The Principles Of War - A Look Back To The Future

AUTHOR Major J. P. Niblett, Royal Marines

CSC 1989

SUBJECT AREA - History

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR - A LOOK BACK TO THE FUTURE

I. Purpose: To illustrate the value of the study of the Principles of War in

an historical context and to describe their relevance and application for

commanders in future conflicts.

II. Problem: During the current year at the USMC Command and Staff College (CSC),

students have been exposed to a wealth of professional military education.

Although war-fighting has been well-illustrated by campaign analyses and strategy

seminars, there has been no attempt to illustrate military history by applying

the established and accepted Principles of War. More importantly, however, their

application to likely future conflicts has been neglected.

III. Data: The recent passage of the 'Goldwater - Nicholls' Bill has confirmed

the importance of operations in a joint arena by all Services of the US Armed

Forces. It also highlighted the implications these operations will have for

officer career patterns and assignments, and significantly the Bill has

re-emphasised the value of Professional Military Education. By re-introducing

the study of military history to the core curriculum at CSC this year, students

have been given valuable lessons on the value of the study of military history.

The study has been presented through a series of seminars, a History of the

Armed Forces symposium, and a number of campaign analyses. Students are strongly

encouraged to supplement the formal teachings by additional private study and

research. In parallel with this syllabus, the College has defined the Principles

of War in a separate lecture and also discussed at length the new MAGTF Master

Plan and it's implications for the Corps.

IV. Conclusions: The syllabus and instruction have emphasised the importance

of the study of military history but there has been no attempt to apply the

well-proven Principles of War to past events nor to project them to likely

future conflicts for the USMC.

V. Recommendations: Rather than study past military events in a purely

historical sense, efforts should be made to identify lessons and to apply

them to the study of the future. The MAGTF Master Plan is a comprehensive

guide for the future of the USMC. A greater understanding of the relevance

of the Principles of War and their application can only serve future commanders

well in their understanding of war-fighting.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR - A LOOK BACK TO THE FUTURE

Thesis: The study of military history is an important method of understanding

the relevance of lessons learnt through the actions of past military

commanders on the battlefield. The application of these lessons

which reinforce the fundamental Principles of War, is a valuable tool

in the study of likely future conflicts.

I. Current Teaching

A. Importance of Professional Military Education

B. Study of military history at the Command and Staff College

II. The Principles of War

A. Framework for the conduct of War

B. Their significance

C. Current accepted Principles of War

III. The Nature and Spectrum of Conflict

A. Definition

B. Low Intensity Conflict Operations

C. Mid-Intensity Conflict

D. High Intensity Conflict

IV. The Principles of War

A. Definitions of the `MOUSE MOSS' Principles

B. Historical examples of successful application

V. Summary

A. Relevance to Manoeuvre Warfare

B. Importance of continued study

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR - A LOOK BACK TO THE FUTURE

Examples from history make everything clear, and in addition they

afford the most convincing kind of proof in the empirical fields

of knowledge. This applies more to the art of war than to anything

else.1

Since World War Two, US military forces have increasingly operated

in a joint warfare environment. Following the recent passage of the

`Goldwater-Nicholls' Bill there were implications not only for officer

career patterns and assignments, but perhaps more importantly for

professional military education (PME). During this current year at the

USMC Command and Staff College (CSC), students have been exposed to a

wide variety of professional reading and seminars designed to create a

greater awareness of the importance of PME. Just one aspect of this

has been the return of the study of military history to the core

curriculum which has sought to give the students an understanding of

the value of study of military history and to gain an appreciation for

the fact that contemporary events have a valid history; it is

important as military scholars to know our history and to have a

proper perspective of where and what we are today.

It is also important early on to understand how the study of

military history should be undertaken. It is easy to approach history

in the wrong manner and to draw lessons which are then used to prove a

point or theory. Superficial study can furnish arguments in support of

any theory or opinion. Similarly, attempts to study history to

determine principles can be equally misleading. Too much focus or

adherance to the `Principles of War' can lead to formula warfare as it

has been described, or conflict by the rules which can lead to

disaster. Finally, it is important to remember that any study of the

past with contemporary values, opinions and knowledge leads to

distortion, false analysis and mis-interpretation.

During this year at CSC, students have been privileged to hear

many talented military historians. Without exception, however, no-one

has attempted to illustrate military history by applying the

established and accepted Principles of War. Apart from a separate

lecture early on in the course there has been no link made between the

understanding of the Principles of War and lessons learned from

campaign analyses. A study of the history of war reveals that its

conduct is influenced by certain broad precepts which have come to be

recognised as Principles of War. OH 6-1 2 emphasises the doctrinal

Principles as follows:

Mass Manoeuvre

Offensive Objective

Unity of Command Security = `Mouse Moss`

Surprise Simplicity

Economy of Force

The conduct of war is an art, a skill requiring a combination of

judgement to weigh up the factors which can seldom be quantified

precisely. The principles influencing the conduct of war are

especially relevant at the strategic level where they predicate a

number of criteria against which courses of action affecting the

national interest or the planning of a campaign may be tested. Most of

them have a direct application at lower levels where they provide a

guide for the planning and conduct of operations on the battlefield.

However, they are not like the laws of natural science, where the

observance of specific conditions produces a predictable result; nor

are they like the rules of a game, a break of which entails a

prescribed penalty. Rather they are guides to action or fundamental

tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning; but

their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with the

circumstances. In the past their application with judgement and

commonsense has led to victory. Blatant disregard for them involves

risk and could lead to failure. With a perceptive eye for the impact

of technology on the modern battlefield, Sir Basil Liddell Hart in

1944 expressed it this way:

The aim of military study should be to maintain a close watch upon the

latest technical, scientific, and political developments, fortified by

a sure grasp of the eternal principles upon which the great captains

have based their contemporary methods, and inspired by a desire to be

ahead of any rival army in securing options for the future.3

The purpose of this paper is to encourage the reader to look a

little way beyond the `MOUSE MOSS' acronym and to develop an awareness

of the value of study of the Principles of War and their relevance and

application for commanders in future conflicts. Firstly though, it is

important to remind ourselves of the established Principles. The

present variations in the number and name of the Principles of War

leads to doubt in their credibility, and a study of military history

in this frame of mind is dangerous. With a knowledge of the

fundamental Principles, the reasons for failures or successes in

military history and the relationship of the circumstances to these

Principles will provide confidence in their validity and help any

student gain an informed opinion of their application.

In the words of General Macarthur:

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained

personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.4

OH 6-1 lists the following table showing the comparison of

Principles of War used by various nations. All the Principles,

however, are interrelated and can, depending on the circumstances,

reinforce one another or be in conflict. As a result, the degree of

application of any specific Principle will vary with the situation.

United States Great Britain France

Objective Selection and maintenance -

of the aim -

Offensive Offensive action -

Mass Concentration of force Concentration of effort

Economy of force Economy of effort -

Manoeuvre Flexibility -

Unity of command Co-operation -

Security Security -

Surprise Surprise Surprise

Simplicity - -

- Maintenance of morale -

- Administration -

Against this introduction and background, this paper will study

the Nature and Spectrum of Conflict in likely future operations for

the USMC and then to illustrate the accepted Principles with

historical examples in order to better understand their application

and relevance.

Recent history has shown that there are certain types of

operations where military forces may be employed across the whole

Spectrum of Conflict. The Nature of Conflict, however, within the same

Spectrum is really the definition of those operations. Distinctions

between the levels of conflict and the different types of operations

in each level are not easy to define, particularly when some

operations can easily fall within other parts of the Spectrum.

In the MAGTF Master Plan,5 illustrations show that since World War

Two the trend has been for conflicts to appear in the lower end of the

Spectrum, called Low Intensity Conflict(LIC). The following section

briefly describes the most likely types of operation for the USMC

MAGTF through the year 2000.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

STABILITY OPERATIONS/MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR

It is planned that MAGTFs will conduct a wide variety of

operations in LIC but centered mainly around either limited objective

operations or stability operations. The former usually involves the

employment of military forces to achieve specific military or

political goals while stability operations assist friendly or allied

governments to maintain internal stability and public welfare. Two

major differences set these two types of operations apart. Limited

objective operations normally employ force from the outset whereas in

stability operations offensive action is less likely.

STABILITY OPERATIONS. These comprise seven types of operations.

1. Show of Presence. Normally a presence is achieved by way of a

joint exercise or bilateral deployment designed to simulate

wartime operations and improve levels of training.

2 Humanitarian Assistance. This can be provided in response to

natural disasters, through bilateral agreements and as civic

action projects within exercises. CSS support is particularly

important in these missions.

3. Mobile Training Teams(MTT). MTTs perform a useful role through

the use of military personnel in a benign environment. They are

co-ordinated through and approved by the Department of State who

control their deployment and employment.

4. Peacekeeping Operations. US forces conduct peacekeeping

operations as pact of a combined or international force and would

normally aim to employ the minimum of force to achieve their aims.

5. Security Operations. These normally involve the protection of

US lives and property as well as offering protection to a friendly

government.

6. Counter-Insurgency. Counter-Insurgency operations are most

likely to occur in the higher end of the Spectrum of Conflict for

LIC involving direct action with insurgent forces.

7. Counter-Narcotic Operations. This remains a sensitive area and

any MAGTF support is likely to be restricted to providing

individual military skills and operational planning assistance to

interagency task forces.

LIMITED OBJECTIVE OPERATIONS

These operations will cover Peacetime Contingency Operations and

Counter-Terrorism. In the former, MAGTFs can be employed to seize

airfields or ports through amphibious raids and to provide protection

or evacuation of non-combatants(NEO). Additional missions include

reinforcement of committed national or international forces and

clandestine operations to recover aircraft, equipment and personnel.

Counter-Terrorism operations are designed to prevent, deter and

respond to terrorism in whatever form it takes. MAGTFs could support

these operations with amphibious raids to hit known terrorist targets,

recovery raids to recover hostages or sensitive material, or

diversionary raids to support national counter-terrorist operations.

In both stability and limited objective operations the MAGTF

flexibility to task-organize and respond as the situation and

circumstances demand is a unique capability which makes the MAGTF

well-suited for employment in low-intensity conflict.

MID-INTENSITY CONFLICT

These conflicts encompass anything from short but intense regional

conflicts to protracted counter-revolutionary operations. In these

situations a MAGTF is most likely to be deployed as part of a larger

naval, joint or combined force. The MAGTF organic support will be

considerably enhanced by other Services to provide a viable operating

force for both land and sea campaigns. Since mid-intensity conflict is

more often regional than global, some of the most likely missions may

be amphibious landings, raids, extractions or protracted land

operations.

HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT - THE MAGTF IN GENERAL WAR

General War is large-scale all-out conflict between major powers

on an international scale. As the nation's most ready force, the USMC

will play a key role in the early stages of a general war before

nuclear operations commence. As in mid-intensity operations, MAGTFs

can be employed as amphibious forces or in land campaigns. In either

case, the MAGTF current capabilities and forthcoming over-the-horizon

deployment potential further reinforce the large number of likely

operations in which they can be employed.

Finally, in addition to all the operations previously mentioned,

MAGTFs may also be employed in a number of other operations across the

Spectrum of Conflict. These include tactical military deception,

psychological operations and civil affairs, as well as unconventional

warfare. It is clear therefore that the USMC has to be prepared to

conduct a very wide variety of operations across the whole Spectrum

but with priority on LIC.

Having now reviewed the Nature and Spectrum of Conflict and how the

USMC is most likely to be employed, it is easier to give a perspective

to the application of the Principles of War by citing historical

examples. The length of this paper does not permit a fully detailed

account of each chosen example so in each case the Principle will be

defined and then an historical example given to show where a Principle

was successfully applied or otherwise.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

MASS

Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.6

Military success will normally result from the concentration of

superior force at the decisive time and place, whether material or

psychological or a combination of both. Concentration does not imply

that there should never be dispersion. A carefully organized

distribution of troops and firepower, accompanied by feints and a

convincing deception plan, helps to balance our own forced and confuse

the enemy. Knowing when to concentrate and when to disperse is a

matter of timing and judgement depending on a careful appreciation of

the situation

Success and failure - Stalingrad, June 1942 - January 1943.

Successive errors led to the halting of the summer offensive

and Soviet deceptions at Moscow prevented the Germans from creating an

effective concentration to meet the Russian counter-offensive at

Stalingrad. The subsequent encirclement of 20 German divisions

effectively ended Hitler's Soviet campaign in the winter of 1942/43,

and the Russians escaped destruction west of the Don. The dispersion

of his two Army Groups left Hitler with too little strength to occupy

the Black Sea coast, the Baku oilfields and Stalingrad. The final

concentration at Stalingrad at the end of a 1200 mile line of

communication with poorly protected flanks was fatal. The Russians

committed sufficient forces to encircle the Germans, while the Germans

signally failed to concentrate enough troops for a breakout.

Concentration, or Mass, and the lack of it, were amongst the most

important reasons for the Russian success and the German failure.

OBJECTIVE

Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined objective.7

In the conduct of war as a whole, and in every military operation,

it is essential to choose a clearly defined, decisive and attainable

objective. The ultimate aim may be absolute or it may be more limited.

Within the political framework set by his government a commander may

have a choice of courses of action, each of which would fulfil the

aim. The commander's initial appreciation will determine which of the

courses is most likely to succeed. This will be expressed as a mission

and an outline plan of campaign. Although the campaign will comprise a

number of operations it is the selection and maintenance of an

objective that remains all-important to a commander.

Success - General Tal's breakthrough at Rafa, 1967

General Tal was the tank expert in the Israeli Defence Force

and in June 1967 he commanded one of the tank Ugdas or groups tasked

with conducting an armoured attack through the Egyptian defences in

the Eastern Sinai. Although the Egyptian defences turned out to be far

stronger than anticipated, Tal achieved his aim by sheer perseverance

and skill as a tank commander. This operation, despite the errors

regarding all arms co-ordination has few equals in modern warfare and

is a fine example of the successful and determined pursuit of an aim.

UNITY OF COMMAND

For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible

commander. 8

Military operations are joint enterprises involving co-operation

between all arms and Services and entails the co-ordination of all

activities to achieve the optimum combined effort. Ideally one

commander is made responsible for the conduct of operations and the

desired efficiency between arms, Services and allies comes from a

thorough understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations

obtained during peacetime training.

Success - El Alamein, 1942

Although many things went wrong at El Alamein, Montgomery

succeeded through a combination of determination, concentration and

co-operation. The 8th Army had enjoyed numerical superiority before

but this was the first major action since Sidi Barrani when all arms

co-operated successfully in an offensive battle. Montgomery's

insistence that the division of all arms should be the basic fighting

formation paid off. Of the many factors which contributed to the 8th

Army's victory, co-operation between all arms at every level and

co-operation between the three fighting Services at the strategic,

operational and tactical levels were amongst the most important.

SURPRISE

Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he

is unprepared.9

Surprise is a potent psychological weapon causing confusion and

paralysis in the enemy's chain of command whilst destroying the

cohesion and morale of his troops. Surprise may be accomplished

strategically, operationally and tactically, either by a ruse or by

exploiting new equipment and techniques. The essential elements of

surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity

and speed. Because it is such an important condition for victory,

commanders must always seek to achieve it in their planning.

Success - Inchon Landings, 1950

Although the operation was to be over-shadowed by nearly three

more years of war, the landings were an undoubted success. In spite of

press speculation the landings achieved surprise. By the time the

naval bombardment and concentrated air attacks began at Inchon two

days before the landings, it was too late for the North Koreans to

react. Inchon was the one place where a decision could be gained but a

landing in such a difficult area had been discounted by the enemy.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.10

The corollory of concentration of force is economy of effort or

force. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and if decisive

strength is to be massed at the critical time and place there must be

no wasteful dispersal of resources or expenditure of effort where they

cannot significantly affect the issue. This necessarily involves a

degree of risk. The application of this Principle may be summed up as

planning for a balanced deployment combined with a prudent allocation

of resources which are strictly related to the aim of the operation.

Success - Von Manstein's Winter Campaign, February - March 1943

During the final German efforts in the winter of 1942/3,

Hitler wanted to recapture Kharkov but his Army Group South CinC, Von

Manstein, pressed his case for destroying the attacking Russian

spearheads. Once the Soviet South West Front forces had been defeated,

Von Manstein turned toward Kharkov and completed a masterly

leapfrogging of his forces from south of the Don to the Donets. At

each stage he held the line with as few troops as possible to provide

local reserves. To concentrate sufficient forces to mount the Donets

and Kharkov counter-strokes, he denuded his eastern flank of its

mobile divisions. The early thaw was exploited to economise in troops

on the less important sector. As an example of economy of force to

achieve a decisive concentration, Von Manstein's winter campaign is a

classic.

MANOEUVRE

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible

application of combat power.11

Manoeuvre is an essential element of combat power and contributes

materially to exploiting successes, retaining freedom of action and

reducing vulnerability. A commander must keep his forces well-balanced

so that he can switch quickly from one course to another with the

minimum of regrouping. The ability to react rapidly depends on good

training, efficient staff work, a sound organization, reliable

communications and a high degree of mobility.

Success - Patton's Pursuit, Normandy to Metz, 1944

Patton's advance from Avranches to Metz was a remarkable

achievement. More than any other general on the Allied side he had

realised Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach. His

operational technique prevented the Germans from organizing resistance

on the river lines and disrupted their command organization. Behind

this technique lay his system of command, a combination of ambitious,

but attainable, objectives and allowing the Corps commanders to use

the maximum of initiative in how they were to be achieved.

OFFENSIVE

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.12

Offensive action is the principal means open to a commander to

influence the outcome of a battle or campaign. The Principle of

offensive action embodies a state of mind which breeds the

determination to gain and hold the initiative and to create

opportunities to harass and destroy the enemy. Offensive action is

essential to create confidence and to establish an ascendancy over the

enemy.

Success - Falkland Islands, 1982

The final push by the British troops towards Port Stanley had

a seriously demoralising affect on the Argentinian defenders. The

whole campaign had been one of taking the war to the enemy. Despite

lack of air superiority and severe logistical restraints, the British

actions ably demonstrated that offensive action can wrest the

initiative from the enemy.

SECURITY

Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.13

Every military operation requires that degree of security which

will enable our forces to achieve their aim despite the enemy's

interference. The denial to the enemy of information of our own forces

and intentions entails unceasing vigilance to safeguard secrets,

prevent infiltration and sabotage and to conceal combat units and

logistic installations.

Success - Virginia, 1862. The Valley and the Peninsula

Through the spring of 1862 both Union and Confederate forces

continued to manoeuvre while seeking the enemy's centre of gravity. A

series of cleverly executed attacks by Lee and Jackson successfully

tied down a numerically superior Union force attempting to reach

Richmond. At the strategic level, the South were able to launch

repeated diversionary raids in the Valley to prevent McDowell from

reinforcing McClellan either in the Peninsula or more directly in

front of Richmond. At the operational level, Jackson's use of his

cavalry to screen his movements and reconnoitre his enemy's positions,

and his habitual secrecy in the execution of his plans, provided the

security on which the success of his actions depended.

SIMPLICITY

...we may look upon the complete or partial destruction of the enemy

as the sole object of all engagements.14

This Principle perhaps more than any other is all-important.

Simplicity can never be over-emphasised. A good, simple plan, with

concise, clear orders minimizes the chance of confusion.

SUMMARY

The fundamental Principles of War might well be termed the

Principles of Success and the application of these Principles should

be studied by every officer as a practical aid to professional

efficiency. In the absence of battlefield conditions, therefore, every

effort should be made to study their application, in theoretical

situations. With respect to the emergence of Manoeuvre Warfare

doctrine in the USMC, all of these Principles and their application as

described in this paper are of relevance. All the tenets of Manoeuvre

Warfare as currently taught are encompassed within the fundamental

Principles of War. Whatever new concepts are applied in modern

teaching they must necessarily be based on military history, and

applied with imagination and commonsense. Indeed, it behoves us all to

`look back to the future'.

F'OOTNOTES

1 Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", tr. O.J.Matthijs Jolles, (Random House Inc., 1943),

p.109.

2 MCCDC, USMC, "Ground Combat Operations", OH 6-1 (Quantico, 1988). Chapter 2,

Section I.

3 B.H.Liddell Hart, "Thoughts on War" (Faber and Faber Ltd., 1944), p.122.

4 Douglas MacArthur, Annual Report, Chief of Staff, US Army, 1933.

5 MCCDC, USMC, "MAGTF Master Plan"(draft), (Quantico, 1988).

6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Operations", FM 1OO-5(Washington, DC, 1986),

p.174.

7 Ibid, p.173.

8 Ibid, p.175.

9 Ibid, p.176.

10Ibid, p.174

11Ibid, p.175.

12Ibid, p.173.

13Ibid, p.176.

14Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", tr. O. J Matthijs Jolles, (Random House Inc., 1943),

p.175.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 1, "The Application of Force",

Army Code No. 71344. London, 1985.

Carl von Clausewitz, "On War". Tr. O.J.Matthijs Jolles. Random House Inc.,

1943.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. "Operations". FM 100-5. Washington,

DC., 1986.

Marine Air Ground Training and Education Centre. Marine Corps Combat

Development Command. "MAGTF Master Plan" (draft). Quantico, 1988.

Marine Air Ground Training and Education Centre. Marine Corps Combat

Development Command. "The Value of Military History", C(C)385O.

Quantico, 1988.

Paret, Peter, ed. "Makers of Modern Strategy". New Jersey: Princeton

University Press, Princeton, 1986.

Thibault, George Edward, ed. "The Art and Practice of Military Strategy".

Washington DC., National Defense University, 1984.

U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. "Ground

Combat Operations", OH 6-1. Quantico, 1988.

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