Gorbachev The Leader
AUTHOR - Major David J. Pyle, USA
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title Gorbachev the Leader
Thesis Gorbachev's charismatic leadership style and
ability to portray the Soviet Union as the leading peace
maker in the world is one of the greatest problems facing the
Bush administration during the next four years.
Problem The Soviet Union has been in a period of
transition since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March
1985. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union has abandon its
confrontational style of world politics and become the
driving force in improving east-west relations. He has shown
himself to be a great communicator and visionary in
addressing problems at home and abroad. His "new thinking"
approach in world affairs has generated great optimism that
"peaceful coexistence" between the superpowers is an achiev-
able goal. Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader who has
presented himself as a rational actor. He has discussed
world problems openly with other leaders and candidly
recognized shortcomings within the Soviet system. He has
introduced liberalization to the Russian people with glasnost
and perestroika. These changes have lead to political and
economic changes within the Soviet Union which have been
dramatic. Other chanages which have truly revolutionized
world opinion toward the Soviets have been the progress in
arms negotiation, and Gorbachev's willingness to question and
challenge Marxist/Lenist ideology. Although these changes
have been positive they have had an impact on some old
alliances. Relationships which grew out of the cold war are
now eroding as the world seemingly moves closer together.
Allies who are hungry for a reduction in world tension are
now questioning the role of the United States in Europe and
the Pacific Basin. New economic ties are also developing
which could serve to even further destabilize the situation.
It appears that Gorbachev has been able to accomplish more in
the last four years with his "charm offensive" than he ever
could have with military force.
Conclusion Gorbachev's leadership style and ability to
convince the world that his nation is sincere in its efforts
to ensure world peace are unprecedented. President Bush must
recognize that he is dealing with a man who rivals some of
the greatest leaders we have ever known. He has shown a
willingness to change and back up his commitments with bold
and audacious action. No one can truly interpret Gorbachev's
motives nor do we know whether his future is secure; however,
he has been successful at taking the initiative away from the
United States in international politics.
Gorbachev the Leader
By Major David J. Pyle
The Soviet Union has been in a period of transition
since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985. Under
his leadership, the Soviet Union has abandon its confronta-
tional style of world politics and become the driving force
in improving east-west relations. He has shown himself to be
a great communicator and visionary in addressing problems at
home and abroad. His "new-thinking" approach in world
affairs has generated great optimism that "peaceful coexis-
tence" between the superpowers is an achievable goal. Within
the Soviet Union he has stirred the very foundation of its
politidal and economic systems in an attempt to stimulate a
nation whose people endure a quality of life which ranks 60th
in the world. Although the United states has not been idle
while Gorbachev has waged his "charm offensive" this nation
has not fully comprehended the impact he has had on world
politics. Gorbachev's charismatic leadership style and
ability to portray the Soviet Union as the leading peace
maker in the world is one of the greatest problems facing the
Bush administration duringthe next four years. President
Bush must determine whether Gorbachev's words and actions are
sincere or whether they are a deception hiding a loaded gun
which is pointed at the heart of our nation.
In many ways Gorbachev has become the un-leader when
compared to previous Soviet heads of state. In the book,
Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, the traditional
Soviet leader is pictured as being "cold, calculating, and in
active pursuit of a master plan ... extending the influence
and power of the Soviet regime and creating a world socialist
system". (18:273) Few can forget the barbaric behavior of
Khrushchev at the United Nation in the early 1960's when he
removed his shoe and banged on the table to get the attention
of the other delegates. This type of behavior would not play
well in todays political setting and it certainly would not
add to a leaders credibility. Now, for the first time, the
world has been afforded the opportunity to see the human side
of a Soviet leader. He smiles, he buys Italian suits, he
allows his wife to play the role of his country's First Lady,
and he discusses world problems openly with other leaders.
The sweeping changes he has introduced contrast the label
affixed to the Soviet Union early in the Reagan Administra-
tion as being the "evil empire". In effect, Gorbachev has
made it more and more difficult for the west to portray him
as the eneny. Although many actions associated with his new
revolution must be considered superficial they have served to
intrigue and satisfy the world that Gorbachev can be trusted.
A dangerous fallout of this change is the new feeling growing
in the west which is similar to the natural desire of compet-
itors to embrace their opponents at the end of a athletic
contest. Many of our allies are hungry for world peace and
are more than willing to make friends with Gorbachev based on
perceptions rather than actions. In this case, however, no
one can be certain that the competition is over or that he
will remain the leader of the only nation in the world that
can truly change our way of life.
Perhaps the one change that has served to enhance
Gorbachev's image more than any other has been his willing-
ness to question and challenge the Soviet system. He had to
address the fact that "fifty years after Stalin announced
that the Soviet Union had entered socialism and nine years
after the date by which Khrushchev promised that the Soviet
Union would reach full communism, the his country was ... in,
deep crisis and in need of radical restructuring". (11:28-
29) Previous leaders had failed to balance ideology with the
world political and economic systems. Gorbachev recognized
that he could just not adapt Marxist/Leninist ideology to
deal with inefficiency within the Soviet Union he would have
to shake the very foundation of the Soviet system. In his 7
December 1988 address to the United Nations he called for
unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces in Europe, but more
importantly he sent a between the lines message that the
Soviet system had failed and the west had won. He acknowl-
edged that the Soviet Union had to and was changing and that
he hoped that the world would accept them as respected part-
ners. This type of talk draws sharp contrast to that of
previous Soviet leaders who often presented propagandistic
phrases as opposed to rational words. Today Gorbachev speaks
of the need for world peace and not of the long-term struggle
of the workers who will eventually rise up to triumph over
capitalism. He calls for mutual understanding and honest
negotiations, and not of the ultimate clash between the east
and the west. He has also pressed for change within the
Soviet Union to make his nation more efficient and more
competitive in the world market. In other words, he has
begun to convince the world that he favors butter over guns
and peace over ideology.
No action that Gorbachev has taken has had as much
impact on world affairs as his willingness to compromise
during east-west arms negotiations. He has presented himself
as a rational actor who will make bold concessions to reduce
tension and appease these who question the intent of the
Soviet military machine. The military has always been an
important political tool for the Soviets. During the last
ten years when their economy had been in a state of turmoil
it was their military which allowed them to remain prominent
in world affairs. Once again, this his why Gorbachev's pro-
posals to cut both strategic and conventional forces has been
considered so dramatic. The question that must be answered
is whether these changes are motivated by a genuine desire to
reduce world tension or because economic inefficiencies
within the Soviet Union have made it impractical to continue
their present level of defense spending. Welcoming Soviet
military cutbacks is an important first step in securing a
more favorable balance of military power in the world; howev-
er, proposed levels are still in excess of what should be
considered "reasonable sufficiency". Also, "to date, there
is no reason to conclude that 'reasonable sufficiency'
represents a renunciation or even an alteration of the inher-
ently offensive Soviet military strategy. Gorbachev and his
allies are as keenly aware as their predecessors that the
Soviet Union's superpower status and future ability to
achieve its strategic objectives will still be derive from
its military power." (17:12) Some NATO allies have proposed
cuts to match Gorbachev's offer and argue that modernization
of the military force in Europe is no longer required. This
reaction is to be expected, but we must ensure that cooler
heads prevail and that the western response still considers
the Soviet a potential adversary.
Gorbachev's actions in foreign affairs have been revolu-
tionary; however, the political and economic changes within
the Soviet Union have been almost as dramatic. "His program
is proceeding on two levels: glasnost and perestroika.
Glasnost means giving publicity to problems, issues, and
proposed solutions to generate support for perestroika, which
means restructuring the bureaucracy and rebuilding the econo-
my and industry." (8:38) The document, "Soviet Military
Power: An Assessment of the Threat", 1988, makes the follow-
ing assessment: "To promote the image of a revitalized
political system, the leadership renewed the crackdown on
official corruption, The new leaders also initiated a sweep-
ing shake-up of the Soviet bureaucracy designed to replace
Brezhnev-era holdovers with new management more technically
competent and attuned to Gorbachev's domestic programs.
Gorbachev and his allies also endorse a policy of
`democratization', which called for a selective expansion of
work force participation in enterprise decision making, and
permitted the popular election of its managers. The goal was
to give workers a greater stake in the management of their
own factories, thereby increasing the pressure on the manag-
ers to be more efficient". (17:10) On the surface these
ideas seem rational and longs overdue; however, the Soviet
leadership is divided on the merits of `perestroika. Many
powerful leaders have been ousted as a result of Gorbachev's
programs and the Soviet GNP fell short of planned levels in
1988 by $21 billion. All this has served to raise uncertain-
ty with regard to Gorbachev's ability to balance the need for
change with the willingness of the people to adapt. In a
speech delivered on 15 February 1989 Gorbachev said, "for all
the current difficulties in perestroika ... that which we
have encountered in this, the beginning of the second stage
... we must decide not on the path of stopping, not on the
path of returning back. No! We must move forward." (5:A1O)
Another important aspect of the reforms is the need for
importing more western technology. Gorbachev realized that
increasing efficiency in his factories alone would not allow
them to catch the west which has been experiencing an unprec-
edented technology boom. He has been eager to expand trade,
to look for beneficial joint ventures, and to increase the
number of business dealings with the west. To date, inter-
face with western companies has been limited. The Soviets
are ideally looking for opportunities which will allow them
to gain western technology in an effort to manufacture
portable goods. Western companies on the other hand see the
Soviet Union as a land of opportunity. A major concern for
the United States must be that restrictions on "dual use"
technology remain intact. We can not afford to allow prod-
ucts or information which may have military application to
fall into the hands of the Soviets.
A surprising fall-out of the reduced tension between the
Soviets and the United States has been the impact it has had
on some old alliances. Many relationships that grew out of
the cold war are now eroding as the world moves closer to-
gether. Of particular concern is the change in attitude of
some of our European allies. In January 1989, U.S. News &
World Report published results of a public opinion poll
conducted in West Germany. This poll showed that a large
percentage of West Germans do not consider the Soviet Union
a threat and that they had a higher opinion of Gorbachev than
they did of President Reagan. This is a drastic change when
compared to studies done in 1985. It appears that the
"kinder gentler Kremlin is in control of the trend lines".
(7:27) These results do not reveal any immediate indication
that NATO may fail or the Soviets can have a free hand in
Europe. What this change in attitude does show is that the
Europeans are eager to reduce tension and that they see
Gorbachev taking greater initiative to improve east-west
relations.
Economic links are becoming more important and are
resulting in improved relations between nations which were
once the bitterest of enemies. No place can this be better
seen than in the Pacific basin. North Korea, South Korea,
China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and other nations are moving toward
or have realized the benefits of a market economy. The
United States has been the dominant power in Asia, but we are
quickly losing ground to Japan. Gorbachev, recognizing the
potential of this area, has also made attempts to take advan-
tage of these realignments. With promises of new economic
links and cutbacks in his military force he hopes to show
these new friends that the Soviets want to be an honest
player in the Asian market. As the United States' influence
in this area declines and economic relationships become more
important we will have to carefully evaluate our role and
recognize that Gorbachev may achieve more through trade than
he ever could have with military force.
Gorbachev's "new thinking" has had a profound impact on
the west, yet it is uncertain as to whether he can survive
within his own political system. Soviet control of the
Russian people and satellite nations has historically been
based on the oppressive authority of the Communist Party back
by the threat of military force. The rigid political and
economic system left little room for free thinking or ini-
tiative. Gorbachev's programs have changed that to a degree
with the indication that liberationzation will continue as long
as he and the Communist Party are not threatened. Today, we
see the start of free elections in the Soviet Union; and
Easter Bloc countries on the verge of sweeping political
reforms. But, we also see Gorbachev's power base within the
Communist Party becoming somewhat fragmented as a result of
the internal shake-ups and slow economic progress. The harsh
reality of Gorbachev's'task is that he must appease all the
players in this very difficult game and ensure that the
Soviet Union moves forward as they approach the 21st century.
Gorbachev is facing the ultimate irony of his own agenda. He
can only succeed by giving up power in favor of a more demo-
cratic system, yet the system he is creating is sure to
undermined his authority. How Gorbachev handles this dilemma
will determine whether he is able to pull off one of the
great power plays of this century.
Gorbachev's leadership style and ability to convince the
world that his nation is sincere in its efforts to ensure
peace are unprecedented. President Bush must recognize that
he is dealing with a man who rivals some of the greatest
leaders we have ever know. He has shown a willingness to
change and back up his commitments with bold and audacious
action. No one can truly interpret Gorbachev's motives nor
do we know whether his future is secure; however, he has been
successful at taking the initiative away from the United
States in international politics. For the time being he is
doing all the right things. His "new thinking" approach,
combined with changes at home and abroad, are reassuring even
to the most pessimistic observer. To the west he is a glim-
mer of hope who if allowed to work his magic may change the
course of history by reducing the risk of a superpower show-
down. To the Russian people and the east he is the "gate
keeper" who wisely opened the door before the walls of eco-
nomic and social despair came falling down. History will
tell us whether this man was fact or fiction. Lets just hope
the all the books telling his story are not written in Rus-
sian.
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