The Ace's Role In Maneuver Warfare And The Marine MAGTF
AUTHOR Major Michael W. Karnath, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE ACE'S ROLE IN MANEUVER WARFARE
AND THE MARINE MAGTF
I. Purpose: To discuss the current state of understanding and
application of maneuver warfare doctrine as it applies to the
employment of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) within a Marine
Air/Ground Task Force.
II. Problem: Although maneuver warfare has been officially
adopted as Marine Corps doctrine there still remains a lot of
confusion concerning how to employ maneuver within both combat
elements of the MAGTF, the ACE and the Ground Component Element.
III. Data: Acceptance of basic command relationships which exist
within the MAGTF and historical analysis of successful airpower
campaigns accompanied by an honest evaluation of how the ACE can
best embrace maneuver warfare leads to some basic tenets of where
the thrust of the ACE should be placed while operating with the
MAGTF.
IV Conclusions: The Ace should always look first to establishing
air superiority, followed by deep air support (DAS), and finally by
close air support (CAS) and troop lift as its focus or point of main
effort (POME).
This does not imply that the GCE's POME will not be initially
supported by the ACE. With the mix of aircraft in the ACE
Commander's posession, simultaneous support of all functions of
marine aviation can be accomplished. However the marines that
comprise the GCE and ACE must realise that multi-role aircraft such
as the F/A-18 probably will be more heavily allocated towards the
ACE's POME vice the GCE's at least initially in a conflict.
THE ACE'S ROLE IN MANEUVER WARFARE
AND THE MARINE MAGTF
I. Maneuver Warfare is new Marine Corps doctrine
A. Maneuver warfare must be standardized and understood
B. Current focus is toward GCE's role
C. Maneuver warfare is method of thinking
1. GCE applications
2. ACE applications.
II. MAGTF command structure
A. ACE and GCE have co-equal status
B. Historical perspective
1. WW II Italian campaign
2. Korean and Vietnam campaigns
III. Highest MAGTF priority for ACE
A. Air superiority--initial POME for ACE
B. Concept applies to all marines
IV. Next highest MAGTF priority for ACE
A. DAS/isolation of battlefield
B. Enemy maneuver capability
V. CAS responsiveness during maneuver warfare
A. Preplanned Scheduled
B. Scheduled on-call
The ACE'S ROLE IN MANEUVER WARFARE
WITHIN THE MARINE MAGTF
The Marine Corps has officially adopted maneuver warfare as
doctrine.1 Much discussion and debate led up to the adoption of
maneuver warfare as doctrine and is ongoing as we try to
standardize the wording and meaning of the associated phraseology
so that comprehension is enhanced. The main buzzwords/phrases of
maneuver warfare are, point of main effort (POME), mission-type
orders, commander's intent, OODA loop cycle ( Observation of the
situation, Orientation to it, making a Decision to reacts and
implement the Action), surfaces, gaps, and reconnaissance pull.2
The majoritiy of past and present discussion, whether written
or verbal, focuses on maneuver warfare as centering on the ground
combat element (GCE) since a ground unit within the GCE is normally
designated as the POME. This has led to a general perception within
the aviation community that the term "maneuver warfare" is a
ground warriors term. Because of this, maneuver warfare is
currently less understood by aviators than by their ground
counterparts.3
This situation cannot be allowed to continue. In order to
achieve the maximum effectiveness of the Marine Air/Ground Task
force (MAGTF), the aviation community must understand and accept
the tenets of maneuver warfare as fully as those who serve with the
GCE. Conversely, the ground community of warriors must understand
the fashion that aviators can and should best support the MAGTF in
the evolving area of maneuver warfare doctrine.
The aviation combat element (ACE) is not merely a supporting
arm that provides air support to the GCE while that entity
promulgates the land battle using the concepts of maneuver warfare.
Rather the ACE, as its name implies, is one of two combat
elements that comprise a MAGTF. It is a combat element that can
maneuver rapidly on the battlefield (albeit in the air), extend far
forward of the GCE, and deliver impressive combat power onto the
enemy with subsequent detrimental effects.4
While the ACE may not normally be the POME of the MAGTF
Commanding Officer (although this does not necessarily have to be
the case) the ACE CO and all of his subordinate CO,s down to
individual officer's leading flights of aircraft must understand our
new doctrine. Maneuver warfare is Marine Corps doctrine and not
just simply GCE doctrine. Every commanding officer within the
MAGTF must establish his own POME and clearly relay his intent to
those units under his command regardless of whether he has been
designated the POME by his superior. This is not meant to imply that
an ACE commander who is not designated as the MAGTF POME is free
to conduct warfare independently of the GCE. It simply means that
in order to support the MAGTF CO's designated POME if it happens to
be a ground unit, the ACE CO will have to designate an appropriate
POME (maintenance of air superiority, interdiction against enemy
second echelon etc.) that will allow him to dedicate the appropriate
amount of assets required to support the MAGTF POME.5 Conversly,
the GCE CO needs to understand that while an appropriate number of
ACE assets will be dedicated to directly supporting his POME, the
entire ACE air complement will not show up over his unit on the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to drop ordnance. This gives
focus to the subordinates and enhances comprehension of how the
ACE fits into maneuver warfare and the MAGTF structure.6
As a starting point it is appropriate to reiterate how the basic
MAGTF command structure should operate. First and foremost is the
fact that the ACE and GCE Commanding Officers are co-equals (the
ACE is not subordinate to the GCE) and as such the ACE develops his
mission-type orders' and commander's intent and issues them to his
subordinates based on the direction provided by the MAGTF CO and
not the GCE CO. Conversely, it should be readily apparent to a MAGTF
CO that while hem or more appropriately his staff are developing
courses of action for the MAGTF to follow, as much consideration
must be given to ACE concerns as to the GCE's before mission-type
orders and commander's intent are issued by the MAGTF CO.
The MAGTF, ACE, and GCE must clearly understand how to use
maneuver warfare in the air as well as on the ground to enhance
overall combat power. There are historical examples of how
airpower when employed without regard to ground maneuver has
failed to achieve significant results in relationship to tactical,
operational, or strategic goals. Airpower and ground maneuver must
be synchronized so that each complements and reinforces the
other.7 The key word is synchronization of the efforts of the ACE
and GCE, not subordination of the efforts of the ACE to the GCE.
The campaign in Italy during World War II provides a contrast
between what can be achieved by airpower alone and what can be
achieved when synchronized with ground maneuver. During a
unilateral air campaign named Operation Strangle allied airpower
attempted to interdict the enemy's flow of supplies into Italy and
reduce it to a level that would force withdrawal. It soon became
apparent that when not faced with coordinated ground operations to
react to the Germans were able to circumvent the application of
airpower to their flow of supplies.8 However, during the next
offensive called Operation Diadem, the allies conducted ground
maneuver in coordination with airpower directed at interdicting the
German elements as they maneuvered behind the lines. This left the
Germans with the choice of repositioning by day and suffering heavy,
unacceptable losses or repositioning under the cover of darkness and
suffering loss of initiative to the allied ground efforts through
delay.9 Of course the German's were soon overcome and forced to
withdraw. General von Senger's (one of the German commanders)
postwar remarks clearly tells that airpower and ground maneuver in
conjunction played a decisive factor in the German defeat:
The enemy's mastery of the airspace immediately behind
the front under attack was a major source of worry to
the defender, for it prevented all daylight movements,
especially the bringing up of the reserves. We were
accustomed to making all necessary movements by night
but in the event of a real breakthrough this was not good
enough. In a battle of movement a commander who can
only make the tactically essential moves by night
resembles a chess player who for three of his opponent's
moves has the right to only one.10
In similar fashion, air campaigns in Korea (Operation Strangle)
and Vietnam (Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I) offered similar
contrasts of what happens or fails to happen when ground and
airpower are not synchronized to achieve a mutual goal.11
The next aspect that is required for effective utilization of
the ACE by the MAGTF commander is a realization that airpower is
much more flexible and responsive to the needs of the MAGTF when
air superiority is gained and maintained. Also an interdiction
campaign that is in tune with and adjusted to the GCE maneuver
warfare scheme of maneuver and timetables is required.12 This
statement is generally accepted on the surface by all marines but
when discussions of maneuver warfare pop up there is confusion of
what that means. It has been my experience that while ground
officers admit air superiority and interdiction is important on the
one hand, they also feel that when the MAGTF CO designates a POME
within the GCE then by definition a majority of CAS capable aircraft
must be dedicated to direct support of the POME unit at the expense
of other ACE concerns. This is an attitude that needs to be changed.
Even many marine aviators are confused by this subject because
written Marine Corps guidance in the form of OH's, FMFM's or other
definitive sources are yet forthcoming on the fundamentals of how
to apply maneuver warfare specifically to the ACE. Whereas the
ground combat arms side of the Marine Corps has OH 6-1:
Fundamentals of Maneuver Warfare to refer to.
Air superiority should be the initial POME of the ACE in any
conflict that we fight. This means that the required number of air-
to-air sorties that can accomplish this task have to be allocated by
the ACE. Since a substantial number of CAS platforms owned by an
ACE are also air-to-air platforms (F/A-18's) this will necessarily
convey a picture to the unperceptive ground or aviation officer that
the ACE is not supporting the MAGTF's POME which probably rests
with the GCE. Of course when analyzed this does not hold up.
Absolutely no good can come of neglecting the higher priority ACE
POME of establishing air superiority and thus giving the GCE freedom
to maneuver without the threat of prohibitive enemy air
interference.13
If air superiority has been yielded to the MAGTF either through
an effective air campaign or because we are fighting a foe that has
no viable air threats then and only then can the ACE reduce the
allocation of F/A-18's from fighter roles to air-to-ground ordnance
delivery. Even when this happens the ACE and the MAGTF CO will
probably determine that deep air support (DAS) or that air support
that is delivered beyond the GCE commander's immediate area of
interest will next become the ACE's POME that best supports the
MAGTF and GCE's POME.
Since amphibious assaults and over-the-horizon capability
training is focusing on landing the MAGTF where the enemy is weak,
or at least not as strong, the ability to interdict the second echelon
that may be coming towards the area of operation to reinforce
becomes important. Interdiction of the enemy command and control
structure, tactical repositiong capability, and in some cases the
logistical capability in the area of operations will do more to
disrupt an enemy than will overwhelming concentration of CAS on
the GCE's POME. This is not an advocation for giving minimal direct
support to the GCE but rather an explanation of why the ratio of CAS
to DAS to air superiority might sometimes appear out of proper
proportion to those maneuver warfare proponents that do not fully
understand how important air superiority and DAS are to the GCE and
their enactment of maneuver warfare doctrine. Certainly, if air
superiority does not have to be fought for to be gained and if the
enemy forces inside and outside the area of operations are weak
than a preponderance of ACE assets can be dedicated to providing
overwhelming CAS wherever the GCE POME is located.
The next point of discussion is how to best increase the
responsiveness of the ACE assets that can and will be dedicated to
direct support of the GCE during rapidly changing, fluid, ground
maneuver warfare style of combat. Some maneuver warfare
proponents looking on the surface feel that the 24 to 36 hour
fragging process is a big impediment to being able to mass dedicated
CAS aircraft at a particular point and time that was not planned for
because a tactical opportunity all of a sudden opens up that needs to
be exploited. This is incorrect logic on several points. First of all,
the air tasking orders and frags that are published by the ACE well
in advance of flight operations are the basis for logistical
allocaticn, ordnance buildup, fuel positioning, organizing the
maintenance effort for aircraft and aviation support equipment,
accommodation of requests from the GCE, combat service support
element (CSSE), and even within the ACE itself, and are the best
estimate to focus combat capabilities. These events are not
instantaneous and require considerable effort, time, and planning.14
The answer to this dilemma is for the ACE and the MAGTF staff
to (specifically the MAGTF air operations section and the ACE
fragging section ) break away from the mindset that a mission that
goes on the ATO or daily frag has to be preplanned. Generally, in
order to maximize the responsiveness of ACE assets to the GCE in a
maneuver warfare environment advance scheduling of direct support
assets (direct support to the GCE POME) should consist almost
entirely of scheduled on-call missions (either airborne or on alert)
with suitable ordnance loads or troop lift capacity that follows the
MAGTF CO's and GCE CO's intent. Then as the battle unfolds for the
GCE, the GCE will have already dedicated but as yet unassigned
assets to rapidly place at the proper place and time through direct
coordination between the GCE CO's air section and the ACE's direct
air support center (DASC) which is doctrinaily co-located with the
senior maneuver fire support coordination center (FSCC).
It is past time for discussion of the ACE's role within the
MAGTF organization as the Marine Corps embraces maneuver warfare
as doctrine. Common understanding of the role that the ACE must
take to best support the concept of maneuver warfare must be
established. Otherwise, the Corps will suffer from well intentioned
but nonetheless piecemealing of scarce aviation assets towards
goals that on the surface seem to support the GCE POME but in fact
are not the best solution. The aviation community already
understands the importance of air superiority and DAS, after all,
that is paramount to the way the aviation community has operated in
the Marine Corps. However the community must stand firm and
convince itself and the others that comprise the MAGTF that the ACE
will have a POME that, although it does not appear to, will best
allow the GCE to maneuver act boldly and decisively, and vanquish
the enemy while being more flexible and responsive to the direct
support needs of the GCE.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. OPERATIONAL HANDBOOK, USMC, (OH) 6-1, Ground Combat
Operations, Section 1303.
2. Ibid.
3. Clover, Kevin R., Capt, USMC. "Maneuver Wafare: Where Are We
Now?" Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, 54-59.
4. Dailey, John R., MajGen, USMC. "Air Issues Reviewed." Marine
Corps Gazette. February 1989, 22-24.
5. Clover Kevin R., Capt, USMC. "Maneuver Warfare: Where Are We
Now?" Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, 54-59.
6. McCutcheon, Richard L., Capt, USMC. "Marine Corps F/A- 18s Now
More Than Ever." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1988, 31-33.
7. Bingham Price T., LtCol, USAF. "Ground Maneuver and Air
Interdiction in the Operational Art." Parameters, March 1969,
16-31.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Treichler, Donald R., Col, USMCR. "MAGTF Aviation Battlefield
Effectivness." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1989, 25-26.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
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