National Security Strategy And American Public Opinion
AUTHOR Major Larry D. Tarbet, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Security
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
Thesis. The United States Government must inform the public of
its national security strategy in ways that are clear, and
credible, and likely to elicit support.
Issue. The makers of national security strategy in the United
States are the President, along with his advisors, and the
Congress. Since 1947, and the formation of the National Security
Council (NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), formulation of
this strategy has increasingly become one formulated by
committee. The President's cabinet, as well as the NSC and the
JCS, are appointees; therefore, they are not elected by the
people to their positions. These appointees are immune to any
direct electoral sanctions by the American people; consequently,
they may not feel the need to inform the public. The Congress has
always had the potential to exert substantial control over
national security strategy. It derives power through its control
of the national purse strings, its legislative capabilities, its
authority to declare war and ratify treaties, its capacity to
veto Presidential appointees, and its responsibility for
overseeing the operations of the Executive branch. Historically,
at least three factors have limited the congressional role in
national security policy making: (1) most congressmen have
traditionally shown a much lower interest in foreign affairs than
in domestic policy issues; (2) congressional powers are
decentralized among a large number of committees resulting in
lack of inter-congressional communication and an inability to
reach a consensus on the direction that national security
strategy should take; and (3) inadequate staffs have hindered
their capacity to keep close tabs on the activities of the
executive branch. One of the United States' greatest resources is
public support: however, the government has not been doing a very
good job of keeping the public informed of its strategy. To
understand why this problem exists we must look at three key
questions: (1) is the national security strategy presented in a
way that the public can understand it, (2) is it supported by
both sides of the political process, and (3) will the public
support it even if it means going to war.
Conclusion. The American Government must get the public to
support the national strategy if we are to continue in the world
as a super power.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
and
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
Thesis Statement. The United States Government must inform the
public of its national security strategy in ways that are clear,
credible, and likely to elicit support.
I. National Security Strategy
A. Definition
B. National security objectives
C. Resources available to achieve objectives
1 Four elements of national power
2. Instruments used in employing national power
D. National Security Strategy of the U.S. FOR 1988
II. Makers of National Security Strategy
A. The President
1. National Security Council
2. Joint Chief's of Staff
B. The Congress
III. Public Opinion
A. Definition
B. Role of the people
1. Political parties
2. Pressure groups
IV. Public not informed of the National Security Strategy
A. Ways the government tries to inform the public
1. Presidential speech
2. Congressional record
B. Test needed by the government to see if the public is
informed.
1. Has it been presented to the public in a clear fashion
2. Is it supported by both sides of the political process
3. Will public support it if it means going to war
V. Vietnam's impact on public opinion and national security
strategy
A. Lack of national strategic objectives
B. Loss of public support
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
Strategy as defined by the JCS Pub 1 is "the art and science
of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and
military forces as necessary during peace and war; to afford the
maximum support to policies in order to increase the
probabilities and favorable consequences of victory; and to
lessen the chances of defeat".1 This strategy is developed by
defining what the national interests are and refining these into
broad goals which become our national objective.
Once the objectives are developed we must look at what
resources are available to achieve these objectives. The United
States possesses four elements of national power to achieve its
objectives: diplomatic, informational, economic, and military.
Falling under these elements are specific instruments that are
used in employing them. Ten of the instruments which the United
States employs are: moral and political example, military
strength, economic vitality, alliance relationships, public
diplomacy, security assistance, development assistance, science
and technology cooperation, international organizations, and
diplomatic mediation. Moral and political example and public
diplomacy will be addressed in this paper.2
The NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES,
distributed by the White House in January 1988, states that moral
and political example is the American spirit and prosperity which
represents a critical challenge to the ideology and the practical
record of our adversaries. Since the days of our Founding
Fathers, this power of example has represented a potent leverage
in international relations. But we should not leave its
expression to chance. It is in our interest to spread this
message in an organized and effective way. Public diplomacy
seeks to explain to foreign audiences our policies and actions in
ways that are clear, credible, and likely to elicit support for
our interest and objectives.3 If one looks closely at these
statements it can be seen that they are directed at foreign
governments not the people of the United States. Nowhere in the
list of ten instruments is there anything dealing with keeping
the American people informed or involved in the national
strategy.
History has shown that nations have come full circle from
the age of small states who fought limited wars for limited
objectives to an age of larger states with citizen armies waging
total war to the present where large states are fighting limited
wars for limited objectives. In order for the United States to
fight limited wars, the objectives for that war must be sound and
in the best interests of the nation as seen by the people.
The makers of national security strategy in the United
States are the President, along with his advisors, and the
Congress. The President's power resides in his constitutional
role as the commander-in-chief and the highest executive of the
government. Until the recent past the President has had the
responsibility of formulating national security strategy and
answered directly to the people for that strategy. Since 1947,
and the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), formulation of this strategy has
increasingly become one formulated by committee. The President's
cabinet, as well as the NSC and JCS, are appointees; therefore,
they are not elected by the people to their positions. These
appointees are immune to any direct electoral sanctions by the
American people; consequently, they may not feel the need to
inform the public. The NSC and JCS provide the President with
the following services and staff work: policy coordination,
policy advice, policy planning, and a crisis decision making
forum.4
The Congress has always had the potential to exert
substantial control over national security strategy. It derives
power through its control of the national purse strings, its
legislative capabilities, its authority to declare war and ratify
treaties, its capacity to veto Presidential appointees, and its
responsibility for overseeing the operations of the Executive
Branch. Historically, at least three factors have limited the
congressional role in national security policymaking: (1) most
congressmen have traditionally shown a much lower interest in
foreign affairs than in domestic policy issues; (2) congressional
powers are decentralized among a large number of committees, each
of which jealously guards its piece of national security turf,
resulting in a lack of inter-congressional communication and an
inability to reach consensus on the directions that national
security strategy should take; and (3) inadequate staffs have
hindered congressional capacity to keep close tabs on the
activities of the executive bureaucracies. However, beginning
with the period of the Vietnam War, Congress has demanded a
larger role in national security strategy making process
primarily through its control over appropriations.5
We must achieve a better working relationship between the
Congress and President. Under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
to a lesser degree Johnson and Nixon, the President was the
ultimate maker of national strategy. However, after Watergate
and Vietnam the division of this responsibility has become a
subject of concern. Congress too frequently responds on the
basis of short-term political pressures. By accepting the more
permanent significance of foreign policy and looking toward the
long term, Congress could become a more effective participant in
the initiation and continuity of foreign policy.6
Public opinion is the term most frequently employed for the
people as a whole and their political role. Upon until World War
I (WWI), foreign policy or national security strategy was the
province of the government and not the people. By the end of WWI
and its terrible cost of men, the majority of the public wanted a
larger voice in national security strategy. This was reinforced
by the United States' reluctance to enter World War II (WWII)
until we were attacked and forced to declare war.7
There are two ways in which the people can influence
national security strategy: either through political parties or
pressure groups. The combination of these two helped end the
Vietnam War. Elected officials in both parties expressed their
disfavor with the war and students and veterans groups forced
pressure groups to influence the government.
One of the United States' greatest resources is public
support; however, the government has not been doing a very good
job of keeping the public informed of its strategy. To
understand why this problem exists we must look at three key
questions: (1) is the national strategy presented in a way that
the public can understand it, (2) is it supported by both sides
of the political process, and (3) will the public support it even
if it means going to war?
How the strategy is presented is critical because the public
will not support something they do not understand. Strategy is
presented to the public through State of the Union messages,
televised speeches, or presented to Congress and placed in the
congressional record. A large portion of the public will miss
the speeches and very few will read the congressional record
resulting in an uninformed public on the national security
strategy. Consequently, we have a national security strategy
that is only known and understood by the Executive Branch and
Congress. It may be said that most Americans are not really
concerned with the national security strategy unless it involves
going to war. This may be true; however, today we are much
closer at any given time to a limited war than any time in the
past. The American people have always been slow to go to war and
had to be provoked. The Vietnam War was a clear example of going
to war without a definitive national security strategy with
objectives and finding out that the public did not support it.
Initially, the Gulf of Tonkin incident gained public support for
American intervention. However, continuation of the war without
a sound national security strategy resulted in the loss of that
support. The government must make every effort to keep the
public informed so they will be able to understand and support
its strategy.
The second question deals with bipartisan cooperation in the
Congress. The Executive Branch must find a way to get Congress
to understand and support its strategy. It is very difficult in
the country to gain the public's support if support in the
Legislative Branch cannot be gained. Because of our two party
system there will always be some disagreement on national
security strategy; therefore, it is imperative that the Executive
Branch develop a sound strategy that the majority of the
Legislative Branch will support and then relay that support to
the public. National strategy must be bipartisan to work and be
assured of public support. During the Vietnam War there was a
lack of support in the Congress because it became apparent that
the Executive Branch did not have a clear set of objectives or
the resources to obtain those objectives. This was suggested in
a statement by Senator William Fulbright in 1967 that "the U.S.
was in danger of losing its perspective on what exactly is in the
realm of its power and what is beyond it". Statements like these
affect public opinion, and it was only a few months later that a
survey showed 46% of the public regarded the commitment to
Vietnam as a mistake.8
The most important question concerns public support of the
strategy even if it means going to war. In a democratic country
where the people elect the governing officials, a president may
be brought down without public support. The people must believe
in the cause and that there is a bonafide reason for it before
allowing their sons to be sent to war, which may be more
difficult in this age of limited wars fought for limited
objectives. The American people are not easily provoked and
usually fight for punitive reasons. The government must be able
to convince the public that going to war is in the country's best
interests. This may be difficult since Vietnam not only divided
the country but caused distrust between the public and the
government.
There are two reasons today that a war like Vietnam could
not be sustained by the government: (1) the country has an all
voluntary force and no draft, which restricts manpower for the
armed forces and (2) with the total force concept the reserves
and national guard would have to be called up. This is one of
the things President Johnson would not do during Vietnam because
of the public opinion. He was quoted as saying "the weakest
chink in our armor is American public opinion. Our people won't
firm in the face of heavy losses, and they can bring down the
government."9 During this timeframe John McNaughton put it best
with the statement "a feeling is widely and strongly held that
the establishment is out of its mind ... that we are trying to
impose some U.S. image on distant peoples we cannot understand,
and that we are carrying the thing to absurd lengths". Related
to this feeling is the increased polarization that is taking
place in the United States, with seeds of the worst split in our
people in more than a century."10
Compared to WWII,the enemy engaged in the Vietnam conflict
were less "evil"; consequently, it was far more difficult to find
convincing ideological or humanitarian reasons to justify the war
to the public. It was a "dirty little war" in a far away place.
Because of its limited, far away nature, it was more difficult to
view the war as necessary from the standpoint of American
security, although the idea of "stopping the Communists" was
related to this concern. In addition, the war was never formally
declared.11
The war became important in domestic partisan politics. It
was begun under a Democratic President who decided not to seek
reelection at a time when the unpopular war was continuing. In
the election, the Democratic party was removed from the White
House by the vote of the American people. They chose to elect a
Republican candidate who promised new, specific initiatives to
bring the war to a speedy end.12
The American people must support the national strategy in
order for it to succeed. The American public has always
considered their country a winner and Vietnam has shaken that
belief. Henry Kissinger has stated, "Vietnam is still with us.
It has created doubts about American judgement, about American
credibility, about American power--not only at home, but
throughout the world."13 Postwar polls show that Americans blame
their political leaders for denying victory to the U.S. forces in
Vietnam.14 General Fred Weyand, the last American commander in
Vietnam, has said:
The American Army is really a people's army
in the sense that it belongs to the American
people, who take a jealous and proprietary
interest in its involvement. When the Army
is committed the American people are
committed; when the American people lose
their commitment it is futile to try to keep
the Army committed. The U.S. may have won
some tactical victories in the war but
suffered a strategic failure.15
The American government must get the public to support the
national strategy if we are to continue in the world as a super
power. The people will not soon forget the government's past
transgressions of the Vietnam War and will judge all future
policies and strategies by that war. Therefore, along with moral
and political example, military strength, economic vitality,
alliance relationships, public diplomacy, security assistance,
development assistance, science and technology cooperation,
international organizations and diplomatic mediation, there
should be an eleventh element added that involves informing the
public of our national security policies and strategies in ways
that are clear, credible, and likely to elicit support.
FOOTNOTES
1JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms. (Washington D.C., 1987),p. 45.
2The White House National Security Strategy of the United
States January 1988.p.7.
3National Security Strategy of the United States,p.7.
4Robert H. Trice,"Principles and Issues,"in American Defense
Policy,eds.John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1982),p.505.
5Trice,p.506.
6James R. Schlesinger,"U.S. National-Security Challenges for
the 1980s,"in The Future of Conflict in the 1980s,eds. William J.
Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (Lexington: Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath & Company, 1981),p.17.
7Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, (London:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1963),p.70.
8Stanley Karnow, Vietnam A History, (New York: Penquin
Books,1984),p.488.
9Karnow,p.481.
10Karnow,p.479.
11John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, (New
York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1973),p.34.
12Mueller,p.34.
13Karnow,p.9.
14Karnow,p.15.
15Karnow,p.16.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frankel, Joseph. The Making of Foreign Policy. London: Oxford
University Press, 1963.
JCS PUB 1, Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. Washington D.C., 1987.
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam A History. New York: Penquin Books,
1984.
Mueller, John E.. War, Presidents And Public Opinion. New York:
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1973.
Schlesinger, James R.." National-Security Challenges For The
1980s," in The Future of Conflict in The 1980s. Ed. William
J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen. Lexington: Lexington
Books, D.C. Heath & Company, 1981.
The White House. National Security of The United States, January
1988.
Trice, Robert H.."Principles and Issues," in American Defense
Policy. Ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
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