The Ace's Rear Area Headache Airfield Security
AUTHOR Major Kenneth T. Reed, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE ACE'S REAR AREA HEADACHE
AIRFIELD SECURITY
As we continue to train with yesterday's tactics and
ground equipment, we need to look into the spectrum of war
and ask ourselves, "where will Marine Aviation fight next? "
No matter what the answer is, Marine Aviation will have to
come ashore somewhere, and there lies the problem of
protecting those valuable assets--aircraft. Aviation
commanders need to begin to plan, train, and employ tactics
for airfield security.
I. Purpose: To suggest ideas on solving the problem of
who should provide airfield security and how it should be
accomplished.
II. Problem: Although the problem of airfield security is
not a new issue, it does present a problem to the MAGTF
commander. Does he allow his ground forces to protect and
secure the airfield or allow the aviation units to provide
airfield security, thus allowing the ground forces to focus
on the battle to the front?
III. Data: By training aviation units in the planning and
execution of airfield security the mission can be accom-
plished and be established as doctrine within the Aviation
Combat Element. This concept can be employed in two steps:
(1) training in using METT-TS-L analysis and (2) establishing
an Airfield Security Department within the Marine Wing
Support Squadron (MWSS). The training of the personnel
within this department would expand their basic infantry
trained skills.
IV. Conclusion: This concept of an aviation unit providing
airfield security is already manned and partially trained
within the MWSS. The restructuring of this department is
minimal and an on-going training period can turn this concept
intoa mission statement.
OUTLINE
I. History
A. Fleet Marine Force
B. DaNang Air Base
C. Marble Mountain
D. Beirut
II. Ideas for Airfield Security
A. METT-TS-L
B. MWSS
III. Command Structure
A. Airfield Security Department
B. Responsibilities
C. Functions
IV. Airfield Security Plan
A. Priorities
B. Planning
THE ACE'S REAR AREA HEADACHE
AIRFIELD SECURITY
"Every airfield should be a stronghold of lighting
air-groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed
civilians in the prime of life protected by detach-
ments of soldiers."
Sir Winston Churchill, 1941
There you are three weeks TAD to 29 Palms for CAX X-8X.
You're a brand new pilot on your first squadron deployment.
It's so hot on the ramp that you can't preflight your air-
craft without wearing flight gloves. The squadron CO calls
you in from the flight line and tells you you're not going
flying this afternoon. Instead you've been hand picked by
the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) Commander to be the OIC for
airfield security! What now lieutenant? Your knees begin to
shake and the line chief has to help you sit down. If there
were any other pilots around they are now long gone and not
around for warmth or help.
Although the situation could come to pass, I'm sure the
ACE Commander will have a better plan than getting one solo
lieutenant to act as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of Airfield
Security. His years of experience and wisdom will enable him
to best provide for the defense of the airfield.
Since early in this century the Marine Corps has always
been ready to defend and protect airfields not only for
follow-on forces but also Marine aviation. In fact, one of
the major reasons why our forces were renamed the Fleet
Marine Force was due to air base defense.
"As in the l920s.. .pressed by the Army to consider
the transfer of Marine aviation to the Army Air
Corps and to have the Marine Corps assume all base
defense missions while relinquishing expeditionary
duty... in 1931... Commandant Ben H. Fuller... also
argued that the objectives of amphibious assault
would be not only enemy naval bases but also air
bases that menaced fleet operations."
"As Marine units returned from China and Nicaragua,
General Fuller saw an opportunity to integrate the
old expeditionary forces into the fleets' organiza-
tional structure, which might help the Corps to
obtain more funds and encourage the Navy operating
forces to train for amphibious warfare. At the
urging of his assistant, Major General John H.
Russell, Fuller asked the Chief of Naval Operations
to approve a name change for Marine expeditionary
units. Heartened by a successful fight in Congress
to stop another manpower cut, Russell suggested that
the expeditionary forces be renamed the Fleet Marine
Force, a title that would cover both base defense
and amphibious assault units. Approved by Admiral
Pratt, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) became a
conceptual reality with Navy Department Order 241 of
December 7, 1933."1
Since the early 1930s, Marine aviation has continued to
modify the mission and tasks of different units to improve
the security of airfields. A specific example is the
creation of Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) in June
1986, to function as an integral unit to the ACE and to
conduct airfield operations including security for flight
line, ammunition, and fuel storage.
History has taught us how important security is to air-
field operations through examples such as DaNang Air Base,
Marble Mountain, and Beirut. During the Vietnam conflict it
was envisioned that U.S. Forces should establish air bases
such as DaNang and from these bases reach out and conduct
operations. "Beyond question, the U.S. Marine Corps at
DaNang conducted the most distinctive air base defense system
and (in the eyes of the Air Force) the most satisfactory. ...
Initially, defense operations at DaNang were just as dis-
organized and uncertain as those at other joint US/RVN air
bases. This state of affairs was soon righted after General
Walt, III MAF Commanding General took charge of DaNang's
overall defense. "2
However, General Walt did not succeed at first and in
fact started to remove infantry units from their security
role at the air base and ordered the establishment of an air
base defense battalion. This battalion was formed from
various logistic service support units and was to be
organized as a conventional infantry battalion. This new
unit proved to be less efficient than infantry units because
of a lack of skill and manpower. It wasn't until a Military
Police Battalion from the U.S. arrived that the defense of
DaNang really took shape.
"Firming up DaNang's defense force consumed around
15 months. Defense at first rotated among the
infantry battalions of III MAF. To free them from
this static onbase role, a provisional battalion was
formed in July 1965 of men from various logistic and
service units. This procedure so weakened support
services that it was ended after 1 month, forcing
the infantry to resume the defense job until June
1966. At that time, the 1st Military Police
Battalion arrived from CONUS and assumed the base
defense mission permanently, having been expressly
organized trained, and equipped for the task."3
(Emphasis Added)
While DaNang's security problems continued, the airstrip
at Marble Mountain had a few of its own. The Commanding
Officer of MAG-16 had additionally been designed as the
Marble Mountain Coordinator for Defense. In much the same
way as General Walt started to use combat service support
personnel, the MAG-16 Commander used squadron personnel for
manning defensive positions. Following a night raid on 27-28
October 1965, where an enemy raiding force attacked the
helicopter facility, the MAG-16 commander lost an estimated
45 percent of the helicopters at Marble Mountain and caused a
significant change into the division operational plans for
several months to follow.
Another example of securing an airfield while continuing
to conduct combat operations is during the Beirut deploy-
ment. Here we learned how important airfield security is to
the MAGTF commander. During these operations the Marines
performing a "presence" mission had to continually coordinate
with the international airfield in Beirut. At the same time
Lebanese forces controlled the Shauf Mountains, and in addi-
tion, they held and controlled buildings and urban areas
outside of the Marines' perimeter. Was the ground force
security too much at the airfield and not enough somewhere
else?
What, then, is the answer to airfield security? Ground
forces could be used to defend the airfield, but the MAGTF
commander will need the Ground Combat Element to focus on the
battle to his front, or perhaps the ACE's very own MWSS, with
personnel trained to accomplish an airfield security mission
should be used. "Yeah, that's the ticket." That way our
lonely young pilot can read on and learn how best to secure
an airfield.
There are two concepts that he must learn or relearn to
the problem of airfield security. The best place to start is
with an old and familiar acronym. Let's see how it applies
to this problem of airfield security and the security unit
needed to defend it. Let's start with the ACE's estimate of
the situation in a defensive posture. This can be made easy
by the tried and true application of the Commander's Estimate
of METT-TS-L.
1. Mission--the ACE must analyze his assigned tasks
carefully. This analysis is of two general types:
a. Specified--are explicitly stated in the directive
of the higher commander, e.g., seize and defend the airfield.
b. Implied--certain additional tasks may be deduced
from the intent of the higher commander, e.g., provide for
perimeter airfield security.
2. Enemy--capabilities
a. Unconventional warfare (SPETSNAZ)
b. Infiltrators
c. Guerrillas
d. Airborne/helicopterborne assault
e. Operational Maneuver Groups
3. Terrain and Weather
a. Terrain (KOCOA)
(1) Key Terrain. What is key, both from enemy
and friendly viewpoint?
(2) Observation. Where can the enemy observe/
shoot me?
(3) Cover and concealment. Where can the enemy
move undetected and without harm from my fires?
(4) Obstacles. What obstacles can we use to deny
enemy capabilities?
(a) Barbed wire entanglements
(b) Mines
(c) Ditches
(d) Felled trees, logs
(e) Antivehicular
(5) Avenues of Approach. What are mechanized,
vertical, waterborne, motorized, and foot avenues of approach
into my position.
b. Weather. Best time for both enemy and friendly
patrols is during rainy, windy and wet weather.
4. Troops and Fire Support Available
a. Where can I get personnel to perform security
functions?
b. Where can I get close in fire support assets,
e.g., mortars, artillery, air, TOWs...?
5. Time and Space. How much area do I need to control?
How much time do I have to prepare my defenses?
6. Logistics. Can vehicles/helicopters resupply
airfield?
The ACE's estimate may determine that certain key areas
outside the airfield perimeter must be held by troops or
controlled by patrolling.
In addition to the ACE's estimate for providing security
to an airfield, he must organize the defense in such a way
that all members of a command know their assignments and
responsibilities.
To begin with, the primary goal is to allow those combat
operations that the MAGTF commander needs in support of his
scheme of maneuver to continue uninterrupted, while security
of the airfield is upheld.
As stated in this February 1989 article about the Air
Force's efforts in Air Base Operability.
"As it charts its many future requirements and their
associated systems, the Air Force has not neglected
the critical need to keep its air bases operating in
time of war. This "mission," like electronic
combat, strategic offensive action, and other
wartime business, carries with it a demand for
specialized top-flight "weapons."
These other technologies underline a number of new
system concepts proposed for possible future use.
They will enhance the defensive fighting positions
from which US base-defense troops would try to ward
off commandos seeking to disable a base."4
Now that the ACE Commander has considered and analyzed
METT-TS-L, he must turn to a unit to carry this operation
through. As I mentioned before MWSS has the task of security
of the airfield; in addition, one can see by Figure 1, that a
MWSS has the personnel and some, though not a lot of weapons
to provide this security.
Click here to view image
However, I would like now to propose a command structure
within a MWSS organization that can accomplish the task of
airfield security.
This command structure would be an ad hoc department and
would only be implemented for wartime or exercises which
require this mission to be performed. This department and
its forces/sections will form the security system for con-
tinued airfield operations and are below in Figure 2.
Click here to view image
The department would be headed by an OIC known as the
Airfield Security Officer (ASO). He is responsible for
implementing the commander's security policy and for the
direction of day-to-day security matters. Within this
department the ASO would be the central point for collecting
and disseminating all information concerning airfield
security.
To accomplish his mission he will:
- Provide required training to security forces.
- Issue necessary SOPs, directives and other such
instructions.
- Requisition essential equipment for security.
- Coordinate the flow of intelligence.6
The Interior Defense Force will man the fixed interior
guard position and will be augmented by a company-size
reaction force. The reaction force should be well trained in
both hostage and bomb incidents. This Interior Defense Force
is organized as a tactical unit and will utilize procedures
that are well established for defense operations. Their
functions include:
- Manning protective positions along the inner
perimeter.
- Engaging and neutralizing enemy attacking forces.
- Assist the military police force at ingress/egress
points.
- Plan and coordinate a tactical deception plan.
- Provide security at sensitive areas such as fuel
and storage dumps.
- Assist the exterior guard force in their obstacle
plan.
- Providing a reaction force in response to enemy
attack.
The Exterior Guard Force is responsible for providing
physical security to control the outer perimeter area. This
can be accomplished by patrolling and scouting areas or
specific routes leading to the airfield. This force will
plan and coordinate the obstacle plan which will include such
considerations as: barriers, guard dogs, lighting
installations, sensors, and portals which control the
ingress/ egress points.
Their functions include:
- Gathering information by patrolling and scouting
specific areas and routes.
- Providing the initial warning of an enemy attack.
- Assist the military police force at ingress/egress
points.
The Military Police (MP) Force is well trained for
providing physical security and is responsible for critical
areas of flightline, command post7 and ingress/egress
points. The MP Force contains Marines that are fully trained
(MOS 5811) in their duties and responsibility. In addition
they can provide a small reaction force to augment the
interior defense force. Their functions include:
- Law enforcement.
- Control access to ingress/egress point.
- Provide flightline and command post security.
- Crowd and riot control.
The Communications Section is responsible for
establishing a dedicated security communications system. In
addition to tactical vehicle mounted radios, the security
forces are issued AN/PRC-77 single-channel radios (total of
88 in a Marine Wing Support Group). It should be expected
that approximately 22 of these radios can be found in support
of security one airfield.8 Telephone sets (buried,
hand-wired) are also available and should be the prime and
most secure method of communications between the security
forces. This section is also in charge of communications
security (COMSEC). The following are some recommendations
for COMSEC:
- Disperse antennas throughout airfield.
- Exercise burst transmissions.
- Avoid known/common call signs.
- Avoid commonly known frequencies.
- Avoid scheduled net changes.
- Vary the reporting in/out reports.
- Use couriers.
These responsibilities and functions should be very
flexible; however, as stated before the billet assignments
within the MWSS for the Airfield Security Department (ASD)
should only be needed for exercises or in a real-time
situation. Generally speaking, individuals performing guard,
patrolling, scouting, etc., have received little specialized
security training and no ground tactical training beyond
their initial basic training. Therefore individuals filling
these billets would be required to receive additional train-
ing in security related duties. For instance, a certain
number of billets in the maintenance section, motor pool,
dining facility, etc., would be identified as those partici-
pating in the ASD operations by responding to either the
Interior Defense or Exterior Guard Forces. The ASO would be
responsible for ensuring that proper training is scheduled.
The airfield security plan must not place such restraints
on the MWSS that it cannot continue to function effectively.
To accomplish the airfield security mission, the MWSS must
continue to function without degrading combat operations of
its support role to the ACE; therefore, all units on the
airfield must be prepared to defend against attempts to dis-
rupt operations, they must plan and execute both active and
passive security measures. Some of these measures include
establishing aircraft dispersion, revetments, camouflaging
and improving basic infantry skills.
In planning for an airfield security mission, plans and
provisions should be established for staffing, equipping and
training, based on the commander's assessment of the
different threat conflicts. The basic security plan may have
to consider supporting arms as a form of reinforcements;
however, within the ACE's reach is offensive air support and
antiair warfare which can counter most viable threat
conditions. Therefore thorough planning will result in
effective, timely and efficient implementation of a well
coordinated fire support airfield security plan.
When enemy forces conduct large-scale attacks, the MAGTF
commander may have to task organize the ACE with resources
from the GCE to employ as a maneuver force in defeating this
threat.
"Well lieutenant if you're still with me, I hope I've
given you some food for thought, and your knees have stopped
shaking. Remember now, these are only concepts!"
Footnotes
1Alan Reed Millett, SEMPER FIDELIS The History of the
United States Marine Corps (New York: MacMillan Publishers
Co., Inc., 1980), p. 329-330.
2Roger P. Fox, AIR BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM 1961-1963 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
History, United States Air Force, 1979), p. 116.
3Fox, p. 117.
4Robert S. Dudney, "Air Base Operability," AIR FORCE
MAGAZINE, February 1989, p. 42.
5Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design
for a U.S. Marine Airfield, dtd 15 July 1985 (BETAC
Corporation, 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va.), p.6-4.
6Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design
for a U.S. Marine Airfield, p.6-6.
7Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design
for a U.S. Marine Airfield, p.3-2.
8Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated Security Design
for a U.S. Marine Airfield, p.3-4.
Bibliography
1. BETAC Corporation. Vulnerability Analysis and Integrated
Security Design for a U.S. Marine Airfield.
Arlington, Va: BETAC Corporation, 1985.
2. Dudney, Robert S., Senior Editor. "Air Base Operability."
AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, February 1989.
3. Fox, Roger P. "AIR BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM 1961-1973." Office of Air Force History
United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1979.
4. Millet, Alan R., "SEMPER FIDELIS The History of the United
States Marine Corps." New York: MacMillan Publishers
Co., Inc., 1980.
5. Murphy, John R., Corporal, USMC. "Landing Zone Defense."
Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988.
6. U.S. Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
TERRORISM COUNTERACTION, OH 7-14, Quantico, Va., 1984.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
