Embracing Maneuver Warfare And Preparing For War
AUTHOR Major P. B. Retter, Australian Army
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: EMBRACING MANEUVER WARFARE AND PREPARING FOR WAR
I. Purpose: To examine what changes are required to current USMC
training publications, formal courses, attitudes to Professional
Military Education (PME) and FMF training before the USMC can
develop a military environment which compliments the philosophy of
Maneuver Warfare.
II. Problem: The Marine Corps has formally adopted the philosophy
of Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting doctrine. It
remains to be seen; however, whether the Corps can put aside old
prejudices and attitudes, and incorporate this new doctrine into
the way in which it prepares for war.
III. Data: The Commandant recently approved a new doctrinal
publication titled "Warfighting". Designated FMFM l, the document
represents the first major step taken by the Corps to implement
Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting philosophy.
Successful implementation of this philosophy will result in major
changes to the way in which the Corps prepares for war on the
modern battlefield. Four major "hurdles" to the effective
implementation of this philosophy have been identified. These
hurdles are: a lack of doctrine, a reluctance to put aside old
attitudes and prejudices, a belief that Marines can become Maneuver
Warfare "experts" overnight, and a need to overcome a number of
"institutional" issues which may detract from the FMF's ability to
prepare for war. While the Corps will soon issue FMFM 1 to all
Marine officers, and implement a revised Professional Military
Education (PME) Programme, more needs to be done.
IV. Conclusion: Inadequate FMF training, a lack of Maneuver Warfare
theory in NCO resident courses, persistent old attitudes and
prejudices, and a need to find solutions to a number of
institutional issues, still pose a threat to the effective
implementation of Maneuver Warfare. The key to success remains with
the unit and formation commanders of the FMF.
V. Recommendations: Unit and formation commanders within the FMF
must embrace Maneuver Warfare with determination, and encourage all
Marines to develop the individual and unit skills necessary to
succeed on the battlefield. They must demand those changes to
courses, training and institutional problems necessary to
effectively implement this new warfighting philosophy.
EMBRACING MANEUVER WARFARE AND PREPARING FOR WAR
OUTLINE
Thesis
The Marine Corps has formally adopted the philosophy of
Maneuver Warfare as the basis of its warfighting doctrine. The
Corps must now put aside old prejudices and attitudes and
incorporate this new doctrine into the way in which it prepares for
war. This will not be an easy process.
I. The Challenge
II. The Modern Battlefield and Maneuver Warfare
A. Characteristics of the Modern Battlefield
B. Description of Battle and the philosophy of Maneuver
Warfare
1. Boyd's Action/Reaction Loop
2. Surprise and Risk
3. Mission Oriented Command and Control
C. The Essential Elements of Maneuver Warfare
1. Speed of Action
2. Concentration of Combat Power
3. Firepower supports Maneuver
4. Suprise
5. Initiative and Boldness
III. Implementing Maneuver Warfare
A. The Need for Doctrine
B. Old Prejudices and Attitudes
C. Education and the Art of War
D. Professional Military Education
E. Resident Courses
1. Officer Courses
2. NCO Courses
F. FMF Training
G. Institutional Issues
IV. Conclusion
EMBRACING MANEUVER WARFARE AND PREPARING FOR WAR
BY
MAJOR P.B. RETTER
During times of peace the most important task of any
military is to prepare for war.... All peacetime
activities should focus on achieving combat readiness.
This implies a high level of training, flexibility in
organization and equipment, qualified professional
leadership and a cohesive doctrine.1
The Challenge
In the past decade, much has been written by Marines on the
subject of Maneuver Warfare. Debate on the merits or otherwise of
the philosophy has been extensive. Some opponents of Maneuver
Warfare have labelled it as little more than "common sense", while
others have rejected the "attrition" verses "maneuver" comparisons
of warfare as being unrealistic and too extreme. In the past, this
debate has been viewed as both necessary and healthy. It should be
noted, however, that the time for debate is now over.
The USMC has formally adopted the philosophy of Maneuver
Warfare as the basis of its "Warfighting" doctrine. The keystone
doctrinal publication on warfighting, designated FMFM 1, was
recently approved and signed by the Commandant. This publication
will be available to all Marines within the next few months.2 The
Corps must now put aside old prejudices and attitudes, and
1 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico, 1989) p.41
2 Colonel M.D. Wyly, Doctrine and Development Branch,
Warfighting Centre, MCCDC, Personal interview, 23 Feb 89.
incorporate this new doctrine into the way in which it prepares for
war. This will not be an easy process.
The challenge is to develop a military environment which
compliments the philosophy of Maneuver Warfare, and which allows
commanders to develop the skills and procedures necessary to
succeed on the future battlefield. This will require changes to
current USMC training publications, formal courses, attitudes to
professional military education (PME) and the way in which the FMF
trains for war.
The Modern Battlefield
Future battles will be conducted in an environment which is
extremely lethal, non-linear, and often uncertain. The lethality
of weapons has improved dramatically in the past 20 years. As a
result, units will need to employ greater dispersion and increased
speed of movement if they are to survive. Forces
opposing each other will no longer advance within well-defined
linear boundaries. Opportunities for success on the battlefield
will appear fleetingly as units maneuver to exploit their weapon
systems or to protect themselves. Control on the battlefield will
be more difficult to achieve and maintain. Commanders will be
forced to make rapid decisions, often in the face of conflicting
information and uncertainty.
Maneuver Warfare and the Modern Battlefield
The Philosophy of Maneuver Warfare attempts to make best use
of this environment, and advocates that success will largely depend
on our ability to adapt to constantly changing situations. 3 Current
USMC doctrine defines Maneuver Warfare as "an approach to warfare
that emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy's tactical
units and the mental process of the enemy commander - his ability
to make correct and timely decisions - rather than simply
inflicting casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained."4
In Bill Lind's book it is put more simply: " Maneuver Warfare can
be thought of as military judo. It is a way of fighting smart, of
out-thinking an opponent you may not be able to overpower with
brute strength."5
Maneuver Warfare is based on the belief that a battle consists
of two forces pitted against each other. The actions of each force
causes the other to modify existing plans. The force which can
consistently replan and react first will gain and maintain the
initiative.6
In a successful battle, the enemy is continually forced to
modify his plans. After each modification, however, it is necessary
for the friendly force to conduct further actions so that the
enemy's plan repeatedly needs revision. At each repetition, the
3 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1,(Quantico, 1989) p.57.
4 MCCDC, USMC, "Ground Combat Operations", OH 6-1, (Quantico,
1988) p. 1-5.
5 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook, (Colorado:
Westview Press Inc, Publishers, 1985) p.2.
6 Major J.D. Kelly, "Embracing Maneuver", Defence Force
Journal No 69, (March-April 1988), p.39.
enemy's response is increasingly inappropriate until, eventually,
his organization loses cohesion and he is forced to disengage or
face destruction.7
To force an enemy to alter his plan it is necessary to
surprise him. To achieve surprise, that is to do something
unexpected, requires some risk. If all risk is minimized, then the
chosen course will be apparent and surprise will not be achieved.
The acceptance of risk is essential to the attainment of surprise. 8
Having achieved surprise, the commander must now act more
quickly than the enemy can react. Given the chaos which will reign
on the battlefield, the commander's aim must be not to try to
impose order, but rather to organize himself to cope with the
disorder quicker than his opponent. A responsive mission oriented
command and control system, where all commanders are aware of the
intentions of their superiors at least two levels up, attempts to
do this.9
In addition to the need for a mission-oriented command and
control system, there is also a requirement for slick battle
procedures, effective communications and superior mobility. These
elements, when coupled with decisive and bold commanders, create
the necessary environment for success.
7 Ibid. p 39.
8 Ibid. pp 39-40.
9 Ibid. p 40.
Maneuver Warfare is not a new concept. While the Germans have
often been regarded as the premier exponents of the "maneuver"
style of war, they have not been alone. Other countries have for
many years advocated similar philosophies. For example, in 1965 an
Australian philosophy was developed for commanders on the confused
battlefield. The creed included the following points:
* act boldly on contact
* if the situation is confused, do something and do it right
away
* if opportunity beckons, seize it
* if the stake is worth it, then the gamble is justified
* battles can be won without detailed knowledge of the enemy
* battles can be won even when all troops are not fully
briefed
* the unexpected immediate action usually achieves surprise
* when the battle hangs in the balance quick decision is more
likely to succeed than a deliberate estimate and plan 10
There are many similarities between this creed and the essential
elements of Maneuver Warfare.
The Essential Elements of Maneuver Warfare
Before attempting to implement Maneuver Warfare, it is
important to analyze the essential elements of the philosophy. The
following list of elements is not intended to be restrictive, but
rather to serve as a framework for discussion:
* Speed of Action
* Concentration of Combat Power
* Firepower supports Maneuver
10 Major H.L. Bell, "Audacity in Battle", Australian Army
Journal, (February 1965), p. 1-5.
* Surprise
* Initiative and Boldness
Speed of Action relates both to time and space. It is not just
our ability to move fast, but also our ability to operate quickly;
that is to assimilate information, to decide on an appropriate
course of action, and to execute the resultant plan.
The modern battlefield will continue to be, chaotic, violent,
and confused. This fact was noted by US military officers in the
1930's when introducing infantry officers to the "fog of war" on
the battlefield: " In war obscurity and confusion are normal. Late,
exaggerated or misleading information, surprise situations and
counter orders are to be expected." 11
Officers who wait for complete information or who refuse to
take risks will often find that the enemy has reacted faster and
taken the initiative. Speed of Action demands that commanders be
capable of making decisions quickly when surrounded by uncertainty.
Concentration of Combat Power relates to our ability to mass
forces at a key point on the battlefield at a decisive moment. The
key is to concentrate at the decisive place and time and strike at
a key enemy weaknes. Concentration of force at a key point will
often require a commander to accept risk elsewhere on the
battlefield.
11 "Infantry in Battle", (Washington DC: The Infantry Journal
Inc, 1939) p. 16
When concentrating forces on the battlefield, a commander must
effectively utilize both firepower and maneuver. This quote from
"Infantry in Battle" illustrates the point:
Fire without movement is indecisive.
Exposed movement without fire is disastrous.
There must be effective fire combined with
skillful movement.12
The point to remember is that firepower, if used effectively,
allows us to successfully maneuver, and concentrate our combat
power at the decisive point and time on the battlefield.
Surprise implies striking an enemy where and/or when he does
not expect it. Surprise can often be achieved through avoidance of
familiar patterns and techniques. Commanders must stress the need
for deception, flexibility, and originality when developing courses
of action. A successful surprise attack may paralyse an enemy and
can cause disproportionate results far greater than the physical
forces used would normally indicate. Surprise will often be
difficult to achieve and generally requires the commander to accept
some degree of risk. Surprise, if achieved, must be exploited
through bold action and initiative.
In the history of warfare, there are numerous examples of
golden opportunities being thrown away because of a lack of
audacity on the part of commanders. If opportunity beckons, the
commander must seize it. 13
12 Ibid. p 223.
13 Major H.L. Bell, "Audacity in Battle", Australian Army
Journal, (February, 1965) p 1-2.
If an enemy mistake creates an opportunity, a commander who
hesitates to seize it commits the gravest of errors. If by our own
efforts we create an opportunity, failure to seize it is a waste
of the lives lost in the creation. As opportunities are usually
fleeting, only the commander who reacts quickly will reap the
benef its. 14
Subordinate commanders must be encouraged to seize fleeting
opportunities and implement decisions based upon an understanding
of what their superior would want them to do. A decentralized,
mission-oriented command and control system is essential if
operations are to be conducted at a high tempo. Maneuver Warfare
requires competent commanders at all levels, who can be trusted to
exploit opportunities in accordance with their superiors' "intent"
without reference to higher headquarters.
Implementing Maneuver Warfare
The implementation of this warfighting philosophy will not
occur overnight. Major R.K. Dobson, an instructor at the Command
and Staff College, has identified four major "hurdles" which have,
to date, prevented the Corps from effectively implementing the
philosophy of Maneuver Warfare. These hurdles are;
* a lack of doctrine
* a reluctance to put aside old attitudes and prejudices
14 Ibid. p. 1-5.
* a belief that Marines can become Maneuver Warfare "experts"
overnight
* a need to overcome a number of "institutional" issues
which detract from the FMF's ability to prepare for war 15
The Need for Doctrine
At present Maneuver Warfare means different things to
different Marines. Following a 1986 survey of 375 Marines from the
2d Marine Division, Captain Kevin Clover stated, " We have a
considerable amount of educating to do throughout the ranks of the
Marine Corps. Marines are just not "reading off the same sheet of
music" when it comes to Maneuver Warfare terminology." 16
When preparing for war, unity of effort is essential. Doctrine
provides the framework for unified action by establishing the way
in which we practice our profession. It provides the basis for
mutual understanding on the battlefield. 17 With the issue of FMFM
1, the Marine Corps will have taken the first step in ensuring all
members of the Corps understand the USMC's warfighting philosophy.
An additional five "keystone" doctrinal publications are
planned to be issued within the next two years. These publications
will cover the three levels of war (strategic, operational and
15 Major R.K. Dobson, Instructor Command and Staff College,
MCCDC, Personal Interview, 16 Mar 89
16Captain K.R Clover, "Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?",
Marine Corps Gazette, (February, 1988) p. 120.
17 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico, 1988) p. 43.
tactical), amphibious operations, and the way in which the Marine
Corps should task organize for war. These publications will form
the basis of all USMC teaching. Training manuals will be updated
to reflect this new warfighting approach as techniques and
procedures are revised and/or new technology and equipment render
current procedures obsolete. 18
It should be stressed that the development and issue of this
doctrine will only be the first step in ensuring this philosophy
is understood at all levels within the Marine Corps.
Old Prejudices and Attitudes
Traditionally, the Marine Corps, like many other military
institutions, has resisted change. Colonel John Studt USMC (retd),
in describing the reasons for this resistance, stated that the
Marine Corps had "never institutionalized a system that encourages
innovative ideas or criticism from subordinates". 19
In addition, some Marines have reacted negatively to criticism
from prominent "maneuverists" like Bill Lind. In some cases, this
has reinforced their reluctance to deviate from traditional
attitudes and procedures. Hopefully the issue of FMFM 1 will
demonstrate that "Maneuver Warfare" is more than an "academic"
philosophy, and hasten its acceptance. The support of unit and
16 Colonel M.D. Wyly, Doctrine and Development Branch,
Warfighting Centre, MCCDC, Personal interview, 23 Feb 89.
19 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook", (Colorado:
Westview Press Inc, Publishers,1985) p xii.
formation commanders will be crucial in this process.
Education and the Art of War
The Art of War has no traffic with rules, for the
infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat
never produce exactly the same situation twice.
It follows then that the leader who would become a
competent tactician must first close his mind to the
alluring formulae that well meaning people offer in the name
of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut
to the heart of the situation, recognize its decisive
elements and base his course of action on these. The ability
to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired
overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that
training in solving problems of all types, long practice in
making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of
concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of
mind are indispensable requisites for the successful
practice of the art of war.20
To successfully implement Maneuver Warfare as its warfighting
philosophy, the Marine Corps must develop professional leaders at
all levels of command. All commanders must be able to analyze
situations on the battlefield and quickly develop workable plans,
often without reference to higher headquarters. Sound military
judgement, while initially based on a thorough knowledge of
techniques, rules and procedures, must be developed through years
of experience. In peacetime this experience should not be limited
to periods of "formal training", but rather reflect a continuous
process of education. The aim of the Corps education and training
programme must be to produce Marines who know how to think "on
20 "Infantry in Battle", (Washington DC: The Infantry Journal
Inc, 1939) p. 1.
their feet" and quickly produce appropriate solutions to complex
problems under difficult conditions. Ideally it would aim to
produce Marines who are experts in the "Art of War".
It should be noted that to produce an "expert" is a difficult
process. In a 1989 Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) instructional
handout entitled "Introduction to Tactical Concepts", an analysis
is made of the five phases of development a person goes through to
become an expert.
The first phase is that of a "beginner", where essentially all
you do is learn the "rules and techniques of the game". Actions are
based on following these rules. The environment in which these
rules are applied is not considered. The next stage is that of
"advanced beginner". In this stage you apply the rules to a variety
of situations and see whether they still work or not. Experience
is gained by a process of trial and error. The beginner makes
mistakes and learns that some rules and techniques do not work in
some situations. In Stage 3 you become "competent". Based on your
environmental experience and your thorough understanding of the
rules you develop a hierarchy of rules which you selectively apply
given a variety of situations. Stage 4 is the "proficient" stage.
You know the rules, you know the game, and you know the environment
so well that you start to develop a style of your own. You become
intuitive. Finally you become an expert. Your skills are so
developed that your actions are natural, almost always correct,
and carried out sub-consciously.21
For example, the majority of infantry 2nd Lieutenants who
complete the Basic Officers Course (BOC) at The Basic School (TBS)
will probably graduate in the "advanced beginner" category. By the
time they finish the Infantry Officers Course (IOC), they should
have progressed to the "competent" stage. When they arrive in their
units, they should be striving to develop into "proficient" and
finally "expert" platoon commanders. Only a few of these officers
will ever reach the "expert" level; however, the aim of the
training programme should be to produce "thinking" platoon
commanders who have not only learnt "rules and techniques", but
more importantly have learnt how to think logically under
battlefield conditions by selectively applying or modifying the
"rules and techniques".
This process is further complicated by the need to prepare all
leaders for promotion. For example, while the infantry Lieutenant
is developing into an expert platoon commander, he must also be
exposed to the "techniques and environment" associated with
becoming a company commander. This training and education is
essential for all Marines since death and injury will often
necessitate rapid promotion in wartime.
Within the FMF, commanders must ensure that all Marines
understand this five step education process, and recognise that to
become warf ighting "experts" they will need to do more than just
21 AWS, MCCDC, "Introduction to Tactical Concepts", (Quantico,
1989) p.DO-2.
learn the "buzz" words. Excellence will not be achieved overnight,
but rather as a result of an education system which includes
theoretical and practical instruction, extensive reading and
practical experience in FMF units.
Professional Military Education
For some time it has been recognized that the intense demands
of FMF training, periodic non-FMF assignments, and infrequent
formal courses, have resulted in many Marines neglecting their own
professional military development.
In November 1988, General A.M. Gray established a compulsory
Professional Military Education (PME) programme for all officers,
staff NCOs and NCOs. The purpose of this programme is to ensure a
continuity of education for all Marines throughout their careers.
Marines are required to complete a series of resident or
correspondence courses at various stages of their careers. These
courses will be supplemented by an extensive professional reading
list. 22
Development of the reading list is now well advanced. A PME
task group at Quantico has developed a draft list of required
reading. Each officer, SNCO and NCO will be required to read
between eight and 30 books prior to promotion to the next rank
level. The reading list is expected to be approved by the
22 CMC msg to all Marines dated 10 Nov 88 ( ALMAR 255/88 DTG
102002 z Nov 88).
Commandant within the next few weeks.23
The success of PME will depend, to a large degree, on the
interest shown in the reading programme by unit commanders. FMFM
1 states: "Commanders should see the development of their
subordinates as a direct reflection of themselves. "24
Commanders should set realistic reading goals commensurate
with work commitments. Written assignments, based on these
readings, should also be requested. Discussion and debate on issues
directly related to topics covered in the readings should be
encouraged. Unit commanders must ensure that their subordinates
develop the ability to analyze issues and think logically. This is
particularly important among junior officers.
Resident Courses
Past criticism of "formal" education in the Marine Corps
asserted that resident courses run by the Corps were entirely
devoted to "what" to think, and neglected "how" to think. In 1985
Bill Lind stated:
The Marine Corps education system is, in reality, one devoted
to techniques. While the argument can be made that, due to
long periods of absence from the FMF and the increasing
complexities of modern combat, officers must be solidly
grounded in the technical fundamentals, the relative exclusion
of innovative thought is tragic. Despite some historical
analysis at AWS and the Command and Staff College aimed at
improving decision-making skills, there seems little room for
questioning and creative thinking. Even more tragically, many
officers show little inclination for creativity. Beginning at
23 Colonel P.K. Van Riper Memo, "PME Reading List", dated 17
Feb 89.
24 MCCDC, USMC, "Warfighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico, 1989) p. 51.
the Basic School, techniques are memorized with little broad
understanding of the conceptional foundations. This emphasis
on techniques - the so called "basics" - has led to stagnancy
in Marine Corps Education.25
This criticism may well have been deserved; however, Mr Lind
has also noted that "excellence in techniques is very important in
Maneuver Warfare... .A major difference between a military that can
do maneuver warfare in combat and one that can only talk about it
is excellence in techniques."26 The Marine Corps must design
balanced courses which produce officers who are both "educated" in
how to think and "disciplined" in what techniques they use or
modify.
An examination of TBS, AWS and the Command and Staff College
in 1989 has revealed an evolving formal education system, more
attuned to producing officers who are able to think logically, and
whose solutions are not restricted to checklists or textbook
formulas.
The BOC now exposes 2nd Lieutenants to the philosophy of
Maneuver Warfare early on in the course. They become familiar with
concepts such as "Commanders Intent", "Focus of Main Effort",
"Surfaces and Gaps" and "Combined Arms". Practical exercises stress
sound military judgement as opposed to the memorizing of basic
techniques. A recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette stated:
Companies (of 2nd Lieutenants) often fight outnumbered and
must continually improvise, exercise initiative consistent
25 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook", (Colorado:
Westview Press Inc, Publishers, 1985) p 42.
26 Ibid. p 12.
with the commander's intent, and integrate combined arms with
rapid maneuver to achieve decisive results.
Unfortunately, my own observation of recent 2nd Lieutenant
infantry graduates from the BOC has revealed a lack of knowledge
and experience when selecting fire positions, conducting patrols
and implementing other basic "warfighting" skills. 28 While these
observations are not conclusive, my concern is that the BOC staff
may need to spend more time concentrating on basic techniques.
Having said this, I am confident that as FMF commanders assess the
strengths and weaknesses of these officers, the BOC will find the
right balance between developing sound military judgement and
teaching the "basics".
An examination of current AWS instructional material has
revealed a well-balanced tactics package, where historical examples
and practical exercises are effectively combined to assist
students in analyzing why past military commanders have been
successful or otherwise on the battlefield.29 Discussions with AWS
staff have indicated that students are well versed in concepts such
as "Commanders Intent" and "Focus of Main Effort", and that
effective use is made of practical exercises to develop the
27 The Basic School Staff, "TBS: Genesis of Marine Professional
Military Education", Marine Corps Gazette, (March, 1989) p 53.
28 Observations occurred during a visit to an IOC field
exercise at TBS on 5 Jan 89.
29 AWS, MCCDC, "Offensive Tactics", and "Introduction to
Tactical Concepts", (Quantico, 1989).
decision-making skills of the students. 30
The Command and Staff College course has been revised
significantly this year. Increased emphasis has been placed on the
implementation of plans during two-sided command post exercises
(CPXs). Students have been exposed to the "fog" and "friction" of
war, and forced to implement plans in the midst of uncertainty.
While the course will continue to evolve, the major changes this
year have seen students thoroughly exposed to the philosophy of
Maneuver Warfare. 31
While it appears that officer courses are evolving to meet the
needs of Maneuver Warfare, little evidence of change is apparent
in current non-commissioned officer (NCOs) courses. Although
emphasis should still be placed on "techniques", squad leaders,
platoon sergeants and first sergeants must also thoroughly
understand the concepts associated with Maneuver Warfare. While
many of these concepts will be covered during FMF training,
resident courses must include discussions and practical exercises
designed to develop thinking NCOs capable of initiative and
decisive action. Failure to expose NCOs to these concepts may
result in a junior leadership characterized by "robots" who cannot
think for themselves, or act independently when confronted with
unusual battlefield situations.
30 Colonel R. I. Neal, Director AWS, MCCDC, Personal Interview,
24 Feb 89.
31 Colonel P.K. Van Riper, Director Command and Staff College,
MCCDC, Personal Interview, 16 Feb 89.
Training in the FMF
The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win
in combat. Training is the key to combat effectiveness and
therefore is the focus of effort of a peacetime military. "32
While most current unit training programmes appear adequate,
the advent of Maneuver Warfare will necessitate development of
training programmes which are more realistic and challenging. The
following guidelines should be examined when developing FMF
training programmes.
Initial training should ensure all Marines have mastered basic
tactical techniques and have understood the value of battle
procedure and unit SOPs. This initial training is crucial to all
future training.
As Marines gain experience and develop their skills, so too
should the scope and complexity of their training increase. During
this training, commanders must stress that subordinates think for
themselves and make their own decisions consistent with their
superior's intent. There is a need for unit commanders to cultivate
an attitude where a subordinate who makes a mistake, is preferred
to one who never makes one by always playing "safe". Subordinates
must be "trusted" to implement orders based on their own initiative
and experience.
Training, be it a unit-sized force on force exercise, a
tactical exercise without troops, or a command post exercise,
should force all participants to analyze situations and react to
32 MCCDC, USMC, "Warf ighting", FMFM 1, (Quantico,1989) p. 46.
them quickly. Throughout this training the fog and friction of the
battlefield should be stressed. Two-sided exercises are the ideal
training medium for commanders to develop their tactical skills.
In these situations, commanders are pitted against an adversary,
uncertainty, and the clock. Invariably the commander who reacts
more quickly with a workable plan will prevail over the commander
who waits for the complete tactical picture to unfold before
activating a superior plan.
Marine training must stress that sound techniques, a thorough
knowledge of battle procedures, and the ability to quickly analyze
incomplete and contradictory information are all necessary if
Marines are to be prepared for the battlefield of the future.
Institutional Issues
There are a number of outstanding issues which may affect the
FMF's ability to effectively implement the Corps' warfighting
philosophy. These issues range from "personnel" policies concerning
promotion and assignments in the FMF, to "operational" issues, such
as the need to streamline the current Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) command organization.
Solving many of these problems will take months, if not
years; however, in dealing with these issues, the overriding
concern must be to find solutions which allow FMF units to "train"
more effectively. All senior Marine officers must insist that the
FMF be "organized for warf ighting and then adapted for peacetime
rather than vice versa."33
Conclusion
The development of doctrine and the PME programme appear to
be "on track"; however, old attitudes and prejudices, inadequate
FMF training, the lack of Maneuver Warfare theory in NCO resident
courses, and the need to find solutions to a number of current
"institutional" issues, still pose a threat to the implementation
of Maneuver Warfare. The degree to which the Corps successfully
embraces Maneuver Warfare will depend, to a large degree, on how
FMF unit and formation commanders react to this warfighting
philosophy.
Hopefully, they will embrace Maneuver Warfare with
determination, and encourage all Marines to develop the individual
and unit skills necessary to succeed on the future battlefield.
The junior leadership of the Marine Corps will eagerly embrace the
philosophy of Maneuver Warfare if given the chance.
33 Ibid. pp. 41-42.
Bibliography
Basic School Staff. "TBS: Genesis of Marine Professional Military
Education". Marine Corps Gazette (March, 1989)
Bell, H.L. Major. "Audacity in Battle". Australian Army Journal
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Clover, K.R. Captain. "Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We Now?". Marine
Corps Gazette (February, 1988)
Dobson, R.K. Major, Instructor, Command and Staff College. Personal
interview. Quantico, Va, 16th March 1989
Gray, A.M. General, Commandant USMC. Message to all Marines (ALMAR
255/88 DTG 102002z Nov 88)
"Infantry in Battle". Washington DC: The Infantry Journal Inc, 1939
Kelly, J.D. Major. "Embracing Maneuver". Defence Force Journal (No
69, March-April 1988)
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Press Inc, 1985
Neal, R. I. Colonel, Director Amphibious Warfare School. Personal
interview. Quantico, Va, 24th February 1989
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