Does The Marine Corps Need The EA-6B "Prowler" Aircraft
AUTHOR Major R. B. Johnson,USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: DOES THE MARINE CORPS NEED THE EA-6B "PROWLER"
AIRCRAFT?
I. Purpose: To examine the need for EA-6B aircraft to
support the MAGTF commander's effort to shape and focus the
battlefield.
II. Thesis: Airborne electronic warfare (EW) is critical
for the success and the survival of the MAGTF's aviation
combat element on the modern battlefield.
III. Data: The EA-6B and its predecessor, the EA-6B, have
demonstrated the merits of maintaining and upgrading
dedicated EW platforms that have the flexibility to respond
to a dynamic and ever-changing electromagnetic spectrum. The
EA-6B on-board systems provide MAGTF commanders with several
unique capabilities. The electronic intelligence (ELINT)
collected by the EA-63, and processed and analyzed by VMAQ-
2's organic Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES) can provide MAGTF commanders with
insights on the enemy's disposition and intentions on the
battlefield. The EA-6B's tactical jamming system can
selectively neutralize/degrade enemy air defense systems
and/or command and control nodes. The Prowler's capability
to carry and fire the high-speed anti-radiation missile
(HARM:) integrated with the aircraft's on-board systems
enhances its air defense suppression mission. In peacetime,
EW training of our forces is one of the most important
missions of VMAQ-2. However, the single siting of VMAQ-2 on
the east coast has created a severe discrepancy in EA-6B
training and exercise support received by FMFPAC and its
subordinate commands. If our MAGTF's and their aviation
combat elements are going to train like they will fight, the
reorganization of VMAQ-2 into three separate and distinct
squadrons is needed.
IV. Conclusion: The EA-6B will play an integral role in
the planning, coordination, and intelligence efforts required
to identify, locate, and defeat the air defense threats and
command and control nodes of today and into the near future.
The loss of the Prowler and its unique capabilities would not
be in the best interest of the Marine Corps.
V. Recommendation: The EA-6B is ready to handle future
challenges on the battlefield, but changes in VMAQ-2
organization and structure are needed for the Marine Corps to
benefit totally from this unique aircraft.
DOES THE MARINE CORPS NEED THE EA-6B "PROWLER" AIRCRAFT?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: Airborne electronic warfare (EW) is
critical for the success and the survival of the MAGTF's
aviation combat element on the modern battlefield.
I. Electronic Warfare Overview
A. Critic's concerns about EA-6B's
B. EW effectiveness on the modern battlefield
C. Low intensity conflict
II. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron Two (VMAQ-2)
A. EW mission
B. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) mission
C. Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and
Evaluation System (TERPES)
D. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) mission
E. High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM)
F. Electronic Counter-countermeasures (ECCM) mission
III. Marine Corps EW Shortfalls
A. FMFPAC/FMFLANT comparison
B. I MEF/Third MAW EW support
C. III MEF/First MAW EW support
IV. VMAQ-2 Reorganization
A. I MEF/III MEF Organic EW support
B. Contingency responsiveness
DOES THE MARINE CORPS NEED THE EA-6B "PROWLER" AIRCRAFT?
There are critics both in and outside the Marine Corps
who currently advocate stripping the regular Marine Corps of
its only dedicated aviation electronic warfare (EW) platform,
the Grumman EA-6B (Prowler) Improved Capability II (ICAP II)
aircraft, and transferring these assets to the Navy and/or
the Marine Corps Reserve. These individuals argue that the
EA-6B is too costly in terms of manning requirements and
fiscal demands to remain in the regular Marine Corps;
especially in this era of funding and personnel constraints.
They express concerns about the EA-6B's label as a national
asset and question the likelihood of this particular aircraft
being available to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) commander during contingency operations. They
further endorse the view that the Prowler will have limited,
if any, utility in the perceived low intensity conflicts of
the future.
Contrary to these beliefs, the EA-6B and its
predecessor, the EA-6A "Electric Intruder", have been in the
vanguard of EW support aircraft since the Vietnam War. These
aircraft have demonstrated over the past two and a half
decades, the merits of maintaining and upgrading dedicated
airborne EW platforms that have the flexibility to respond
and adjust to the dynamic and ever-changing electromagnetic
environment.
If the trends in EW development and technological
advances continue, the EA-6B, with proposed weapon system
upgrades and aircraft improvement packages, will assume an
even greater and more vital role in supporting the MAGTF
commander's efforts to shape and focus the modern
battlefield.1
Electronic warfare effectiveness is not a tangible
commodity, unlike bombs on target or the occupying of a
specific piece of terrain. Military history since World TWar
II has demonstrated that EW effectiveness lies in the
friendly force's capability to exploit and neutralize the
enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while retaining
its own ability to control and protect it. EW, when properly
exploited, results in reduced aircraft loss rates and the
capability to achieve air superiority against both an
adversary's air threat and his air defense systems.
Indirectly, the control of the different facets of EW also
results in a greater number of aircraft available to support
both the anti-air warfare (AAW) and the offensive air support
(OAS) requirements of the fighting forces. Marine Corps
planners and policy makers must not overlook this time proven
capability. Its effective utilization is critical on the
modern battlefield and absolutely essential to the survival
of our aviation assets.
A review of the United States' experience in the Vietnam
War and international conflicts which have occurred since
Vietnam, highlight the essential role that EW has come to
play on the battlefield of today. The Vietnan War resulted
in an U. S. technological boom in electronic weaponry and
equipment to deal with the vast array of Soviet radars and
missile systems being introduced into North Vietnam. As the
war progressed, a direct correlation was established between
the capability of the U. S. to counter the North Vietnamese
radar and missile threats, and the U. S. aircraft
survivability rate. For example, the initial deployment of
Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems into North
Vietnam in 1965 resulted in the U. S. Air Force losing one of
its aircraft for every two SA-2 missiles fired. Several
months later, these numbers changed dramatically to a thirty-
to-one ratio due to the introduction of new EW aircraft, new
EW systems, and new tactics designed to defeat this specific
threat.2 The United States military's recognition of this
EW and survivability correlation resulted in the introduction
of the Marine Corps' EF-l0 and EA-6A into Vietnam in 1965
and 1966 to respond to the North Vietnamese missile system
threat.
If EW lessons-learned from Vietnam needed additional
confirmation, the experiences in the Yom Kippur War of 1973,
the Bekaa Valley confrontation of 1982, the Falkland Island
conflict of 1982, and the United States' retaliatory attack
on Libya in l986 revalidated and reinforced the need for
friendly forces to control and exploit the electromagnetic
spectrum on the fields of combat.
The Yom Kippur War found the Israelis on the brink of
defeat due to new developments in electronic technology and
weaponry. The Egyptians and Syrians surprised the Israelis
by employing new Soviet air defense systems consisting of
acquistion radars, SAM systems, and anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) which initially established a protective air defense
umbrella around their military forces and effectively
neutralized the Israeli Air Force (IAF). The IAF was able to
overcome this initial setback by responding immediately to
this new threat with new equipment and tactics, but at a
tremendous cost in aircraft--over 100 destroyed.3
The 1982 Bekaa Valley confrontation was the culmaination
of Israel's experience from the Yom Kippur War. The Syrians
had received sophisticated integrated air defense systems
(IADS) from the Soviets. As a show of force against the
Israelis' involvement in Lebanon, the Syrians deployed these
systems into the Bekaa Valley. The IADS were designed to be
a formidable threat to any IAF air operations into the Bekaa
Valley due to the overlapping, and mutually supporting radar
and SAM/AAAA envelopes. Unfortunately, for the Syrians, the
IAF integrated its aviation and ground-based EW systems,
intelligence assets, and supporting arms into a coordinated
attack designed to disrupt and neutralize these systems. The
employment of these tactics proved highly successful with the
IAF virtually destroying the Syrian IADS in the Bekaa Valley
while incurring minimal losses. The demonstrated success of
employing a full spectrum of supporting arms against air
defense systems has become the standard tactic for attacking
and suppressing these threats.
EW also played an integral role in the outcome of the
air battle which developed over the Bekaa Valley in 1982.
Israeli aircraft reportedly jammed the ground-based Syrian
surface-to-air command, control, and communication networks
used to control the Soviet-built aircraft flown by the
Syrians. The effectiveness of this tactic contributed to
the shootdown of ninety-six Syrian aircraft by the IAF in
air-to-air combat, with the Israelis losing only six
aircraft, all to Syrian SAM's.4
The Falkland Islands conflict demonstrated again the
vulnerability of aircraft to SAM systems, with the British
downing 37 Argentinian aircraft which were without EW
equipment and protection.5
The United States' retaliatory air strikes against Libya
in 1986 provided contemporary illustrations of the importance
of EW exploitation. Marine Corps and Navy EA-6B's, and Air
Force EF-111's utilized to support the Libyan strikes proved
to be effective in jamming and neutralizing the radar and
missile threats posed by the Libyan air defense. These EW
platforms enabled the A-6E, F/A-18, and FB-111 strike
packages to successfully ingress and egress against SAM/AAA-
protected targets, unimpeded by electronic surveillance and
tracking, to deliver their ordnance.
Events which took place in the Yom Kippur War, the Bekaa
Valley, the Falkland Islands, and the Libyan retaliatory air
strikes clearly provide military planners with a view of
future battlefields. Again and again, one of the essential
combat factors in each of these conflicts proved to be the
capability to control the electromagnetic spectrum. Mr James
J. Townsend, fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic
and International Studies, states, "... the U. S. probably
would not face such an enemy as unsophisticated as the
Syrians in Lebanon....The corollary is that, whenever and
wherever the United States may fight again, it is likely to
encounter EW threats much more serious than any it has ever
faced before."6
The conflicts discussed above are dwarfed when one
begins to recognize the tremendous EW buildup in terms of
acquistion radars, EW aircraft, AAA systems, and SAM systems
which the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites have
undertaken over the last decade. The Warsaw Pact currently
has 10,000 intercept radars, over 700 electronic warfare
aircraft, 12,000 radar directed AAA systems, and 13,000 SAM
systems deployed in eastern Europe. The Soviets have
deployed these systems and aircraft to their satellite states
because their research and development programs have shown
that these weapons, if not countered, will impede our air
operations by destroying our aircraft.
For those who contest the need for EA-6B's in low
intensity conflicts (LIC), the environment and scenario in
which these conflicts are contemplated must be fully defined.
For example, any Third World country capable of importing
Soviet and/or free world weaponry and technology has the
potential to inflict unacceptable losses on military forces
trying to impose their will on them. "During the period
1982-1987, the Soviets exported ... 20,000 surface-to-air
missiles to the Third World."8 Potential adversaries such as
Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua could pose a formidable force in
terms of Soviet surrogate air defense threats, and represent
the type of enemy the Marine Corps would most likely oppose
in future conflicts. "The unchecked spread of modern weapons
... has raised the degree of sophistication of the threat
even in the remotest of these regions to a level where EW
assets are not merely useful to possess, but a necessity."9
The eighteen EA-6B Improved Capability II aircraft
currently in the Marine Corps inventory, the aircrew of four
(pilot and three electronic countermeasure officers [ECMO])
which operate each of these aircraft and its weapon systems,
and the approximately six hundred support and maintenance
personnel who keep the aircraft flying are trained for, and
ready to handle, challenges on the future battlefield.
First, we need to review Marine Tactical Electronic
Warfare Squadron Two's (VMAQ-2) organization to better
understand its mission and charger. VMAQ-2 is the sole EA-6B
squadron in the Marine Corps. It is tasked with supporting
the aviation EW requirements of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(FMFPAC), Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), and their
subordinate commands.
Electronic Warfare is subdivided into three operational
areas--electronic warfare support measures (ESM), electronic
countermeasures (ECM), and electronic counter countermeasures
(ECCM).10 To accomplish EW training, exercise, and
contingency support requirements for both FMF's, VMAQ-2
maintains the capability to function as three separate
detachments with six EA-6B aircraft each. Each detachment is
augmented with its own maintenance, logistic, and
administrative support when tasked to conduct independent
operations away from homebase.
The Prowler and its aircrew conduct ESM missions by
using the aircraft's on-board system (0BS) to collect
electronic intelligence (ELINT), and by relying on the
ground-based Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing
and Evaluation System (TERPES) for processing and analyzing
the ELINT data collected by the aircraft. The OBS is a fully
automated system which consists of several frequency receiver
antennae integrated with an on-board computer. The data
gathered through the different receivers is processed and
analyzed by the computer for threat system identification.
Once a threat radar identification is correlated, alfa-
numeric symbology identifying that particular threat appears
on cathode ray tubes (CRT) situated in front of the two back-
seat ECMO's for monitoring and appropriate action. Totally
software dependent, the OBS is fully reprogrammable and
designed to provide our MAGTF commanders with a credible and
technological edge in EW capabilities.
TERPES is organic to VMAQ-2 and was designed and
developed to provide EA-6B mission planning, ESM mission
processing, and intelligence and targeting support. Besides
supporting VMAQ-2 requirements, TERPES also provides the
MAGTF with an enemy's Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)
gathered by external intellence sources and updated with
ELINT data received from EA-6B ESM flights. This near-real
time intelligence enables the MAGTF commander to gain
insights on the enemy's disposition and intentions. For
example, the Soviet's emphasis on mobile SAM's, AAA, and
their associated radars will provide an electronic picture of
the battlefield by correlating known threat systems with
their movement on the battlefield. Collected ELINT data
further assists in the tactical planning of offensive air
support missions to minimize potential aircraft losses. A
thorough analysis of this data identifies weaknesses and/or
strengths in the enemy air defenses, while providing updated
jamming targets for future EA-6B ECM missions.
The ECMO's conduct ECM missions with a state-of-the-art
ALQ-99 tactical jamming system (TJS) which consists of wing-
mounted jamming pods, jamming control modules, OBS, computer
system and a computer keyboard which provides an interface
between the ECMOs' and the TJS. The TJS provides a limited
capability to counter tactical voice communications and data
link transmissions, enabling the MAGTF commander to
selectively attack and neutralize enemy command and control
nodes through electronic means. The EA-6B's TJS is primarily
designed to deny and/or degrade the targeting capability of
early warning, acquistion, and SAM/AAA threat radars, thus
permitting attack and fighter aircraft to successfully
penetrate enemy air defenses. The ECM0 achieves the desired
results by assigning different types of computer generated
jamming modulations which have been developed to defeat or
deceive the effectiveness of the specific radars targeted.
The EA-6B weapon system was recently given an offensive
weapon capability to attack SAM/AAA systems and their
associated early warning/acquistion radars. The capability
to carry and fire the high-speed anti-radiation missile
(HARM) was integrated into the EA-6B weapon system, providing
an offensive capability for which the Prowler was well
suited. The Prowler's ability to search for, intercept,
locate, and immediately recognize a threat signal, used in
conjunction with the HARM's capability to home in on
parametric data emitted by a radar antenna, allows the EA-6B to
identify and destroy priority targets with greater assurance.
In peacetime, accomplishing the ECCM mission is the most
important of the three EW subdivisions. By accomplishing
this mission we properly train and prepare our military
forces to function in a hostile EW environment. VMAQ-2
conducts ESM and ECM missions against our own equipment and
operators to familiarize them with potential enemy EW threats
and help them identify and combat the different effects of
EW. "If and when war should come, the outcome almost
assuredly will not be determined by what new technologies are
on the drawing-boards of the adversaries involved, but by
what systems already have been fielded and how well, they are
being used. In the final analysis, therefore, readiness and
training count for at least as much as hardware."11
ECCM training is also the one area where VMAQ-2 has
been unable to meet the total EW requirements of the Marine
Corps, due largely to the centralization and single siting of
our EA-6B's at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point,
North Carolina. If the Marine Corps is going to train like
it is going to fight, then VMAQ-2 should be supporting FMFPAC
and its two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) with the same
proportionate amount of EW training and exercise support that
FMFLANT and its single MEF currently receive. As modern
warfare has demonstrated, "... there may be no time, once a
war begins, to make up for previous peacetime neglect."12
A comparison of FMFPAC's and FMFLANT's primary aircraft
authorization suggests FMFPAC forces have a greater need for
EA-6B support, especially when one realizes that 62 per cent
of the Marine Corps aviation assets reside in FMFPAC. In
spite of this apparent requirement, I MEF and its aviation
combat element (ACE),the Third Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW),
sited at MCAS El Toro, California have had limited EW
training and exercise opportunities over the last three
years. First Marine Expedition Brigade (MEB) and its ACE,
Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-24, sited at MCAS Kaneohe Bay,
Hawaii have not received dedicated EA-6B training in over
seven years and that was conducted in conjunction with a
deployment to the continental United States. III MEF and its
ACE, First MAW, have experienced 21 months of EA-6B gapping
in the unit deployment program (UDP) over the last seven
years due to U. S. Navy carrier (CV) commitments.
I MEF and Third MAW have averaged less than two per cent
of the total EA-6B flight hours flown for the last three
years. Over these three years, VMAQ-2 flew 42.7 hours during
fiscal year 1986, 230 hours during fiscal year 1987, and
156.9 hours during fiscal year 1988 in support of I MEF's EW
requirements, while the Marine Corps' EA-6Bs flew over 5,250
flight hours in each of these years! This discrepancy in the
amount of flight hours flown in support of EW training and
exercise can be attributed to both the single siting of VMAQ-
2 on the east coast and the ongoing reductions in travel
funds and flight hours. Although there is a memorandum of
understanding addressing the semi-annual deployments of EA-
6B's to the west coast for I MEF/Third MAW training and
exercise support, the funding and flight hour costs
associated with sending a detachment of personnel and
aircraft to the west coast will continue to be prohibiting
factors.13
Since 1981, III MEF and First MAW'S scheduled EA-6B UDP
detachments of four EA-6B's have been diverted on three
different occasions from the western Pacific to support Navy
CV commitments in the Atlantic: April 1981 through February
1982 aboard the USS Nimitz; February 1984 through November
1984 aboard the USS Saratoga; and May 1986 through November
1986 aboard the USS America. If this CV requirement for
Marine EA-6B continues, and there are indications it will,
the Marine Corps can anticipate yet another CV tasking in
the near future. As in the past, a CV commitment would
result in at least a six month gap in III MEF's scheduled EA-
6B UDP detachment.
As already pointed out, VMAQ-2 maintains the capability
to function as three independent detachments with six EA-6B
aircraft, each detachment capable of being augmented with its
own maintenance, logistic, and administrative support.
Reorganizing VMAQ-2 into three separate and operational
distinct squadrons; one based on the east coast to support II
MEF, one based on the west coast to support I MEF, and one
based in the western Pacific to support III MEF, could well
be the key to the Marine Corps success on the modern
battlefield by increasing the availability of critical EW
training for FMFPAC units.
The VMAQ-2 reorganization initiative would provide the
Commanding General's of I MEF and III MEF and their
subordinate commands with organic and uninterrupted EA-6B
support, which certainly is not the situation today. The
capability to integrate EA-6B's into all aspects of exercises
and training, i.e. fighter, attack, and command and control,
would pay immeasurable dividends in terms of combat readiness
for those aviation and ground units which currently receive
minimal EW training. This multi-site proposal would be more
responsive to the EW requirements of both I MEF and III MEF,
while reducing the disportionate share of EA-6B support
received by II MEF. Although there are advantages inherent
in situating and centralizing EA-6B maintenance and personnel
support at MCAS Cherry Point, the operational disadvantages
in terms of training, combat readiness, and lack of
responsiveness to the FMF's EW reguirements exceed the
monetary and personnel savings associated with the
centralization issue.
Most contingencies and operational plans (OPLANS)
supported by Marine Corps forces have at least a four EA-6B
aircraft detachment or larger assigned to the time phased
force and deployment list. In some contingency scenarios,
where two or more OPLANS are being conducted simultaneously,
I MEF and/or III MEF could find themselves without dedicated
Prowler support. This is especially possible in a situation
where a VMAQ-2 detachment has been CV designated or deployed.
The EA-6B is not an end-all; however, it was designed
and developed as an EW platform to respond and counter the
ever-changing EW environment. The Prowler plays an integral
role in the coordination and intelligence effort required to
identify, locate, and defeat the air defense systems of today
and the future. Its state-of-the-art ECM system and ESM
capabilities enable the MAGTF commander to both neutralize
and exploit potential enemies' use of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The loss of the EA-6B and its unique capabilities
would not be in the best interest of the Marine Corps. Does
the Marine Corps need the EA-6B? The answer is emphatically,
"Yes", but several changes in the VMAQ-2 organization and
structure must be accomplished if the Marine Corps is to
benefit totally from this unique aircraft.
FOOTNOTES
1Grady L. Jackson, "Maintaining the Edge," Journal of
Electronic Defense (April 1987) ,pp.4l-46,103.
2Gowri S. Sundaram, "Modern Airborne Electronic Warfare: New
Concepts, Programs, and Products Proliferate,"
International Defense Review (February 1985),p.169.
3Sundaram,p.l69.
4Sundaram,p.170.
5Sundaram,p.169.
6James J. Townsend, "Electronic Warfare: The Invisible
Dimension of Victory," Sea Power (October 1985),p.55.
7Jonn M. Porter, "Tactical Aircraft Survival Dependent on EW
Capabilities," Armed Forces Journal International
(February 1989) ,p.79.
8Porter,p. 79.
9Sundaram,p.169.
10U. S. Marine Corps FMF 5-1, Marine Aviation,pp.114-115.
11Townsend, p.57.
12Townsend, p. 57.
13 Memorandum of Understanding between FMFPAC and FMFLANT for
EA-6B Support,dated 15 April 1986.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jackson, Grady L., Rear Admiral, USN., "Maintaining the
Edge," Journal of Electronic Defense (April 1987)
Memorandum of Understanding between FMFPAC and FMFLANT for
EA-6B Support, (15 April 1986)
Porter, John M., "Tactical Aircraft Survival Dependent on EW
Capabilities," Armed Forces Journal International
(February 1989)
Sundaram, Gowri S., "Modern Airborne Electronic Warfare: New
Concepts, Programs, and Products Proliferate,"
International Defense Review (February 1985)
U. S. Marine Corps FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation (24 August 1979)
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