Amphibious Or Ambiguous? Is The Corps Caught In The Confluence?
AUTHOR Major Alfred E. Burkhard Jr., USA
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AMPHIBIOUS OR AMBIGUOUS? IS THE CORPS CAUGHT
IN THE CONFLUENCE?
I. Purpose: To examine the dilemmas facing the Marine
Air Ground Task Force concept.
II. Problem: The implementation of the MAGTF concept must
undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization of
mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the Marine
Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM-1 and to
implement the MAGTF Master Plan.
III. Data: A balance between peacetime and wartime
organization begins the conceptual questioning. A function
vice mission based structure causes a "mental distancing"
among the GCE, ACE, and CSSE. While daily integration of
efforts is the first step toward combined arms, the MAGTF is
denied such integration until formation.
While able to rapidly form a MAGTF, resources and skills
will be tested. Command and control systems must be
functional. Support systems must also be valid and
functional. Finite resources in these two areas point to a
need for the establishment of priorities.
Equipment requirements will be subject to budgetary
restrictions. "Peripheral" issues such as lift and multi-
purpose capabilities give rise to further dilemmas. Can the
equipment "get to the fight?" What will be the competition
for multi-purpose systems?
Training is and will continue to be the key to success
for any military force. The integration of training is and
will be the key to success in combined arms warfare. Yet, the
MAGTF does not enjoy the opportunity to integrate the
training efforts of its forces. The functional vice mission
organization of the Marine Corps has its greatest impact in
this arena.
IV. Conclusion: The MAGTF concept is not flawed from its
inception. Rather, a lack of clear mission focus and priority
will hinder its implementation.
AMPHIBIOUS OR AMBIGUOUS?
IS THE CORPS CAUGHT IN A CONFLUENCE?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. The implementation of the MAGTF concept
must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization
of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the
Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM 1
and implement the MAGTF Master Plan.
I. Introduction
II. Thesis Development
III. The current organization of the Marine Corps sets the
stage for "mental distancing" and the conflict with
the doctrine of combined arms warfare.
A. Organization based upon function
B. GCE/ACE/CSSE
C. Master Plan
IV. The MAGTF concept calls for the rapid formation of a
force designed and capable of executing a myriad
missions.
A. Finite resources
B. Command and control
C. Support
V. The equipment used by the MAGTF will be restricted by
lift considerations and born of compromise.
A. Procurement
B. Equipment
C. Lift
D. Impact
VI. Training the MAGTF will pose a number of significant
challenges.
A. Integrated effort
B. GCE/ACE/CSSE
C. How to train
D. Priority
VII. Conclusion
AMPHIBIOUS OR AMBIGUOUS?
IS THE CORPS CAUGHT IN THE CONFLUENCE?
The purpose of this paper is not to "stir the pot" of
interservice rivalry. There is little real argument
concerning a need for the Marine Corps, as well as the other
services, far into the future. Rather, the intent of this
paper is two-fold: first, to examine the dilemmas facing the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept; and second, to
provoke a questioning process in the mind of the reader
concerning the focus of the Marine Corps of the future. In
order to accomplish the intent, this paper will address
four areas that impact upon the MAGTF; current organization,
formation, equipment, and training.
The United States Marine Corps currently suffers from
an identity crisis. No longer comfortable with its amphibious
role alone, the Marine Corps has adopted the MAGTF concept
to disguise this crisis. The recently published FMFM-1,
Warfighting, is now the doctrine for the conduct of war
by the Marine Corps. The MAGTF is the vehicle for the
execution of this doctrine. The MAGTF Master Plan, 1990-
2010 provides the long range focus for the Marine Corps
as it moves into the future. Both the doctrine and the long
range focus of the Marine Corps are sound and well thought
through. Sadly, it is the MAGTF concept that is caught
between the two. The implementation of the MAGTF concept
must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization
of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the
Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth
in FMFM-1 and to implement the Master Plan.
To begin the examination of the MAGTF concept it is
necessary to look at the basic organization of the Marine
Corps. Companies through Divisions exist, but it is not
this aspect of the organization that requires scrutiny.
Rather, it is the organization of the Marine Corps into four
elements; command (CE), ground combat (GCE), air combat
(ACE), and combat service support (CSSE), that sets
the stage for something less than a combined arms
environment.
This division of elements into functional areas begins
the "mental distancing" that will occur between or among
elements that do not enjoy a close daily integration of
efforts. The introduction of the MAGTF concept does not
change this division of units, but rather attempts to
downplay this critical area of concern. Further compounding
this concern is the stated intent to be able to form a MAGTF
at any level, depending on the situation.
FMFM-1 addresses clearly the essence of combined arms
warfare:
In order to maximize combat power, we must use
all the available resources to best advantage. To
do so we must follow a doctrine of combined arms.
Combined arms is the full integration of arms in
such a way that in order to counter-act one, the
enemy must make himself vulnerable to another. We
pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a
dilemma--a no-win situation. (7:75)
It would follow that "to the greatest extent practicable,
Fleet Marine Forces must be organized for warfighting
and then adapted to peacetime rather than vice versa."
(7:42-43) Yet, the daily existence of the assets required
to prosecute a combined arms effort against an enemy is
missing. The GCE contains the direct and indirect fire and
maneuver systems. Infantry, armor and artillery belong to
the GCE commander. They are his from day to day with an
established chain of command. The ACE owns and is responsible
for the aviation and air defense systems. The CSSE owns and
is responsible for the combat support and combat service
support personnel and equipment. Within each of these three
elements, the working relationships and standard operating
procedures differ and are based upon the functions each is
to perform. The result is an organization of elements that
does not support combined arms warfighting, but rather
peacetime operations.
The Master Plan calls for the ability of the MAGTF to
perform a myriad missions. As each element exists "in its
own world," until such time as the MAGTF is formed, the
daily interaction of elements is strictly controlled by
established procedures. The command element of the MAGTF
must be capable of pulling the collective efforts of diverse
units together. The command element must eliminate the
"mental distancing" that exists between elements.
It will be a challenge to change the mind set of the
elements in the MAGTF from "function" to "mission." The
success of the MAGTF will depend on the ability to focus
the functional efforts of many into a common mission focus.
The MAGTF concept calls for the rapid design of a force
commensurate with an assigned mission. The impact of this
ability to organize at any level will be felt across the
board. The areas of resources, command and control, and
support require comment.
Again, FMFM-1 and the Master Plan place the MAGTF
concept in an unenviable position. As resources are finite,
and each of the elements (GCE, ACE, CSSE) serve as the
resource pool from which the MAGTF will be drawn, the
resources required by both doctrine and mission may be in
great demand and therefore not available. Conflicting
priorities may preclude the rapid or complete formation of
the MAGTF. To use the GCE as an example, the same marines
perform all three types of infantry combat-light, airmobile,
and mechanized. If needed for one type of mission, they are
unavailable for others. The issue of availability will be
key to the rapid formation of one or more MAGTFs.
When drawing from the four elements for forces, the
issue of unit integrity must be addressed, as this will
be the heart of command and control.
The command and control of each element within the MAGTF
goes beyond mere communications. Command and control denotes
not only personnel and equipment, but the systems that
support the integrated efforts required of the MAGTF.
The collection of command and control systems must
come together at the operating level of the MAGTF. The
command element of the MAGTF feels the pinch at this point.
The diversity and intricacy of systems familiar to the
various elements may be foreign to the MAGTF command element.
Using the ACE as an example, The Marine Air Command and
Control System (MACCS) deserves discussion as it pertains to
the mission of the MAGTF. Necessary for the ACE to execute
its functions, the MACCS is, nevertheless, heavily dependent
upon communications and coordination. (4:46-47) The challenge
is to operate all the command and control centers in support
of the MAGTF mission. The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC),
Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), Tactical Air Operations
Center (TAOC), Anti Air Operations Center (AAOC), and Direct
Air Support Center (DASC) functions must be performed. Skill,
training, and equipment will be required to operate all these
centers. The command and control requirements are extensive
and must be integrated with the other elements of the MAGTF.
At what level or levels can the ACE rapidly task organize,
equip, and deploy its assets? Are the command and control
centers flexible enough to cover the mission spectrum?
What is the level of training and equipment on hand to
facilitate unit integrity in support of the MAGTF?
Can unit integrity be ignored without a loss of command
and control?
The specialization of functions within CSSE units
points to the need for unit integrity or command and control
elements capable of integration into the MAGTF effort.
While FMFRP 1-11, 1990 may address the Brigade Service
Support Group Command Element (Nucleus) (3:6-5), it does
so with the admission of contingency planning capabilities
in light of finite resources. These finite resources point to
the possible limitations encountered when forming a MAGTF as
a result of varied and possibly conflicting missions and
priorities.
Finite resources, command and control, and support
within a newly formed MAGTF point to a shortfall. What is to
be the focus of effort? FMFM -1 calls for a combined arms
approach to war and the Master Plan calls for a wide spectrum
of mission capabilities. The MAGTF concept must meet the
demands of both. The rapid formation of the MAGTF is merely
the first step. The integrated efforts required for success
must be present if success is to be achieved.
Thus far, the discussion has centered around what
might be called "conceptual" issues. Some might say they are
about as easy to grasp as a hand-full of jello, but they
none-the-less deserved attention. Look now at the issue of
equipment and its impact on the MAGTF concept. The equipment
is "real"- you can put your hands it. But the issue is not
the equipment itself as much as it is the manner in which
equipment is procured.
The procurement system can easily be described as
cumbersome and involved. To describe it in detail is beyond
that required for this discussion. In summary, equipment is
procured after a need has been recognized and funding
approved. That need is the result of a review of the threat
faced and the design of force capabilities needed to counter
the threat. The force capability is a combination of
manpower and equipment. While manpower is a critical aspect
that cannot be ignored, the equipment aspect of force
capability will now be the point of discussion.
The Marine Corps faces the same equipment obsolescence
problems enjoyed by the other services. Unique to the Marine
Corps, however, is its inclusion in the Department of the
Navy. (1:10) The result is a Marine Corps budget that is a
subset of that of the Navy. Additionally, the Marine Corps
enjoys the requirement to work with the Army concerning the
development of doctrine and equipment common to both services
as it pertains to common functions. (1:11) This situation
causes the Marine Corps, and ultimately, the MAGTF, to have
equipment that is unique to the Corps as well as common to
other services.
The M-1 main battle tank, the A-6 Intruder, and the
F/A-18 Hornet are three examples of equipment common to
multiple services. These are weapon systems born of
comprise. The tank and the two aircraft are chosen for
discussion for they highlight the restrictions the MAGTF
will encounter as the doctrine in FMFM-1 and the focus of the
Master Plan are examined.
The M-1 tank has been adopted as this nation's main
battle tank. The M-1 offers mobility, firepower, and
survivability against an increased armor threat on the
modern battlefield. The MAGTF will enjoy the advantages of
the M-1 while at the same time suffering from questions of
supportability. The issue of strategic and tactical lift
must be addressed. Size, weight, and fuel consumption are
of vital concern. Additionally, the quantity and doctrinal
employment of armor within the force pose significant
concerns. The Master Plan calls for the ability to fight
in a mechanized environment and the doctrine for such
warfare exists. However, the issue may be "what can we get
to the fight?", not "what do we need for the fight?"
Primary considerations are strategic and
tactical lift-the Marine Corps' reliance on
Navy shipping for strategic mobility and on
helicopters and vertical/short takeoff and
landing aircraft for tactical mobility from
ship to shore and during operations ashore. (7:52)
The plan to replace the aging A-6 Intruder with the
F/A-18 Hornet is another example of equipment compromise
that may hinder the MAGTF. The replacement of a strike
aircraft with an aircraft capable of multiple roles should
be viewed with concern. The concern should not stem from the
ability of the aircraft to perform multiple types of
missions, but rather from the budgetary restrictions that
force the adoption of such equipment. The passing of the
"Reagan years" marks the end of the military spending spree
that all services enjoyed. Commonality of purpose/function
has become a critical aspect of systems procurement. This
in turn drives an examination of need and the prioritization
of missions.
As the replacement of the A-6 Intruder with the F/A-18
Hornet will likely not be on a one-for-one basis, the
competition for resources will, again, be an issue. Carrier
based, fighter capable, and common to both the Navy and the
Marine Corps, the F/A-18 Hornet will be a system in demand.
The M-1 and the F/A-18 both meet the needs of the
MAGTF. Both allow the MAGTF to meet the doctrinal imperatives
of FMFM-1. Both provide capabilities that support the needs
outlined in the Master Plan. Yet, both are systems that fall
victim to the "peripheral" issues that plague the MAGTF
concept. Lift, both strategic and tactical, and multi-purpose
capability have a hidden impact. Available dollars limit the
procurement process. Available equipment will limit the
capabilities of the MAGTF. The MAGTF concept cannot serve
two masters given the reality of the procurement process.
Prioritization of focus must be addressed.
Not withstanding problems in organization, formation,
and equipment, the most disconcerting aspect of the MAGTF
concept is that of training. The training that is so critical
to mission success is the training that must occur for
planners, combatants, and support personnel alike. Given the
wide spectrum of missions addressed in the Master Plan and
the sense of urgency depicted by FMFM-1:
During times of peace the most important
task of any military is to prepare for
war. As the nation's rapid deployment
force, the Marine Corps must maintain
itself ready for immediate employment in
any clime and place and in any type of
conflict. All peacetime activities should
focus on achieving combat readiness. This
implies a high level if training, flexi-
bility in organization and equipment,
qualified professional leadership, and
a cohesive doctrine. (7:41)
the MAGTF will certainly have a "full plate." It is at
this point the MAGTF concept suffers its greatest short-
fall. Who, what, when, where, how and why will this training
take place?
While task organization, command and control, equipment,
and support structure questions may all be answered with the
formation of a MAGTF, the most critical issue has been
overlooked. The ability to quickly form and deploy a MAGTF
falls far short in ensuring mission success. The forces that
comprise the MAGTF will be drawn from the GCE, ACE, and CSSE.
With the possible exception of the Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MFU) deployed or afloat for an extensive period of time,
the MAGTF will suffer from a lack of unity in effort as a
result of a lack of integration in training.
The GCE, ACE, and CSSE are placed in a quandary. Each
must maintain proficiency in their respective areas yet
provide The MAGTF with forces capable of operating across
a wide spectrum of missions at various force levels while
at all times adhering to doctrine.
The GCE must be prepared for operations in three basic
modes; light, airmobile, and mechanized, or a combination of
all three. Each of these is demanding and require a
considerable degree of skill and training. When examined
in the context of some of the mission capabilities listed
in the Master Plan; counter-terrorism, non-combatant
evacuation operations, hostage rescue, counter-insurgency,
and counter-narcotics, (5:5-4,6) the training "challenge"
is apparent. The challenge is particularly demanding for the
planners and leaders. What is the priority? At what level
should this training occur. Is training integrated (combined
arms) or independent? How will resources be allocated? What
resources exist?
The ACE is tasked with performing the six functions of
of Marine aviation; air recce, antiair warfare, assault
support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and
control of aircraft and missiles. (4:6-8) As a resource
element from which the MAGTF will draw, the ACE also enjoys
the training "challenge." Are the training requirements
for Marine aviation so specialized that training cannot
be integrated? Can the focus of combined arms warfare be
met if the training is not integrated?
The CSSE is not immune to the problem. It is charged
with the combat service support of the MAGTF. As its
functions are varied, so must be its training.
The dilemma facing the MAGTF at this point is that of
"how to train".
Training programs should reflect practical,
challenging and progressive goals beginning with
individual and small unit skills and culminating
in a fully combined arms MAGTF (7:47)
At first glance, this approach to training would seem to
be valid. However, the resources required for training are
finite. To say that training should be practical,
challenging and progressive is not enough. There must be a
focus for training-there must be a mission. To be prepared
to fight anywhere in any climate is a tall order to handle
when planning training.
Each of the elements (CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE) are
blessed with an abundance of manuals and operational
handbooks. Commanders at various levels are provided with
guides and references that cover the planning spectrum
in preparation for mission accomplishment. Yet, there does
not exist a "capstone manual" on the subject of training
within the MAGTF concept. Without such a thought process for
training, the various references available tend to focus
the forces involved on the functions to be performed, not
the training of units destined to fight in a combined arms
environment.
If "Training is the key to combat effectiveness
and therefore the focus of a peacetime military" (7:46)
and the maximization of combat power rests in the best
use of available resources (7:75) then the MAGTF must
have the opportunity to train as it will fight. FMFM-1
provides the doctrine for the conduct of combined arms
warfare and the Master Plan lists the capabilities that the
MAGTF must possess and train toward. Yet, OH-2 The Marine
Air Ground Task Force manual, the source document for the
MAGTF concept, provides only one paragraph to address
training.
Missing in the development of the MAGTF concept is a
Mission Essential Task List (METL) (2:2-1) or a
prioritization of training effort based upon missions and
limited resources. The MAGTF concept is caught in the void
of focus and priority. The questions of who?, what?, when?,
how?, and why? are not answered. Without the guidance needed
to answer these questions, the training cannot be expected to
support the combined arms approach to war. Without an
established priority of effort, there can be no guidance
concerning the use of valuable training resources.
The issues addressed have covered four areas of concern
when examining the MAGTF and the MAGTF concept. Each has an
impact on the "vehicle" to be used by the Marine Corps as it
moves into the future. The concept is not flawed from
inception, but rather a victim of the clash between an
emerging doctrine and the desire to perform a myriad wide
ranging missions.
A balance between organization for war vice organization
during peacetime begins the conceptual questioning. A
function based vice mission based structure causes a "mental
distancing." Daily integration of all efforts begins the
combined arms approach to war, yet this is denied the MAGTF
by virtue of current organization and structure.
Rapid formation of a MAGTF to "meet the need" is not
impossible. But the mere task organization of a force for a
mission fails to address the resources and skills required
for success. Resources are finite and competition will occur.
Command and control is a resource intensive, skill dependent
aspect of any task organized force. The integration of
different systems for command and control will not be with-
out difficulty. Supporting a rapidly formed organization for
a myriad possible missions is not a task to be taken lightly.
The reality of equipment on hand vice equipment required
must be addressed. Strategic and tactical lift capabilities
may limit the MAGTF to a far greater degree than anticipated.
The adoption of multi-purpose/role systems is indicative of
shrinking resources and the competition for these systems
that is sure to follow.
The ability to organize, equip, and deploy rapidly is
for naught if the force has not been properly trained. This
training must include the planners, leaders, combatants, and
support personnel alike. Without training, the success of the
mission will hinge on luck or the incompetence of the
opponent. Neither of these variables can be relied upon to
guarantee success.
The doctrine and a plan for movement into the future
both exist, yet there is a shortfall. The implementation
of the MAGTF concept must undergo severe scrutiny and
requires a prioritization of mission focus if it is to be the
vehicle used by the Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine
set forth in FMFM-1 and implement the MAGTF Master Plan.
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