The Marine Corps Reserve: Times Are A Changin
AUTHOR Major David M. Kirkwood, USMCR
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE: TIMES ARE A CHANGIN
I. Purpose: To contrast current roles of the Marine
Corps Reserve with current changes in force structure
and philosophy
II. Problem: The Marine Corps Reserve will under go
many changes during the 1990's in order to meet the
changing requirements within the active force
structure. Moreover, the decision as to how the
reserve will be actually employed upon mobilization
continues to rage.
III. Data: The Marine Corps Mobilization Plan
MPLAN) has outlined the four catagories for
mobilization as: partical mobilization, selective
mobilization, full mobilization, and total
mobilization. The MAGTF Master Plan address the
"spectrum of conflict" as High Intensity being general
war, Mid Intensity being coventional operations short
of general war, and Low Intensity being stabilizing
operations. The majority of force structure changes
were directed in order to return to the days of four
rifle companies per infantry battalion. These changes
have resulted in the transfer of units and
responsibilities to the reserve. Furthermore, the
MAGTF Master Plan indicates the active force should be
able to handle anything short of general war with
little reserve participation. The roles of the Marine
Corps Reserve have not changed; however, the emphasis
is being placed on the augmentation/reinforcement role.
IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps Reserve will be
able to continue as a "force in readines." Moreover,
the individual reservist is our greatest manpower
resourse and his military skill proficieny should be
our main concern.
V. Recommendations: The MAGTF Master Plan should be
the foundation for all future plans to include the
moblization plan. Additionally, we should be realistic
in our plans for employing reserves and stress
individual skill proficieny vice unit proficieny.
OUTLINE
I. The Marine Corps Reserve
A. Levels of Mobilization
B. Roles of the Marine Corps Reserve
C. Composition of the Marine Corps Reserve
D. Total Force Contributions of the Reserve
II. The Spectrum of Conflict
A. High Intensity (HIC)
B. Mid Intensity (MIC)
C. Low Intensity (LIC)
III. Force Structure Changes
A. Designated Augmentation Program
B. 4th Marine Division-FSSG-Wing Changes
IV. The Delimea
A. Reserve Units as Units
B. Reserve Units as Individuals
V. Solutions
A. MAGTF Master Plan
B. Emphasis on Individual Training
THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE: TIMES ARE A CHANGIN
"In the approaching years of defense budget
austerity, the Marine Corps will not be able to do
everything. MAGTF's (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) will
become the nation's `force of choice' in most likely
future conflicts at the lower end of the so called
`spectrum of conflict. ` In so focusing its efforts;
however, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) will retain
usefulness in general war with its three active Marine
Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and gain depth of capability
and sustainability through augmentation and reinforcement
from the reserve." (4:1)
The above is from the draft of the MAGTF master plan
which is to be the road map for the future of our Corps.
To under-stand the impact of the proposed MAGTF master
plan we must understand the "spectrum of conflict" and
the roles assigned the Marine Corps Reserve upon
mobilization. The Marine Coros Reserve will under go
many changes during the 1990's in order to meet the
changing requirements within the Marine Corps.
The Congress and the President hold the key to
unlocking the mobilization capability of our nation in
the event of war or other national emergency.
Mobilization may be defined as the process by which the
armed forces are brought to a full state of readiness for
war or other national emergency. The President under
Public Law can call-up 200,000 reservists for 90 days if
a national emergency. This process is called the
Presidental 200K call-up.
The Marine Corps Mobilization Plan (MPLAN) has
defined four levels of mobilization, besides the 200K
call-up. The President and Congress can mobilize Reserve
Component units and individuals by:
(1) Selective mobilization of units and
individuals to meet domestic emergencies
(2) Partial mobilization of units and
individuals,
up to 1,000,000 individuals, in case of
war or national emergency
(3) Full mobilization of all reserve units,
ready reservists, retired military
personnel and the resources necessary to
fill out existing force structure
(4) Total mobilization of the armed forces
beyond existing force structure (5:par.
c,I-A-3)
"The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to
provide trained and qualified units and individuals to be
available for active duty in time of war, national
emergency, and at times as national security may
require." (7:1)
The Marine Corps Reserve upon mobilization will be
called upon to fill the following roles:
(1) Selectively augment the active Force in
order to field three MEF's at full wartime
structure
(2) Selectively reinforce the active MEF's
with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units
(3) Provide the capability to field a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade to reinforce an
active MEF
(4) If augment/reinforce is not ordered,
provide the capability to field a
Division, Wing, and Force Service Support
Group with reduced capability (7:1)
The Marine Corps Reserve, by law is composed of the
Ready Reserve, which includes the Selected Marine Corps
Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR),
the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready
Reserve which consists of those individuals members
liable for duty in time of war or national emergency
proclaimed by the Congress or when otherwise authorized
by law.
The first category of the Ready Reserve is the
Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). The SMCR consists
primarily of organizations and units who train
individuals in time of peace for immediate mobilization.
SMCR units shall conform, as far as practical, in
organization, training, and equipment with corresponding
units of the Regular Establishment. This practice is
called "mirror imaging." The SMCR now provides 43,600
trained individuals which may be assigned as members of
units or as individual replacements, upon mobilization.
The SMCR is composed of non-prior service and prior
service Marines. The breakdown of non-prior service to
prior
service Marines is 70:30. Non-prior service Marines
receive
approximately six months' active duty initially, which is
devoted to basic "warrior training" and MOS training.
Besides initial entry level training, non-prior service
Marines receive 39 days of training a year, which breaks
down to 14 days of annual training duty (ATD) and 48
drills. Reservists are paid in 4-hour increments, each
4-hour period is called a "drill." Two drills equal one
day, two days equal a weekend drill. The majority of
(SMCR) experience lies within the 30 per cent of prior
service Marines. Usually, these Marines have served
between three and eight years or more of active duty.
Not only are they pretrained, but they provide valuable
skills in many different areas, such as instructors,
recruiters, drill instructors, and NC0/SNC0 academy
graduates.
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) are members
of the SMCR; however, they fill individual billets within
W series T/0's for various bases, stations, and selected
FMF units. Upon mobilization, IMA's will report to their
assigned unit, doing the same duties as when they drill.
IMA's receive the same training opportunity as do members
of SMCR units, but are grouped administratively into
Reserve Augmentation Units. There are currently 2700 IMA
billets approved in the reserve structure; however,
because of congressional limit on SMCR end strength, the
Marine Corps has limited the total number of filled
billets to 1300. This leaves a 1400 man shortfall upon
mobilization.
"The Full-time Support program (FTS) provides SMCR
reservists, who serve on active duty, to administer,
train, and supervise the Marine Corps Reserve. Active
Duty FTS manpower can be allocated to operational
commands, staffs at appropriate headquarters, bases and
stations in order to provide more effective management of
the Marine Corps Reserve program and integration into the
active component." (7:7) There are roughly 2,000 Marines
serving on active duty with the FTS program. Normal
contracts run for 2-3 years, then a new billet and
contract are given.
The second category within the Ready Reserve is the
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR will provide
most of pretrained manpower upon mobilization. The
IRR is composed of those Marines who have completed their
initial enlistment but have not completed their military
obligation. The most significant change in recent
history occurred in 1985, Congress passed a law changing
the military obligation from six years to eight years.
As a result of this change, the IRR will double in
strength to over 75,000 by 1994. Under current
regulations, members of the IRR are required to maintain
their uniforms and keep the Marine Corps Reserve Support
Center, Overland Park, Kansas, informed of a current
mailing address. There is not a recurring requirement
for training; however, members of the IRR who desire to
participate in refresher training do so through the
reserve counterpart training program (RCT). The RCT
program, which is voluntary, provides reservists the
opportunity to perform two to four weeks of active duty
training alongside their active counterparts. The
picture of the IRR is constantly changing. Eventual the
strength is growing, so are the problems associated with
managing the IRR suLch as mobilization readiness, M0S
skill degradation, physical fitness, and combat skills
retention.
"The Standby Reserve consists of those members,
other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve,
who are liable for active duty in time of war or national
emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise
authorized by law."(7:3)
The Retired Reserve consists of those members whose
names are carried on a retired list (active and reserve)
pursuant to 10 USC 274. In Secretary of Defense,
Carlucci`s annual report to Congress, Fiscal year 1990,
he stated, "individuals from the Ready Reserve would be
used to bring active and reserve units to authorized
strength and to replace untrained or partially trained
unit members as well as initial casualty losses. "(1:170)
The following illistrates the current organization of the
Marine Corps Reserve:
Click here to view image
The demand for pretrained reserve manpower is great.
First, 14,000 members of the SMCR are the Marine Corps
appropriation within the Presidential 200K call-up.
Second, bases and stations have identified 2700
individual mobilization augmentee billets which are
critical to the mobilization process and must report by
M+3. More important, only 1300 of the 2700 billets can
be filled because of SMCR end strength limitations,
leaving a 1400 man shortfall. Third, bases and stations
have identified more than 10,000 pre-assigned billets to
be filled by members of the IRR and retired reserve.
Again, like the IMA's, these billets are essential to the
mobilization process and the individuals must report
before M+10. The proposed MAGTF master plan addresses
the "spectrum of conflict", with high intensity conflict
(HIC) being general war, low intensity conflict (LIC)
being stabilizing operations, and mid-intensity conflict
(MIC) being conventional operations conducted short of
general war. The Marine Corps will most likely be
involved in conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum.
"Low intensity conflicts are characterized as operations
conducted to provide assistance to friendly or allied
governments in order to maintain internal stability and
public welfare." (4: sec. 5, p. 1)
"The concept of employment of the MAGTF in general
war (HIC) requires the use of the total force, active and
reserve, with a requirement to expand to five MEF's."
(4:ES) Initially, the Marine Corps could provide two HIC
MEF's without activation of the reserves. However, this
solution would require assets from the third active MEF;
moreover, selected reserve units will be called upon to
provide the three active MEF's with general capabilities
not present in large quantities in the active peacetime
structure. Especially in light of the changes taking
place as a result of the MAGTF force structure study.
The fourth MEF would activate and draw its forces
from the 4th Division-Wing-Force Service Support Group,
and the IRR. "Manning a fifth MEF would require
expansion of overall military manpower...the core of the
MEF command element could be designated in peacetime from
a variety of organizations including the MAGTF
Warfighting Center, a designated Reserve Augmentation
Unit or a combination." (4: Annex b, part 4, p.2)
Sustainment of three MEF's will require augmentation and
reinforcement by designated units from the SMCR. The
residual SMCR units/individuals will form the core of the
4th MEF. The IRR, as well as the additional manpower
that mobilization would bring, would allow, in the
planner's minds, round out of the 4th MEF and formation
of a nucleus for a 5th MEF.
Marine Corps involvement in a mid-intensity conflict
would rely primarily on the active force structure to
conduct conventional combat operations, although the
Marine Corps allocation of the 200K call-up, may be
available, if the President exercises the 200k call-up
option.
General Al Gray, thirty-seventh Commandant of the
Marine Corps, has directed wide-sweeping changes within
the total Marine force. The total force policy was
adopted as a strategy by the United States in the early
1970's and is meant to allow the orderly integration of
U.S. guard and reserve components with active duty
forces. Moreover, it is intented to allow the United
States to maintain a smaller active peacetime force as
national security and military strategy will permit;
while maintaining a full mobilization capability in a
expanded guard and reserve. The Marine Corps total force
policy resulted in a "mirror image" relationship between
the reserve force structure i.e. 4th Marine Division, 4th
Marine aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group,
and like units within the active force structure. The
major drawback of the Marine Corps mirror image policy
has been when a shortage of critical Military
Occupational Skills (MOS) occur within the active
structure, the same shortages exist within the reserve
structure. Moreover, because the force structure is
relatively the same, the reserve is not overloaded with
combat units such as infantry, tanks, and artillery, all
of which will be critical in the event of war or other
national emergency. The following chart illistrates the
current reserve total force contributions:
Click here to view image
"Excellence in infantry units has been the greatest
single combat strength of the Marine Corps." (4: Sec. 8,
p.7) General Gray's emphasis has been on putting more
teeth in the bite of the infantry by adding a fourth
rifle company to each infantry battalion. In order to
accomplish this, certain units have been cadred and a
designated augmentation program established between
regular and reserve units. Specifically, sixteen reserve
rifle companies will augment the following
active duty battalions:
Click here to view image
The only USMCR infantry regiment not participating in the
augmentation program is the 24th Marines. This program
will allow the sixteen rifle companies to train along
with their active counterparts. But what of the five
battalion headquarters with their weapons companies and
the regimental staffs of the 23rd and 25th Marines?
Additional force structure changes will occur over
the next two years as certain active force artillery and
tank units are deactivated. Delta company, 2d Tank
Battalion is scheduled to be deactivated during the first
quarter of FY91, followed by Delta company, 1st Tank
Battalion on a date to be determined. A company within
8th Tank Battalion (USMCR) will be designated to augment
2d Tank Battalion. Likewise, a company from 4th Tank
Battalion (USMCR) will augment the 1st Tank Battalion.
Three active general support artillery battalions, 4/10,
4/11, and 5/11 will be deactivated along with two general
support batteries, P/5/10 and P/5/11. The following
reserve units will assume the following active force
missions: (6:1)
Click here to view image
The biggest tasks facing the reserves begins with
the scheduled transfer of bulk fuel companies during the
third quarter of this fiscal year. The three bulk fuel
companies, three bridge platoons, and one longshoreman
platoon, for a total of 1,752 structure spaces, are
scheduled to be transferred to the reserve. Upon
transfer, the reserve will deactivate one bridge platoon
and one longshoreman platoon. Additionally, bakery,
salvage, and graves registration platoons were originally
earmarked for cadre status in the SMCR for a total of 591
structure spaces. Other force structure changes
occurring within in the total force are the activation of
two firing batteries within the 4th LAAD Battalion and
the reorganization of the 1st, 2d, and 3d LAAM Battalions
to contain two batteries each. The 4th LAAM Battalion
will add a battery for a total of three.
How do these changes effect the current mobilization
plan for the Marine Corps? More importantly, are we
creating a false sense of security unnecessarily? What
is the relationship between the total force policy and
the MAGTF master plan?
"Title 10 United States Code 673(b) gives the
president the authority to call-up reserve forces when
he...determines that it is necessary to augment the
active forces for any operational mission...." (2.28)
The use of this statuary authority in a carefully applied
manner would demonstrate the capabilities and importance
of reserve forces in the overall defense structure.
Therefore, in order to augment the active force, the
president would have to order it.
For years, in closed circles, many heated
discussions have taken place concerning the question;
"how will reserves be employed upon mobilization?"
Certainly, the roles the Reserve will take on during
mobilization are well-thoughout and practical; however,
the delimea lies in how they will be employed. The
delimea is this: Reserve units train as units and will
be employed as units or do they train as units and will
be employed as individuals, thus losing their identity as
units? How the Reserve will be employed, upon
mobilization, should be the driving force behind how they
train in peacetime for war.
The mirror image, total force relationships between
the Regular and Reserve establishment provides a
management model during peacetime and a plan for rapid
mobilization during war. However, our planning stops
once the reservists has reached his station of initial
assignment, whether he is an individual or part of a
unit. During the Korean War our Reserve establishment
was in its infantancy and quite unexpectedly many
reservists were called to active duty. "The fighting men
of the 1st Marine Division (who fought in the Korean War)
were almost evenly divided between Regulars and Reserves,
the Reserves coming from 124 selected cities across the
nation." (3.xi) These Reserve Marines were assembled and
trained at Camp Pendleton, California prior to going to
Korea.
We have changed our force structure to meet changing
times. However, regardless of how you structure the
force, the over-riding factor in determining the speed
which reservists can be employed, revolves around their
level of military competence. We may be able to mobilize
quickly, but if the unit or individual does not
demonstrate basic military combat and military occupation
skill (M0S) proficiency, he must be trained prior to
employment as part of a fighting force. The Reserves are
not alone in this rowboat. Any Marine who has been
serving in a billet outside his M0S will undoudtly suffer
skill (military and MOS) degradation.
Marine leaders have side-stepped the issue of how
the Reserve will be employed long enough . Furthermore,
the current reorganization underway within the Marine
Corps total force coupled with the Reserve Designation
Augmentation Program, adds to the confusion. First, the
active force should be structured in such a way as to be
able to handle any situation short of total war, without
Reserve participation. Moreover, plans should be
developed according to the MAGTF Master Plan which
initially calls for two Marine Expeditionary Forces
(MEFS) in the event of a High Intensity Conflict (HIC)
i.e. total war. These two MEF's would be composed from
the three MEF's currently maintained within the active
force. The third MEF would be composed of Regulars and
Reserves, with the possibility of a fourth being
constituted from residual reserve units and the
individual ready reserve. The designated augmentation
program only gives commanders a false sense of security.
Both Regular and Reserve Commanders believe, in the event
of total war, 16 Reserve rifle companies will immediately
join their active duty battalion, which is a
contradiction to the proposed MAGTF Master Plan.
The over-ridding factors which should drive the
whole mobilization process are: how well do we want our
Marines trained and how much time do have to train them,
prior to deployment into a theater of war. Training is
habitual. While it is desirable for training to be
challenging, adventurous, and even "fun", there is no
substitute for repetition. The Marine must be made in
peacetime (and in wartime) to practice his individual
duties over and over and over again, until he has learned
them so well that he can perform them under the most
distracting of circumstances. The Marine Reservist has
thirty-nine days a year to devote to maintaining his
military proficiency. Our highest priority should be in
maintaining his individual military skill proficiency at
the highest possible level,
Times are a changin!. As we enter the 1990's, it is
time to be realistic in regards to our expectations for
the reserve establishment. Words must give way to
action. Sacred cows must be sacrificed. The individual
reservist, whether he be a member of the SMCR or the IRR,
is our most valuable resource and must be polished into a
smooth fighting machine, before marching off to war.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Department of Defense. "Secretary of Defense's
Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year
1990," Washington, D. C.,
2. "Give Reserves Greater Defense Roles," Defense News
February 20, 1989, p. 28.
3. Hopkins, William B. One Bugle No Drums. Chapel
Hill: Alognoquian Books, 1986.
4. United States Marine Corps. "MAGTF Master Plan
(Draft)," Marine Corps Combat Development
Center, Quantico, Virginia, December 5,
1988.
5. United States Marine Corps. "Marine Corps
Mobilization Plan (MPLAN) Volume I,"
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington,
D. C., October, 25, 1988.
6. United States Marine Corps. "Reserve Force Structure
Brief for ACMC," Headquarters, Marine
Corps, Washington, D. C., November 7,1988.
7. United States Marine Corps. "Total Force,"
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington,
D. C., June, 1988.
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