Marine Corps PSYOP?
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
MARINE CORPS PSYOP?
BY
MAJOR JOHN E. BLAIR
CONFERENCE GROUP 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: MARINE CORPS PSYOP?
I. PURPOSE: To underscore the necessity for the Marine Corps
and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to be able to plan
for and conduct psychological operations (PSYOP).
II. PROBLEM: We can expect the enemy to make extensive use of
PSYOP in contemporary and future conflicts. The Marine Corps
must understand and be prepared to employ PSYOP throughout the
levels of war and across the spectrum of conflict. Presently,
MAGTF's are incapable of planning for or conducting PSYOP.
II. DATA: PSYOP are a vital part of military and political
power. When fully coordinated throughout the levels of war
(strategic, operational, and tactical) and integrated in the
military planning process, PSYOP enhance combat power. When
properly conducted, PSYOP can be an effective force multiplier
across the spectrum of conflict. PSYOP can reduce enemy combat
effectiveness; degrade enemy morale; enhance deception
operations; facilitate the occupation of enemy towns; help
control enemy propaganda; assist in rear area security; and
confuse and harass the enemy.
IV. CONCLUSION: Our maritime expeditionary forces that are
essential for credible deterrence and warfighting across the
spectrum of conflict must be prepared to plan for and conduct
PSYOP.
V. RECOMMENDATION: A PSYOP Master Plan should be developed to
reemphasize and revitalize PSYOP capabilities within the Marine
Corps; it should address: doctrine, training and education,
planning, and force structure.
MARINE CORPS PSYOP?
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT. Our maritime expeditionary forces that are
essential for credible deterrence and warfighting across the
spectrum of conflict must be prepared to plan for and conduct
psychological operations (PSYOP).
I. Service Roles and Missions
A. Title 10
B. National Security Act of 1947
II. PSYOP
A. Definition
B. Historical Examples
(l) Alexander the Great
(2) Genghis Khan
III. PSYOP Capabilities
A. Peacetime
B. Crisis
C. War
IV. Service Responsibilities for PSYOP
A. UNAAF
B. JCS PUB 27
V. Marine Corps PSYOP Deficiencies
A. Doctrine
B. Force Structure
C. Planning
D. Training and Education
VI. MAGTF's and PSYOP
VII. Recommendations for PSYOP Revitalization
A. Doctrine
B. Planning
C. Training and Education
D. Force Structure
MARINE CORPS PSYOP?
"To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the
acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme
of skill."
Sun Tzu, 4th century B.C.
The Marine Corps role in national defense is stated in Title
10, United States Code 5013. It sets forth the composition of
the Marine Corps and assigns their responsibilities:
"...The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and
equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms,
together with supporting air components, for service with the
fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for
the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps
shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed
vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the
protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and
shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.
However, these additional duties may not detract from or
interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is
primarily organized..."
The National Security Act of 1947 required that the Marine Corps
provide rapidly deployable amphibious forces for contingency
missions in support of national strategy. The requirement to
deploy and employ Marine forces as part of the fleet resulted in
establishment of Fleet Marine Forces (FMF's). Marine Corps
policy is that these FMF's will be employed as integrated air-
ground teams -- Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) comprised
of combat, combat support units, and combat service support
units. The Marine Corps describes these MAGTF's as integrated,
balanced air-ground combined arms forces organized for combat
with their own combat service support elements. It advertises
the MAGTF's as multi-purpose forces that can operate across the
spectrum of conflict and perform all aspects of military
operations. The Marine Corps believes that MAGTF's will become
the nation's "force of choice" in the most likely future
conflicts. This may not be the case as the Marine Corps has
failed to embrace the concept of psychological warfare. MAGTF's
are incapable of planning for or conducting psychological
operations.
Psychological operations, or PSYOP, are a form of political
and military activity that is defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff
Publication l as:
Planned operations to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotion,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
foreign government, organizations, groups and individuals. The
purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originators
objectives.
The attitudes and behaviors of foreign groups can influence
situations in ways advantageous or harmful to the attainment of
one's objectives. The use of PSYOP is but one way by which
foreign individual and group attitudes and behaviors can be
influenced. PSYOP are conducted during peacetime, crisis,
hostilities short of declared war, and declared war. PSYOP can
be executed in a national, joint, combined, or single-Service
context, by unified or specified commands, by subordinate unified
commands or joint tasks forces. PSYOP can be carried out as an
integral part of an overall military action or independently of
other military operations.
PSYOP are a vital part of modern military and political
power. When fully coordinated with tactical, operational, and
strategic military planning and effectively integrated in the
military decision-making process, PSYOP enhance combat power.
The ultimate objective of PSYOP is to convince enemy, friendly,
and neutral nations and forces to take actions favorable to the
United States.1 Effective PSYOP modify the behavior of the target
audience in accordance with the commander's objectives.
Military and political leaders have used PSYOP in various
forms throughout history. Alexander the Great perfected a method
of psychological harassment which was the hidden cause of many of
his victories. Alexander developed psychological procedures and
his actions were similar to modern day psychological operations.
He developed and put into practice the following principles:
(l) Maintain good relationships with pacifistic elements
within neighboring peoples in order to take advantage of
favorable opinions and sentiments.
(2) Use secret agents to infiltrate and spread rumors and
news.
(3) In moments of crisis, bury the enemy -- with public opinion
-- under an avalanche of information, true or false, that can
produce concern, demoralization and chaos.
Genghis Khan, "the true father of psychological warfare", is
credited with leading huge hordes of savage horsemen across Russia
and into Europe. The size of his armies was exaggerated by agents
planted in advance of the army and by rumors and other forms of
propaganda. To supplement his PSYOP activities, Ghengis Khan also
used rapid troop maneuver to confirm the illusion of invincible
numbers. Because the Mongols created an image of total, barbaric
domination, target groups never believed they were the victims of
astute psychological warfare. Once the image had spread, the
Mongols had created a permanent weakness in the enemy psychology
and thus gained a military advantage wherever the Mongol reputation
was known.2
Today, PSYOP have become more critical as ideological and
revolutionary struggles increase. When properly conducted, PSYOP
can be an effective force multiplier throughout the spectrum of
conflict (low, mid, and high intensity). PSYOP can reduce enemy
combat effectiveness by inducing enemy forces to disengage, desert,
or act less aggressively; degrade enemy morale; enhance deception
operations; facilitate the occupation of enemy towns; help control
enemy and friendly civilians in the combat area; counter enemy
propaganda; assist in rear area protection; and confuse and harass
the enemy.
During peacetime, PSYOP are generally not needed for support of
routine naval operations. Strategically, however, PSYOP may be
appropriate to increase the willingness of foreign nations to
provide facilities that support U.S. Navy operations, to reduce
foreign government willingness to support operations of potentially
hostile powers, and to retaliate for foreign actions that adversely
affect or interfere with naval operations.
During crisis and the execution of associated short-term
military operations, PSYOP should be conducted to gain support from
foreign nations for U.S. positions, to influence the military and
civilian personnel of the nations against which operations may be
undertaken in order to gain objectives without the need for combat,
and to support the achievement of the objectives of military
operations in minimum time with minimum casualties.
During war, combat operations may be conducted in, or on, the
periphery of a single country, be limited to a single theater, or
be conducted worldwide. Regardless of the extent of the area of
conflict, ideological warfare in the form of PSYOP should be
conducted on a worldwide basis. Three basic reasons for this are
to gain support for U.S. actions, to isolate enemy nations from
outside support, and to establish a psychological climate to
achieve postwar goals. Against enemy nations, PSYOP campaigns are
conducted to weaken the effectiveness of the enemy's military
forces by reducing the will to fight among the enemy populace and
leadership groups, and to degrade the ability of commanders and
political leaders to act decisively.
Service responsibilities for PSYOP are addressed both in JCS
Pub 2, the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) and JCS Pub 27,
Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. The UNAAF sets forth
principles and doctrines governing joint activities and the
performance of the armed forces of the United States. With regard
to PSYOP, the UNAAF states that each Military Department and
Service will:
(l) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate
PSYOP planning skills.
(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute
PSYOP actions and, as appropriate, dedicated PSYOP forces and
equipment.
(3) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments to CINC's for service
in foreign countries.
(4) Provide departmental intelligence to support planning and
conduct of PSYOP.
(5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence
assets, trained, equipped and organized to support planning and
conducting wartime PSYOP.
(6) Train and educate departmental personnel to counter and
neutralize effects of hostile foreign PSYOP.
JCS Pub 27 addresses the use of psychological operations and
identifies the following as specific responsibilities of the Marine
Corps:
(l) Develop PSYOP policy guidance, doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures for the primary functions assigned the
Marine Corps, coordinating as appropriate with the other Services,
to support:
(a) The PSYOP campaigns of the unified commands, through
the designated subordinate component commander of joint force
commander.
(b) Land and associated air operations to seize advanced
naval bases or other objectives essential to the successful
prosecution of a naval campaign.
(c) Assault phase and subsequent land combat of amphibious
operations.
(d) Defense of Marine Corps bases, installations, and
forces in foreign countries.
(e) Intelligence and counterintelligence collection by
Marine Corps forces.
(2) Plan and conduct tactical PSYOP in support of the component
commander.
Allegedly, the groundwork for the development of a basic PSYOP
capability within the MAGTF is addressed within its "blueprints for
the future": the MAGTF Master Plan, the Operational Concept for
the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), and the
Operational Concept for Marine Corps Employment in Low Intensity
Conflict.3 However, these concepts only highlight the Marine Corps'
and the MAGTF's inability to plan for or conduct PSYOP.
Published as a Marine Corps Order in October 1975, the Marine
Corps doctrine for PSYOP is over fourteen years old. It states
"commanders at all levels are responsible for planning and
conducting psychological operations affecting their missions";
however, it provides no guidance or direction for the conduct of
PSYOP by the MAGTF. In truth, the Marine Corps has no viable
doctrine for the conduct of PSYOP.
The MAGTF Master Plan (MMP) foresees that PSYOP will become an
organic capability of future MAGTF's. Accordingly, MAGTF's will be
able to execute PSYOP across the spectrum of conflict. It states
that:
MAGTF's will conduct active psychological operations ranging
from planned civic actions to the employment of specially
organized, trained and equipped psychological warfare units. The
MAGTF commander and his staff will plan and employ organic assets
in support of psychological operations objectives. They will also
be able to integrate other Service units such as specialized U.S.
Army loudspeaker and audio-visual direct support teams as required.
However, the MMP also recognizes that, presently, the Marine
Corps has no doctrine for PSYOP, lacks PSYOP billets for all
MAGTF's, has no PSYOP training for Marines, and has no collateral
PSYOP support equipment.
FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action indicates that PSYOP are a
staff function resident within the G/S-3 section and identifies the
psychological operations officer as under the cognizance of the
G/S-3. However, current MAGTF command element task organizations
do not provide for a PSYOP billet nor do proposed changes to MAGTF
command element task organizations substantially remedy this
deficiency. No one is performing the PSYOP officer staff
functions: advising the commander on PSYOP; preparing PSYOP plans
and estimates; coordinating PS-OP activities; analyzing target
audiences and evaluating the effects of PSYOP; and supervising the
conduct of PSYOP campaigns.
Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground Combat Operations is the
Marine Corps' basic manual for combat. While it contains no
revolutionary departures, it provides the principles of combat
operations based principally on the experience of Marines in battle
and although it identifies PSYOP as one of those general
tasks to be considered in battle, it does not provide for PSYOP
techniques, procedures, professional education nor individual and
unit training.
The Art of War, a treatise written by the Chinese military
thinker Sun Tzu in the fourth century B.C., advocates the idea that
an army of superior numbers can be "made not to fight." Even
General A. M. Gray recognized the "human dimension" in war and that
"moral forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome
of war than do physical."4 Psychological operations have been used
as an integral part of military operations throughout history. As
the Marine Corps plans for the evolution of the current MAGTF, it
can ill afford to pay lip service to the role of psychological
warfare and the conduct of PSYOP. The Marine Corps must recognize
the vital role PSYOP have on the battlefield and must prepare the
MAGTF's for the conduct of psychological operations.
The Marine Corps must prepare MAGTF commanders to identify and
employ organic assets in support of PSYOP objectives. MAGTF
commanders must be concerned with the role of the MAGTF, whether
active or passive, in the attainment of psychological objectives
and the impact of PSYOP on his mission and concept of operations.
At the tactical level, he must understand the capabilities and
limitations of joint PSYOP units in support of the MAGTF or joint
task force.5 Additionally, every Marine should have a basic
understanding of the purpose and capabilities of PSYOP. The
reemphasis and revitalization of PSYOP within the Marine Corps will
not take place overnight, but take place it must. The Marine Corps
should develop its own PSYOP Master Plan addressing: doctrine,
planning, education and training, and force structure. Only in
this manner will the Marine Corps fulfill its responsibilities for
PSYOP.
Doctrine sets forth the purposes and fundamental operating
principles for employment of forces. Our Service doctrine
concerning PSYOP must be aligned with joint doctrine, but more
importantly it must provide guidance and direction for the MAGTF's
employment and use of PSYOP.
The conduct of psychological operations is not the exclusive
domain of specialized units.6 The Marine Corps must develop PSYOP
planners to meet the needs of the MAGTF and to provide our
proportionate share of planners on joint staffs. Trained PSYOP
planners will then be able to properly advise MAGTF commanders
regarding PSYOP and exploitation of military exercises, deployment
of forces, contact with foreign nationals through port visits and
civic action, and specific types of combat operations.
Education and training is essential to the revitalization of
PSYOP within the Marine Corps. We must produce commanders and
planners who understand PSYOP and can evaluate situations for the
employment of PSYOP. The Marine Corps needs to produce planners
who can prepare PSYOP plans and supervise their execution.
Additionally awareness education and training must be provided to
all Marines as it addresses the purposes, uses, and capabilities of
friendly PSYOP activities and, also, the hostile PSYOP threat.
Finally, it's not necessary that the Marine Corps develop new
force structure to provide PSY0P personnel and planners in the
Marine Corps. Rather, the emphasis should be to identify PSYOP
billets within our current and proposed MAGTF command element task
organizations. Additional military occupational specialties
already exist within the Marine Corps to support assignments and
the continued professional development of PSYOP officers and men.
Our maritime expeditionary forces that are essential for
credible deterrence and warfighting across the spectrum of conflict
must be prepared to plan for and conduct PSYOP. Psychological
operations are an important dimension of military power. Whether
we accept it or not, everything we do or fail to do has a
psychological impact on our enemies, our allies, neutrals, and even
ourselves. We can expect the enemy to make extensive use of PSYOP
in future conflicts, therefore the Marine Corps must understand and
be prepared to employ PSYOP throughout the levels of war and across
the spectrum of conflict.
ENDNOTES
1
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Psychological
Operations FM 33-1, Washington, DC, July 1987, p.vi.
2
Ibid., p. 2-14.
3
Susan J. Flores, "PSYOP and the Marine Corps", Marine Corps
Gazette, September 1989, pp. 40-42.
4
U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM 1, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, March 1989, pp. 12-13.
5
Flores, pp. 40-42.
6
Alfred H. Paddock, Military Psychological Operations:
Current Directions, undated, p. 11.
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Curtis, Glenn. An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP).
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Flores, Susan J. "PSYOP and the Marine Corps." Marine Corps
Gazette, September 1989.
Janowitz, Morris and William E. Daugherty, eds. Psychological
Warfare. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1959.
Headquarters, Department of the Army. Psychological Operations,
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Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS
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Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony. Psychological Warfare. New York:
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Martin, John L. et al. Psychological Operations Program
Evaluation. Springfield, Virginia: Abbot Associates Inc.,
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U.S. Department of State. Soviet Influence Activities: A Report
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U.S. Marine Corps. Command and Staff Action, FMFM 3-1. Marine
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U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM-1. Marine Corps Combat
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Paddock, Alfred H. Military Psychological Operations: Current
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Sun Tzu. On the Art of War. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford:
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