Operation "Urgent Fury": Military Police (MP) In Grenada
AUTHOR Major Wayne Hicks, USA
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: OPERATION "URGENT FURY": MILITARY POLICE (MP) IN GRENADA
I. Purpose: To provide an understanding of the events that took
place leading up to U.S. military intervention in Grenada and the
role of the US Army MPs during Operation URGENT FURY.
II. Thesis: Operation URGENT FURY is the first real test of MP
combat support since Vietnam and provides an excellent opportunity
to evaluate doctrine relative to mission, organization, equipment,
and training of both division and corps MP assets.
III. Data: Military police involvement in Grenada centered
around the 82nd Airborne (ABN) Division MP Company, the 16th
Military Police Brigade (ABN), and the 118th Military Police
Company (ABN), XVIII Airborne Corps. On 24 October 1983, the 82nd
MP Company (ABN) was alerted for deployment on Operation URGENT
FURY. After notification, the 82nd MPs, under the supervision of
the the 82nd Airborne Division Provost Marshal (PM), activated
their readiness Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which
increased security for the 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters,
convoy escorts, and various other MP missions that had to be
performed in support of the 82nd Airborne Division. The initial
element of the 16th MP Brigade (ABN) that deployed to Grenada
consisted of the 118th MP Company (ABN), activated on 27 October
1983. The 118th was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division upon
arrival in country, assumed all responsibility for the disposition
of 1,300 Cuban and People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) detainees,
more than 1,200 refugees, and assisted in the evacuation of
American students from the medical school located on the island.
The PM cell of the 16th MP Brigade (ABN) deployed with the XVIII
ABN Corps augmentation forces 30-31 October 1983. The PM cell was
responsible for staff support and expertise in all areas of MP
combat support operations. This included enemy prisoner of war
(EPW) operations, law enforcement, operating a PM office for the
XVIII ABN Corps, and numerous other missions involving MP support
unique to Operation URGENT FURY.
IV. Conclusion: Operation URGENT FURY brings to fruition the
efforts of planners in conceptualizing Low Intensity Conflict. In
addition, problem areas encountered by the MPs left them searching
for a solution, particularly in the handling and disposition of
EPW.
V. Recommendation: U.S. Army military police must move rapidly
to establish better methods of handling and disposing of EPW.
Particular emphasis should be given to developing support packages
and deploying them with the MPs during contingency operations.
OPERATION "URGENT FURY": MILITARY POLICE (MP) IN GRENADA
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: Operation URGENT FURY is the first real
test of MP combat support since Vietnam and provides an excellent
opportunity to evaluate doctrine relative to mission,
organization, equipment, and training of both division and corps
MP assets.
I. Historical Look at Grenada
A. Early Government
B. Development of Present Government
C. Events Leading to U.S. Intervention
II. Intervention In Grenada
A. Military Units Involved
B. Casualty Summary
III. U.S. Army Military Police Operations
A. 82nd Military Police Company (ABN)
B. 16th Military Police Brigade (ABN)
IV. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Operations
A. EPW Facility
B. EPW Processing/Handling/Disposition
OPERATION "URGENT FURY": MILITARY POLICE IN GRENADA
On 25 October 1983, U.S. military forces, with several
Caribbean allies, intervened on the island of Grenada. Operation
URGENT FURY was initiated to protect the lives of U.S. students,
restore democratic government, and eliminate Cuban influence on
the island. Two US Army Ranger Battalions, a brigade of soldiers
from the 82nd Airborne Division, a Marine amphibious unit, the
Navy aircraft carrier USS Independence and its battle group, and a
few Special Operations Forces combined to swiftly overthrow the
Cuban and Grenadian defenders.
Before trying to understand the military operation that took
place, it would be prudent to first examine very briefly the
historic events that led to the intervention of U.S. forces in
Grenada.
Grenada, formerly a British colony, attained internal self
government in 1967. From the 1950's, politics had been dominated
by Sir Eric Gairy, who combined flamboyant populism and strong-arm
tactics with interest in unidentified flying objects and
unconventional religion. (9:14).
On February 7, 1974, Grenada became independent over the
objections of opposition parties who feared Gairy's intentions,
and who later accused him of winning the elections of 1976 by
fraud. The New Jewel Movement (NJM), formed in 1973 and led by
Maurice Bishop, became the major opposition party. Its program
stressed socialist and nationalistic ideals, and protested
economic and social conditions in Grenada, as well as abuses of
power by the Gairy regime.
On March 3, 1979, the NJM overthrew the Gairy government in a
nearly bloodless coup. Bishop became the new Prime Minister.
The new government, initially welcomed by Grenadians, promised
to hold early elections and model Cuban revolutionary democracy,
which it tried to implement with Cuban aid.
Human rights were regularly violated. Habeas corpus was
abolished for political detainees, and by 1982 there were over 95
to 98 political prisoners in Grenada. Freedom of the press and
political freedom were all but abolished as well. (9:19).
Bishop established close ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba.
In January 1980, Grenada was the only Latin American country other
than Cuba to vote against a U.N. resolution condemning the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
By 1980 there were about 30 Cuban military personnel in
Grenada. Approximately 700 were there in October 1983, which
included several hundred "construction workers" engaged in helping
to build a new airport at Point Salines in the southwest corner of
the island. The airport, ostensibly to promote tourism, plainly
has features valuable for military purposes, and many of the Cuban
workers there were para-military personnel. (4:27).
The October 19, 1983 murder of Bishop and most of his Cabinet
was apparently part of a power struggle instigated by Bishop's
reluctance to impose an even more radical program, and by reports
that he was engaged in an attempt to improve relations with the
United States.
The U.S. assault on Grenada commenced at dawn, 23 October,
1983, with nearly simultaneous assaults on the island's two
airfields. Army Rangers parachuted into Point Salines airstrip,
while two Marine companies secured the Pearls Airport and nearby
Grenville. The Rangers encountered heavy antiaircraft fire, but
they secured the runway and a group of grateful students at the
nearby True Blue Medical School Campus. Reinforced by
paratroopers of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, the Army
elements attacked into the thick foliage around Salines to isolate
and destroy the remaining opposition. (8:57-58).
During the eight-day campaign, 599 US and 80 foreign students
were evacuated without injury. Civil order was restored. Cuban,
Soviet, and various Eastern bloc representatives were removed from
the island. The casualty toll was relatively light considering
the amount of men and equipment utilized for the operation.
Eighteen US troops were killed in combat, one died of wounds, 115
were wounded and 28 more suffered nonhostile injuries. The Cubans
lost 24 killed, 59 wounded, and 605 captured who were later
returned to Cuba. The PRA suffered 21 killed and 58 captured.
There were 24 Grenadian civilians killed during the
operation. (8:60-62).
Now that a historical background has been given, it is time to
focus on the U.S. Army military police involvement in Grenada. I
will discuss the deployment of the XVIII Airborne Corps assets,
both division and corps.
On 24 October, 1983, the 82nd MP Company (ABN) was alerted for
deployment on Operation URGENT FURY. At the time of notification,
the unit was performing garrison law and order duties, as well as
company training. After notification, the 82nd Division PM and
the 82nd MP Company (ABN) activated their readiness SOP.
Approximately 13 hours later, the 2nd platoon (+) began deploying
in direct support of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division.
Upon arrival in Grenada. the 2nd platoon (+) was task
organized by squads for EPW collection/holding/processing,
detainee/refugee control, battalion Tactical Operation Center
security, and assisting with the clearing of civilian homes of
possible resistance. It can be readily seen that this platoon had
its hands full from the minute it landed on Grenada. In addition
to the combat support missions already outlined, the platoon moved
two squads to the True Blue Medical College and given the mission
of providing security and evacuation of foreign and U.S. medical
students. This mission lasted until October 28. (5:31-34).
The 3rd platoon, 82nd MP Company (ABN) was deployed on 26-27
October 1983, by squad with their supported battalions of the 2nd
Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, and remained in direct support
throughout the operation. Missions included EPW escort, clearing
procedures, search missions for Cuban hideouts and weapons caches,
and some escort duty for prominent visitors to the area.
On 29 October 1983, the General Support platoon of the 82nd MP
Company (ABN) was deployed and assumed responsibility for securing
the 82nd Division Tactical Operation Center. This platoon also
assisted with EPW missions and locating and securing weapons
caches. Additional missions included assisting Air Force Security
Police with flight line missions at the Point Salines Airport.
On 2 November 1983, the 1st platoon, 82nd MP Company (ABN) was
deployed along with the headquarters element of the 82nd MP
Company (ABN). The primary mission of this platoon was to
establish a 24-hour customs operation, which they did with
excellent results. Although the military operation resulted in
casualties, lost equipment, and had all the distinguishing
characteristics of a small scale war, re-deployment back to the
United States required a customs check of all soldiers and
personnel.
The magnitude of the EPW operations was such that support was
required from the XVIII ABN Corps military police assets. On 25
October 1983, the 503rd Military Police Battalion (BN), 16th MP
Brigade (ABN) was ordered to return to Fort Bragg, NC, from Seneca
Army Depot, NY, where it had been deployed in response to
anti-nuclear protest demonstrations. The 118th MP Company, a
separate unit of the 16th MP Brigade (ABN), was attached to the
503rd MP BN and deployed to Grenada on 27 October 1983, prior to
the return of the 503rd MP BN from Seneca.
The 118th MP Company (ABN) further attached to the 82nd MP
Company (ABN) upon arrival in Grenada, pending arrival of the
503rd MP BN headquarters add the 21st MP Company, 5O3rd MP BN.
The 108th MP Company, 5O3rd MP BN, remained at Fort Bragg and
provided law enforcement support to the XVIII ABN Corps elements
that did not deploy to Grenada. On 3 January 1984, the 108th was
rotated into Grenada and became the first of the rotational units
to provide continued law enforcement support on the island of
Grenada along with the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). The
missions performed by these units included personnel security,
point security of select and critical facilities, customs
operations, cordon and search, roadblocks, and combat patrols.
These units also worked closely with Grenadian police to
re-establish local control.
The 82nd Division MP Company has a vital role to play in
Division combat operations and this point was clearly demonstrated
during their participation in Operation URGENT FURY. Operating
primarily at squad level, MPs were confronted with a myriad of
missions which they completed with decisiveness, ingenuity, and
resourcefulness. They demonstrated that they were equally capable
of performing purely combat type missions such as EPW operations,
which proved to be the biggest challenge for MPs in Grenada. More
importantly, the 82nd MPs showed they could transition from combat
to combat support missions with minimal planning. For a unit that
had recently been filled with paratroopers out of Basic Training,
the value of Grenada as a training tool can not be
overemphasized. The 82nd MP Company (ABN) performed over 83% of
their assigned doctrinal missions during Operation URGENT FURY.
The operation validated the concept of attaching a Corps MP
Company to a Division PM for use in performing assigned missions
that exceed available resources within the Division. While a lot
of Operations Plans call for this to happen, there has been some
skepticism as to whether this would actually work. (9:54-57).
Indeed, it worked so well that the 118th MP Company actually
arrived in Grenada before the 82nd Airborne Division PMI
This last point leads to the consideration of three problem
areas, that, if corrected, can significantly enhance MP support to
tbe commander in future operations. Although all three problems
are significant, I will only discuss one: the handling,
processing, and disposition of EPW. The other two problem areas
deal with equipment and/or personnel issues that do not warrant
discussion in this paper.
The most crucial problem facing the MPs in Grenada was the
operation of an EPW facility. Mps were called upon to rectify
equipment/supply shortages and overcrowding at the EPW camp.
Managing the evacuation of U.S. and Foreign nationals, detainees,
and refugees (handling detainees, refugees, and evacuees are all
considered as part of the EPW mission) also created a severe
strain on MP resources. Upon arrival of the 82nd PM in Grenada,
he divided the primary responsibilities among his staff members to
help deal with the EPW mission. The Deputy PM was assigned all
EPW actions to include the building and occupying of a new EPW
camp and subsequent evacuation of all EPW and detainees. This was
no small undertaking.
Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces initially placed in charge of
the EPW/detainee camp were not sufficiently equipped or aware of
the requirements inherrent in running an EPW facility. Because of
the political nature of URGENT FURY, the CPF was responsible for
the EPW facility. These personnel had no experience in handling
EPW, were not aware of the Geneva Convention requirements
governing EPW, and did not know U.S. military points of contact to
obtain the necessary equipment to run the Facility. As a result,
EPW were not properly processed, the EPW camp was poorly situated,
had inadequate security, lacked functional sanitation facilities,
and adequate medical facilities. The MP platoon leader, the
senior MP at the location of the EPW facility, recommended
corrective action which was frequently taken, but he did not have
the influence to ensure that significant progress was made. It
appeared to the MPs on the ground that they had the responsibility
to resolve the problems with the EPW camp, but not the authority.
A simple fix to this problem would be to deploy a field grade
military police officer with the contingency force. This would
insure someone with experience and authority would be available to
resolve problems with an EPW facility.
It is an interesting fact that none of the EPW attempted to
escape while in confinement. Initially, some of the EPW walked
away from the holding area, but were easily and quickly brought
back under military control. This was a result of the area used,
which had no way to control movement and the lack of personnel to
guard the prisoners also contributed. Once the military MPs took
charge of the EPW facility, there were no efforts to try and leave
the facilty. Prisoners did what they were told to do.
There was no host nation support provided to the military MPs
to assist in running the EPW facility. The 82nd Division was
tasked to support the facility logistically, a mission which
caused a lot of concern initially. The 82nd did not deploy to
Grenada planning to feed, clothe, and shelter over 1,500 personnel
who would need care after initial military operations had been
completed.
EPW operations required a full military police company 24
hrs/day, seven days/week. This drastically reduced the number of
MPs available to support Corps operations. In addition, the
capturing troops of the 82nd Division did very little tagging of
EPW which placed a burden on the MPs to try and segregate EPW.
Rangers and Marines left large numbers of EPW located in central
collection points with no tagging done at all. Processing of
these EPW was done by military intelligence personnel and civil
affairs assets. Combat troops turned to the MPs to handle EPW as
soon as possible. When no MPs were available, combat troops
escorted EPW to the collection points thus reducing the combat
resources of the Corps.
One of the biggest headaches for the MPs in Grenada with
regards to EPW was the segregation effort. Doctrine calls for the
segregation of EPW by rank, however, the detainees wore no rank
nor did they have an identifiable rank structure among
themselves. There was an MP to EPW ratio of 1:12 instead of the
desired ratio of 1:4. The potential for an extreme emergency was
always "just around the corner". The MPs did a superb job of
heading off trouble before it found them.
Operation URGENT FURY provided the first true test of military
police combat support operations since the Vietnam War, and the
only test under current doctrine. Experiences during this
operation for the military police have proven current doctrine to
be valid, and has further served to point out shortcomings in some
operational areas. Of significant importance is the need to
provide a military police package available early in the operation
to free the combat soldier from military police related duties and
combat support missions. Some missions that caused combat
commanders extreme manpower burdens during URGENT FURY were
responsibilities for EPW operations, circulation control, and
security of critical facilities.
The military police experience during this operation will be
valuable in planning for future Low Intensity Conflict operations
anywhere in the world. If we have learned our lessons, the next
contingency deployment involving military police will be conducted
with greater ease than Grenada.
Few military operations are free of flaws and human errors,
and the operational planning for URGENT FURY was not perfect by
any means. There is plenty of room for improvement using military
police in contingency operations. We should, however, appreciate
the soldiers who fought and died in Grenada, regardless of their
military occupational specialty or service. Criticism of
Operation URGENT FURY has been loud, but the mission was
accomplished.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Crocker, George K. Grenada Remembered, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College. (1987).
2. Dunn, Peter M. American Intervention In Grenada, Colorado:
Westview Press, (1985).
3. Gilmore, William C. The Grenada Intervention, New York:
Mansell Publishers, (1984).
4. 0'Shaunessy, Hugh. Grenada, New York: Mead Publishers,
(1985).
5. Payne, Anthony. Grenada: Revolution And Invasion, New York:
St. Martin Press, (1984).
6. Russell, Lee E. Grenada 1983, London England: Osprey Press,
(1985).
7. Spector, Ronald H. US Marines In Grenada, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, (1987).
8. U.S. Department of the Army. "Operation URGENT FURY."
Military Review. (July 1986), 58-69.
9. U.S. Department of State. Lessons of Grenada, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, (1986).
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