The Role Of Marine Aviation In Maneuver Warfare
AUTHOR Major John B. Saxman, USAF
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
The Marine Corps has made maneuver warfare its
official doctrine. Major efforts have been made to
incorporate this doctrine into Marine Corps' operations.
However, the focus has been primarily on the ground combat
element. Very few authors have written on the role of the
Marine air combat element in maneuver warfare. One of the
few who has tackled the subject is William S. Lind. Bill
Lind is a familiar author to most marines. He has written
extensively on the employment of the ground combat element
in maneuver warfare. His most recent work, "Maneuver
Warfare and Aviation," attempts to define how the air combat
element should be employed. While Mr. Lind's ideas on the
employment of ground forces were relatively sound, his
concepts for the employment of airpower are questionable
at best.
This paper defines the role of Marine aviation in
maneuver warfare by contrasting Mr. Lind's viewpoints with
those of the author. Mr. Lind's basic tenet is that
aviation should be used primarily in the role of flying
artillery for the ground combat unit. The author takes the
viewpoint that aviation should be considered a co-equal
combat arm wish the ground element and used as an
independent maneuver unit when the operational situation
dictates.
Because these two viewpoints are so diverse, they each
have entirely different implications on doctrine, command
and control, education, missions, and equipment. This
paper examines the two viewpoints in each of these major
areas and recommends the changes necessary to incorporate
the author's point of view on the role of aviation in
maneuver warfare.
THE ROLE OF MARINE AVIATION IN MANEUVER WARFARE
In order to truly employ the tenets of maneuver
warfare, the Marine Corps' air combat element must operate
as an independent maneuver unit synchronized with, not
subjugated to, the operations of the ground combat unit.
I. Introduction
A. Synchronization vs subjugation
B. Implications for other services
C. Focus on exposing the fallacies of
the reform movement's viewpoint
II. Five main areas of contention
A. Doctrine
1. Strategic and operational vs tactical
doctrine
2. Airpower as the focus of main effort
B. Command and control
1. Maneuver warfare top down emphasis
2. Air combat element's role in MAGTF
3. MAGTF's reluctance to use ACE as an
independent maneuver unit
C. Education
1. Lack of aviation education for ground
officers
2. Difference in view of the battlefield
between the ACE and OCE
D. Missions
1. Need for air superiority to be priority
mission.
2. Armed reconnaissance vs battlefield air
interdiction
E. Equipment
1. Characteristics of the military
reforme's ideal Marine aircraft
2. Problems with this aircraft
THE ROLE OF MARINE AVIATION IN MANEUVER WARFARE
The survival of the Marine Air and Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) is in jeopardy. Many military reformers, in the
guise of promoting maneuver warfare, are advocating that the
Marines eliminate their helicopter, reconnaissance, air
superiority, and all weather interdiction aircraft and
replace them with the modern day equivalent of the Stuka
dive bomber.1 Many military reformers believe the
only role for the Marine Air Combat Element (ACE) in
maneuver warfare is to supplement the lack of organic
firepower in the Ground Combat Element (GCE). If Marine
aviation is relegated to this role, then the Marine Corps is
no longer fighting as a MAGTF, but merely as a ground combat
unit with very expensive airborne artillery. A Marine Corps
without its own multi-purpose ACE would not be significantly
different than any other light, mobile, ground force. The
MAGTF is unique because it is the only single service task
force that can combine a GCE and ACE into a highly mobile,
rapidly deployable, combined arms team. However, many
military reformers, along with some marines, fail to see the
advantages of using the ACE as an independent maneuver unit.
In order to truly employ the tenets of maneuver warfare,
1William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare and Aviation (Unpublished
Manuscript, Second Draft), pp. 28 - 29.
the ACE must operate as an independent maneuver unit
synchronized with, not subjugated to, the operations of the
GCE.
The Marine Corps' decision on how it will employ its
aviation has wide spread implications for the other
services. If the Marine Corps elects to restructure its
ACE to emphasize only close air support (CAS), then the air
Force and Navy will have to provide the Marine GCE with all
the other ground support missions (reconnaissance, anti air
warfare, deep air support, and electronic warfare).1
Additionally, the Marine Corps' emphasis on CBS could
adversely affect the air Force's ability to acquire the type
of replacement ground support aircraft it desires. Marine
Corps aviation has long enjoyed a reputation among some
members of Congress and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense as being the premier organization in supporting
ground combat units. By emphasizing only CAS, the Marine
Corps would be sending out a signal that could easily be
misconstrued to mean that the other aviation ground support
missions are not important. The Air Force, under pressure
to "do it like the Marine Corps" could be pushed into buying
a limited capability aircraft capable of only close air
support, rather than a more practicable, multi-mission
MCDEC,USMC, Tasking USMC Fixed Wing Tactical Aviation,
OH 5-3, (Quantico, 1982), p. 1-1.
aircraft that could accomplish all the ground support
missions.
When the army air Force first struggled with the
difficult question of how to best employ its airpower, it
was fortunate to have an influential and visionary leader to
give it guidance. As the Marine Corps now ponders a similar
question, it unfortunately is receiving its advice from a
Billy Lind, not a Billy Mitchell. William S. Lind needs no
introduction to members of the Marine Corps. He is a
controversial figure who marines seem to either like or
despise. He has significant influence with the Marine Corps
and access to some of its senior leadership. While a few
might relegate his contributions to promoting maneuver
warfare as little more than expanding the Marine Corps'
vocabulary of German phrases, many would grant him
considerable credit for influencing the Marine Corp to adopt
maneuver warfare as its official doctrine. In his book,
"The Maneuver Warfare Handbook," he describes how the
ground combat element should fight using maneuver doctrine.
While this book was relatively well received by the members
of the GCE, aviators are finding the ideas expressed in his
most recent work, "Maneuver Warfare and Aviation,
questionable at best. Athough numerous people have
expressed their opinion on the role of the ACE in maneuver
warfare, none are as influential, have developed their ideas
as extensively, or have put as much effort into reforming
the Marine Corps as Mr. Lind. Therefore, his manuscript
"Maneuver Warfare and Aviation" could be considered to be
the center of gravity of the reform movement's position.
Exposing the fallacies of his maneuver warfare concepts
concerning Marine aviation doctrine, command and control,
education, missions, and equipment is the Schwerpunkt (main
effort) of this paper.
Doctrine
Doctrine is the glue that holds everything together. It
determines the command and control, education, missions, and
equipment a service needs. Therefore, doctrine must be
sufficiently encompassing that it covers all situations
under which the service may be called to fight. The main
problem with Mr. Lind's doctrinal concept of maneuver
warfare is that he tends to focus on the tactical level
of war and emphasizes winning battles, rather than focusing
on the operational and strategic levels and emphasizing
winning wars. Not only does he focus on battle, but he
discounts the impact that air and naval forces can have on
the conflict:
... when we speak of an air Schwerpunkt, we are
not saying that air is the Schwerpunkt to the
MAGTF. There has been some misunderstanding on
this point. Because in almost all situations it is
the ground battle that is decisive, the
Schwerpunkt for the MAGTF is defined in term of
the ground battle. ...the air Schwerpunkt is the
answer to the question, "What can air do that
nothing else can do that will have a decisive
effect of the ground battle?" In other words, the
air supports the ground. It is possible that
there could be a few situations where an action by
aviation would be the total force Schwerpunkt,
i.e., where air would be looked to for a decision
and the ground forces would be in support. But
history suggests this will happen seldom, if ever.
The history of attempts to achieve decisions by
air alone is one of repeated failures.1
While history might show that air alone has often
failed to achieve decisions in battle, it also shows that
ground combat alone has not won many, wars. The war in the
Pacific during WW II provides an excellent strategic
example. Did the United States win the war in the Pacific
because of the island hopping battles fought by the army and
Marines, the Navy's control of the sea lines of
communication, or the air Force's bombardment of the
Japanese mainland? Who was the Schwerpunkt in this example?
Was it land, sea, or air forces? Obviously, the point of
effort changed from one force to another throughout the
campaign. None of the forces individually won the war. All
made unique and essential contributions to the overall
effort.
1 Lind, p.6.
The campaign in Italy during WW II illustrates this
idea at the operational level of war. Allied ground forces
were stagnated at the Gustav line. Even though enough
dedicated fighter and bomber close air support was provide
to reduce the town of Cassino to rubble, the ground combat
units could not win the tactical battle and advance.1
Allied airpower`s independent interdiction campaign,
code-named "Operation Strangle," was equally ineffective.
Only after the allies viewed the problem from the
operational level, did they finally realize how to overcome
the Germans. The solution, an operation code-named
"Diadem," called for a synchronized combined air and ground
offensive. While the allied ground units waged a renewed
attack and increased the German's need for resupply and
mobility, allied air forces interdicted the railroads and
highways needed to get the supplies and reserves to the
front. The Germans now faced an unsolvable dilemma. Allied
destruction of the rail system forced them to devote much of
their motor transportation to moving supplies. This
drawdown of their motor transport assets, combined with an
increased battlefield air interdiction effort, degraded
1 W. F. Craven and J. L. Crate, eds., The Army Air Forces
in World War II, Europe: Argument to V-E Day (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 366-370.
their tactical mobility at the time they needed it most.1
Unable to wage an effective flexible defense, the Germans
were forced to withdraw from their long held positions.
This example provides several excellent points. In this
situation, no amount of close air support to the allied
ground combat forces was enough to help them win the
tactical battle. Nor was an independent air interdiction
operation successful. It took a synchronized air and ground
effort at the operational, not tactical level, to eventually
achieve a decision. The final point worth pondering in this
example is "Who was the Schwerpunkt?" Was it the ground
maneuver unit that increased the enemy's need for supply and
mobility or was it the air maneuver unit that actually
destroyed the enemy's supplies and reserves?
The preceding two examples demonstrated how air, land,
and sea forces can work together at the strategic and
operational levels to achieve a decision. The 1973
Arab-Isreali war provides a tactical example of a ground
maneuver unit conducting operations solely to support the
air maneuver unit. The operation was code-named "Gazelle".
1Battlefield air interdiction (BAI) is a USAF term
for attacks on troops and equipment immediately behind the
main battle area. It differs from deep interdiction because
it has a near term impact on the tactical battle.
2Price T. Bingham, "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction
in the Operational Art," Paramters, XIX No. 1, (March, 1969),
pp. 19-20.
The Isreali Air Force (IAF) could not adequately operate as
a combined arms team with the ground combat unit because the
Egyptian air defense belt was for all purposes impenetrable
by air. To overcome this dilemma, the Isreali ground forces
attacked the SAM sites, destroyed 10 of them, and eventually
established a safe corridor through the air defences for the
IAF. This gave the IAF the maneuver room it needed to
accomplish a successful attrition of 53 of the remaining 61
SAM sites.1 With the SAM threat reduced, the Isreali
Defence Force combined arms team went on to completely
surround the Egyptian Third army and cut it off from its
source of supply.2
These three examples demonstrate the need for doctrine
to be applicable at the strategic and operational levels as
well as the tactical level. Mr. Lind's emphasis on maneuver
warfare at the tactical level overlooks the fact that a
nation must be decisive at the operational and strategic
levels in order to win a war. His belief that the ground
combat unit is almost always the Schwerpunkt can lead to
1US army Command and General Staff College Reference
Book, Selected Readings in Tactics, The 1973 Middle East
War, RB 100-2. Vol 1, (Ft Leavenworth: Government Printing
Office, Aug 1976), pp. 5-11.
2Ross L. Smith, Close Air Support - Can It Survive
the 80's (Ft Leavenworth: US army Command and Staff College,
1979), pp. 50-51.
command and control, education, mission, and equipment
decisions that fail to take advantage of the unique air and
sea capabilities of our forces. As all the examples point
out, synchronization of forces is the key to winning at any
level of war. An effective command and control system is
the key to synchronization.
Command and Control
In "Maneuver Warfare and Aviation," Mr. Lind's
discussion of command and control focuses on how to make CAS
more responsive. Once again, his emphasis on the tactical
level causes him to overlook the most important points. The
real issue for maneuver warfare command and control is
synchronizing the available air, land, and sea forces to
best help the MAGTF, joint task force (JTF), or theater
commander achieve his objective. In an ideal situation,
maneuver warfare emphasis would begin at the top. The
overall commander would devise a campaign plan for his
theater of operations that would identify the enemy s center
of gravity. He would then designate his main effort. The
air, land, and sea forces within his command would all
develop proposed courses of action that would support the
effort. The commander would consider these courses of
action and formulate his concept of operations. His concept
would take advantage of the unique contributions of each
force and synchronize their efforts into an effective
campaign. Traditionally, the Marine Corps has not operated
this way, nor supported this type operation when serving as
a subordinate unit to a JTF or theater commander.
When operating as an independent task force, the MAGTF
frequently fails to treat its ACE as a separate maneuver
unit and relegates it to a support role. Although the
titles and the organizational chart lead you to believe the
MAGTF consists of two combat elements and a support element,
practice dictates otherwise.
Click here to view image
During the debrief of the 1989 Marine Corps Command and
Staff College's "MAGTF in Offense" exercise, a student who
had served on the ACE staff put up the following slide
showing "how it really worked in the exercise and how it
often works in the real world":1
1Personal experience, Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, 1988-1989.
Click here to view image
The slide identified the major problem in the
relationship between the ACE and GCE in the MAGTF.
although the official organizational chart depicts the ACE
and GCE to be co-equal combat elements, other Marine Corps
publications better explain the true relationship. Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1, states that only
the GCE is responsible for developing courses of action for
the MAGTF commander's approval. The primary role of the ACE
and the combat service support element (CSSE) during the
formulation of courses of action is to determine if they can
support them. Although the ACE commander is responsible for
formulating the anti air warfare concept of operations, it is
the GCE commander who proposes to the MAGTF commander how
all the remaining aviation sorties should be apportioned and
allocated. The GCE commander is responsible for selecting
the interdiction targets and determining when, where and how
much CAS will be used.1 If the Marines Corps truly
1MCDEC, USMC, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine,
FMFM 0-1 (Quantico, 1979), p. 3-6.
considers aviation to be a "combat element" then the ACE
should be responsible for proposing courses of action and
recommending the interdiction and CAS, as well as the
antiair warfare, concepts of operation to the MAGTF
commander.
The Marine Corps' view of aviation as only a supporting
arm, not an independent combat element, becomes very obvious
when the MAGTF is employed subordinate to a JTF or theater
commander. Marines traditionally have viewed any attempt by
the JTF or theater air component commander to use Marine air
for missions other than direct support of the Marine GCE as
bordering on treason. Even though the Commandant of the
Marine Corps has issued a "White Paper" to the contrary,
most marines still consider the air-ground team to be
indivisible. The Korean and Vietnam wars provided examples
of this problem.1 While there are many excellent reasons
to keep the MAGTF fighting as a team, there will be times
when supporting the main effort will dictate the Marine
Corps' ACE performing independent missions. While Marine
leadership now understands this problem, many Marine Corps
officers remain unconvinced. The solution to changing this
prevailing attitude is to better educate the officers
responsible for making command and control decisions.
1William S. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington:
US Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 60-62 and 51-52.
Education
Mr. Lind's concept to improve maneuver warfare
education in the Marine Corps focuses on making aviators
more knowledgeable of ground combat. If the curriculum at
the Marine Corps Command and Staff College is representative
of the amount of aviation related instruction given at the
other Marine Corps schools, then the problem is not the
aviator's lack of knowledge of ground combat operations but
rather the ground officer's lack of exposure to aviation.
During the 1955-59 school year, the Command and Staff
College had only one, three-day exercise that emphasized the
employment of airpower.1 This limited exposure
to aviation presents problems from the top to the bottom
of the command and control system. The majority of MAGTF
commanders are ground officers, not aviation officers.
Some have little concept of what aviation can and cannot do
or how it should be employed. In the absence of a strong
ACE commander, they are likely to squander their aviation
resources. Even if the MAGTF commander is an aviator, it is
the GCE commander who makes two of the critical aviation
1Personal experience, 1988-1989.
decisions. He is responsible for formulating the
interdiction and CAS concept of operations.
Even the officers at the very bottom of the chain of
command must understand the capabilities of Marine aviation.
The platoon leader requesting close air support needs to
know what targets are appropriate for air and which are
better served by artillery and direct fire weapons. He must
also understand aviation weapons effects and capabilities.
In all these cases, it is the ground officer that has
the ultimate decision of when, where, and how air is used,
not the aviator. Therefore, it is more essential for the
ground officer to understand the employment of air than for
the aviator to understand ground combat.
The education system should also make the GCE and the
ACE more aware of the fact that they both view the
battlefield from a different perspective. The GCE is
constrained by the realities of geography that limit its
speed and mobility. Even though maneuver warfare doctrine
emphasizes a larger area of influence and interest than
previous doctrine, Marines on the ground tend to be
interested only in their immediate tactical situation. The
ACE, on the other hand, operates on a battlefield basically
unrestricted by geography. The ACE can more readily see the
battle on the operational, as well as the tactical level.
The ACE has the mobility to influence the battlefield from
well behind friendly lines to hundreds of miles into the
enemy's rear area. Because of these different views and
areas of influence, the ACE and the GCE may quite often
disagree on how to fight the battle. While this disparity
is useful in generating a variety of courses of action (and
an excellent reason to include the ACE in the process) it
will also create considerable conflict in the MAGTF. A
MAGTF that is aware of the problem and comprised of officers
well educated in the capabilities and limitations of all the
elements (GCE, ACE, and CSSE) of the MAGTF will be better
prepared to make the right decisions on how to fight the
war. They will also be better prepared to decide what
aviation missions will best contribute to the main
effort.1
Missions
Marine aviation provides six tactical functions for the
Marine Corp: antiair warfare, offensive air support,
reconnaissance, assault support, electronic warfare and
control of aircraft and missiles. In "Maneuver Warfare and
Aviation," Mr. Lind challenges many of the traditional
1Dennis M. Drew, "Joint Operations, The World Looks
Different 10,000 Feet," Airpower Journal, Vol II, NO. 3
(Fall, 1988). pp. 5-11.
thoughts on how, why, when, and by whom these functions
should be accomplished. His ideas concerning antiair
warfare and offensive air support are quite controversial
and deserve individual discussion.
Mr. Lind uses the term air superiority to describe the
mission the Marine Corps calls offensive antiair warfare.
Mr. Lind sees aviation's efforts to gain control of the air
as "a private battle with the enemy air force" and questions
the wisdom of current Marine doctrine that directs the
anti air effort to be the priority mission for the ACE:
Usually, we are told that we must win air
superiority before we can do much ground
support: it comes first. Maneuver warfare
challenges this dictum on two counts. First, the
purpose of aviation is to help achieve a decision
on the ground. Therefore, the ground situation,
not some abstract rule, determines the priority of
air-to-air compared to air-to-ground. Second,
enemy air may or may not be a significant threat
to our ground forces.
Three points must be made here. First of all, it is
surprising that Mr. Lind, who developed his concept of
maneuver warfare by studying the German Blitzkreig in WW II,
would come to the conclusion that achieving air superiority
is not a fundamental part of maneuver warfare. Germany's
major offensives into Poland and Russia, both began with an
1Lind, p. 14.
extensive air superiority campaign. Mathew Cooper in his
book, "The German Air Force, 1933 -1945", makes this point
clear:
The first, and major, task of the Luftwaffe during
the invasion of Poland had been the destruction of
the Polish Air Force. The importance of this
mission was emphasized by the Luftkriegfuhrung
(the standard regulation for the conduct of air
war), which stated: `Combat action against enemy
air forces must be taken from the very beginning
of a war. Neutralization of enemy air power
weakens the whole military power of the enemy and
server to protect the friendly forces...'1
The German's attack into Russia began the same way:
On 22 June 1941, the Wehrmacht advanced upon
Soviet Russia. The Luftwaffe, acting upon
information gained in high-altitude photographic
reconnaissance missions, concentrated its strength
on the Red Air Force, in an attack that was to
last three days.. .thanks to the Luftwaffe's
efforts in the first seventy-two hours of the
campaign, the Red Air Force posed no real menace
during 1941.2
Secondly, giving priority to air superiority is hardly
an abstract rule. History has repeatedly demonstrated the
consequences of ignoring it. Commanders have occasionally
found themselves in such dire defensive situations that they
had no choice but to fly air-to-ground missions before they
1Mathew Cooper, The German Air Force, 1933-1945 (New York:
Janes, 1981), p. 97.
2IBID., p. 222.
gained air superiority. The results have been devastating.
The Isreali Defense Force (IDF) found itself in such a
position at the outbreak of the 1973 war. The Arabs took
the Israelis by surprise by attacking on the brink of both a
Moslem and Jewish holiday. The Syrians and Egyptians waged
a simultaneous attack on two fronts that left the IDF
in a critical situation. On the Golan heights, the Syrian
army massed 700 tanks and 7,000 men against an IDF
consisting of less than 180 tanks.1 Before the Isreali
Air Force (IAF) could conduct an offensive antiair warfare
campaign, they were forced into action to save the
outnumbered ground forces from being overrun. The IDF
called on the massive use of CAS to turn the tide of the
battle. With the support of air, the ground forces were
able to eventually halt the Syrian advance, but the losses
to the IAF were overwhelming. In the first day of fighting
in the Golan Heights, the IAF lost 40 aircraft, 38% of the
total number of aircraft lost in the war.2
The third point is that although enemy air may not pose
a threat to the ground force, it may still pose a threat to
the ACE or CSSE, and must be neutralized. Mr. Lind
eventually comes to the same conclusion.
1RB 100-2. p. 63.
2 Ibid. ,p. 83.
In summary, the commander must determine in each
situation what priority to give air superiority. As a
general rule it should come first, but the operational
situation may dictate otherwise. The commander must
understand the consequences of attempting to perform other
ground support missions without first gaining control of the
air. It should also be pointed out that air superiority is
one of the missions Mr. Lind says that "when the capability
is needed, it can come from another service."1
Mr. Lind's concept of air-to-ground support is the
other major Marine aviation functional area that deserves
discussion. The Marine Corps uses the term offensive air
support to describe its air-to-ground missions. It
recognizes two different types of missions, deep air support
(interdiction) and close air support. Mr. Lind divides
air-to-ground support missions into three different types:
interdiction, armed reconnaissance, and close air support.
His thoughts on interdiction can be summed up in two points:
Attacking fixed targets -- interdiction-bombing --
has a long history of failure. . .Other historical
examples suggest that attacking some kinds of
fixed targets, such as bridges, can be effective
when integrated with the ground situation.2
1Lind, p. 28.
2Ibid., pp. 10-11.
His first point is quite valid. Unfortunately, his
second point suggests that the Marine Corps should find
someone else to do the job:
The small amount of fixed targets that is likely
to be militarily useful does not justify
maintaining such an expensive capability in the
Marine Corps...1
A MAGTF that doesn't have the capability to perform air
superiority or interdiction missions can hardly be described
as an "air-ground" task force.
The air-to-ground missions that Mr. Lind does champion
are close air support (CAS) and armed reconnaissance (AR).
Both of these missions require close coordination with the
GCE because they are flown in areas where troops are in
contact with the enemy. The missions are similar except
that when performing CAS, the pilot use someone else, either
on the ground or in the air, to identify his target. When
flying armed reconnaissance, the pilot would be on his own
to visually detect, identify and then attack the targets.
Mr. Lind's proposal to make CAS and AR the primary
maneuver warfare aviation missions is neither historically
supportable nor applicable to today's modern battlefield.
Mr. Lind's interpretation of the German's use of aviation in
1Ibid., p. 11.
WW II is slightly flawed. He attributes much of the
German's success during the Blitzkreig to the Stuka
dive-bomber and tank combination. Unfortunately, this is a
myth:
The combination of tank and dive-bomber in attack
has become an established part of the myth of
Blitzkreig, the revolutionary strategy which
German armed Forces were supposed to have
practiced in the first half of the Second World
War.1
...the practice of Blitzkreig as has been
popularly understood since the war is, at the very
least, misleading. The use of the Luftwaffe to
support the army has been described with this in
mind, and it is interesting to note that the
German air Force did not come to concentrate on
these types of operations which have traditionally
been associated with Blitzkreig until the
victorious Blitzkreig campaigns were a thing of
the past.2
History does show that the Germans used their tactical
aviation to perform air superiority, interdiction, and
indirect support missions more frequently than they flew
direct support missions such as AR and CBS. But regardless
of how the German's used their tactical aviation, the Marine
Corps should not attempt to apply the German's ideas to the
modern battlefield without giving them considerable
scrutiny.
1Cooper, p. 40.
2Ibid., p. ii.
Mr. Lind frequently cites the success of Hans Ulrich
Rudel, a German Stuka pilot on the Eastern front, to
demonstrate how effectively air and ground forces can work
together. However, today's modern battlefield is
considerably different than the one Hans Rudel found himself
fighting above in his JU-87 Stuka dive-bomber. Rudel's
primary threat came from antiaircraft flak guns, a threat
he could generally visually locate and avoid. Today his
Stuka dive-bomber, or any other aircraft that continually
exposed itself to the vast array of air defense weapons
possessed by a modern ground force, would have little chance
to survive.
Technology has changed not only the lethality of the
battlefield, but also increased the capability of today's
warriors to fight around the clock, in any weather. The two
missions that Mr. Lind stakes the future of Marine aviation
on, CAS and AR, are the only two ground support missions
that can't be accomplished at night or in the weather. If
the ground forces have the potential for night/weather
operations, so must aviation. Mr. Lind is quick to point
out, "it is not possible to find and identify enemy units at
night and in bad weather on an intermixed battlefield."1
That doesn't prevent aviation from flying missions against
1Lind, p. 28.
units that aren't intermixed on the battlefield. Today's
aircraft have the technology to do the job. Our potential
adversaries do not. It would be foolish not to exploit this
advantage. The best solution for the Marine Corp is to
retain its capability to perform all ground support missions
as well as expanding its ability for night/weather
operations.
The Marine Corps should also incorporate in their
doctrine a mission that is targeted against the forces
immediately to the rear of the main battle area. This
mission, unlike Mr. Lind's armed reconnaissance would not be
dependent on good weather or daylight. Rather than sending
a pilot out to roam the battlefield and visually acquire,
identify, and attack targets, the Marine Corps should
structure their mission to be similar to a USAF's
battlefield air interdiction (BAI) mission.
BAI is a form of interdiction that is integrated with
the GCE's scheme of maneuver in order to synchronize its
effect. It is targeted against enemy mobile concentrations
that are far enough from the friendly troops in contact to
not require visual friend or foe target identification. BAI
is designed to destroy the enemy s reserves, mobility, and
fire support. It is accomplished close enough to the main
battle area that it has a near term effect on the GCE's
tactical situation. BAI relies on procedural control to
identify friend from foe. A flight of aircraft is given a
designated target area in which it may attack any targets
that it finds. Reconnaissance aircraft, ground recon units,
or other strike flights can all be used to determine which
target areas contain appropriate targets. In the future,
the USAF's JSTARS system will have the capability to provide
this information at night and in the weather.
There are considerable benefits to flying BAI as
opposed to Mr. Lind's armed reconnaissance. The most
significant is that the pilot does not have to expose
himself to the threat for an extended period of time
attempting to determine if his target is friend or foe. If
its in his target area, its a threat. BAI is planned
against enemy units that have not yet become intermixed with
friendlies or dispersed into their attack formations. These
concentrated threats are vulnerable to area munitions. The
pilot can make one pass, limit his exposure, yet retain a
high probability of destroying multiple threats. When
threats are intermixed with friendlies or if they are
dispersed on the battlefield, pilots are forced to use
precision guided or point and shoot weapons, such as the
gun. These weapons require an individual pass for each
target and greatly increase the pilots exposure time to the
threat.
BAI also has benefits over the other ground support
missions. Unlike interdiction, BAI can have a near term
effect on the battle. Its procedural control measures
require continual coordination with the GCE. While this
sounds restrictive, it actually forces the air and ground to
synchronize their efforts. From a pilot's point of view
it is a better mission than CAS. He can prestudy his target
areas and execute his own tactics. Unlike CAS, BAI requires
much less command and control and no communication in the
target area. Finally, the pilot can better mass his forces
and create force packages that can help him penetrate the
enemy's defences.
The biggest advantage of BAI compared to armed
reconnaissance is that the Marine Corps doesn't have to
change any of its equipment to incorporate this mission into
their maneuver warfare concept. Mr. Lind suggests a brand
new aircraft to execute his concept of aviation maneuver
warfare.
Equipment
Mr. Lind advocates giving up the Marine Corps' all
weather interdiction and air superiority aircraft. In their
place he proposes a ground support aircraft with the
following characteristics:
- slow speed with good agility
- inexpensive so it can be bought in quantity
- capable of only day, below the weather operations
- VSTOL
- highly accurate weapons delivery while "jinking"
- able to absorb a lot of hits
- small signature
- primary weapon would be a large caliber gun1
This type aircraft would have some major drawbacks. It
could not perform any missions other than armed
reconnaissance or close air support. The flexibility that
comes form a multi-mission aircraft like the F-18 would not
exist in the Marine Corps. Although VSTOL aircraft
operating from expeditionary fields and moving with the GCE
is a desirable concept, the supply problems have yet to be
worked out. The AV-8's program manager, COL Lewis Watt,
acknowledged the situation:
The problem with forward basing of the Harrier has
been getting adequate logistical support to the
aircraft at its remote site.2
Any VSTOL aircraft that attempts to move along with the
advancing forces will tend to restrict the mobility of the
GCE. The GCE will have a much larger supply train to move
and a corresponding larger rear area to protect. The net
1Lind, pp. 26-25.
2John C. Scharfen, "Mean Machine, Jungle Fighter, Unique
One, AV-8B Harrier II," Amphibious Warfare Review (Spring
1988), p. 10.
result could be less mobility on the maneuver battlefield.
Many reformers advocate that large quantities of
simple aircraft acquired at low cost yield more capability
for the dollar than a smaller number of highly capable
expensive aircraft. Mr. Lind made this argument 6 years ago
when he proposed the USAF should buy lots of simple fighter
aircraft instead of a smaller number of expensive, but much
more capable F-15 aircraft.1 Unfortunately, large
numbers of inexpensive aircraft require large numbers of
expensive people to fly, maintain, support, and provide all
the other infrastructure needed to conduct aviation
operations. The net result is a significant loss in
capability for a very small unit savings in cost.2 In
addition, the aircraft Mr. Lind describes is really not a
simple, low technology aircraft. He wants VSTOL capability,
and also the ability to deliver weapons accurately while
"jinking," something even our most advanced aircraft
currently can not do.
He believes that "jinking" about the battlefield will
allow the pilot to defeat the threat. Mr. Lind identifies
1William S. Lind, "Quality Versus Quality," Air
University Review, Vol XXXIV, No. 6 (Sep-Oct, 1983),
pp. 86-88.
2Herbert W. Johnson, "Air Force Fighters Simple or
Complex," Air University Review, Vol XXXIV, No. 4
(May-Jun,1983), pp.24-35.
the primary threat as small caliber automatic weapons, not
radar guided AAA and SAMS. If Mr. Lind had done more
research, he would have found that although "jinking"
decreases an aircraft's chance of being hit by radar guided
weapons, it actually increases its exposure to barrage type
fire such as from automatic weapons. Speed and minimum
exposure, not "jinking," are the key to survival against
this type of threat. Finally, a pilot that is seriously
"jinking" will have little ability to see, let alone
identify and destroy targets.1
The Marine Corps doesn't need to change its present
mix of equipment to be effective on the maneuver
battlefield. It just needs to employ its current equipment
where it is best suited. Fixed wing aircraft should
concentrate on air superiority, interdiction, battlefield
air interdiction, and to a lesser degree close air support.
Armed reconnaissances missions and modern day Stukas
have no place in today's Marine Corps.
With these thoughts in mind, what is the role of
Marine aviation in maneuver warfare? Marine aviation's role
is to provide the task force or theater commander with a
maneuver unit with capabilities that are distinct from his
1Penetration Aids Course, USAF Fighter Weapons School,
Nellis AFB, NV, 1983.
naval and ground forces. Marine aviation must be able to
operate independently of the GCE to gain a decision or to
work in synchronization with it to support the GCE's
efforts. To fulfill this role, Marine aviation must be
guided by doctrine that is applicable on the strategic and
operational levels, as well as the tactical level of war.
Its command and control system must take into account the
unique capabilities of aviation. The ACE and GCE must be
considered as two equal combat arms, and have equal
influence in the planning process. Aviation and ground
officers must be better educated in order to understand each
other's tactical capabilities and constraints. The Marine
Corps should include battlefield air interdiction as one of
its offensive air support missions. Most importantly of
all, the Marine Corp must consider aviation to be more than
flying artillery. Only when the Marine ACE is considered to
be a separate maneuver unit will the Marine Corps have
embraced the true concept of maneuver warfare.
Bibliography
Bingham, Price T. "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in
the Operational Art." Parameters, XIX No. 1 (March
1989), 17-26.
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Drew, Dennis M. "Joint Operations. The World Looks
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