What's Wrong With America's Maritime Strategy?
AUTHOR Major Stephen M. Womack, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICA'S MARITIME STRATEGY?"
I. Purpose: To report on the shortfalls of our current U.S.
Maritime Strategy and the fundamental weaknesses that exist in
our present policy because of lack of necessary linkage with
other national strategic interests.
II. Problem: Our National Maritime Strategy is inadequate in
that it does not deter the Soviets from unacceptable global
adventurism ultimately leading to conventional or even nuclear
war. Its fundamental weakness lies in an inadequate linkage to
necessary national strategic concerns.
III. Data: Our present number of large, vulnerable aircraft
carriers compromises our ability to safeguard U.S./Western
interests in the event of a tactical or strategic exchange with
the Soviets or her client states. Additionally, America's
current amphibious ship mix does not give the U.S. the ability
to project sea power at MEF levels on a two ocean front.
Finally, Americans must discourage our leadership from
obligating us to nuclear arms reduction agreements such as the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). This is a
critical link to an effective maritime strategy and NATO must
support us in this effort.
IV. Conclusion: America must rally its leadership to see the
wisdom of smaller, more numerous aircraft carriers to give us
the protection we will need in order to create a significant
strike capability from the sea. Similarly, the nation must be
convinced that we will not be able to effectively prosecute Low
Intensity Conflict nor possess the means to ward off critical
regional instability unless amphibious shipping is dramatically
increased.
V. Recommendation: The American public bust be educated about
the changes necessary to achieve the above goals. We, as a
nation, have the capability to repair the shortfall that exists
in our National Maritime Strategy. It is a matter of convincing
the public at large so that Congress will realign priorities
sufficiently over a reasonable period in order to fund these
vital but required changes.
"WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICA'S MARITIME STRATEGY?"
Outline
Thesis: Current U.S. Maritime Strategy is inadequate to
guarantee Soviet deterrence from unacceptable global
adventurism leading to conventional or nuclear war.
I. Current Strategy
A. How did current maritime strategy evolve?
B. How does it relate to overall national strategy in
general?
C. Current maritime strategy is no longer a realistic
response to changing Eastern world direction
II. Four things must happen to remedy problem
A. Numerous, smaller carriers vs. supercarriers
B. Need to increase amphibious shipping
C. Need to disfavor nuclear reduction in Europe
D. Increase in share of burden from NATO allies
III. Argument for smaller carriers
A. Spreads risk of loss
B. Creates possibility for additional Surface Action
Groups
C. Gives more flexible response to Soviet aggression
IV. Need to increase amphibious assault shipping
A. Strengthens maritime capability
B. Increases MAGTF capability for regional conflict
V. Need to disfavor further nuclear reduction in NATO
A. INF Treaty more favorable to Soviets than NATO
B. Raises conventional threshold too high
V. Allies must bear greater share of the burden
A. Necessary to guarantee effective global response to
Eastern European aggression
B. Remedy of linkage vs. moral persuasion
"WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICA'S MARITIME STRATEGY?"
It is an unassailable argument that democracy, as we
know it as Americans, is the greatest form of government to
exist in the world today. But when the question of national
defense arises, as it relates to U.S. strategy, we begin to
see that our form of society bears a high cost in our
struggle to develop and maintain an effective national
defense. This is true whether looked at from the narrower
perspective of our federal maritime objectives or from the
broader one of our national security strategy. Ironically,
in a nation where broad constitutional protections abound,
including free speech and the privilege of leading a life
unfettered by governmental control, Americans have the right
to be and remain ignorant on any issue they choose. As a
costly consequence the greatest and best articulated
position on global strategy or on any other issue affecting
the world is worthless if voters do not support it as a
majority.
I believe, therefore, that ambivalence about defense by
people at large today is an important factor in failing to
achieve the national security strategy necessary to
guarantee U.S. interests and objectives around the world.
The critical linkage between strategy, maritime or
otherwise, and our capability to convince Americans of its
worth is therefore crucial to implementation of an effective
policy. Is America willing to be sufficiently educated
about national security? And more specifically, what should
U.S. Maritime strategy be in order to support our broader
strategic interests? In what specific areas should an
attempt be made to school the national public?
CURRENT STRATEGY
In order to intelligently discuss a rational approach
to an effective maritime strategy, it is first necessary to
take a look at our overall national strategy. Once an
articulable national policy based on strategic interests is
examined, then it becomes easier to see just how a set of
national maritime objectives can best support it.
Our national military strategy is designed to "preserve
America's political identity, framework and institutions; to
protect the U.S., including its foreign assets and allies;
to foster the country's economic wellbeing; and to bolster
an international order supportive of the vital interests of
this country and its allies ... and to achieve these ends,
our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence,
forward defense, and alliance solidarity."1 The biggest
threat to U.S. security interests is the global challenge
posed by the Soviet Union which places a high degree of
importance on dividing the solidarity of our Western
alliance nations.2 Put very simply, it is quite easy to see
that any credible maritime strategy espoused by the U.S.
must be predicated upon this aim of the Soviets. It is also
quite easy to see, then, why the mutual support expected
from our NATO allies, in particular, is all the more
important. This issue will be discussed separately at a
later point. Four specific areas related to a sound
maritime strategy will be separately addressed in the
context of just how to best take the "message home" to a
nation. The third area, disfavoring nuclear arms reduction
in Central Europe, vis-a-vis intermediate range nuclear
missiles, will be developed as I believe this is an
important link to a viable maritime strategy.
It is not the aim of this paper to discuss what our
maritime strategy should be as much as it is to deal with
the linkage between it and our national strategic interests.
In brief, I favor with little exception, the course of
maritime strategy that has been advanced and adopted by our
government. That is to say, I believe that the current
three phased approach, beginning with the aim of
deterrence/transition to war, is the right course.
This initial phase would be triggered by some
unacceptable movement by the Soviets that would carry with
it the potential for world wide escalation. "Keys to the
success of both the initial phase and the strategy as a
whole are speed and decisiveness in national decisionmaking.
The U.S. must be in a position to deter the Soviets `battle
of the first salvo' or deal with it if it comes. Even
though a substantial fraction of the fleet is forward
deployed in peacetime, prompt decisions are needed to permit
rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis."3
An example is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. When
Premier Khruschev started to move missiles into Cuba,
President Kennedy threatened a blockade of the island. It
worked. Russia stopped the missile shipments and dismantled
existing sites. The key here was the relationship between
our strategy of strong deterrence and our capability to
carry it out. Simply stated, our strategy of deterrence in
that situation would have been worth nothing had we not had
the means to back it. That takes the support of the
American people which must be as big a part of our U.S.
maritime strategy as the strategy itself.
The second phase is that of seizing the initiative in
the event that phase one does not work. Here, our maritime
strategy is predicated upon the notion that as soon as we
see any unacceptable movement in the first phase we
basically fire the first shots at sea against any Soviet sea
target whether they be surface ships or submarines. Our
ability to execute this phase depends upon our ability to
surge American naval forces ahead quickly to forward
deployments and key world choke points to protect sea lines
of communication. According to former Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, USN (Ret.), Phase II
of the maritime strategy is antisubmarine warfare where it
will be essential to conduct forward operations with attack
submarines using maritime patrol aircraft, mines, attack
submarines, and sonobuoys, to prevent leakage of enemy
forces to the open ocean where the Western alliance's
resupply lines can be threatened.4
Finally, in the third phase, after attack on the Soviet
navy, we would finish the destruction and then turn
attention to the land battle caused by Soviet aggression at
the outset. We will definitely complement the prosecution
of this battle using the full weight of our carrier battle
forces.
I SMALL vs. BIG CARRIERS
"It is essential that we begin to reduce our dependence
on the large deck carrier. The national interests of the
U.S. calls for a global maritime strategy which, in turn,
requires flexible and diversified naval forces with
offensive power. If we forefo this diversification and
continue to depend almost entirely on the large deck
aircraft carrier, we are selling out our maritime defense
for the future."5
Today's carrier is not too big for operational
effectiveness but it is too expensive to give the U.S. the
number it needs to provide an adequate number of carrier
task forces to give us the best guarantee against the kind
of attrition that the Soviets may be capable of inflicting
against us if we deploy our surface action groups in
accordance with our maritime strategy. Recently, the
Norwegian Defense Staff confirmed Soviet mobilization of a
regiment of Backfire bombers to the Kola region. The
obvious aim of moving the Backfires to the Kola area was to
develop Soviet capabilities for long range missile attack
operations against U.S. aircraft carriers.6 With a range of
over 2500 miles these aircraft "can get through air defenses
at high speeds and low levels. In maritime operations they
carry either nuclear or conventional ... cruise missiles
with a range of up to 460 kilometers."7 This kind of
alarming reality points up to the vulnerability of the
supercarrier and focuses the need to spread this risk by
creation of smaller, more numerous carriers. Furthermore,
as third world nations develop greater offensive
capabilities, for example, silkworms, the supercarrier of
today becomes a super target at the cost of $2 billion a
copy.
Even in the epic saga of Tom Clancy's fictional Red
Storm Rising, the reader is suddenly horrified at the
prospect of losing the supercarrier Nimitz to Kelp missiles
launched from Soviet Backfires from over a hundred miles
away over the mid Atlantic. With her sustainment of massive
damage went the entire Carrier Air Group's command and
control and the central protection necessary to safeguard
the convoy to Europe to resupply NATO and her allies against
the Soviet attack along the Central Front.8
Former Navy Secretary John Lehman, who advocated that
"evidence still seems overwhelmingly in favor of the Nimitz
class carrier of 90,000 tons as the optimum size and design
for putting air capability at sea ....", he did not hesitate
to point out that the U.S. could gainfully employ more mid
size carriers like our 64,000 ton Midway and Coral Sea.9
Of course the other side of this argument is that even
if the U.S. was sold on the wisdom of a more numerous--say
twenty-five--but smaller carrier fleet there would simply
not be sufficient surface action ships to form the
protective task force around the mother ship. I believe
that this counter argument is outweighed by the grouping or
cluster concept of sending out two smaller carriers sailing
in close proximity to each other while enjoying the same
size common task force protection as the case is with the
supercarrier.
While more expensive in terms of total dollars spent
for total deck space afforded, I submit that this is far
more palatable to Americans as an alternative to what I see
as the "supercarrier/supertarget" aircraft carrier of today.
A mix of large and small carriers offers the additional
benefit of compounding an adversary's target selection
problem. This is especially true if the smaller carriers
have long range surface-to-air missiles and either cruise
missiles or strike capable aircraft. With the added
capabilities based upon smaller platforms, target dispersion
throughout the fleet is enhanced greatly.10 "The
technologies needed to build the platform and air wing
components of this ship--the `CVA' or `escort
carrier'--already exist."11 When the President of the U.S.
informs voters of the simplicity of this strong and
effective element of our maritime strategy, people only have
to remember the near sinking of the Stark in the Persian
Gulf and the sinking of the Sheffield in the Falklands to
understand that strong anti-air defense systems do not
guarantee survivability.
But how does the Commander-in-Chief, the Defense
department and others in government make a credible case to
the country to fund such a costly program? Primarily, the
Joint Chiefs must begin to speak with singularity of purpose
devoid of the bickering and inter service rivalry that has
been "business as usual" too often. The President must be
the primary spokesman to convince Americans of our strategic
needs. The marked increase in effective defense spending
during the first six years of the Reagan Administration owes
from an aggressive, straightforward case made directly to
the American public.
II NEED TO INCREASE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING
For the U.S. and her NATO allies to appreciably deter
global adventurism by the Soviets into willing third world
countries, an element of our national maritime strategy must
include the ability to project greater seapower ashore into
areas of the world where Low Intensity Conflict runs counter
to U.S. interests. This is especially true given former
President Reagan's national policy statement on defense in
which he stated that "Regional and Low Intensity Conflict
constitute a serious security challenge to the U.S."12 I
believe that it is a shameful failure of U.S. policy in that
the Navy today would not be able to provide us with the lift
capability to put the assault elements of a Marine
Expeditionary Force ashore while providing concurrent
capability of any appreciable size in any other region.
"The U.S. Navy does include a goal of 76 amphibious ships in
a deployable battle force of 600 ships, which it may achieve
in the late 1990's. But even with 76 amphibious ships, a
two-ocean split will not support a MEF size operation.13
What is more alarming is the fact that by the year 2006,
forty-five of these amphibious ships will have reached the
end of their service lives.14
To be certain, it is a mistake for our maritime
strategy to embrace U.S. entry into every LIC environment
where remote American interests are at stake. We simply can
not spread our limited means so thin. We must only enter
those conflicts where the U.S. or one of its allies has a
vital stake in the outcome or, secondly, the outcome gives
the Soviets a clear edge in regional domination in an area
of the world that is of strategic significance such as
Central America.
Again, the exorbitant cost of shipping in the day of a
static budget at best does not portend well for a new class
of LST's, more LHD's and other amphibious assault ships to
allow the Marine Corps to do what Congress chartered it to
do. Only a slim prospect for funding for the forseeable
future lies in the scrap for blue dollars already targeted
by the Navy for programming surface action ships as well as
other "big ticket items." Again The answer lies, I believe,
in taking the message directly to the people by our
appropriate spokesmen, namely the President and key
government leaders.
III NEED TO DISFAVOR FURTHER NUCLEAR MISSILE REDUCTION
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
It was a mistake for the U.S. to advocate the reduction
in the number of intermediate range nuclear missiles in
Europe. Their continued presence there would have
guaranteed a strong relationship, although indirectly, to a
solid U.S. maritime strategy. First, the Soviets have a
great fear of U.S./NATO Pershing II missiles that have been
poised on targets within the Soviet Union for several years.
I believe The effect of such a strong deterrent to a remote,
although possible, incursion across NATO's flanks is a
matter of concern to the Soviets. It is a stated objective
of our official maritime strategy that the U.S. would seize
the initiative against Soviet sea targets in the event that
they attempted to invade Western Europe. While nuclear
missiles currently positioned in Europe will be a likely
target by conventional means should this occur, their
continued presence would be a credible part of our flexible
response ability. The presence of these potent missiles is
a great compliment to our naval striking ability in combined
deterrent effect.
Additionally, by entering into the INF Treaty, we
simply lowered the conventional arms threshold of
confrontation in Central Europe. As a matter of record,
U.S. Representative Les Aspin (D--Wis), Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, suggested that ten
additional ground divisions are needed to restore NATO's
overall deterrent following the removal of INF Missiles.15
What is also important here is that, even though I
think it was a mistake for the President to support the INF
treaty, the American people suppported him after he came
across repeatedly on all television networks emphasizing the
importance of what he believed and articulated as crucial
arms control. Senate ratification was easy once it knew how
Americans thought. This is precisely how our American
public is educated about maritime strategy or otherwise, We
too often take the right case to the wrong people. Of
course it would be naive to suggest that the President and
defense establishment bypass the lawmakers and agencies
responsible for strategy implementation. I submit simply
that we take more of a sound and sensible message regarding
strategy to the catalyst of the Congress and essential
agencies--the public.
IV ALLIES MUST BEAR SHARE OF THE LOAD
The U.S. maritime strategy that I wish to see will be
weakened considerably without the support, both militarily
and economically, of those nations whom we depend upon in
carrying it out. It is pretty easy to draw this conclusion
when considering that the Soviets spend 16-18% per year of
GNP toward defense compared to America's 6.1%.16 Or stated
another way, the Soviets spend at a rate of 3.5% per annum
compared to our decline over the past three years.17 How
can allies help in support of our maritime strategy? What
do we do if they don't? I do not suggest that we tell NATO
that we pull out Europe if its members do not help to "pay
the freight." We do not tell Japan and others under similar
arrangements with the U.S. regarding basing for mutual
defense that we would take out advisors and support if they
do not contribute a fairer share. But rather we should
impose trade restrictions and economic leverage in carefully
determined cases. This policy of linkage between stronger
defense support and potential trade barriers will help to
give America the leash it needs to bring our allies into
positions of responsible support for common defense.
There are those who are quick to point out, and rightly
so, that America is no longer the world economic leader
that it once was. They would use this argument to
suggest that many of our NATO and Pacific Basin allies are
so well positioned from a balance of trade standpoint upon
which the U.S. depends, that it would be dangerous for us to
suggest that we put greater conditions upon their
willingness to bolster mutual defense costs. This simply is
not the case, however. While economic development of the
Western world is a strategic interest of the U.S., it
should not govern our candid and straightforward attempts
to have our allies support what is fair.
In summary, current U.S. maritime strategy offers a
good plan for carrying out national interests and objectives
of Soviet containment and resolution of certain regional
conflicts But it needs to be fused tighter with the
essential ingredient of a better capability to carry it out.
It has been weakened by our failure as a nation to convince
the public sector of how important and costly that strategy
is. Will America be educated? If we in the defense
establishment, working with and through our departmental
structure, speak honestly, openly and often to our nation
through our commander-in-chief and other key elected
supporters then I believe that the answer to the question
favors a credible strategy in the years to come.
FOOTNOTES
1Adm James D. Watkins, (Ret), USN, "The Maritime
Strategy," Proceedings, (January 1986), p.4.
2Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the
U.S.,(January 1988), p.5.
3Watkins, p.9.
4Watkins, p.11.
5Lcdr T. Wood Parker, Jr., USN, "Paradigms, Conventional
Wisdom, and Naval Warfare," Proceedings, (April 1983),
pp.30-35
6Julian Isherwood, "Norwegians Eyeing Soviet Naval Buildup
in Kola Region," Armed Forces Journal International, (March
1989), p.44.
7Isherwood, p.44.
8Tom Clancy, Red Storm Rising (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1986).
9John Lehman, "The 600 Ship Navy," Proceedings, (January
1986), p.38.
11Daskal, p.52.
12Reagan, p.5.
13Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal
Year 1988, Executive Summary, p.168.
14Maj Alan P. Heim, USMC, "Power Projection, Amphibious
Lift, and the Navy/Marine Corps Team," Marine Corps Gazette,
(December 1987), p.37.
15Les Aspin, "Guest Viewpoint," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, (November 1987),p.1.
16Reagan, p.40.
17Reagan, p.39.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Aspin, Les. "Guest Viewpoint." Aviation Week and Space
Technology, (November 1987), 1.
2. Clancy, Tom. Red Storm Rising. New York. G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1986
3. Daskal, Steven E., Capt, USAFR. "The `CVA': Big Deck
Alternative?" Proceedings, (October 1986), 37.
4. Heim, Alan P., Maj, USMC. "Power Projection, Amphibious
Lift, and the Navy/Marine Corps Team. " Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1987), 37.
5. Isherwood, Julian. "Norwegians Eyeing Soviet Naval Buildup
in Kola Region." Armed Forces Journal International,
(March 1989), 44.
6. Lehman, John. "The 600 Ship Navy. " Proceedings, (January
1986), 38.
7. Reagan, Ronald. National Security Strategy of the U.S.,
(January 1988), 5,39,40.
8. Watkins, James D., Adm (Ret), USN. "The Maritime Strategy."
Proceedings, (January 1986), 4-11.
9. Weinberger, Casper W., Annual Report to Congress, Executive
Summary, (FY 1988), 168.
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