities, as distinct in
character as they are, don't employ well together to
facilitate the development/employment of operational
strategies at the MAGTF level...These problems
certainly involve the distinct lack of money and
national resolve to pursue costly new weapons systems
no matter how forcefully we may articulate "need." 1
As the next century approaches, the requirement to have a
dedicated airborne EW platform within the Marine Corps is of
vital importance to the MAGTF commander. The many varied
missions which the Marine Corps may be called upon to perform and
the uniqueness of the MAGTF make the EA-6B ideally suited to
perform a myriad of missions. The ability to deploy such a
formidable force which has both an air and a ground element makes
the MAGTF unique.
The missions to which a MAGTF could be assigned may require
anything from a small security element up to and including a
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) . Of course, the ability to
tailor or task organize for a particular mission is not unique to
the Marine Corps, but the assets from which the Commander has to
choose are.
The current platform which the Marine Corps uses to
accomplish the EW mission is the EA-6B, but because of a
reorganization of the Marine Corps it may not be available to the
MAGTF commander in the 21st century. The Marine Corps is
currently looking at having primarily Vertical Short Take Off and
Landing (VSTOL) or Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL)
aircraft instead. Whether or not this comes to pass, we must
start preparing for the future now if we are to keep our combat
capability intact.
The MAGTF master plan calls for a return to the Navy of all
Marine EA-6B aircraft when and if another aircraft fitted with
pallets/pods can assume the mission. The question to be answered
is whether another suitable aircraft can fill the mission
requirements of the Marine Corps as it relates to EW and, if so,
whether it will be cost effective.
The Marine Corps' desire to have an entire STOVL/VSTOL fleet
into the 21st century will provide the Marine Corps with the
mobility and support required on tomorrow's battlefield. "As we
approach the year 2000, we hope to reduce the number of different
aircraft type/model/series (TMS) in the Marine Corps' inventory.
The goal is to decrease the number of people required to support
our weapon systems and simultaneously increase mission
effectiveness in terms of aircrew and aircraft performance." 2
By adopting the idea of a VSTOL fleet, the Marine Corps will
be able to take advantage of the possibility that conventional
airfields of today will become viable targets for priority
destruction in conflicts in the future. We will no longer be
linked to a long, highly visible target. Instead, we will be
able to take advantage of roads and small landing zones which
will not be as vulnerable as our airfields are today.
By being able to land in a significantly smaller area which
is less conspicuous than a major airfield, aircraft should be
able to land closer to the Forward Edge of the Battle Area
(FEBA) . By doing so, they could conceivably have a shorter
transit time from forward arming and refueling points (FARPS) and
thus become more responsive to the MAGTF commander. The fact
that the commander now has a force multiplier close at hand gives
him the added flexibility of being in a position to more rapidly
shape the battlefield to his advantage.
The helicopter certainly fits in the category of being a
VSTOL aircraft, as does the AV-8B Harrier. However, the other
aircraft currently in the Marine Air Wing are not. Whether we
will be able to perform our missions without their use is
questionable. But what will be the missions of the Marine Corps
in the 21st century? Will we need EW in order to conduct
amphibious assaults? Will we be utilized in urban warfare where
there may not be a need for an airborne EW platform? Who will
electronically screen the battlefield to protect the Amphibious
Task Force (ATF) before the Marines are disembarked? Who will
protect the assault helicopters on their way to the landing
zones? What about the air defense role?
Just as there are offensive uses of an EW airplane, there
are defensive uses as well. Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD),
Surface Search Coordination (SSC) , and Electronic Support
Measures (ESM) are all missions currently flown by the EA-6B
Prowler. Therefore, as we approach the next century, the mission
of Marine Corps EW will have to be redefined, or the Marine Corps
will have to come up with another airframe which can perform the
same missions.
The Navy may have to assume responsibility for ASMD and SSC,
but unless there is a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) near by, the
ATF may have to perform these missions without the use of carrier
based EW aircraft. But even with a CVBG in close proximity, the
ATF may have to fend for itself because the carrier EW assets
will be required to screen the CVBG and not the ATF. The CVBG may
have an entirely different mission during the landing phase.
ESM is a mission which allows the MAGTF commander to receive
up-to-the-minute information on the enemy's electronic order of
battle (EOB) primarily in the form of early warning and target
acquisition radar sites which are in the MAGTF commander's area
of interest. ESM is a mission performed by the EA-6B in a
totally passive manner. Using the aircraft's on-board
surveillance system, the information is recorded on magnetic
tape. Within minutes of landing, the tape is processed by the
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation
System (TERPES) and can be incorporated into the intelligence
preparation of the battlefield for the MAGTF commander by
providing up to minute information of the EOB.
The Navy will continue to use its EA-6Bs throughout the next
decade to pursue the electromagnetic spectrum both actively and
passively. In the 21st century the EA-6B will probably be
replaced by a variant of the A-12, currently on the drawing
board. But the Marine Corps is not scheduled to get the A-12,
which creates a dilemma for the Marines. Due to other
priorities, the Marines are not scheduled to receive the aircraft
which will eventually replace the EA-6B because it is too
expensive.
In all likelihood the Marines will not be able to afford to
develop an EW aircraft suited specifically for their mission.
The cost of developing a unique airplane is prohibitive;
therefore, we must get smarter in the way we procure aircraft.
We must either use current airframes with their already existing
systems or develop some new combination of aircraft/systems short
of creating a new airframe just for EW. There are many
possibilities.
The best solution overall for the Marine Corps is to retain
our ties with the Navy and follow on their coat tails in future
enhancements to the EA-6B and any follow on type of aircraft. By
doing so, we will continue to be on the leading edge of
technology by maintaining our ties with our counterparts in the
naval service and jointly come out with a quality product. The
EW community in the Navy as a whole is very small when compared
with other communities. We need each other's strength to
continue to exist as a community in this age of high technology.
The EA-6B Advanced Capability (ADVCAP) and the
companion Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System
Communications Workstation scheduled for FMF
introduction in 1995 represents a tremendous C2 warfare
capability. By eliminating it, we risk starting over
the requirement to build a credible capability to wage
C2 warfare that is available and funded in the Prowler.
The costs involved in such a "start up" undertaking for
the Marine Corps oriented toward bringing a C2 warfare
capability to the FMF in a VSTOL/STOVL package
replicating what will be available in the Prowler would
be astronomical.3
One obvious advantage of retaining the EA-6B is that its
onboard system has state of the art electronics which has been
combat proven on numerous occasions. Its speed allows it to
rapidly reposition itself in the fluid battlefield of today so
that critical geometry requirements can be maintained and that
repositioning, if required, can be accomplished in quick fashion.
The cost of keeping the Marine Corps supplied with EA-6B
advanced capabilities (ADVCAP) aircraft is a hard figure to pin
down. According to sources at the Pentagon, the current FY-9O
recurring flyaway cost of one Prowler without pods, based on 12
aircraft per year, is between $25-38 million per copy.4
If the Marine Corps elects to go their own way in the search
for a new EW platform, then one possible solution is to utilize a
variant of the MV-22 Osprey with an EW module which could be
incorporated in the MV-22 airframe. But the future of the MV-22
is questionable at best, so it might not be a viable alternative.
Secretary of Defense Cheney has cancelled funding for the MV-22
and the subject is now being looked at by Congress as to whether
it constitutes re-instatement.
The Marine Corps desperately needs a replacement for its
aging fleet of H-46 medium lift helicopter. If in fact the MV-22
is the ultimate replacement, then a variant would certainly be
worth looking into. The already existing ALQ-99 system developed
for the EA-6B and EF-111 could potentially be modified to be
utilized in the MV-22.
The MV-22 has more than enough cabin space to allow the
incorporation of the numerous boxes which make up the ALQ-99
system. The other advantage of the MV-22 is that it is capable
of enough airspeed to allow operation of the ALQ-99 Tactical
Jamming Pod which requires 220 knots to operate both transmitters
contained within the pod. Bell/Boeing has done studies on the
feasibility of modifying the MV-22 to an EW variant and have
concluded that it would be feasible. Moreover, if the MV-22 is
developed further, its VSTOL and multi-mission capabilities would
make it the best aircraft for the Marine Corps. The MV-22 would
have the speed and maneuverability to cover the majority of
Marine Corps assets should it be selected as the ultimate
replacement for the H-46; however, it would not be able to
rapidly reposition itself if it was required in the support of
fast attack aircraft, namely the F/A-18 or the AV-8B. The cost
of the MV-22 is approximately $26 million per copy.5
Another suitable platform might be the H-60 Blackhawk.
Granted, it is not in the Marine Corps inventory with the
exception of HMX-l, but if we do not get the MV-22, then the
Marine Corps may have to use the H-60 to replace the H-46
helicopters currently in use. In this case a currently existing
platform could be utilized to be incorporated with an already
existing EW computer system, the ALQ-99. There would have to be
many things worked out in regards to compatibility and the
marrying up of the two systems, but we would not have to develop
an entirely new aircraft system.
The Army has conducted studies as to the feasibility of
integrating the ALQ-99 system into a UH-1H Airborne Radar Jammer
(ARJ).6 The H-60 would obviously require some modifications to
incorporate not only the onboard system, but the tactical jamming
system as well. The major obstacle would be in generating
sufficient electrical energy to operate the ALQ-99 pods without
the use of ram air turbines capable of producing the amount of
power required to utilize the integrated system.
The H-60 option would limit or degrade the capability of the
Marine Corps to conduct electronic countermeasures in support of
fixed wing aviation because of the limited speed of the H-60
(approximately 180 knots). It would not be impossible, but it
would require greater numbers of assets to accomplish the task.
Again this option is viable only if the Marine Corps elects to
use the H-60 as its replacement for the aging CH-46. Otherwise
its cost is prohibitive. The off-the-shelf cost for a combat-
capable H-60 is approximately $18 million per copy.
Another option for an airborne EW platform is the Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV). The
major advantage of the RPV is the relatively low cost and minimal
radar cross section.
Tactical aircraft have a survivability problem over the
modern battlefield that will steadily worsen due to the
growing capabilities of ground-based air defenses. . .It
would be a cheap and thus expendable asset and would
free manned EW systems to pursue more difficult tasks.
Taking the "integrated" out of enemy air defenses is a
SEAD option that can be and should be pursued in
addition to physical destruction.
The television camera or infrared package of the RPV would have
to be replaced by some sort of EW system but yet is a much more
financially affordable package than having to create a new fixed-
wing variant. The RPV fits the category of a VSTOL aircraft and
for a fraction of the cost of an EA-6B could possibly perform
some limited EW functions for the MAGTF commander in his
electronic surveillance and prosecution of the battlefield.
There are a couple of disadvantages to the RPV. The first
is its lack of speed which means it would have to be pre-
positioned in the place of intended use. The second disadvantage
is its lack or absence of a human element to rapidly adjust to
changing situations in a wartime mode of operation. Because of
the size of the RPV and its associated onboard package, it would
obviously have to be placed closer to the systems it would be
working against in order to have sufficient effort. But yet
again its small radar cross section would make it harder to
detect as well.
As we move into the 21st century, the need for an airborne
EW platform is real. Regardless of what we eventually wind up
with, it will probably be what we can afford to pay the lowest
bidder. The prices of the platforms discussed above have varying
degrees of EW capability and obvious differences in cost. Should
we go with the Prowler or go with another platform and
incorporate our already existing technology into another
platform?
Or will we decide to incorporate a totally new EW package
into an already existing platform? In the long run, I believe we
are better off retaining our ties with the EA-6B Prowler. We
cannot afford to let that capability go. The Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC) of the future could potentially find us fighting
against the weaponry intended for Mid Intensity Conflict (MIC).
Colonel L. G. Karch summed this up well when he noted
(Proceedings November l988) that "the most likely level of
conflict will be LIC, but the most likely combat will be MIC."
The fact that LIC will most likely occur in the Third World does
not mean that MIC or even High Intensity Conflict (HIC) will not
occur in the Third World. We must therefore prepare ourselves.
Even with the stealth aircraft of the future and the projected
use of low observables, the requirement for EW is real. The use
of an EW platform is even more effective when used to protect low
observables of the future.
Any of the above platforms would require significant
technological studies to determine the amount of modification
necessary in order to make them suitable replacements. They all
have limitations either in the form of speed, capabilities,
endurance or the lack of a manned crew, etc.; but when faced with
the need to develop an alternative to the EA-6B, some concessions
must be made. The requirement to have an active and passive EW
platform for the future is real. The MAGTF commander in the
future should go to combat with the knowledge that he has the
technology, weapons, and people he needs. He can decide, based
on the situation at hand, not to employ all his assets, but he
should not be limited as to what he could use if required. The
MAGTF commander of the future will not be able to choose his war;
it will be chosen for him. If the politicians fail in their
quest for world peace, then it will be young soldiers, not
politicians, that carry out military operations to defend U. S.
interests. In this day of electronic gadgetry, we cannot afford
to send our people to war without the tools to gain the advantage
or survive the war.
ENDNOTES
l.LTCOL J. D. Buchanan, "The Winning Combat Edge" unpublished
manuscript, 1989.
2.LTGEN Charles H. Pitman, "Aviation Posture Statement," Marine
Corps Gazette, (July 1989), 58.
3.LTCOL J. D. Buchanan, "The Winning Combat Edge" unpublished
manuscript, 1989.
4.LTCOL N. D. Schmidt, CNO/OP-501, interview about EA-6B,
Washington, D. C. , March 1990.
5.COL Schaefer, NAVAIR PMA-275, briefing on V-22, Washington,
D.C., February l99O.
6.ARJS, Airborne Radar Jamming System, (Electronic Warfare
Marketing, Grumman Aerospace Corporation)
7.MAJ McCormick, CNO/OP-504F, phone conversation about H-60,
Washington, D. C., March 1990.
8.COL L. G. Karch, "CAS, SEAD and UAVs", Marine Corps Gazette,
(February 1990) 47,52.
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