A Hedge Against Uncertainty: Command, Control, And Communications (C3) Technology AUTHOR Major J.R. Thomas, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - C4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: A HEDGE AGAINST UNCERTAINTY: COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) TECHNOLOGY THESIS: The commander's interaction with machine technology is less than perfect. However, an appreciation of C3 technology in the areas of communications and computers can reduce the uncertainty in battle. ISSUE: To win in battle, the commander seeks accurate and timely information to make certain that his actions are correct. The command, control, and communication system's function is to help satisfy his critical information needs. Without a reliable and responsive C3 system, the commander's ability to make a logical decision relegates itself to a dependence on the uncertainty in the outcome of battle. While the commander's critical information needs are simple, he has to interact with man and machine to reconcile his information needs. It is this imperfect alliance which causes the phenomenon of "fog and friction" in war which leads to the uncertainty of its outcome. Martin Van Creveld says that certainty on the battlefield is an unattainable goal due to the "fog" and "friction" of war. Not immune to fog and friction, doctrine can cause uncertainty. While accepting a limited degree of uncertainty is tolerable, to resign oneself to viewing the battlefield as a three-dimensional stage for events to unfold outside the influence of the commander is unexcusable. Both the Soviet Union and United States subscribe to a military defense policy which center pieces technology. It is the pursuit of technology which has had the most influence on these two countries achieving superpower status. By calling for substantial investments in C3 automation, our national military defense strategy causes us to deal with uncertainty through technology. Nonetheless, it is impossible to envision a C3 system which avoids the potential imperfections of man in either its design or use. CONCLUSION: The modern and future battlefields will have one major thing in common--they will be C3 system intensive. Advances in C3 technology in the areas of digital communications and computer applications makes available the resources necessary to create an atmosphere of certainty on the battlefield. A HEDGE AGAINST UNCERTAINTY: COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATONS (C3) TECHNOLOGY OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The commander's interaction with machine technology is less than perfect. However, an appreciation of C3 technology in the areas of communications and computers can reduce the uncertainty in battle. I. Factors influencing victory in battle A. Information needs B. Responsive C3 systems C. Man vs Machine 1. Investments in C3 automation 2. Supporting doctrine 3. Reconciling imperfections of man and machine II. The quest for certainty A. The National Defense Strategy B. The technology edge C. The human factor III. Changing doctrine in pursuit of certainty A. Maneuver Warfare B. Understanding Intent IV. Certainty through technology A. Communications 1. Digital communications 2. Burst transmissions 3. System limitations B. Computers applications 1. Process and send data 2. System limitations V. Battlefield of the future A. The technology advantage B. Resources to deal with uncertainty C. Recognizing the requirements D. Fulfilling information needs A HEDGE AGAINST UNCERTAINTY: COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) TECHNOLOGY The final aim in any battle should be to win a decisive victory whether militarily, politically or economically. To win in battle, the commander seeks accurate and timely information to make certain that his actions are correct. Realistically, the command, control, and communication system's function is to help satisfy his critical information needs. Without a reliable and responsive C3 system, the commander's ability to make a logical decision relegates itself to a dependence on the uncertainty in the outcome of battle. While the commander's critical information needs are simple, he has to interact with man and machine to reconcile his information needs. It is this imperfect alliance which causes the phenomenon of "fog and friction" in war which leads to the uncertainty of its outcome. The commander's interaction with machine technology is less than perfect. However, an appreciation of C3 technology in the areas of communications and computers can reduce the uncertainty in battle. Martin Van Creveld says that certainty on the battlefield is an unattainable goal due to the "fog" and "friction" of war. Fog refers to a commanders' imperfect ability to distinguish relevant information. On the otherhand, friction is akin to "Murphy's Law" which says you can expect something to go wrong in the best of situations. Many commanders find it difficult to accept uncertainty in battle and rightly so. While accepting a limited degree of uncertainty is tolerable, to resign oneself to viewing the battlefield as a three-dimensional stage for events to unfold outside the influence of the commander is unexcusable. Moreover, it is understandable that commanders are turning to technology to solve critical information needs. Designed to get, process, and send more and more, the C3 systems carry the burden of providing certainty to the commander on the battlefield. While Martin Van Creveld refers to the maddening pursuit of technology as "the futile quest for certainty," it is difficult to embrace fully this concept. Both the Soviet Union and United States subscribe to a military defense policy which center pieces technology. Afterall, it is the pursuit of technology which has had the most influence on these two countries achieving superpower status. A review of the National Security Strategy of the United states provides an excellent example. Our defense policies stress that the United States and its allies must continue to enjoy technological superiority over the Soviet Union....Our advantages in areas such as precision guided munitions, stealth technology, submarine quieting, and super-computer technology are important strategic assets and we intend to exploit them...1 By calling for substantial investments in C3 automation, our national military defense strategy places us on a head-on confrontation with uncertainty. One merely has to view the long range C3 architecture for our armed forces to appreciate this fact. For example, reviewing the draft Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan you find the document littered with "high tech" solutions to lessen uncertainty on the battlefield. The vertical take-off and landing aircrafts (V/STOL-AV-8B Harrier and V-22 Osprey) are excellent examples. Forward basing fast moving V/STOL fixed wing aircrafts are a noble quest for certainty on the uncertain battlefield. The question to ask is "Where will it land?". Carrying the analogy one step farther, consider this graphic description of combat in the 21st Century. First come the drones, wheeling high in the sky like vultures. The robot planes stay aloft for days, scanning the terrain, eavesdropping on radio chatter, and feeding information to intelligence specialists safely ensconced in a bunker 100 miles away. Ten miles to the east a group of skyborne, smaller robot aircraft wait for the silent enemy to turn on his radar. At the first electronic pulse, these kamikaze machines will swoop down on the enemy's gun emplacements...2 Consider now, an electrical storm disrupts the signal to the drone (Remote Piloted Vehicle [RPV]). Out of control, the robot drone crashes and kills many innocent civilian lives in a heavily populated city. Seriously, this description sounds much like our evolving doctrine for the use of the RPV. Here is another example--a Marine pilot fails to balance the vertical jets of a V/STOL aircraft and plummets to his death. Once again man pits himself against automation only to find himself emersed in fog and friction to become a victim of uncertainty. Think of the savings in military lives if man could remove himself from the loop. Nevertheless, military leaders can be successful in battle by reconciling the imperfections of man and the preciseness of machines. "In any case, the causes, nature and outcome of war are determined by the human element of society."3 A study of history reveals many examples of the human element causing confusion and fear in combat. Commanders, influenced by the imperfections of man, make good and bad decisions. Often times, these decisions change the destiny of nations. Consider this incident in the war torn region of the Persian Gulf. On 3 July 1988, an Aegis cruiser, the U.S.S. Vincennes was participating in an oil tanker escort mission. Armed with the Aegis air-defense system, the cruiser felt confident it could defend herself. The Aegis system is a highly automated target tracking system capable of tracking 16 aerial targets at a time. While moving through the gulf, the cruiser detected an aircraft on its radar and mistook it for an attacking Iranian F-14. The combat information center (CIC) aboard the ship reported to the captain that the Vincennes was under attack. Reacting quickly, the ship tried to contact the approaching aircraft with no success. The captain of the ship ordered the plane shot down. The missile hit its target which turned out to be a commercial Iranian flight (F1 655) with 290 civilians aboard. There were no survivors. Later, a navy investigation revealed that human error caused the misidentification of the aircraft and that the Aegis System worked. The captain of the Vincennes made his decision to fire based on data provided by his CIC which was in error. Perhaps the crew of the U.S.S. Vincennes reacted too quickly, or it remembered the incident of the frigate U.S.S. Stark a year earlier. Operating in the same region, the Stark did not react and was hit by an Iraqi missile which killed 37 sailors. "Human error in a battle environment kills a lot of people," says Norman Polmar of the U.S. Naval Institute. Not immune to fog and friction, doctrine can cause uncertainty. The Webster Dictionary defines doctrine as a set of beliefs or principles codified by a group of people or organization. The United States Marine Corps' evolving basic ground combat doctrine of maneuver warfare is not immune to fog and friction. Maneuver warfare is an approach to war which emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy's tactical units and the mental process of the enemy commander--his ability to make correct and timely decisions--rather than simply attempting to inflict casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained.4 At the heart of success in maneuver warfare is the issuance of mission-type orders. Mission-type orders specify what must be done without prescribing how it must be done. An understanding of the "commanders' intent" is the most crucial element in the equation. A full understanding of intent frees the commander or his subordinate without guidance to seize the initiative to exploit or destroy the enemy. Additionally, decentralized control provides greater flexibility. During the American Revolution, the German term for this type of warfare was "Auftragstaktik." A subordinates lack of understanding of the commanders' intent runs the risk that the mission will be a failure. This is the problem. Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen are imperfect human beings. The commander's intent is subject to imperfect interpretation resulting in confusion and uncertainty in the minds of those individuals having to execute the orders. This is clear when you look at a simple hypothetical mission-type order given by higher headquarters to a division commander. Here is the general situation provided to 2nd Marine Division on 6 February 1989. Situation: An enemy force has invaded the US from Cuba. The enemy advancement has been halted just north of Jacksonville, Fl. US forces have been fighting to push the enemy south to Miami in order to restore national borders. The enemy headquarters is located in Jacksonville, Fl where he has control of the US naval port. 2nd Marine Division located on the South Carolina border receives a warning order directing it to prepare to repel the enemy in order to (intent) restore national borders. Mission-Type Orders: Higher headquarters sent the following mission to 2d MARDIV on 7 February 1989. 2nd Marine Division at H-hour on 8 Feb. 89 will attack to seize the port of Jacksonville, Fl. in order to (intent) regain control of the port. Destroy enemy in zone and prevent withdrawal to the west. The 2d Marine Division commander must now selects the best course of action to accomplish the above mission. Having received the higher headquarters' intent and the mission it assigned, he has enough information to operate in isolation. Given fog, friction and the imperfections of man, the division commander is likely to develop a unique interpretation of the mission orders he received to execute. The orders raise a number of questions which can only be answered by higher headquarters. Is the division to seize the port and not the city? Is it possible to do one and not the other? Is it desired to do one and not the other? How critical is time if the enemy has to be destroyed, the city cleared and the port seized? Why gain control of the port if the overall intent is to push the enemy south to restore the border? What does destroy the enemy in zone mean? Should enemy forces be pushed to south vice destroyed? Which is likely to result in fewer casualties? It becomes clear that a reasonable understanding of intent at one level does not prevent a wrong interpretation by individuals at other levels of command. Thinking you have a grasp of the commander's intent can be as catastrophic. As quickly, failure to resolve questions can add to the uncertainty and confusion in battle. It is impossible to envision a C3 system which avoids the potential imperfections of man in either its design or use. " No single communications or data processing technology, no single system of organization, no single procedure or method, is in itself sufficient to guarantee the successful or even adequate conduct of command in war."5 As long as the human element remains in the loop some uncertainty in combat will exist. Commanders and subordinates alike must accept this idiosyncrasy and move forward with the conduct of war. They must stand prepared to respond to the imperfections of men and deal with the results of fog and friction. While many military thinkers continue to espouse the notion that achieving certainty on the battlefield is a futile quest, a degree of certainty is possible with the advances in C3 equipment technology. Digital communications and computer applications in C3 systems provide the resources necessary to create an atmosphere of certainty on the battlefield. "Deterring and defeating aggression requires more than combat forces and a logistical support system...It also requires command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems."6 The success of the commander on the battlefield rests on three factors. First, he requires the skills to discern his critical information needs. Secondly, he needs the ability and knowledge that will allow him to select those C3 systems which will capture this information. Finally, the commander requires an understanding of C3 system limitations. Communications equipments and computers are important tools to aid the commander in creating an atmosphere of certainty. For example, by using the Position Reporting and Location System (PLRS), a commander can exercise control over his forces by knowing their exact location at any time on the battlefield. PLRS is a crypto secure, jam resistant, computer system which will significantly enhance the commanders' versatility to decide in a tactical operation. Similar to PLRS, NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based satellite navigation system that provides accurate three-dimensional position and navigation information worldwide. A commander can improve his maneuverability and provide for more accurate and timely fire support to units equipped with PLRS and NAVSTAR GPS. However, like any system there are limitations to their usefulness. While designed and built to aid in the decision process, relying solely on systems such as PLRS or NAVSTAR GPS runs the risk of creating a situation of dependence. As equipment failure occurs, the commander may find himself at a loss to prosecute the battle without a machine report. Further, PLRS and GPS do not provide data on the enemy force. Therefore, when planning for an operation with this equipment, the commander must weigh the need for alternative systems to satisfy critical information needs. Nonetheless, the commander must make effective use of technology in the form of computers to survive. This is necessary because of the large amounts of information to process and analyze. With computer automation fully integrated into the military, the commander's ability to process and analyze information from many sources is a reality. Serving as a force multiplier, computers can analyze intelligence data from a variety of sources (satellite, radio, etc.), and provide the commander with near real-time intelligence updates on enemy forces at record speed. To be sure, commanders must recognize and deal with computer limitations on the battlefield. One of the biggest issues which surrounds the use of computers on the battlefield is nuclear survivability. Depending on the type of nuclear explosion, each nuclear detonation would generate varying degrees of heat, radiation, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and shockwave. Each uniquely effects computer electronics. Computer systems can be protected from these effects through a process called "hardening." The point to remember is that computers can create havoc on the battlefield if the data it produces or the equipment itself is assumed to be infallible. Afterall, computers are designed, built, and programmed by man. Other advances in communications are providing the edge to the commander. One such development is the introduction of the Digital Communications Terminal (DCT). The DCT is a programmable, hand-held, input/output device that operates over tactical radio and wireline systems. It allows the commander to compose rapidly, edit, send, receive and display preformatted, free-text messages and graphic data. The DCT represents a quantum improvement in speed, accuracy, and reliability of Marine Corps tactical communications. By taking advantage of the latest technology advances in burst transmissions, the radio frequency (RF) signature of units in combat are smaller. Radio operators spend less time on the radio. A reduced radio signature means the enemy is less likely to locate, jam, or destroy friendly units. Again, failure to recognize the limitations of digital communications can have a negative impact on the decision process. First, the circuit path must be of good quality to provide a reasonable chance of success of passing data. Second, repair of digital equipment is more difficult. Often times, equipment has to be returned to the manufacturer. This means commands must have sufficient quantities to replace damaged equipment. Many other technological developments are under procurement or have begun the research, development, testing and evaluation phase. Even with their limitations, computers and communications equipments are pivotal to the success on the modern and future battlefields. The modern battlefield and the battlefield of the future will have one major thing in common--they will be C3 system intensive. Our over-the-horizon capability will steadily improve. The amphibious assault forces will see bigger and faster ships (LHD-1, LSD-41, and LCAC). Increased investments in space are likely--fueled in part by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). With the space shuttle flying once again, greater access to space means more C3 satellites and greater control and maneuverability of United States defense forces. Many other initiatives, sponsored by the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, seeks to address our command, control, and communications needs in concert with our US National Security Strategy. At the center of this strategy is the quest for certainty. The goal is to provide the military chain of command with the necessary resources to make accurate and timely decisions. Everyone in the chain of command is benefitting from this strategy. Advances in C3 technology in the areas of digital communications and computer applications makes available the resources necessary to create an atmosphere of certainty on the battlefield. This atmosphere of certainty is created when the commander satisfies his information requirements. A recognition and understanding of these critical information needs and an appreciation for the human factor provides the frame work for the commander to make accurate and timely decisions. While a robust and responsive C3 system fails to assure success in battle, its benefits serve as a force multiplier when used effectively, thereby, obviating fog and friction. ENDNOTES 1 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988, p.9. 2 Owen Davies, "Robotic Warriors Clash in Cyberwars," Omni (January 1987):76. 3 Martin Van Creveld, Command In War (Massachusetts and England: Harvard University Press, 1985). 4 U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Operations OH 6-1. Quantico, Va. January 1988,p. 1-5. 5 Martin Van Creveld, Command In War (Massachusetts and England: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 261. 6 Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1990, dtd January 17, 1989 (GPO, Washington, D.C.), p. 197. BIBLIOGRAPHY Barry, John; Sandza, Richard, and Russell Watson. "A Case of Human Error." Newsweek, 15 August 1988. Cohen, Richard M. "Blaming Men, Not Machines." Time, 15 August 1988. Creveld, Martin Van. Command In War. Massachusetts and England: Harvard University Press, 1985. Davies, Owen, "Robotic Warriors Clash in Cyberwars," Omni (January 1987). Newell, Clayton R., LTCOL. USA. "Fog and Friction: Challenges to Command and Control." Military Review, August 1987. Roberts, Wesley K., "Battlefield Leaders for the Twenty-First Century: The Razor's Edge of Leadership," Military Review, 11 (November 1988). Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1990, dtd January 17, 1989 (GPO, Washington, D.C.). The Royal Bank Letter, "Living with Uncertainty," published by The Royal Bank of Canada, vol. 68. No.2, March/April 1987. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps 1987 Concepts and Issues. Washington, D.C. 3 February 1987. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Operations OH 6-1. Quantico, Va. January 1988. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Ground Combat Element Command Control, OH 6-1A. Quantico, Va. June 1988. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. MAGTF Master Plan (draft). Quantico, Va., 5 December 1988. Vermillion, Major John M., "Tactical Implications of the Adoption of Auftragstaktik for Command and Control on the Airland Battlefield." DTIC Technical Report. FT Leavenworth Kansas, 2 December 1985.
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