Light Infantry: The Multi - Spectra Force
AUTHOR Major Lance D. Jordan, USA
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force
I. Purpose: A review of the roles and missions of light infantry
forces in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts through an
examination of common characteristics of light infantry forces.
II. Problem: Although light infantry forces are often associat-
ed with employment in a low-intensity conflict, the light infan-
try force has an equally important role in the mid- to
high-intensity conflict.
III. Data: Light infantry forces have demonstrated a common
characteristic: self reliance. These units have displayed excel-
lent leadership patterns at the small unit level. Junior leaders
are trained to make independent decisions. Historically, light
infantry forces have been employed throughout the spectrum of
conflict. Commanders must conduct a thorough METT-T analysis to
insure that light forces are occupying the correct sector or are
assigned missions within their capabilities.
IV. Conclusions: U.S. Army Airland Battle Doctrine is consistent
with the employment of light forces and a heavy/light force pack-
age should be considered when the terrain and weather will
justify the decision.
V. Recommendations: Light infantry divisions have a role and
mission just as mechanized forces; each has their own capabili-
ties and limitations. Light infantry forces have the ability to
operate in terrain that will not support mechanized operations.
Light infantry can and should perform economy of force roles to
allow heavy forces to concentrate elsewhere.
Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force
OUTLINE
Thesis: Light infantry forces are often associated with low-
intensity conflict, but they have an equally important role in
the mid- and high-intensity battlefield as well.
I. Historical perspective
A. Between the world wars
B. Malaya l946-l966
C. China-Burma-India 1944
D. North Africa 1941
II. Characteristics, roles and missions of light infantry
A. Self reliance
B. Independent action
C. Use of weapons
III. Airland Battle Doctrine and NATO
A. Doctrine and light infantry
B. Light infantry in the covering force
Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force
by Major Lance D. Jordan. USA
Modern technology affords today's armies with the means to
move, shoot, and communicate more reliably than ever. This en-
hanced capability has resulted in an increased cost: heightened
destructability. The military and political leadership from 1950
to the present have placed nuclear weapons at tactical, operation-
al, and strategic levels. This strategy has been to maintain a
credible, cost effective force(e.g. nuclear weapons as a substi-
tute for conventional forces).
Motivated by political and military reasons, commanders on
both sides of the Iron Curtain are reevaluating the use of nucle-
ar weapons. The recent signing of the INF treaty between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has brought about a change in focus from
nuclear to conventional forces. From a U.S. perspective, this
change in focus has meant the creation of light infantry divi-
sions. During REFORGER 1988 a brigade from the 10th Infantry
Division (Mountain) was deployed to Europe to augment one of the
U.S. Corps and to validate U.S. Army doctrine on the use of a
heavy/light force combination. (6)
Additionally, there are two other poignant illustrations of
this modern phenomenon of military evolution. First, in 1973
well-trained and determined Egyptian soldiers armed with portable
Soviet ATGMs defeated Israeli armor formations. (1:188)
Second, in 1988 an Afghan rebel armed with the U.S. Stinger mis-
sile defeated Soviet attack helicopters. The effectiveness of
these light forces demonstrates that there is a role for light
infantry on the modern battlefield. Light infantry forces are
often associated with low-intensity conflict, but they have an
eaually important role in the mid- and high-intensity battlefield
as well.
This analysis of light infantry will first look at three
historical examples of the use of light infantry during and after
World War II. Second, a discussion of common characteristics of
light infantry units and possible roles and missions will be
provided. Third, the requirements for light forces under Airland
Battle Doctrine and a possible scenario for light infantry employ-
ment in NATO will be addressed.
Historical Perspective
In the prologue to his book, On Infantry, John A. English
writes, ". . . groups of foot soldiers remain to this day among the
most powerful and influential forces on the battlefield." (1:ii)
Had this point of view been expressed between World Wars I and
II, John A. English would not have found many followers.
The dawn of the airplane and the tank created much doubt as
to the continued utility of foot infantry. During this period
between the wars, two strategic thinkers emerged in Western writ-
ings, J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart. In the mind of Fuller the
mechanization of the battlefield reduced foot infantry to perform-
ing unimportant missions. According to Fuller, "Tanks conquer
and infantry holds." (1:31)
In contrast, Hart's philosophy of the "expanding torrent"
was that foot infantry penetrated and held the flanks while mo-
bile forces exploited and pursued. The use of light infantry to
achieve tactical surprise by attacking at night in reduced visi-
bility urged the revival of the importance of light infantry
forces. Liddell Hart viewed the light infantry soldier or "light
fighter" (7th Infantry slogan) as a stalker, an athlete, and a
marksman. (1:34-38)
Light infantry is easily distinguished from other infantry.
Major Scott McMichael writes that there are two points of view on
this issue. First, the traditional U.S. point of view is that
light infantry is light in organization and equipment for the
purpose of achieving strategic mobility. Second, the European
view is that light forces have a philosophy and mindset that make
them unique. Their tactics are different and their style appears
to be more self reliant than conventional or mechanized infan-
try. (8:xi-xii)
Three excellent examples of the use of light infantry are
found in the British operations in Malaya(1946-1966), the World
War II China-Burma-India theater with the Chindits(1944), and the
9th Australian Infantry Division in North Africa(1941).
Malaya 1946-66
In the first example-the British, along with the Malayan
police and civilian authorities combined their efforts and con-
ducted a successful counterinsurgency operation against Chinese
communist forces. This case study of Malaya is a shining example
of a successful counterguerrilla operation and serves as a good
model for the proper employment of light infantry forces in a
low-intensity conflict. Active military operations took three
forms: combat patrols, area saturation with large units, and
jungle bashing. (8:101)
The first two methods proved to be unsuccessful methods due
to the loss of surprise. The third technique, "jungle bashing."
proved to be the most favorable method because small units would
secretly infiltrate an area and force the guerrillas to move.
The guerrilla's movement would subject them to ambush by govern-
ment troops. Two key elements to the British success were small
unit leadership and skill among their junior leaders in decision
making. (8:101)
Commanders were given wide latitude in handling operations
within their area of responsibility. Company commanders were
allowed to maintain their units in the field for long periods of
time, thereby exposing the soldiers to the same conditions experi-
enced by the guerrillas. In this type of environment,the British
soldier learned discipline, patience, and field craft which led
to denial of sanctuary to the enemy in the jungle. (8:106-107)
Burma 1944
The second example is equally as significant, but not as
well known. The actions of light infantry forces in Burma be-
tween March to June 1944 were sometimes referred to as the Chin-
dit War. The term Chindit was a reference to a group of British
and Indian jungle fighters trained by Major General Orde C.
Wingate, the "Lawrence of Burma." Eventually the term "Chindit"
was used to refer to all of the units operating in the Japanese
rear area. (10:918)
These light infantry forces were employed at the operational
level of war in a mid-intensity environment. Twenty thousand
specially-trained jungle soldiers operated two hundred miles to
the rear of the Japanese forward line of troops. The U.S. Army
contribution to this campaign was three thousand soldiers under
the command of Brigadier Frank D. Merrill. This unit, known as
"Merrill's Marauders" was one of many British, Indian, and
Chinese units under the command of Lieutenant General Joseph
Stillwell. These were not elite soldiers, but ordinary,
well-trained light infantry capable of independent action. (8:41)
The operations of these units can be characterized as unor-
thodox and ambitious. These units would move great distances
over unimaginable terrain and attack the enemy where he least
expected it. The training of these soldiers emphasized physical
endurance, field craft, and mule team procedures. The tactics
stressed surprise, envelopment, shock, and disciplined
fire. (8:42)
The self-sufficiency of the "Chindits" through the use of
mule teams and aerial resupply made it possible for the units to
operate without fixed lines of communication. The Chindit War
illustrates that the high value of individual skills, coupled
with special tactics and techniques can have an effect disporpor-
tional to the actual numbers of men involved. (8:42)
North Africa 1941
The third example, places light infantry in a static defense against
armor. In April and May 1941 the German Afrika Korps met defeat
when they encountered an outnumbered Australian unit at To-
bruk.(9:1) The 9th Australian Division was not operating in a
high-intensity battlefield as defined to-
day(i .e. ,nuclear/chemical). However, considering the technology
available in 1941 and the environment of the battle, it was
high-intensity for its era. The 9th Division organized its de-
fense as a strongpoint in depth with a mobile reserve. This
division was well supported with separate brigades of armor and
numerous anti-tank and field artillery battalions. The key to
the success of this division was the close cooperation and coordi-
nation of inf antry, armor, artillery, and engineers.
The 9th Division used the depth of its defense to its advan-
tage. It did not have sufficient forces to be strong everywhere
along the front, so its commander chose to establish pockets of
resistance. Enemy armor units were allowed to penetrate friendly
forward units in preplanned areas so that they would be destroyed
in designated kill zones within the strongpoint. The light infan-
try used aggressive, deep patrolling to deny the enemy close-in
observation and maintained all-around security against surprise
attack by enemy armor.
The Australians learned two unique lessons from this experi-
ence. First, the artillery and the anti-tank guns are the nucle-
us of the defense. Second, these forces must be integrated with
the infantry units and engineer obstacles. In support, the infan-
try must be organized to defend these weapon systems and the
sectors of fire for the AT weapons must be established and maxi-
mum effective marked on the ground with reference points.
However, it should be noted, this process is time consuming and
must take into account the preparation time for individual and
crew-served weapon fighting positions. (9:46)
Characteristics, Roles and Missions
Characteristics
The three previous examples establish three common character-
istics for light infantry forces: a tendency towards self reli-
ance, an independence of action, and a unique appreciation of the
use of weapons. Moreover, to be effective, light infantry forces
cannot depend on fixed lines of communication. The attitude that
grows from this concept is self reliance. (8:219-222) Self reli-
ance may be defined as the ability to do the impossible when
faced with a critical mission and no resources. In turn, this
self reliance instills strong interdepence between individuals
and units. This interdependence is especially noted at the compa-
ny, platoon, and squad level. Light infantry units and their
leaders have a unique appreciation and view of terrain not shared
by their mechanized brothers.(8:219-222) The simple fact that
there is no terrain impassable to foot infantry may foster this
difference. When selecting sectors for light infantry units,
cover and terrain should be unsuitable for enemy tanks and hinder
enemy counteractions. (3:33)
The tendency towards self reliance is reinforced by excel-
lent leadership at the small unit level. The need for indepen-
dent action is paramount to insure the survival of light forces.
The leadership in light infantry unlike that of other forces.
tends to centralize in the NCO and junior officer. This is de-
rived from shared experiences of danger and depravation. For
example, patrolling is the common method of combat activity; this
places a tremendous leadership burden on the young officer or
NCO.
The advantage created by superior leadership is no more
apparent than in the light infantry force's ability to splinter
and still conduct successful missions. Large units such as a
battalion will breakdown into smaller units for movement or infil-
tration of enemy lines. Latter the units will regroup at a desig-
nated time and place for a mission. During REFORGER 1988 a light
infantry battalion from the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain)
conducted a night attack in the opposing force's rear area.
While a night attack is not unusual in training exercises, the
technique used by the unit was ambitious. This particular unit
infiltrated the opposing force positions by squad, moved on multi-
ple routes across unfamiliar terrain for over twenty-five kilome-
ters, reassembled, and attacked the opposing force's rear area.
Later, the unit exfiltrated by squads to return to friendly
lines. (6)
Finally, light infantry is unique because of its unique
use of weapons. The light infantry soldier must be well trained
in the employment and firing of his individual as well as the
unit's crew-served weapons. The majority of the time these units
will be operating outside the range of friendly artillery and
beyond external logistic support for class III and V. The light
infantry soldier cannot afford to waste ammunition nor to underes-
timate his opponent's weakness. The use of weapons must comple-
ment the light infantry soldier's tactics as well as the terrain
on which he operates.(4:64)
Roles and Missions
The light infantry force is offensively oriented, but in a
high-paced environment it cannot strike quick enough nor
follow-through soon enough for decisiveness.(4:34) This fact was
recognized by the 9th Australian Division at Tobruk and justified
their use of a mobile reserve consisting of armor and anti-tank
weapons. There is still a need for mechanized forces and light
forces should not be substituted for heavy forces unless the
terrain, weather, and combat situation justify the decision.
Offensive actions by light forces in a low-intensity con-
flict must be curtailed. The military arm of power is not the
centerpiece, but takes a supporting role to the diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and psychological instruments of power. The more likely
role for light infantry is the training of government or popular
forces, defending critical sites or borders. (7:57-58) For exam-
ple, the mobile training teams sent to Honduras and El Salvador
from SOUTHCOM provide instruction to units in those countries on
everything from rifle marksmanship to training management.
Other roles and missions which could be assigned during any level
of conflict are protecting rear areas and defending built-up
areas, but they will not be discussed here.
Airland Battle Doctrine and NATO
One of the previously stated characteristics of light infan-
try is an appreciation for terrain. In order for light infantry
to be successful in the mid- to high-intensity environment of
NATO, the light force must exploit defensively the protective
qualities of less traf ticable, compartmented terrain and yet
operate offensively against Soviet forces. (7:116)
This combination of defensive and offensive action is the
thrust of the U.S. Army's Airland Battle Doctrine. The defense
will provide the force with the opportunity to take offensive
action. The decisive battle cannot be won while on the defense;
in order to take offensive action, the light infantry force must
seize the initiative and exercise it aggressively. The use of
surprise is key to the successful execution of Airland Battle
Doctrine. (11:14-16) By gaining surprise, light forces can over-
come superior enemy forces by creating confusion and disorganiza-
tion.
Recognizing that heavy forces will dominate in a NATO Cen-
tral Front battlefield, the use of light infantry forces in that
environment must be examined with that as a foundation. A scenario
described by Major James Greer, USA, in a July 1988 article in
"Military Review" pointed out four possible missions for light
infantry. The number one mission would be to demonstrate U.S.
support to NATO by deploying forces to deter Soviet aggression.
However, if deterrence fails three employment options would
be available for light infantry:
1) To defend forward in the main battle area;
2) To provide rear area security;
3) To assume a covering force role forward of the main
battle area. (2:11)
The first two roles are easily understood, but the third mission
does provide a unique challenge for light forces.
Normally covering force operations are carried out by ar-
mored cavalry squadrons and regiments. These units are
self-contained and organized for operations away from the main
body. The problem currently facing these cavalry units is their
lack of sufficient dismounted scouts to cover the numerous trails
and routes available to an attacking enemy. (2:12-13)
Light Infantry can enhance the covering force units by con-
ducting reconnaissance patrols, establishing observation posts,
and organizing armor killer teams to destroy advance guard vehi-
cles.(2:14) The covering force will tight nonlinearly, comple-
menting the light infantry's desire to operate in the enemy's
rear areas when the light force is bypassed. As in the example
of the 9th Australian Division, the light infantry will defend in
depth and establish pockets of resistance around their anti-tank
weapon systems. A mobile unit of tanks,if attacked, or anti-tank
weapons will form the reserve.
Two possible methods or techniques would be used to describe
this type of operation. One method would be to place the light
infantry forward of the armored cavalry regiment. The infantry
would be given a mission of reconnaissance of enemy units and
disruption of their formations. This technique would be used
when the covering force area is deep. (2:14-15) When the covering
force area is shallow the side-by-side technique would be used.
In both instances a METT-T analysis would determine the best
sector to place the light infantry forces. Of the two options,
the later would be the most difficult to control.(2:15)
Light infantry forces must be as capable as the rest of the
U.S. Army. It has to be prepared to face a full range of threats
and environments from terrorism to high-intensity conflict.
There is no doubt that the newly formed light infantry divisions
were structured to take advantage of strategic lift assets in
order to gain strategic mobility. (7:1-3) But like their European-
counterparts, the U.S. light divisions are recapturing the spirit
and philosophy of the light infantry ethic. Tough demanding
training is developing those small unit leaders who are capable
of taking independent action without reliance on guidance from
above.
Light infantry forces stress high quality leadership,
confidence, and self reliance. The result is a small unit that
is decisive and offensively oriented. (8:116) The chaotic
environment of the battlefield will find individuals fighting not
in mass formations, but in small disjointed groups working
independently from one another, but toward a common objective.
Groups of fighting men on foot will still reign supreme. (1:204)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. English, John A. "On Infantry." New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1981.
2. Greer, James K.,Major,USA. "A Light/Heavy Covering
Force in Europe." Military Review. (July 1988), 10-19.
3. Hart, B.H. Liddell, CPT. "A Science of Infantry
Tactics Simplified." 3ed. London: William
Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1926.
4. Hart, B.H. Liddell. "the Future of Infantry."
London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1933.
5. Lloyd, E.M.,Col., Royal Engineers. "A Review of
the History of Infantry." 2ed. West Port,
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1908.
6. Lloyd, Herbert, Col, USA, C/S, 10th Infantry Division.
Personal Interview(December 3, 1988).
7. Luttwak, Edward "Strategic Utility of U.S. Light
Infantry Divisions, A Systematic Evaluation."
USA Training Spt Ctr, Ft. Eustis, Va., August 1985.
8. McMichael, Scott R.,Major,USA. "A Historical Perspective
on Light Infantry." Combat Studies Institute,
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., September 1987.
9. Miller, Ward A. ,Col,USA. "The 9th Australian Division
vs. the Africa Korps:An Infantry Division Against
Tanks-Tobruk, Libya, 1941." Combat Studies Inst,
Ft. Leavenworth, Ks, August 1986.
10. Montross, Lynn. "War Through the Ages." New York:
Harper and Row Pub, 1960.
11. U.S. Army FM 100-5. "Operations." Hq U.S. Army,
Washington, D.C. (May 5, 1986).
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