Strategic Loss In Indochina - U.S. Policy In Laos
AUTHOR Major Michael E. Ruth, USAF
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
STRATEGIC LOSS IN INDOCHINA - U.S. POLICY IN LAOS
After World War II, the United States was the preeminent
world power, but the rapidly growing number of nations in the
world complicated the task of formulating foreign policy.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of
the U.S. with Laos, from WWII to 1962, to address problems in
strategy formulation and the use of national power.
Laos emerged from WWII with the same nationalistic
ideals as many other former colonies. As a land-locked and
very rugged country in Southeast Asia, Laos has very little
strategic value, except for her shared border with Vietnam.
After WWII, Laos supported the French during their war with
the Viet Minh, and was given full independence in 1953. The
Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954 called for a neutral
state in Laos and reconciliation with the communist
guerillas, the Pathet Lao. This was accomplished in a
coalition government formed in 1957. Soon after, the
government moved away from the neutralist policy and toward
the west forcing the communists out. Civil war broke out
again in 1959. A coup by neutralist factions of the army
brought about a three way fight until the neutralists joined
with the Pathet Lao. A second coalition government was the
result of a ceasefire in 1961 and was endorsed by the second
Geneva conference in 1962.
U.S. policy through these years was inconsistent and
usually shortsighted. It suffered from three major problems.
(1) There was no strategic objective to the policy of the
U.S. toward Laos. Under the Truman and then Eisenhower
administrations, military aid was sent to the French to fight
the Viet Minh and later to the Laotians to build the same
type of army to continue the fight. Economic aid was sent
with no viable plan for its use. (2) The U.S. had no
strategy for coordinated use of all elements of national
power. Truman effectively cancel led out the use of political
power by allowing the French to recolonize Laos after WWII in
the face of strong nationalistic sentiment. At times during
1960, the U.S. was paying the soldiers of both sides of the
conflict. (3) U.S. policy toward Laos consisted of a
reactive rather than an active strategy. This phenomenon is
mainly atributable to lack of intrest in Laos except at times
of extreme crises. Since no coherent, defined strategy was
in being, the U.S. was continually responding to, rather than
directing the antagonists.
The legacy of U.S. policy in Laos during this time was
the loss of control over an area which would become stra-
tegically important to America's enemy of the next decade.
STRATEGIC LOSS IN INDOCHINA - U.S. POLICY IN LAOS
OUTLINE
Thesis: A study of the relationship between the United States
and Laos from WWII to the signing of the Geneva accords in
1962, in order to address problems in U.S. strategy
formulation and the use of national power.
I. Background on Laos
A. Geography and people
B. Early history
C. Beginning of U.S. policy in Laos
D. French Indochina War
E. Geneva agreements on cessation of hostilities in
Indochina - July 1954
II. Aftermath of Geneva
A. U.S. participation in the conference
B. The first coalition government - 1957
C. Election of 1958
III. Renewed civil war in Laos - 1959
A. The government moves right
B. Pathet Lao refuse integration
C. Elections of 1960
D. The Kong Le rebellion
E. The second coalition government - 1961
IV. Problems with U.S. policy in Laos
A. No clear strategic objective
B. Uncoordinated use of national power
C. Reactive verses active strategy
STRATEGIC LOSS IN INDOCHINA - U.S. POLICY IN LAOS
Wisdom consists not so much in knowing what to
ultimately do as in knowing what to do next.
- Herbert Hoover
On October 8, 1961, an agreement on the composition of
a coalition government for the Kingdom of Laos was signed on
the Plaines des Jarres with the support of the U.S.
government. Four years earlier at this same location, the
same parties had made an almost identical commitment to a
very cold reception by U.S. policy makers. What was the
reason for this change? Had U.S. national interests changed?
What was the goal of U.S. policy in Laos and had it now been
met? The answers are unclear. Unclear, not because history
does not record the facts, but because the reasons, policies
and goals were unclear and at times contradictory.
Inconsistent or ineffective policies have in the past and
continue to affect the relationship of the United States with
the other countries of the world. The purpose of this paper
is to study the relationship between the United States and
Laos from WWII to the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1962,
in order to address problems in U.S. strategy formulation and
the use of national power.
National policy is based on many variables including,
ideology, political system, laws, and ethical standards to
name just a few. These variables define our national
personality and interests and are reflected in our
relationship with other countries through U.S. policy. Once
policy is defined, a national strategy should be developed to
optimize the use of the elements of national power to support
that policy.
Strategy. The art and science of developing and using
political, economic, psychological and military forces
as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum
support to policies, in order to increase the
probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and
lessen the chance of defeat. (11:350)
It is at this level of national strategy development that
post WWII U.S. policy toward Indochina in general, and Laos
in particular, broke down.
Laos is a landlocked country in central Indochina about
the size of Oregon. Its borders are basically formed by two
prominent geographical features, the rugged Annamite mountain
chain defining its eastern border with Vietnam and the Mekong
River on the west dividing it from Thailand and Burma. On
Laos' northern border lies China and to the south, Cambodia.
The geography of the country is extremely hostile, made up
mainly of deep, narrow valleys surrounded by steep, saw-
toothed mountains, all of which covered by dense jungle. The
people are ethnically diverse; the Lao comprising barely one
half of the population and inhabiting mainly the low
flatlands along the Mekong and its tributaries are the
politically and economically dominant group. Of the at least
forty-two other tribal clusters in Laos, most live at varying
altitudes in the mountains of the interior or on one of the
two grassy, highland plateaus, the Plaines des Jarres in the
north or the Bolovens Plateau in the south.
Historically, the strategic value of what is now modern
Laos has been little more than as a buffer state or territory
between rival powers in the Southeast Asian region. With the
exception of a two hundred year period between the 14th and
16th century, the ancient history of Laos is one of a country
dominated by other peoples as a client state, protectorate,
colony, or conquered territory. Early recorded history
begins with Laos as a part of the Khmer (Cambodian) Empire,
subsequently overrun by Mongols from the north and constantly
harrassed by its neighbors tothe east (Annam or Vietnam) and
the west (Siam or Thailand and Burma). A French colony for
over 60 years, Laos had a short period of independence
following World War II (the period of focus of this paper),
before being dominated and finally conquered by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Along with a history of continuing alliance and conflict
with its neighbors to the east and west, Laos has always had
warm, friendly relations with Cambodia and has always felt
threatened by its powerful northern neighbor, China. Another
factor in Southeast Asian internal politics and external
relations is the influence of the Indo-Buddist culture west
of the Annamite chain (Laos, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia) and
Sino-Confucianism east of the mountains (Vietnam). For Laos,
this heritage has fostered a "religious justification of
kingly rule," (5:25) which, as will be seen later, has
profound impact on the conduct of government and the
influence of the Laotian "royals."
French colonial rule of Laos was largely benevolent.
The French maintained the colony merely as a buffer between
economically important Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and the
British and Siamese influence to the west. The French made
minor improvements in schools, health and public works but
generally allowed the traditional forms of government to
operate. The Laotians for their part reciprocated this
treatment by being "...the enfant sage (the well-behaved
child) of the Indochinese union. " (5:31)
Perhaps the only major mistake made by the French in
their sixty years of tutelage in Laos was the extensive
use they made at subordinate echelons of Vietnamese
civil servants. As in the case of the Indian civil
servant used by the British in Burma and Malaya, the
result was that too few capable native administrators
were trained to hold positions of responsibility in
their own country. This deficiency was to make itself
felt after full independence was gained..."(5:31)
The French continued to administer Indochina during
World War II under Japanese direction after skirmishes with
Japan in northern Vietnam in September, 1940 (France asked
for, but received no support from Pacific allies) and
Japan's only asian ally, Thailand, in January, 1941. This
arrangement existed until the waning days of the war when,
with their empire crumbling, the Japanese
... lashed out in a destructive rage in all directions...
On March 9, 1945, Japanese troops once more attacked
without warning, wantonly killing French soldiers and
civilians. French pleas for American help were ignored.
Within a short time, all Frenchmeh in Indochina .. .were
interned in Japanese camps; all, that is, except those
in Laos.
... In a spontaneous movement of generosity and
courage equaled only by the attitude of the Filipinos
toward the Americans, the Laotian people came to the
help of the French. Literally hundreds of Frenchmen
were hidden from their Japanese pursuers by Laotian
friends... (5:33)
Some Lao, including the only organized Laotian military unit,
the First Battalion of Chasseurs Laotiens (Laotian Light
Infantry) created by the French in 1943, took to the hills
with a handful of French officers and men to fight as
guerillas against the Japanese. "[M]any of Laos' political
leaders in the difficult years of the 1960's, both of the
Right and of the Left, are `graduates' of the anti-Japanese
underground." (5:33)
Official American policy, that is, the policy of
President Roosevelt toward Indochina at this time was
perfectly clear. Since early 1943, he had made his position
known to all the allies, including the French. Independence
for the three countries of Indochina after a period of
international trusteeship should be the goal. The French
should not be allowed to reestablish colonial rule. By the
Tehran conference, Roosevelt, Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek were
in agreement with this solution. Churchill, having colonial
possessions of his own in East Asia objected on the side of
the French, but the President cut him off at Tehran. "Now
look here, Winston, you are out voted three to one. "(1:11)
In a memorandum to Secretary of State Hull in January, 1944,
FDR reiterated,
... Indochina should not go back to France but [should]
be administered by ah international trusteeship....
France has milked it for one hundred years. The people
of Indochina are entitled to something better than
that. (1:13)
However,
...Roosevelt's personal ideas had not been elaborated
into an official and operational policy and apparently
ran counter to the desires and activities of other
Allied powers. In addition, both in Washington and in
the field American policy makers at lower echelons often
concentrated on objectives and policies which were
effectively, although not necessarily overtly,
competitive with Roosevelt's ideas. (1:5)
Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, brought a halt to
the ideological efforts of the American president to remove
the yoke of colonialism in the world. The complete turn
around of American policy can be demonstrated by President
Truman's comments to Charles de Gaulle in August, 1945. "In
any case my government offers no opposition to the return of
the French army and authority in Indochina."(1:28) To Madame
Chaing Kai-Shek, when asked of the trusteeship that President
Roosevelt had spoken of, Truman stated, "that there had been
no discussion of a trusteeship for Indochina as far as he was
concerned."(1:28)
At the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, it was decided
by the allies that the Chinese would accept the surrender of
Japanese forces in Indochina north of the 16th parallel
(Laos, N.Vietnam) and that the British would do the same
south of that line (Cambodia, S.Vietnam). At the war's end,
the Chinese did make token moves into Hanoi and the northern
provinces of Indochina as the Japanese left, but Chiang Kai-
Shek had other priorities in his own country, so there was
never a total occupation. The resulting vacuum led to an
opportunity which the Laotian leaders did not pass up. The
pursuit of independence for Laos.
The post WWII history of Laos has been largely shaped by
four individuals, three of whom are brothers, all of whom are
princes. The first, Prince Phetsarath, the Viceroy of the
kingdom since 1941 was the oldest of the three brothers. The
title of Viceroy put him in the position of intimate
counselor to the King and in the event of the King's death
with no heir, he would be responsible for selecting the new
King from the princes of the kingdom, obstensively, himself
Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong are the younger
brothers (Souphanouvong was born of their father's second
wife). All three brothers were well-educated, including
university study in France. The last of the four princes is
Boun Oum. Boun Oum was the crown prince of the Kingdom of
Champassak, one of the three historic kingdoms which make uo
modern Laos. Under French rule the three kingdoms were
administered separately. Under the Vichy, during WWII, the
three were united to form the Kingdom of Laos. Under the
unification agreement, Boun Oum renounced the throne of
Champassak but retained the royal title for himself and his
heirs.
On September 15, 1945, Prince Phetsarath officially
reaffirmed the union of the territories and proclaimed
independence from France for the Kingdom of Laos. He became
Prime Minister of the new government called Lao Issara (Free
Laos) and on October 12th, a provisional constitution was
approved establishing a constitutional monarchy. The one
stumbling block was that the King, Sisavang Vong, refused to
recognize the new government in favor of remaining a
protectorate of France, and was susequently deposed. Public
sentiment was with the Lao Issara but they became
uncomfortable about the removal of the King and so, did what
the Lao have always tried to do in a crises, negotiate. A
common position was found and the King was enthroned again in
Luang Prabang (the ancient seat of the kingdom) on April 23,
1946. By this time the French had returned to Southeast Asia
and were fighting the meger Lao army up the Mekong valley.
Meanwhile, Prince Souphanouvong, with the help of the
American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had sought help
from Ho Chi Minh, the President of the newly declared,
independent country of Vietnam (Ho claimed all of present day
Vietnam, the French colonies of Tonkin, Annam and
Cochinchina, but controlled only the territory north of the
16th parallel because the British occupied the south). Ho
provided some Viet Minh advisors and weapons to help
Souphanouvong form an army. On his return to Vientiane with
his new force, Souphanouvong was named Minister of Defense in
the Lao Issara. His efforts, however were not enough to
defend against the overpowering French forces aided by
British air support. On September 23, 1946, the last
provincial capital in Laos fell to the French.
The Lao Issara fled to Bangkok in advance of the French
and set up a government in exile. The French, within the
year, instituted a new constitution. It was signed by
King Sisavang Vong just a year after the last, but now
returning his country once again to the status of a
protectorate of France. In November of 1947 the first
National Assembly gathered in its inaugural session. Its
power was legislative and covered internal affairs only,
France still controlled foreign relations and the military.
But, by July, 1949, the French
...because of their growing need to maintain a quiet
rear area during their military operations against the
Viet Minh, granted more substantial independence to
Laos.... A Franco-Lao General Convention accorded
Vientiane greater latitude in foreign affairs, including
the right to apply for membership in the United Nations.
(3:34)
Laos was also allowed to field its own territorial army,
alhough it was pooled with other French Union force; under a
French Commander in Chief.
By this time the Lao Issara had finally unwound.
Phetsarath had been striped of his title as Viceroy by the
King and would not consider reconciliation until that title
was returned to him in 1957. Souvanna Phouma found the
latest action by the French promising and flew to Paris to
join the King at the signing of the Convention.
Souphanouvong continued to press for international support
for the Lao Issara throughout his time in Bangkok using FDR's
rhetoric that the French should not be allowed to dominate
the people of Indochina. He continued to meet with
sympathetic agents of the OSS in efforts to secure U.S.
support, but American attention was turned toward western
Europe and China. Increasingly aware that the Viet Minh were
the only entity actively supporting his cause, Souphanouvong
turned to the North Vietnamese for support, broke with the
Lao Issara and formed the Pathet Lao.
During the next few years, the Viet Minh continued to
battle the French while concurrently supplying and training
"resistance" movements in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao continued to grow during this time and
established support areas in the provinces along the
Vietnamese Laotian border. Then in 1953, two important
events took place in Laos, one military and one political.
That year brought the full impact of the French
Indochina War to the Lao. In April, the Viet Minh launched a
full scale attack with four divisions in a wide pincer
movement to take control of northern Laos, the royal city of
Luang Prabang and the capital at Vientiane. The first battle
of the campaign was the capture, for the first time by the
Viet Minh, of a border post along the historic invasion
route into Laos, Dien Bien Phu, held at the time by a small
unit of the Laotian army. The communist southern attack was
stopped at the Plaine des Jarres where overwhelming French
firepower and air support could be effectively employed in
the open grassland of the plateau. The northern attack was
repelled more by luck than skilled fighting. Approaching
the outskirts of Luang Prabang the communists lost a main
ammunition dump to French action in their rear and the
monsoon season began early, thwarting their attack.
On the political side, continuing pressure from Prince
Souvanna Phouma, who had become Prime Minister in 1951,
resulted in a Treaty of Amity and Association between Laos
and France, in which France finally acknowledged the full
independence of Laos and also provided for the mutual defense
of the Kingdom. That agreement left no choice for General
Henri Navarre, commander of the French forces in Indochina,
but to defend all of Laos should she be threatened. On
November 20, 1953, General Navarre ordered the recapture and
fortification of Dien Bien Phu.
To be sure, the French National Defense Committee
had addressed to Navarre on November 13, 1953, a
directive in which he had been "invited ... to adjust
operations to his needs," but the fact remains, however,
that Navarre had clearly realized that a total
evacuation of northern Laos, including the two capitals,
would have had such a demoralizing effect on both Viet-
Nam and Cambodia as to make the continuation of the war
fairly hopeless. The battle for Laos was, therefore,
part of an overall strategy which could not be readily
divorced from the physical and psychological environment
of the war. A great part of the disasters in Laos and
South Viet-Nam in 1960 and 1961 must be ascribed to the
fact that this elemental truth was forgotten. (5:57)
Back in the U.S., debate was heating up on whether
America should intervene in Indochina. Already, the United
States, beginning in Truman's administration and continuing
at an even greater rate during Eisenhower's, was bearing a
great share of the cost of the French war effort. By 1953,
fully 70 percent of the cost of the war was borne by America,
$954 million by the end of the conflict. (3:46) The French
continued to ask for direct American military involvement,
but Eisenhower was leary about sending combat troops into
another Asian war so soon after Korea.
Indeed, a Gallup poll in March, 1953 had reported 85
percent of Americans opposed to U.S. involvement in
Indochina, and Congressional mail reflected the same
attitude. (3:49)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were split on the idea of
intervention, but Secretary of State Dulles proposed an
international coalition of Britain, the U.S., and friendly
Asian nations to commit ground forces to help the French.
Eisenhower approved the proposal but the British reception
was cold for three reasons: they were not consulted in
advance, they believed it weakened the western position at
Geneva, and they were unsure this was a sincere U.S. policy.
"You cannot ask us to agree when the Cabinet ministers,
senators and military leaders have not yet made up
their minds about what we are to agree upon," an
influential [British] official said. (3:50)
The confusion of the U.S.public was summed up by
Representative John W. McCormack, Minority Whip of the House.
The American people are confused, and I cannot blame
them. When members of Congress are confused, it is only
natural that our people should be. This lack of
knowledge, creating uncertainty and confusion, is not
confined to the Democratic members alone. I have had a
number of Republican members tell me they do not know
where we are or where we are going. (3:50)
Fighting continued through the winter of 1953-1954 with
a major Viet Minh/Pathet Lao offensive in all sectors of
Laos. The main objective was to spread out the French forces
and set up the demoralizing defeat of the garrison at Dien
Bien Phu. The Pathet Lao with the aid of their North
Vietnamese sponsors made significant gains initially, but
even with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, were unable to hold on
to any more territory than the two northern provinces of Sam
Neua and Phong Saly, which they had held since the spring of
1953.
In July, a ceasefire was finally ageed upon in Geneva.
For Laos, the consequences were a complicated ùset of
political relationships and the yoke of international
involvement for years to come. Throughout the Geneva
meetings the Lao had insisted that they were not engaged in a
civil war (as the Vietnamese were), but that the fighting in
Laos was the result of foriegn intervention, specifically,
the Viet Minh. This approach did prevent the Pathet Lao from
being seated at the conference, but in the agreements they
were recognized and requirements were put on the Laotians to
incorporate the Pathet Lao into the government. The other
main requirement of the accords was that all foreign forces
would leave Laos except for a 5000 man French force, made up
of advisors and the units stationed at two air bases, and
that Laos would not enter any military alliances. For their
part, the Laotians realized that their only hope of survival
was to follow a policy of non-alignment and neutrality,
counting on the pledge of each conference participant,
renouncing military expansion into Laos.
The U.S. took exception to the wording of the final
declaration at Geneva, fearing that it would not prevent
communist expansion in Southeast Asia, and so, with non-
communist Vietnam, did not sign the accords. The agreements
had a positive point in favor of Laos, in that they did not
restrict the bi-lateral economic and military aid program
begun in 1951 with the United States.
Prince Souvanna Phouma wasted no time in putting on a
diplomatic "full court press" to ensure the integrity of his
small country and to isolate the Pathet Lao from their
external sponsors. By removing the outside influence, he
reasoned,the Lao people could resolve their differences.
This effort would take time to bring results, but by 1956 he
had persuadedhis brother, Prince Souphanouvong,to join the
government and integrate the Pathet Lao forces into the Royal
Laotian Army. To do this Souvanna Phouma had spent a lot of
time talking mainly to Chinese and North Vietnamese officials
in an effort to bring pressure on the Pathet Lao to
negotiate. These efforts included visits to Peking and Hanoi
which greatly distrubed the U.S., especially Secretary of
State Dulles, because both communist governments demanded
that Laos forbid the installation of any American bases or
military advisors on its soil. Souvanna Phouma was willing
to make this concession in light of the fact that China and
North Vietnam had no objection to the French presence
permitted under the Geneva Accords.
Discord in the royal government now reared its head, as
some conservatives, motivated by U.S. threats of a cutoff of
aid, got cold feet about a coalition. Several negative votes
in the spring of 1957, concerning the August 1956 agreement
with the Pathet Lao, lead to a crises of confidence and the
resignation of Souvanna Phouma. Two attempts were made at
forming another government and after both failed, Souvanna
Phouma was again asked to form a government. He submitted
the same coalition he had tendered six months before and this
time it passed the Assembly. On November 18, Prince
Souphanouvong, ù
...after eleven years in rebellion, formally returned to
the authority of the King the provinces of Sam-Neua and
Phong Saly and the Pathet Lao personnel under his
command. One day later, on November 19, 1957, the
Laotian National Assembly, recalled into special
session, gave its unanimous vote of approval to the new
government which now included two Pathet Lao members.
The whole assembly and the spectators broke out in
spontaneous applause as the vote was announced. Laos
was finally at peace for the first time since World
War II. (5:80)
Reaction to the news in Paris and London was elation;
in the Soviet Bloc, mellow but positive; in Washington
however, the State Department commented as follows,
The United States feels, however, that a coalition with
the Communists is a dangerous line of conduct, for the
history of similar coalitions elsewhere in the world
reveals that they end tragically in penetration and
seizure of the country by the Communists. Consequently,
the evolution of the situation in Laos is a source of
serious concern to the United States, which is observing
very closely the situation in that country. (5:81)
The Defense Department took the opposite tack, pointing out
that this was a victory for the west because the two
communist controlled provinces had been peacefully returned
to Royal control. Once again, the U.S. Government could not
agree on the success or failure of U.S. policy, because it
was not clear what that policy was. Two years before at
Geneva, this same administration had agreed at the conference
table that a permanent solution must include the Pathet Lao,
and now they were out to undermine that solution.
The euphoria of peace and reconciliation was shortlived.
Subtle interference by two external forces would conspire to
undermine the fragile balance that Souvanna Phouma had so
carefully achieved. Those two influential factors took the
form of economic aid from the United States and continued
ideological pressure from North Vietnam. In general, the
backdrop of the latter influenced the affect of the internal
turmoil caused by the former.
The Viet Minh continued to supply, train and control the
Pathet Lao in varying degrees throughout the next five years.
The threat of intervention from the east continually
exacerbated any conflict or crises the government of Laos
faced over this period. By 1960, when the civil war was in
full swing again, the North Vietnamese had advisors and
troops with the Pathet Lao as well as artillery units
supporting neutralist factions of the Royal army. The gains
made by the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh along the entire
eastern border region, allowed construction to begin on a
project of far-reaching impact for the future, the Ho Chi
Minh Trail.
By 1957, U.S. economic aid had reached a level of $40-50
million per year and was the highest per capita U.S. aid
program in Southeast Asia. (3:105) Included in this program
was underwritten the cost of the entire Royal Laotian Army.
Here again, coordinated use of U.S. national power was non-
existant. The JCS had advised the Secretary of Defense in
1954 that support of a Laotian armed force for other than
internal security was not realistic. Laotian forces to
prevent external agression were unthinkable; afterall, the
French Union forces during the war had numbered over 450,000
men. The State Department however, decided that for
"political reasons," a force of 25,000 men should be
supported. Congress questioned the logic of that decision
years later.
U.ùS. support of a 25,000-man army, of the entire
military budget, and of segments of the civilian economy
is, in fact, based on a political determination, made by
the Department of State contrary to the recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Laos, the only country
in the world where the United States supports the
military budget 100 per cent, military judgments have
been disregarded.(3:99)
The military aid though was not the main problem. With
the influx of large amounts of American wealth into a barter
economy, Laos was unable to handle the resulting inflationary
pressure. The opportunity to improve one's financial
position was significantly increased for the Laotian who
could serve in the government. The average Laotian however,
was watching the cost of living steadily rise while his lot
got worse.
In this atmosphere, elections were held in May of 1958
to fill 21 seats in the National Assembly, made by the
reintegration of the two northern provinces and a
restructuring of some other districts. The political party
of the Pathet Lao, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) campaigned
vigorously against the extensive corruption in the
administration of the foreign aid program, emphasizing the
fact that less than 10 percent of the aid went to projects
which would benefit the people, such as, schools, roads, and
medical care. Their opponents on the other hand were feeding
coal to the fire. The Nationalist and Independent Parties
might have eight or nine candidates running for the one seat,
the motivation being to get into the Assembly and take
advantage of the financial opportunities offered by control
over U.S. aid money. To make matters worse, the U.S., in an
effort to address the shortcomings presented by the NLHS,
pumped an additional $3 million into the country, late in the
campaign for public works projects. Unfortunately, much of
the money went to buy off some of the competing candidates of
the two non-communist parties so that the NLHS would not be
able to benefit from a split vote. Even under these
conditions, on the eve of the election, all parties,
including the Pathet Lao itself, felt that the NLHS was
approaching extinction. Prince Souphanouvong said in an
interview with the New York Times:
... that he favored the participation of the NLHX in a
coalition government regardless of the outcome of the
elections and that he would accept the verdict at the
polls even "if the majority parties were unwilling to
take in Neo Lao Hak Xat representatives," provided that
the new government pursued a policy of peace and
neutrality. (5:86)
When the vote was counted the NLHS had won nine seat in
the Assembly, four more were won by the leftist Santiphab
(Peace) Party. Even with this moral victory at the polls the
NLHS and its ally had only 13 of 59 total seats in the
National Assembly, but it shocked the conservative elements
of the government and the military. The extent of the NLHS
"victory" demonstrated, if nothing else, the fairness of the
selection, but American officials were both surprised and
distraught by the outcome.
A new government was formed by a coalition of the two
non-communist parties after Souvanna Phouma received a no
confidence vote in the Assembly, based on the lax
administration of the American aid program and the strength
of the NLHS showing in the election. With Phoui Sananikone
as Prime Minister, the Rally of the Laotian People (RPL)
Party excluded the NLHS from the cabinet. The escalation of
internal conflict, exaggerated by external interference,
again threatened to undermine the stability of the government
and embroil Laos in civil war.
The new government moved away from the pure neutrality
Laos had maintained since Geneva, by allowing a diplomatic
mission from the Republic of China (Taiwan) and a full
embassy from the Republic of Vietnam (South), thereby,
heating up the propoganda machines of the communist bloc.
Subsequent statements by the Prime Minister that American
military instructors would be allowed into Laos and in
February, 1959, that Laos had fully accomplished the
requirements of the Geneva Agreements and "was no longer
bound by its provisions," further infuriated the East,
particularly the People's Republic of China. (5:97) Border
violations by Viet Minh forces were reported and used as
justification for the government's more "pro-American"
stance.
In May of 1959 the integration of two battalions of
Pathet Lao soldiers into the Royal Laotian Army served as the
next flashpoint. During the days before the 1958 election,
the Pathet Lao fighting units had been demobilized and had
turned in their arms and equipment to the Royal Lao forces.
In the coalition agreement, two battalions of 750 men each
were to be integrated into the government army. At formal
ceremonies to finally integrate the two battalions, one at
the Plaine des Jarres and the other at Xieng-Ngeun, the
Pathet Lao soldiers refused to accept their enlistments in
the Royal Army. Seven days of tension and negotiation
followed when finally the Xieng-Ngeun battalion accepted
integration. The unit on the Plaine des Jarres still refused
and even though surrounded by four battalions of Royal Army
troops, slipped out of camp that night, with their families,
crossed the plain the next day and into the jungle. Attempts
by the army to capture the errant battalion went for naught.
In Vientiane, the leaders of the NLHS, including
Souphanouvong and the 8 other members of the National
assembly were arrested.
During the remainder of 1959, the Pathet Lao returned to
guerilla warfare in their historic stronghold of Sam Neua and
Phong Saly provinces. In December, Prime Minister Sananikone
tried to restore calm by using the rhetoric of two years
before, calling for reconciliation and a "neutral Laos."
This time the army acted to "save" the country. On 25
December, the military, with all five generals in agreement,
deposed Sananikone and ten days later a new government was
named by the King with a civilian prime minister, but with
General Phoumi Nosavan as Minister of Defense. The next
showdown of power was the national elections to be held in
April.
Fearful that the NLHS/Pathet Lao influence in the rural
areas, even with the political leaders under guard in
Vientiane, was growing, the government devised countless
methods of "officially" reducing the chances of the NLHS at
the polls. Restructuring districts, requiring higher
educational standards of the candidates, and good-old ballot
box stuffing were some of the methods. The results were that
no NLHS or Santiphab candidate won election.
The results were incredible. In Sam Neua, the
Pathet Lao base area, the NLHS candidate, a former
governor of the province, was reported to have received
a total of 13 votes to the successful candidate's 6,508.
... In another, the NLHS candidate was credited with 4
votes to the opposition's 18,189, although there were
at least 5 members of his immediate family eligible to
vote for him. (3:133)
The conservatives firmly entrenched in power and the
Pathet Lao leaders safely locked up, events seemed to calm
down in Laos. This was not to last. On 23 May, Prince
Souphanouvong, the other jailed NLHS members and their guards
escaped into the hills; the crises was on again.
What happened next in Laos was completely beyond the
imagination of the diplomats, intelligence experts and
anthropologists: A young army captain took over the
reins of power in Vientiane for no other reason than
that he was "sick and tired of it all"--the graft and
corruption, the fratricidal war, the loss of Laotian
values, and foreign control of Laotian affairs.(5:184)
Captain Kong-Le was perhaps the best military officer in
Laos. He commanded the elite Second Parachute Battalion of
the RLA. On 9 August, he captured Vientiane and all
government offices in an almost bloodless coup, while most
officials were attending the funeral of King Sisavang Vong in
Luang Prabang. He then enlisted Prince Souvanna Phouma, who
was the chairman of the National Assembly, to become Prime
Minister again with the concurrence of 34 of the 59 members
of the Assembly. Souvanna Phouma accepted, but in the
meantime, General Phoumi, the rest of the cabinet, and the
remaining members of the Assembly went south to Savannakhet
and declared themselves the legal government. With a
basically military power base this southern group needed a
legitimate civilian leader to prevent the appearance of a
military dictatorship. Prince Boun Oum was drafted to fill
this role.
Now there were three antagonists in Laos, all armed and
intent on providing in their own way, what the people of Laos
wanted, peace. But the price was more war. Souvanna Phouma
was able to get the new King's approval to form a cabinet,
thereby becoming the "legal" government in Laos. But, with
only a small number of loyal army units, his ability to
control the country was limited. The Pathet Lao, although
rapidly attempting to control the hinterland, were not yet
strong enough to take full advantage of the situation. In
the south, Boun Oum and Phoumi were being supported by the
U.S. and had the major military force, but had to wait for
the monsoons to let up before they could use that force
effectively.
The country was now in chaos. Souvanna Phouma tried to
negotiate with both extremes from the middle ground of
"neutrality" for Laos. The task was overwhelming. U.S.
policy, if it could be called that, was incoherent. A Time
magazine cover story stated,
...Though the U.S. had recognized the Kong-Le--Prince
Souvanna government, it soon shifted the bulk of its aid
to General Phoumi. The aim, explained the CIA, who
called Phoumi "our boy," was to "polarize" the Communist
and anti-Communist factions in Laos.(5:189)
To which the eminent Southeast Asian reporter and historian,
Bernard Fall editorialized,
If that was truly one of America's main objectives
in Laos in the autumn of 1960, then it can only be said
that it succeeded rather too well, for the
"polarization" process occurred at an alarming rate.
By the time it was completed on December 16 with the
artillery bombardment of Vientiane, it had repelled into
the waiting arms of the Pathet Lao, the Soviet Union,
Red Chiha, and North Vietnam not only Captain Kong-Le
and his tough paratroops (who all had won their spurs,
or rather, wings, fighting the Communists) but
Souvannaphouma who in the past had done more to
extricate his homeland from Communist domination than
all the leaders put together of the so-called
"right-wing"--for in fact they had no political
views. (5:189)
It is ironic to note here that almost every country in the
"west" and "east" not only officially recognized the Souvanna
Phouma government in Laos, including the U.S., but that most
truly supported, with the exception of the U.S., his efforts
at trying to resolve the crises.
As the fighting heated up in the fall, General Phoumi
was determined to rid the country of the neutralists first
and then presumably the real enemy from the left. In
fairness to the General at this time, as a military man, he
was almost certainly more concerned about the rebellion of a
unit in his own army than he was about the Pathet Lao.
Before he could effectively face the enemy, he must restore
discipline in his own ranks. Fighting was bitter all the way
up the Mekong and the battle for Vientiane began on December
16, 1960.
Before the battle, which was a bloody one lasting four
days, Souvanna Phouma took three dramatic steps. First in
October, he accepted Soviet economic aid and a diplomatic
mission to Laos. In November, he reached an agreement with
his half-brother, Souphanouvong, and formed a new coalition
cabinet which included not only neutralists but more NLHS
members than the two he had accepted in 1957. British and
French recriminations of U.S. policy were loud: "support for
General Phoumi Nosavan from the United States [had] thrust
Premier Souvanna Phouma into the waiting arms of the
Communists."(5:196) But, in the midst of a bitter
Presidential campaign, the American attitude toward Allied
warnings was glib.
In fact, it had become an axiom among certain Far
Eastern experts that their policy moves were correct
when " the French were bitching again " (5:197)
The third action by Souvanna Phouma was one of desperation
and probably frustration. In early December, he turned over
the reigns of the government to the only official of his
cabinet still in Vientiane and went into exile in Cambodia,
reasoning that if the capital fell, he would be forced to
resign.
When their position became untenable in Vientiane,
Kong-Le's battalion evacuated the city with his Soviet
equipped, North Vietnamese manned artillery and the support
of Pathet Lao units covering his escape into the jungle. The
civil war was now in high gear. "The various factions kept
on fighting each other as if the greatest prize in the
worldwide Cold War was to be Prime Minister of Laos." (5:195)
The Kong-Le/Pathet Lao alliance eventually provided the
impetus to return to the conference table. By the spring of
1961, the situation was stalemated in Laos. The Boun Oum
government with its American supported, conventional, heavy
armor equipped forces held only the Mekong valley and the
cities. Kong-Le and the Pathet Lao with their light mobile
Soviet support army held the rest of the country. A cease
fire was negotiated to begin on May 3, 1961. The situation
resembled a similar one seven years before with the French
and Viet Minh forces in Vietnam. Once again,
The West would ... reluctantly walk to a conference
table at Geneva with yet another military defeat hanging
like a dead albatross around its neck (5:208)
The second Geneva Conference, in less than a decade,
concerning the future of Laos was convened May 16, 1961.
Before it was adjorned in 1962, the Laotians had finally
formed another coalition government with Souvanna Phouma as
Prime Minister. Four years after forming the first coalition
with the Pathet Lao, Souvanna Phouma, submitted his cabinet
to the King, consisting of 16 members: four Right-wing, four
Pathet Lao, and eight followers of the Prince. However, the
political landscape had changed dramatically. Bernard Fall
wrote in 1961;
There were a few far ranging differerces, however.
Instead of two Communists in cabinet positions, there
would be four now: instead of having too deal with 1500
poorly armed Pathet Lao fighters, there were close to
10,000 now, well-armed with new Soviet weapons; instead
of being neutral without ties to a Communist country.
Laos now had diplomatic relations with almost all of
them; in addition to assistance rendered by American
and French technicians, it was now to receive aid from
several Soviet bloc countries (including Red Chna and
North Viet-Nam); and instead of being able to count on
either the "umbrella clause" of SEATO or the as yet
unchallanged readiness of the West to support it. Laos
was now completely isolated from effective help when it
needed it most. Finally, in spite of the enormous sums
of money which it had received from the United States,
it is today as poor as ever and covered with the searing
scars of corruption, chaos, and civil war. (5:229)
It is tough to measure the success or failure of an
endeavor without some point of reference from which the
evaluation is based. However, it would be difficult to view
American policy in Laos after World War II a success from any
reference. Three glaring problems are evident in the way
U.S. strategy was developed for Indochina in that period, and
it can be said that those problems still exist today. These
three problems are: lack of a strategic objective of the
policy, uncoordinated use of national power to achieve that
objective, and a reactive rather than active strategy to
support U.S. policy. All of these problems are interrelated.
It would be wrong to say that the U.S. never had a
strategic objective in Laos. The United States did not get
involved in Southeast Asia until WWII. At that time U.S.
policy and objectives were very clear, at least at the
decision making level. President Roosevelt understood that
the only national interest America had in Indochina was an
ideological one. This was true for Laos even more than the
other countries in the region. Laos, as has been previously
discussed, had no strategic importance to tne United States
in the way of geographic positions raw materials, agriculture
or industry. What was important for the U.S. was the
abolition of the old, world order. America was the great
power now and it was time for the rest of the world to
participate in the American dream, self-determination and
independence. Roosevelt's policy toward Laos held just those
elements. Realizing that with no training, the Laotian
people may find the transition from protectorate to
independence difficult, his strategy was to set up an
international trusteeship to guide this former colony, and
others, in developing a viable government.
During the Truman years there was no national interest
in Southeast Asia and the President said as much in his talks
with de Gaulle and the Chinese. By adopting a policy of pre-
war status quo, the U.S. forfeited any rights in or
responsibility for the region.
With the establishment of the People's Republic in China
and the advent of war in Korea, American policy now became
linked with the French in Asia under the title of
containment. The U.S. seemed to have no strategic objective
at this time other than to finance an indefinite French
holding action against the "Viet Minh in Southeast Asia. This
policy carried over to the Eisenhower administration but
still no defined objective. What was the goal of American
policy? In 1958, there was a stable, popularly elected
government in Laos. Representation in that government of
communist and leftist parties was less than that of a number
of Western European governments. The communist field army
had demobilized (the only time in history, then and since,
that that has happened) and two communist-held provinces had
been returned to Royal government rule (again, a rare
exception in history). If this was not containment, it would
be difficult to find a better example. However, at that time
this outcome was unacceptable to the American government.
Four years, and another American administration later, a
similar solution was acceptable with much greater concessions
to the Pathet Lao. If nothing else, the Kennedy
administration could read history. In the case of Laos, it
is clear that there was still no strategic objective to U.S.
policy, but it was understood that for an acceptable price
(without committing U.S. forces), the government presented in
1961 was as good as it would ever be. The cohesion of any
strategy is the ability of all participants to focus on the
objective. After FDF's death the U.S. lost that focus in its
relationship with Laos.
The second problem with U.S. policy in Laos over this
period was the lack of consistency and coordination among the
various branches of the American government in applying
national power to influence the success of those policies.
Mainly an internal bureaucratic problem steming from the
large size of the government and poor communication between
the various branches, it was acentuated by the lack of clear,
definable goals in the case of Laotian policy.
The lack of communication between U.S. agencies was
obvious. In one sample, the OSS, acting on the policy
outlined by Roosevelt that the French be prevented from post-
war participation in Indochina, worked closely with Ho Chi
Minh during and after the war. It was the OSS that involved
Prince Souphanouvong with the Viet Minh in 1945 and continued
to work with him through 1946 while he was in exile in
Thailand with the Lao Issara. All of this went on despite
the revised policy of Truman that the U.S. had no objection
to French reoccupation of her colonies.
In the mid 1950's the U.S. sent tremendous amounts of
economic aid to Laos with no conditions, assuming that the
Lao, with very little experience in government administration
(under colonial rule the French brought in Vietnamese civil
servants), would know how to use it effectively. That, as
has been shown, was not the case and the resultant corruption
played into the hand of the Pathet Lao. Concurrently,
military aid was being supplied with advisors (American
military advisors were prohibited by the Geneva accords so
they wore civilian clothes) to train and equip a Laotian army
in the image of the French one which had just been defeated
in Vietnam by the same "people's" army which now threatened
Laos. Did this situation make sense? Not to the Pentagon,
who objected to that course of act on but were overruled by
the State Department on this matter of military strategy.
Even more ironic and incoherent was the state of affairs
during the crises in 1960-1961. American policy changed
almost daily during this period but for a time in the fall of
1960, the U.S. officially recognized a government that had
aligned itself with the communist Pathet Lao, paid the salary
of its forces which were now supplied by the Soviet Union and
supported by North Vietnamese artillery units, and at the
sametime, equipped and supplied by "rebel" force which
opposed it. Although this policy ensured that the United
States was backing the winning side, it certainly was not
cost effective nor politically wise.
Lastly, U.S. policy in Laos utilized a reactive
strategy. Once again, the lack of a clearly defined goal
prevented the formulation of a coherent, active strategy.
Because there was no established framework for building
effective and coordinated use of the instruments of national
power in a relatively minor country, the job of day to day
oversight fell to one individual or office. In the case of
Laos and many other small countries like it, the American
ambassador is that individual. Not until there was a
"crises" in the country did any higher coordinating authority
get involved and when it happened, this was usually the
Secretay of State or the President, bypassing the huge
bureaucracy at the State Department. This, of course, is not
the case in relations with old allies, large trading partners
and mortal enemies, but for small, strategically unimportant
countries, unless there is a strong, clear objective,
reaction to crises is the modus operandi of the U.S.
government.
During the most important time in America's relationship
with Laos, two individuas had tremendous impact, both
negative. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under
President Eisenhower, spoke loudly and pretended to carry a
big stick, to adapt a phase from Theadore Roosevelt.
Especially where Asia was concerned, Dulles consistently used
the threat of American military power in an attempt to
contain communism by "bullying." In reality however, the
chance of using that power was slim, and it soon became
obvious that he was just "crying wolf." The other individual
was J. Graham Parsons, Ambassador to Laos from 1954 to 1952
and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs from
1958 to 1961. The man who had the most direct influence over
American policy in Laos commented frankly in 1957, "I
struggled for sixteen months to prevent a coalition." (3:86)
He was regarded by Laos' most influencial politician, Prince
Souvanna Phouma, in this way:
He understood nothing about Asia and nothing about Laos.
The Assistant Secretary of State is the most nefarious
and reprehensible of men. He is the ignominious
architect of disastrous American policy toward Laos. He
and others like him are responsible for the recent
shedding of Lao blood. (3: 170)
The Individual charged with the responsibility for U.S.
policy can make a tremendous impact on its success or
failure. Without objective oversight, that impact will, as
in the case of Laos, more often than not, be negative.
There is no doubt that American intentions were good in
Laos. As Richard Nixon would write of the subsequent
American involvement in Vietnam, "Our goals were noble in
Vietnam. But a just cause is not a substitute for
strategy. "(9:47) Fifteen years of an aimless policy toward
Laos resulted in a weak, three-party coalition government and
a comunist army occupying more than half the contry,
including an important supply route, the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
which would greatly affect the next fifteen years of American
policy in Indochina.
Once America gave up the moral high ground in Laos by
allowing the French return in 1945, the United States was
commited to a strategic loss in Indochina. Arthur Dommen
wrote in 1964:
... A decade after independence, a visitor to Laos could
not but feel that the prestige of France, a colonial
power defeated in a liberation war that took a heavy
cost in French lives and honor, was actually higher than
that of the United States, the champion of the self-
determination of peoples. In subordinating its native
belief in the liberty of peoples to what appeared to be
a temporary necessity, the United States had forfeited
the powerful appeal of this ideal and thereby undermined
its long-range goal of assisting the construction of a
politically stable society willing and able to resist
the Communist "wave of the future." (3:xiv)
Herbert Hoover is only partially correct, the wisdom of the
next move is important, but the goal should be defined at the
outset and, if it is worth pursuing, should not chance.
Click here to view image
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Cameron, Allan W., ed. Viet Nam Crises, A Documentary
History Volume I:1940-1956. Ithaca:Cornell University
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2. Champassak, Sisouk Na. Storm Over Laos. New York:
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3. Dornmen, Arthur J. Conflict in Laos. 2nd ed. New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1971.
4 Dommen, Arthur J. Laos: Keystone of Indochina. Boulder
Westview Press, 1985.
5 Fall, Bernard Bù Anatomy of a Crises, Garden City:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969.
6. Fall, Bernard B. Last Reflections on a War. Garden City:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967.
7. Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1948.
8. Langer, P.F., and J.J. Zasloff. Revolution in Laos: The
North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. Santa Monica:The
Rand Corporation, 1969.
9. Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. New York:Arbor House,
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10. Thibault, George E., ed. The Art and Practice of Military
Strategy. Washington, D.C. :National Defense University,
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11. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington D.C., 1987.
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