Complexion Of Engineer Support
AUTHOR Major Ed J. Maguire,USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Logisitics
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title COMPLEXION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT
Thesis The complexion of Marine engineer task are not supported
by present doctrine, training, equipment, or organization,
although its valid combat missions are recognized by the Marine
Corps.
Issue Over time the quest for certainty of the engineer mission
has caused an imperfect relationship between the tasks performed,
the standards or degree of the tasks, the environment in which
those tasks are performed, and who is actually assigned those
tasks. Undoubtedly, some of the factors responsible for this
imperfect relationship are inherent in the nature of modern war.
Others unduly emphasis excessive specialization, centralization,
and instability in the organization of the engineers. This could
conceivably have been avoided by a better distinction of
engineers, that of a combat arm or that of a combat service
support element. A walk through history will show how the lack
of distinction between the two has caused the complexion in the
evolution of todays' engineer mission.
In 1927, Major General Commandant Lejeune published a paper
describing his thoughts on the role of engineers in the Marine
Corps. He envisioned a service organization whose capabilities
spanned the broad spectrum from performing military engineering
as a member of a Marine Division in an amphibious assault to
cabinetmakers for the garrison posts. As the remainder of the
combat arms evolve, with modern, highly lethal weapons and rapid-
paced, tactics of maneuver, engineers experience inadequacies of
current doctrine, training, equipment, and organization.
Today, we still expect one young Marine, military
occupational speciality (MOS) 1371, Combat Engineer, to perform
all the following duties: Bricklayer, Bridge Carpenter,
Cabinetmaker, General Carpenter, Woodworking Machine Operator,
General Painter, Sawmill Operator, Engineer Demolition
Specialist, Basic Engineer, Construction Crew leader, and
Camoufleur.(MOS) These are in addition to the special "combat
engineer" skills a 1371 Marine also needs in order to accomplish
mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks in combat.
Conclusion Engineers at every level are seeking solutions and
creating innovative but local alternatives to meet today's
mission requirements with limited assets, outdated equipment, and
ill-defined doctrine and techniques. The Warfighting Center has
taken the lead on the complexion of the engineer support problem,
largely beginning with a engineer conference scheduled for early
May. Here, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will listen to
approximately fifty of the key engineers within the Marine Corps
to determine what actions should be taken. If all goes well the
combat mission of engineers will be supported by doctrine,
training, equipment, and organization.
RESEARCH PAPER
COMPLEXION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT
Topic: Explain a problem situation:
Thesis Statement: The complexion of the Marine engineer tasks are
not supported by present doctrine, training, equipment, or
organization, although its valid combat missions are recognized
by the Marine Corps.
I. History of Marine Engineers
A. Influence by Army engineers
B. Influence by German engineers
C. Influence by Navy Seabees
D. Name changes from pioneers to combat engineers
II. Doctrine Changes
A. Tactical mission vs. non tactical mission
B. Jack of all trades
C. Military occupational skills (MOS) changes
D. Three way split wing, force, and combat engineers
III. Training Improvements
A. Engineer School
B. On the job training
C. Increasing the number of individual tasks training
D. Changing the training between peace time and war
IV. Equipment
A. From shovels to bulldozers
B. Impact on mobility
C. Procurement problems
D. Does the description of task fit the equipment
V. Organization
A. Post WW II peace time posture cuts in troop numbers
B. The changes from the Vietnam war
C. MAGTF combat engineer support vs. general engineer
D. Responsibilities chances on the organization make up
RESEARCH PAPER
COMPLEXION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT
One of Webster's definitions for complex is "a group of
obviously related units of which the degree and nature of the
relationship is imperfectly known". This definition fits the
state of the engineer community within the Marine Corps today.
In the past there was one engineer unit that performed all of the
engineering tasks incumbent within the engineer mission. Today
there are three engineer units that split the engineering tasks
in order to accomplish the engineer missions. Over time the
quest for certainty of the engineer mission has caused an
imperfect relationship between the tasks performed, the standards
or degree of the tasks, the environment in which those tasks are
performed, and who is actually assigned those tasks.
The complexion of Marine engineer tasks are not supported by
present doctrine, training, equipment, or organization, although
its valid combat missions are recognized by the Marine Corps.
Undoubtedly, some of the factors responsible for this imperfect
relationship are inherent in the nature of modern war. Others
unduly emphasis excessive specialization, centralization, and
instability in the organization of the engineers. This could
conceivably have been avoided by a better distinction of
engineers, that of a combat arm or that of a combat service
support element. A walk through history will show how the lack
of distinction between the two has caused the complexion in the
evolution of todays engineer mission.
There is a common misperception within the Corps that the
engineer organization was created initially as a combat arm. Our
attachment to the U.S army engineers, in terms of much of our
doctrine, training, and equipment, has prevented us from
recognizing that we were created as a service organization. The
first Marine engineers started in June 1913 with Company "H", 1st
advance Base Regiment formed at Marine Barracks, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. The 1st Regiment was a "fixed defense" regiment,
with "H" company performing the duties of an engineer company and
a machine gun company. The engineer company was used as an extra
rifle company and did not perform any real engineer tasks. In
October, 1920, "H" company was transferred to Quantico. From
1920 until 1927 the size of the engineer unit at Quantico varied
(2).
In 1927, Major General Commandant Lejeune published a paper
describing his thoughts on the role of engineers in the Marine
Corps. He envisioned a service organization whose capabilities
spanned the broad spectrum from performing military engineering
as a member of a Marine Division in an amphibious assault to
cabinetmakers for the garrision posts. There tasks would be the
operation of captured of newly constructed advance base
facilities until relieved by Army or Navy counterparts (3).
Other duties consisted mostly of what we know today as landing
support duties: supervising labor details, clearing the landing
beach of hindrances to landing, organizing the beach to receive
and issue supplies, and preparing the beach to receive and unload
landing boats. Each regiment had its organic pioneer platoon to
perform these tasks. Overcoming obstacles and other "combat
engineer" tasks were performed by the attacking infantry as a
matter of course. From 1927 until early 1935, the "engineers"
performed primarily base service and support functions.
Concurrent with the early development of the Marine engineer
organization, the army was in the midst of a major reorganization
that drastically reduced the scope of the engineers. In fact, in
1935, Army Chief-of-Staff General Malin Craig advocated
eliminating engineers from the division entirely (4-9). He
argued that proper reconnaissance would allow divisions to avoid
obstacles and barriers. In addition to re-organization, the army
was greatly increasing its emphasis on mechanization and mobility
A conflict of events since the larger dependence on
mechanization the larger the requirement should be for the
engineers to provide mobility, countermobility, and
survivability. The Marine Corps for once did not follow the Army
lead on this issue, but to a certain extent adopted the German
engineer philosophy.
The disparity between the American and the German philosophy
on engineers was recognized by General J.L Schley, USA, who on 3
October, 1939, wrote:
"The Germans believe that the modern trend toward
motorization and mechanization demands a much larger
proportion of engineers... We seem to be moving in exactly
the opposite direction" (6-9)
In the German army, the general engineer support services, (which
American engineers usually perform), were left to semi-military
labor and construction units, usually composed mostly of
civilians.
By 1942 the Marine Corps had elected to build up the size of
the engineer force but split the engineering tasks into two main
areas: tactical engineering and general engineering. Tactical
engineering was performed by the Engineer Battalion and general
engineering by the Pioneer Battalion (11). Although the the new
term "tactical engineering" appeared, there was no new combat-
oriented doctrine, equipment, training, or organization
specifically developed. The engineers still operated with
commercial/ civilian construction equipment, slightly modified to
meet military needs. In manning and equipment, the pioneer
battalion was quite similar to the engineer battalion. Pioneers
normally landed with landing teams, on D-day, to begin
establishing supply dumps in support of the assault units.
During the initial landings, they would be used as stretcher-
bearers, runners, scouts, or for whatever purpose they were
needed. In 1947 the Pioneer Battalions name was changed to
"Shore Party Battalion" to better reflect its mission. The Navy
would help the Pioneer Battalion's engineering effort with the
creation of the Navy Construction Battalion (Seabees) into the
Marine engineer organization.
In 1942 admiral B. Morrell, Civil Engineer Corps, USN,
created the Seabees in order to fill the urgent need for more
experienced construction workers in the theater of operation. If
Marine Engineers are characterized as "Fighters who build", the
Seabees are characterized as "Builders who fight". As soon as
general unloading began, Seabees battalions came ashore to
augment and expand upon the construction or repair work began by
Marine engineers. For instance, until the later part of World
War II, the Seabees provided the majority of construction support
to Marine aviation. In support of Marine aviation the Marine
Corps established a third type of engineer battalion called the
aviation engineer battalion. The direct control of the Seabee
engineer support was lost in 1950 when the Navy's Seabees were
removed from the Marine engineer organization. To fill the gap
created by this action, a memorandum of understanding between the
Marine Corps was pursued, and the Force Engineer Battalions were
created (7).
The Force Engineer battalions primarily had their roots in
the separate, or aviation engineer battalions of World War II.
Their mission was to provide engineer support to the landing
force as a whole, including the aviation element, and to
reinforce, augment, and expand on the efforts of the divisional
engineer battalions. Consequently, they were much larger and
much more heavily equipped than their divisional counterparts.
Independent bridge companies were also created, just prior to the
Korean War. Located in Force Troops, these units held all the
FMF's bridge capability, separate from either the divisional
engineer battalion or the Force Engineer Battalion. Headquarters
Marine Corps (HQMC) thought that this system was more responsive
to the needs of the whole force . In the next several years HQMC
would make many changes within the engineering area, in a quest
to provide more responsive engineer support to the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF).
In recognition of the hasty, expedient nature of the
divisional engineer battalion's capabilities, HQMC adopted the
name "Pioneer Battalion" for the divisional engineer battalion.
As the results of a composition board, referred to as the
"Hogaboom Study", HQMC attempted to show a distinction between
the Pioneer Engineers (divisional) and Force Troop engineers.
This was the first attempt by HQMC to show the difference between
the two engineer units through a mission statement. The
Pioneer's mission would read combat engineer support and the
force engineer's would read service support. Along with the name
change and the different mission statement, the Pioneer Battalion
would also receive a seizable reduction in manpower and
equipment. A reduction in construction capability was reflected
in the personnel reduction of about 15% and equipment reduction
of about 34%. The net reduction in construction capability, in
consideration of dispersed type operations, is estimated at
approximately 50% (32). These "Pioneer Battalions" existed until
1963 until they were redesignated as "Engineer Battalions". A
few years later the build up in Vietnam began and both engineer
battalions and force engineers had the mission of performing
similar tasks.
Vietnam was the classic engineer example of an imperfect
relationship between unit's missions and the tasks assigned
because of the specific time and place. The vast majority of
engineer task in Vietnam were service - oriented and assigned by
area. As a consequence, distinction between unit mission,
although it existed on paper, was never really considered. The
11th Engineer Battalion (force engineers) found themselves
sometimes in direct support of an infantry unit while 1st
Engineer Battalion (division engineers) found themselves
sometimes making mount out boxes. Unfortunately, due to the
"Hogaboom Study", the division engineer battalions, still
equipped essentially as pioneer battalions, had much less
capability for construction - type tasks. But, the nature of
war, in this specific place and time, reinforced the belief that
all engineers are indeed "jack of all trades", and perform the
same tasks no matter what type unit that they belong to.
If you were to ask an infantryman from Vietnam about how he
remembers the engineers and he will fondly recall the hot shower
and cold beer that awaited him back at the combat base. But
mostly, his vision of engineers will be more like a bunch of
construction workers in uniform, spending time building and
maintaining the vast support network that characterized Vietnam.
The "McNamara Line" was one such network. A series of fortified
bases, linked by cleared traces a minimum of 200 meters, was
supported by barbed wire, minefields, and other constructed
obstacles. It would be a linear barrier extending from a point
on the South China Sea just south of the DMZ, to the DONG HA
mountains. This is not to say that engineer battalions did not
provide direct support in the the actual prosecution of the fight
against the enemy but that the engineer effort in Vietnam was
decidedly service - oriented. It did not give a true distinction
between engineers, as a combat arm or as a service support. Post
- Vietnam would bring the Marine engineer organazation some
subtle, yet important, changes.
In 1976, the name of the divisional engineer battalion was
again changed to "Combat Engineer Battalion". This was done to
distinguish it from the support battalion and reflect the
battalion's "combat" nature. At this time public opinion of its
armed services was at the lowest level in history. The Marine
Corps reacted to this difficult post - Vietnam period by
restructuring to make the most effective use of its remaining
active units. The Force Service Support Group (FSSG) was formed.
Many of the divisional support or service elements (including the
force engineer battalions) found themselves reassigned to the
newly created FSSG's. The Combat Engineer Battalion remained in
the division but with still an imperfect relationship between the
tasks performed, the standards or degree of the tasks, and the
environment in which those task are performed. Figure #1
portrays the evolutionary development of the Marine engineers
from 1913 until the present.
The Combat Engineer Battalion was still equipped with
commercial construction equipment, little changing from World War
II. Its overall capability was still practically identical to
the pioneer battalion of the late 1950's. The Marines assigned to
the engineer occupational fields received no further combat
training after departing boot camp or the Basic School. The
missions of the units within the engineer organization have
changed little since the early 1940's. Consequently, the tasks
and capabilities that compose those missions have not changed.
The engineer organization has, resident within it, approximately
the same number of task that it had 50 years ago. The reductions
in personal to adopt a peace - time posture, but not a reduction
in tasks performed, implies that today fewer people are trying to
accomplish the same number of things.
Today, we expect one young Marine, military occupational
specility (MOS) 1371, Combat Engineer, to perform all the
following duties: Bricklayer, Bridge Carpenter, Cabinetmaker,
General Carpenter, Woodworking Machine Operator, General Painter,
Sawmill Operator, Engineer Demolition Specialist, Basic Engineer,
Construction Crew leader, and Camoufleur.(MOS) These are in
addition to the special "combat engineer" skills a 1371 Marine
also needs in order to accomplish mobility, countermobility, and
survivability tasks in combat. Further, all types of assault
minefield and obstacle breaching, assault gap crossing, engineer
reconnaissance, and all types of obstacle and field fortification
building are demanded as well as the continuing actions expected
of combat Marines (12). This broad range of tasks expected of
the majority of the engineer community limits the attainment of
proficiency in any given area. If this young Marine transfers to
a wing engineer organization, he will have to be proficient in
the construction and maintenance of airfields. With three
different engineer units to be assigned to (combat, force and
wing), tasks performed by the individual Marine are highly
conditional.
These conditions are dependent on the mission / unit to
which the engineer is assigned in regards to environment,
conditions, an standards. Thus, for example, a combat engineer
would cut a rough trail through the jungle with hand tools while
under enemy fire, while a force engineer would cut a main supply
route wath heavy equipment with the absence of enemy fire. The
engineer school only gives a broad overview of this engineer
field that contains a tremendous task list. This formal school
can only qualify a Marine at the basic level. Time constraints
prevent the school from preparing a Marine for all the possible
changes to environment, conditions, and standards. This generic
instruction package reinforces the "Jack of all Trades" stigma
instead of stressing the distinction between the three different
engineer units.
In the 1980's, the Marine engineer continues to follow the
Army's lead in training and equipment even though they have two
entirely two different missions. As the remainder of the Marine
combat arms evolve, with modern, highly lethal weapons and rapid-
paced, tactics of maneuver, engineers experience equipment
inadequacies. The combat engineer battalion with the mission of
mobility enhancement for the MAGTF is equipped with commercial
bulldozers which are the tallest, loudest, slowest vehicles on
the battlefield. They can barely be loaded aboard ship. They
are, in fact, a detriment to the mobility of the assault element.
In spite of all of this, a combat role for combat engineers is
valid. History has proven this again and again. Marine
engineers, unfortunately, are not yet prepared for it. How does
the future of the engineers look?
"During times of peace the most important task of any
military is to prepare for war. As the nation's rapid
response force, the Marine Corps must maintain itself ready
for immediate employment in any clime and place and in any
type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on
achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of
training, flexibility in organization and equipment,
qualified professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine"
(10).
Engineers at every level are seeking solutions and creating
innovative but local alternatives to meet today's mission
requirements with limited assets, outdated equipment, and ill-
defined doctrine and techniques. The Warfighting Center has
taken the lead on the complexion of the engineer support problem,
largely beginning with a engineer conference scheduled for early
May. Here, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will listen to
approximately fifty of the key engineers within the Marine Corps
to determine what actions should be taken.
"The essential thing is action. Action has three stages:
the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for
execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are
governed by will. Will is rooted in character, and for man
of action character is of more critical importance than
intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will
without intellect is dangerous" (1)
-- Hans von Seekt
If all goes well the combat mission of engineers will be
supported by doctrine, training, equipment, and organization.
History owes the engineers and even our beloved Corps no less.
Click here to view image
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Cal von Clauswitz, ON WAR, trans. and ed. M. Howard and
P.Paret (Princeton University Press, 1984) p119.
2. Donnelly, Ralph W. "A Brief History of U. S. Marine
Engineers," Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, USMC.
3. Lejeune, John A. MGEN Commandant, USMC. "The Engineer
Battalion of the Marine Corps," Leatherneck Magazine. (Aug 1928).
Reprinted obtained from Reference Section, United States Marine
Corps Historical Center, HQMC, Washington D.C. 20380.
4. Maripoti, Major James A. USMC. "Combat Engineers; Obstacles
to overcome,"United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 107.
June, 1981.
5. McCalister, Captain F.M. "Engineering Problems of Marine
Brigades," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 24, No. June, 1940. (pg.7).
6. Montross, Lynn. "All In A Day's Work, The Engineers and Shore
Party In Korea," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1952.
7. Smith, Lt. Colonel Robert L. USMC. "A New Look For the
Engineers," Marine Corps Gazette, December, 1954.
8. Telfer, Gary L., Major, USMC. U. S. Marine in Vietnam:
Fighting the North Vietnamese: 1967. History and Museums
Division, HQMC, Washington, D. C. 1984. Library of Congress No.
77-604776.
9. U. s. Department of the Army. The Corps of Engineers: Troops
and Equipment. by B. D. Coll, J. E. Keith, and H. H. Rosenthal. A
volume in the Technical Services subseries of United States Army
In World War II. Washington, D. C. 1958.
10. United States Marine Corps. Warfighting (FMFM-2) Manual draft
copy 1989.
11. United States Marine Corps. FMF Organization and Composition
Board Report - Service Element,1957.
12. United States Marine Corps. Military Occupational speciality
(MOS) Manual. MCO P1200.7. 8 July 1986.
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